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Abstract 
As the scope and importance of the global economy expands, the international 
business arena presents continuous challenges in the governance of multi-
national enterprises (MNEs). Chief among these challenges is the management 
of the turbulent milieu in which world commerce is conducted and, as a result, 
academic inquiry into the environmental dimensions of international manage-
ment has increased. The focus of this academic attention however, has been 
primarily concerned with MNEs from developed countries (DCs) which 
establish operations in other industrialised economies. In relative terms, there 
has been insufficient research into DC based organisations involved in less 
developed countries (LDCs). This dearth of inquiry is particularly evident in the 
rapidly expanding island economies of the South-west Pacific. 
Accordingly, the aim of this thesis is to extend current understanding of 
international management in the volatile and diverse context of LDCs. To this 
end, the management of Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL), an Australian 
mining company which operated in Papua New Guinea's North Solomons 
Province, was investigated. Using a single case study approach, inductive and 
deductive processes were applied in order to comprehend the reality of BCL's 
complex relationship with its host country and host society. Extant literature 
formed the conceptual framework of the study, from which the central and 
subordinate research questions were framed. Primary data were gathered from 
interviews with past executives of BCL, with secondary material assembled 
from company documents, published histories, news articles, PNG and 
Australian government reports and prior studies of Bougainville. A broad 
verification process was instituted to ensure the rigour of the data and the 
interpretive process which followed. 
The research findings support claims in the literature that corporate performance 
is dependent upon the close alignment of elements within the internal and 
external environments of MNEs. However, it was determined that alignment 
becomes increasingly difficult as the business climate in the host setting 
deviates from that in the home country, and MNE activities cannot be sustained 
under extremely divergent home-host conditions despite management's efforts 
to control external and organisation-specific variables. It was further established 
that MNE management should focus environmental congruency on the host · 
society, rather than on the host country as suggested in the literature. Evidence 
from the research reveals that the immediate population is the most influential 
iii 
contextual factor for MNEs, particularly in LDCs of the South-west Pacific 
which are typified by ethnic identity and local attachments which take 
precedence over the abstract notion of nationhood. 
The outcomes of this thesis present a range of implications concerning the 
management of MNEs in LDCs in terms of policy development, management 
practice and theory development, as well as suggesting possibilities for further 
research in the subject field. 
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Notes 
When refening to the people of, or matters concerning, Bougainville, 
authorities use alternative spellings: 'Bougainvillean' and 'Bougainvillian'. This 
thesis employs the former, except in the use of direct quotations. The decision 
was arbitrary in the interests consistency. 
As noted in Chapter 4, the Bougainville group includes numerous islands, 
many of which are small reefs and atolls. In this thesis, the term 'Bougainville' 
or 'the . island' refers to the major island on which the Panguna mine was 
situated. Where reference is made to islands other than the main landmass, 
specific annotation is given. 
Papua New Guinea used Australian currency until 19 April 1975, when that 
country introduced its own, the kina and toea (1 kina = 100 toea). At that time 
Kl was equal to A$1, and it remained pegged to the Australian dollar until 1 
January 1976 after which the exchange rate varied. Throughout the 1980s, the 
kina hovered around A$1-50, but was revalued to A$1-36 in 1989 after the 
closure of the Bougainville mine. As at 1 June 2000, the exchange rate was 
Kl:A$0-64 (Kl:US$0-37). Currency conversions shown throughout this 
thesis reflect the approximate exchange rates prevailing during the period under 
discussion. 
Two measures of mass are noted in this thesis; ton and tonne. Ton was the 
imperial measure used by Australia and Papua New Guinea until 1974, at 
which time the metric measure, tonne (1,000 kilograms) was introduced. The 
imperial ton weighs 2,240 pounds, referred to in the mining industry as a 'long 
ton' (as opposed to a 'short ton' of 2,000 pounds used in numerous other 
industries). One tonne equates to 2,204.6 pounds. 
The history detailed in this thesis concludes in October 1999, when Papua New 
Guinea promised the Bougainvillean people the autonomy for which they had 
struggled for decades. At the time of writing, this had not been enacted by the 
central government. 
As anonymity was assured to the former executives of CRA/BCL who 
graciously assisted in the preparation of this thesis, individual recognition has 
been avoided. Accordingly, passages of the text which are based on their 
information are cited in non-personal terms. 
xx 
CHAPTERl 
RA TI ON ALE AND INTRODUCTION 
TO THE THESIS 
OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter provides an introduction to the thesis. The rationale for the 
research of the thesis is presented, followed by a precis of the subject case 
study and a statement of the scope of the inquiry. The research questions are 
noted, and the key terms used in the thesis are defined. The chapter concludes 
with a description of the organisation of the thesis. 
RATIONALE FOR THE THESIS 
Commercial transactions have been conducted across national borders since the 
beginning of recorded history (Adler, 1986). Since the 1970s however, the 
exponential growth in international business has been typified by increasing 
numbers of multinational enterprises (MNEs), escalating foreign investment, 
and a growing diversity of products being manufactured and sold abroad 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1995; Doz, 1991; Dunning, 1993). Concomitant with the 
expansion of global trade and investment has been the need for managers to 
understand the international business environment and how this environment 
affects strategy formulation and implementation in multinational enterprises 
(Buckley, 1994; Dunning, 1993; Sundaram & Black, 1995). Accordingly, 
management research has been increasingly concerned with the challenges 
which arise when firms' operations extend beyond domestic borders (Buckley, 
1996; Robock & Simmonds, 1989). 
A significant outcome of international management research is the realisation 
that MNE performance depends, in large measure, on two factors: assessing 
and managing the impact which the external operating environment has on the 
firm, and the adaption of the organisation to that environment (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1995; Child, 1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Garland, Farmer & 
Taylor, 1990; Ronen, 1986). As a result, the literature emphasises the need for 
MNEs need to achieve and maintain congruency between their internal and 
external operating contexts (Al-Shammari, 1994; Doz, Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990; Farmer & Richman, 1965; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). The extent to which 
firms are able to manipulate these environments to achieve the desired 
congruency is restricted by several factors, however. Regardless of how 
sensitive management may be to its surroundings, the degree to which it is 
possible to fashion corporate operations to suit external factors is restricted 
(Child, 1981; Laurent, 1986). Similarly, there are limits on a management's 
ability to alter particular exogenous components within its milieu (Fatehi, 1996; 
Garland et al., 1990; Hofstede, 1987). 
The difficulties which MNE management encounters in aligning internal and 
external factors are particularly evident in less developed countries (LDCs). 
Whereas business conditions in industrialised economies are largely attuned to 
corporate needs, the human and structural characteristics of LDCs generally 
present an antithetical environment. Typically, MNEs from developed countries 
(DCs) which operate in emerging economies are confronted by an intricate 
interplay of diverse legal, cultural, economic and political realities which 
combine to create significant barriers to the pursuit of business interests. Thus, 
as the business climate in the host country deviates from that experienced in the 
home country, the likelihood of management achieving symmetry between the 
internal and external environment decreases. Under these conditions, corporate 
performance may be at risk (Brown, 1994; Hibbert, 1997; Kolde, 1985). 
The examination of a DC MNE operating in an LDC is an ideal vehicle for 
gauging the influence of home-host country heterogeneity on the realisation of 
environmental congruency because it provides a sharp contrast in operating 
contexts and the organisational variances therein. This thesis seeks to contribute 
to the current body of literature on international management by researching the 
impact of divergent business environments on the performance of an Australian 
company located in a developing Pacific economy. 
It is considered thl:}t a single, longitudinal case study is an appropriate research 
methodology for the objectives of the thesis. A qualitative approach provides 
the detail and depth required to interpret the complex environmental elements 
inherent in the analysis of organisations and management. By applying prior 
research and theories to the data which emerge from the case, exploratory and 
explanatory outcomes may be accomplished. The limitations associated with 
qualitative inquiry may be minimised through careful case design and the 
development of a case protocol (Bresnen, 1988; Dunkerley, 1988; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Patton, 1990; Pettigrew, 1990). 
2 
OUTLINE OF THE CASE STUDY 
The focal organisation of this thesis is Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL), 
which operated the Panguna mine on Bougainville island between 1963 and 
1990. A prefatorial overview is offered here to acquaint the reader with the 
history of the mining company and its host environment. 
Evidence of Bougainville's mineral deposits date from the 1930s, but the 
potential of the resource was not appreciated until exploration in the early 1960s 
revealed extensive copper and gold reserves. As a result, Conzinc-Riotinto of 
Australia (CRA), established an open-pit mine at Panguna in the south-central 
region. The negotiations which preceded the commencement of operations in 
1972 were, by legal necessity, conducted with the Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
and Australian governments, both of which displayed little sensitivity to the 
traditions of the Bougainvillean people, whose lives would be affected by the 
mine. Notwithstanding, CRA's management appreciated its responsibilities to 
the island's communities, and developed social and economic policies which 
were widely considered as progressive and generous for the period. 
Disillusioned by decades of colonial domination and resentful of Japan's cruel 
occupation during World War II (WWII), the Bougainvilleans tended to be 
suspicious of outsiders and generally opposed any form of foreign business 
involvement with their communities. The island's unilateral incorporation into 
an independent PNG in 1975 served to aggravate the people's bitterness and 
scepticism, and revived calls for political and economic independence. 
The mine and its facilities produced many employment opportunities for the 
Bougainvilleans, made a huge contribution to PNG revenue by way of taxes, 
royalties and dividends, and provided the island with social services such as 
health, education and recreation amenities. However, these benefits were 
accompanied by substantial ecological damage, the expropriation of land from 
traditional owners, the disintegration of the Bougainvilleans' egalitarian social 
structure and the disturbance of farms and plantations. The quantum and 
disbursement of compensation for these losses was an issue of contention, and 
further dissatisfaction emerged from PNG's refusal to return equitable amounts 
of government revenue to the Bougainville people. 
In 1987, purporting to represent the majority of Bougainvilleans, the Panguna 
Landowners Association (PLA) demanded from BCL compensation of KIO 
3 
billion (A$16 billion/US$11.6 billion), a 50 per cent share of the mine's profits 
and increased environmental protection. Negotiations throughout the coming 
year failed to settle the matter, and in November 1988 the PLA instituted a 
campaign of disruption against the mine. By January 1989 the situation had 
deteriorated into violence which resulted in PNG mobilising armed forces on 
the island. 
Offers of settlement by PNG during 1989 were to no avail, and the military 
presence was strengthened in the face of increasing civil disorder. Human 
rights violations by the PNG militia inflamed the situation, consolidating many 
islanders behind the PLA's guerilla force, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army 
(BRA). As a result, PNG declared a state of emergency on the island. 
Sabotage forced the mine to suspend production in May 1989. Operations 
resumed in the following September, but after further attacks the plant was 
closed indefinitely. To protect its workers, the company began to evacuate all 
non-Bougainvillean personnel forthwith, with the last employees leaving the 
island in February 1990. The mine remains abandoned to this day. 
To stem the escalating bloodshed, the central government declared a cease-fire 
and withdrew its army in February 1990. When PNG imposed a blockade of 
goods and services in May 1990 however, the BRA leadership declared 
Bougainville an independent republic. Although the secession is not recognised 
by PNG or the United Nations, the Bougainvilleans resisted national and 
international attempts of reconciliation for nearly 10 years despite the violence, 
poverty and disease occasioned by their political and economic isolation. 
Hostilities formally ceased in April 1998, and conditional autonomy was 
offered by PNG in October 1999. 
THE SCOPE OF THE CASE STUDY 
Although the central theme of this thesis is the management of the Panguna 
mine and BCL's 27 year relationship with th~e Bougainvillean people, the 
conceptual and temporal boundaries of the study are more comprehensive. The 
broad array of interwoven factors which contributed to the final outcome 
demand a detailed exploration of the historical, social and political forces which 
preceded the period under examination. Similarly, whilst the analysis of the 
case concludes with the closure of the mine in 1990, subsequent events of 
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significance to the Bougainvilleans, PNG, Australia and the company are 
considered. This extension serves to highlight the long-term impact which the 
management of MNE may have on various stakeholders. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on the issues noted in the rationale for the thesis, the central research 
question for investigation in this study is: 
In what ways might the experience of Bougainville Copper Limited be 
instructive to the study and practice of MNE management in environments 
which are significantly different to home country conditions? 
This question will be considered in the light of seven sub-questions which form 
the basis for the research. These questions are: 
Research Question la: To what extent were elements of the internal 
operating environment of Bougainville Copper Limited (i.e. the company's 
approach to convergence/divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, 
and organisational culture) able to be manipulated by BCL management in the 
pursuit of attaining congruity with elements of the company's external operating 
environment (i.e. legal, cultural, economic and political factors)? 
Research Question lb: To what extent were elements of the external 
operating environment of Bougainville Copper Limited (i.e. legal, cultural, 
economic and political factors) able to be manipulated by BCL management in 
the pursuit of attaining congruity with elements of the company's internal 
operating environment (i.e. the company's approach to convergence/ 
divergence!crossvergence, management philosophy, and organisational 
culture)? 
Research Question 2a: Which of the internal factors - the company's 
approach to convergence/divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, 
and organisational culture - had an impact on the legal, cultural, economic and 
political environment of Bougainville Copper Limited? 
Research Question 2b: To what extent did the company's approach to 
convergence/divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, and organis-
ational culture impact on the legal, cultural, economic and political environment 
of Bougainville Copper Limited? 
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Research Question 3a: Which of the external factors - legal, cultural, 
economic or political - had an impact on Bougainville Copper Limited's 
approach to convergence/divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, 
and organisational culture ? 
Research Question 3b: To what extent did legal, cultural, economic and 
political factors impact on Bougainville Copper Limited's approach to 
convergenceldivergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, and organis-
ational culture ? 
Research Question 4: Was the closure of Bougainville Copper Limited's 
Panguna mine the result of a deficiency in environmental alignment? 
To satisfy the inductive nature of this inquiry, the research questions have been 
intentionally cast in broad terms. The purpose of not restricting the scope of the 
questions is to allow for maximum flexibility in the research process (Hakim, 
1987) and to decrease the risk of limiting the findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY 
As the title of this thesis implies, 'international management' is a critical term 
for this study. Phatak (1997:3) defines international management as 
... a process of accomplishing the global objectives of a firm by (1) effectively 
coordinating the procurement, allocation, and utilization of the human, financial, 
intellectual, and physical resources of the firm within and across national boundaries 
and (2) effectively charting the path toward the desired organizational goals by 
navigating the firm through a global environment that is not only dynamic but often 
very hostile to the firm's survival. 
Invariably, discussions concerning the management of enterprises across 
international borders incorporate elements of comparative management. 
International and comparative management are not synonymous. Whereas the 
former concerns the process of applying management concepts and techniques 
in the context of the international economy (Kefalas, 1990), the latter focuses 
on "cross-cultural or cross-national similarities and differences of management 
phenomena" (Miller, 1984:71). From a research perspective, comparative 
management provides the local information necessary for understanding 
international management (Boxall, 1995). Because of the complementary nature 
of the two, many aspects of international management discussed in this thesis 
are informed by comparative management, although the latter term is not 
specifically used. 
6 
Given the focus of the central research question, the tenn 'multinational 
enterprise' needs to be considered. While the literature distinguishes between 
multinational, international, transnational and global organisations (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1995; Kaynak, 1993), this thesis adopts 'multinational enterprise' as 
a general designation for organisations which accord with the following 
definition. Sundaram and Black (1995:3), define a multinational enterprise as 
any enterprise that carries out transactions in or between two sovereign entities, 
operating under a system of decision making permitting influence over resources aIXl 
capabilities, where the transactions are subject to influence by factors exogenous to 
the home country environment of the enterprise. 
BCL is a public corporation, the registered office of which is in Port Moresby, 
PNG. The company was structured into three units; production, personnel and 
community relations, and administration. Each of these units were under the 
direction of a Assistant General Manager who, in tum, was responsible to the 
General Manager/Managing Director. All senior officers of BCL, apart from the 
Board, were located on Bougainville. During the productive years of the 
Panguna facility, the mine was managed by this team, with minimal operational 
input from the Australian-based CRA. As the situation on the island began to 
deteriorate in 1987, CRA executives became involved in the mine's affairs -
especially at the political level. Since the closure of the mine, the affairs of BCL 
have been managed by CRA Minerals (PNG) Pty. Ltd. (BCL Annual Report, 
1994; Quodling, 1991). Reference to the management of BCL throughout this 
thesis is to be construed as the local senior executives, except where otherwise 
stated. 
As much of the discussion in this thesis concerns the concept of 'culture' and 
its effect on the management of MNEs, the term requires specification. 
Definitions of culture are dependent upon the context in which they are used. In 
general terms, culture may be considered as a system of "socially transmitted 
behaviour patterns that serve to relate human communities to their ecological 
settings" (Keesing, 1974:75). That is, culture constitutes the accepted beliefs, 
habits, attitudes, traditions and practices of a certain group through which that 
group meets its needs. This thesis uses the term culture in two senses: 
• National (or social) culture refers to the collective character of groups within 
a given geographic area (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1992) which represents the 
"knowledge, belief, art, morals and customs ... acquired by man [sic] as a 
member of society (Herskovits, cited in Phatak, 1997: 142). 
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• Corporate culture is a shared set of values which provide a common direction 
for the behaviour of all employees in a particular organisation (Maddox, 
1993). 
Whilst distinct concepts, national and corporate culture are inextricably linked as 
"organizations are actually microcultures that operate within the larger context of 
a national macroculture" (Harris & Moran, 1996:83). 
The most defining contextual characteristic of this case study is the lack of 
economic and social development of the host country and host society. Both 
PNG and Bougainville are regarded as 'less developed countries'. LDCs are 
states which, in relation to the industrialised world, endure some measure of 
economic and/or social deprivation. A detailed categorisation of stages in 
development appears in Chapter 2. Various terms are used to denote LDCs. 
'First, Second and Third World' were coined in the 1950s to differentiate 
between industrialised, communist and undeveloped countries respectively. 
Whilst 'First World' and 'Second World' are not in contemporary use, 'Third 
World' is still widely adopted in describing the poorer countries. In recent 
years, terms such as 'developing countries' and 'less/lesser developed 
countries' have emerged as these phrases are more positive and echo a sense of 
moving forward. The labels 'North' (richer) and 'South' (poorer) countries are 
also in common use. This thesis generally uses LDC in describing emerging 
states. 
A term which is employed with specific meaning in this thesis is 'corporate 
performance'. The measures used in determining corporate performance reflect 
the objectives of a particular industry sector, organisation or business unit. For 
example, Negandhi and Palia (1989:396-397) report that "the performance of 
[a certain] computer industry is evaluated in terms of the three stated goals of 
ownership participation and control, self-sufficiency, and technology transfer". 
Dyer and Reeves take a different perspective, and focus on micro-level results: 
"human resource outcomes such as absenteeism, turnover and indi victual or 
group performance [and] organizational outcomes such as productivity, quality 
and service" (1995:661). The general indicators of corporate performance in 
'for profit' operations however, are financial or accounting outcomes such as 
growth, sales volume, net profit, return on assets, and return on invested 
capital (Beamish, Killing, Lecraw & Morrison, 1994; Peterson, Sargent, 
Napier & Shim, 1996; Porter, 1980; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). Notwithstanding, 
as Katz and Kahn (1978:244) advise, "organizational survival [is] the sovereign 
goal of all organizations and the appropriate criterion of organizational 
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performance". This thesis adopts Katz and Kahn's (1978) view that, ultimately, 
corporate performance equates to corporate survival. 
A glossary of terms used in this thesis is presented at pages xviii-xix. 
ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 1 provides the rationale for the thesis, introduces the BCL case, and 
defines key terms used in the study. Chapter 2 explores the literature on 
international management. It investigates the nature of MNEs and the environ-
mental factors which impact on their operation, with particular emphasis on the 
management of DC companies operating in LDCs. Various management and 
organisation theories are examined. In Chapter 3, the central and subordinate 
research questions are presented, and the research methodology adopted in this 
inquiry is described. Using a single case study approach, the management of an 
MNE in an LDC is researched by way of analysing data elicited from 
documentary evidence and interviews. The subsequent three chapters provide 
the case material: Chapter 4 reports on the history of Bougainville, Chapter 5 
details the operation and management of the Panguna mine, and Chapter 6 
discusses the Bougainville revolution, the closure of the mine and the 
consequences of the war. Chapter 7 analyses the case study data in the light of 
prior research and the theories educed from the literature review. In Chapter 8, 
the research questions are used to structure the analysis and discussion of the 
research findings and the conclusions of the thesis. This chapter also canvasses 
the implications of the inquiry as they relate to policy development, manage-
ment practice, theory development and further research. The thesis closes with 
a statement of the limitations of the study, and a brief summary of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER2 
INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT: 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTER 
The objectives of this chapter are to review extant literature on international 
management and to explore theories and studies which centre on the 
management of multinational companies which operate in diverse business 
contexts. Following a brief introduction to international business and the nature 
and management of MNEs, the operating environment of international 
management is explored. The literature identifies those elements, endogenous 
and exogenous to the· firm, which influence MNE performance and proposes 
various approaches to their management. The chapter then focuses on the 
characteristics of LDCs, their relationship with foreign corporations, and the 
management challenges they pose for MNEs. 
The chapter goes on to consider the challenges which finns encounter in 
aligning the internal and external properties of their environment, and argues 
that this objective becomes increasingly difficult to achieve as the heterogeneity 
between home and host countries increases. The selection of Bougainville 
Copper Limited as the subject case is considered, and the chapter concludes 
with a statement of the seven research questions for investigation in this thesis. 
THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL BUSINESS, 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND 
INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT 
This section provides an overview of international business, multinational 
enterprises, and international management. A general review of these factors is 
necessary as they form the context in which the affairs of MNEs are conducted, 
regardless of the nature of the host country or the objectives of the enterprise. 
International Business 
International business "occurs whenever an individual, corporation or public 
institution located in one country engages in a commercial transaction with an 
individual, corporation or public institution in another country" (Dunning, 
1993:4), and consists of four main components: foreign trade, trade in services, 
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portfolio investments and direct investments (Caves, 1982; Khambata & Ajami, 
1992). The history and rationale of commerce between countries is summarised 
below, together with a discussion of the international management imperative 
which has accompanied escalating business globalisation over the past three 
decades. 
Historical development 
International business is as old as human civilisation and has been an integral 
feature of most societies throughout history1• Early theories of international 
business focused on mercantilism which asserted that national wealth was 
measured by a country's holdings of precious metals; gold and silver being the 
currency of trade between countries. Aiming to maintain a trade surplus by 
accumulating gold and silver, countries could fund armies to expand their 
colonial empires. The mercantilist views of the 15th and 16th declined as classical· 
economists, most notably Hume, Smith and Ricardo, argued for a relaxation of 
government control in favour of more laissezjaire approaches to international 
trade (Hutton, 1988; Robock & Simmonds, 1989). Free-market philosophies 
extended in the 18th century as the industrial revolution prompted Europe's 
emerging capitalists to seek cheap and secure and sources of raw material in 
overseas investments (Nath, 1988). Throughout the 19th century, world trade 
increased steadily due to improving transport and technology, plus a growing 
recognition of the economic and social benefits afforded by international 
business. The years between the two World Wars were marked by an expansion 
of off-shore enterprises as companies based in Europe and the United States 
(U.S.) took advantage of concessions offered by countries with smaller or 
undeveloped economies (Ronen, 1986). Reconstruction and the emergence of 
newly independent nations following WWII resulted in a continual increase in 
international commercial activity (Partners in Development, 1970). This 
phenomenon was dominated by the U.S.A. until the late 1960s, after which 
Japanese and European firms took the lead in global trade and investment 
(Dymsza, 1987a). The 1980s saw the rapid emergence of the Pacific Basin 
nations (Garnaut & Drysdale, 1994) due, in the main, to the ascendancy of the 
Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs)2 • Global business at the end of 
the 2Qth century has reached unprecedented levels; the volume of international 
trade has expanded from US$200 billion (Sundaram & Black, 1995) to more 
1 An historical account of international trade patterns is provided by Hutton (1988:3-8) 
and Dunning (1993: Chapter 5). 
2 NICs are those countries which were previously classified as less developed, but which 
have experienced rapid economic growth in recent years (Kogut, 1991 ). 
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than US$6 trillion in the last 25 years (WTO International Trade, 1999), and the 
trend is expected to continue into the new millennium (World Bank, cited in The 
Economist, 1994: 3-4). 
Forces Driving the Growth of International Business 
Various environmental pressures compel organisations, both large and small, to 
operate in the global economy. The primary motivators of intemationalisation3, 
over which the business community has little control, are resource acquisition, 
market growth, competitive forces, technological advances, changes in 
consumption patterns, and government policies. These are briefly discussed 
below, in tum. 
Several factors are forcing companies to increasingly seek foreign suppliers of 
resources. These include: (i) local scarcity or unavailability of required products 
or services (Khambata & Ajarni, 1992; Punnett, 1989), (ii) reduced labour costs 
(Phatak, 1997), (iii) cheaper materials or components (Dunning, 1993), and (iv) 
access to low-cost finance (Sundaram & Black, 1995). 
When the productive capacity of companies exceeds domestic demand, new 
marketing opportunities are sought in other countries. The trend for both large 
and small MNEs to generate sales outside their home market has been increasing 
over the past two decades (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1995). 
While early economic theory emphasised those inherent characteristics which 
afford a given country competitive advantage, contemporary thought focuses on 
global competition. Porter (1990) argues that competition depends on industry's 
ability to innovate, and advantage accrues to companies which innovate in order 
to compete in the global marketplace. Thus, as firms begin to expand into 
foreign markets, their competitors have little choice but to follow. 
The ability of many MNEs to develop or acquire sophisticated technology 
enables them to coordinate manufacturing, management, services and processes 
around the world. This results in the efficient delivery of low cost goods and 
services to a diversified market. The primary areas of technological advantage 
are information processing, communication and transportation (Casson, 1995; 
Dunning, 1993). 
3 
'Internationalisation' is the process by which a firm changes from a purely domestic 
to an international organisation. The sequence of evolution is generally one of 
moving from no exporting, to exporting via an agent, to a sales subsidiary and, 
finally, to a production facility (Welch & Loustarinen, 1988). 
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Whereas most products and services were previously restricted to domestic 
consumption, many companies are now recognising that customers in different 
countries have similar needs and wants. Common consumer demands simplify 
firms' participation in the world economy because fewer product and service 
varieties can serve many markets (Levitt, 1991; Yip, 1995). Notwithstanding, 
firms need to approach global product standardisation with caution due to local 
idiosyncrasies in many markets (Kashani, 1989; Whitelock, 1987). 
Beginning with the Bretton Woods Agreement4 , many countries have been 
working towards reducing protectionism, deregulating exchange rates, and 
eliminating barriers to foreign investment. This process has been accelerated by 
the widespread acceptance of the principles of the World Trade Organisation5 
(Hibbert, 1997). 
The Global Economy 
Concomitant with the intensification of international business activities has been 
a change in organisational perspectives. Whereas firms once considered 
individual countries as distinct and independent zones of commercial activity, 
the emergent focus is on the need to operate within a worldwide marketplace. 
Dicken (1992) terms this change in the world economy as the 'global shift'. For 
firms operating in the global economy however, the nature and impact of this 
change is not clear; as Parker (1996:485) reports, "There is a lack of consensus 
about what globalization is and means". The evolving body of literature on 
globalisation is diffuse in both the concepts it presents and the strategies for 
firms which it implies. For example, Levitt (1991) argued in 1983 that 
converging consumer tastes offer MNEs economies of scale in producing 
standardised products; Hamel and Prahalad ( 1985) propose cross-subsidisation 
as an MNE strategy for competition, noting "cross-subsidization and retaliation 
describes the battle, [but] world brand dominance is what the global war is all 
about" (pg 140); Porter's (1986) industry-based approach suggests that global 
strategies should seek "competitive advantage ... through either a concentrated 
4 In 1944, representatives from 46 Allied nations gathered at Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire, USA to plan a stable and sustainable international monetary system which 
would be instigated following the end of WWII. The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank), and the International Monetary 
Fund were established at this forum. 
5 In 1947, 23 countries endorsed the 'General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' (GATT) 
which stipulated the principles of negotiating the reduction of trade barriers on a 
multilateral basis. In January 1995, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) took over 
from GATI with increased powers of investigation, arbitration and compliance. 
(Dunning, 1993; Garland et al., 1990; Schwab & Smadja, 1995). 
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configuration, coordination among dispersed activities, or both" (pg 29); and 
Prahalad and Doz (1987) contend that elements of international business are 
both pressures for global integration ("centralized management of 
geographically dispersed activities'', pg 14) and pressures for local 
responsiveness ("resource commitment decisions taken autonomously by a 
subsidiary in response to local...demands", pg 15)6 • Notwithstanding this 
diffusion, Parker (1996:485) distils prior research into a broad definition: 
Globalization is more usually described in the business literature as shifts in 
traditional patterns of international production, investment, and trade (Dicken, 
1992); or as interconnections between overlapping interests of business and society 
(Brown, 1992; Renesch, 1992). 
Parker's definition alludes to the breadth and complexity of globalisation, not 
only for commercial enterprises, but also for society and its institutions. The 
rapid development of this phenomenon has had a profound impact on the 
behaviour and policies of both governments and companies. According to 
Beamish et al., (1994:33), globalisation has resulted in 
.. .increased exposure for both firms and countries to the forces in the international 
economy: changes in prices and demand in export markets, changes in prices and 
supply of imported products, and changes in exchange rates. The increased openness 
to the international economic environment can increase the variability of a firm's 
profits and of a nation's GNP growth rate and, hence, increase the risks of a firm's 
operations and reduce the stability of a country's economy. 
International business therefore, is not only a mechanism for the exchange of 
products and services for private profit, it is also an influential agent in the 
governance and economic welfare of much of the world's population. 
At the political level, the most significant impact of globalisation has been the 
ongoing decline in importance of nations as economic units. In the past, national 
borders represented the delineation of both political and economic 
independence, but today the lines on a map mainly portray political perimeters7 
(Ohmae, 1995). As international competition has impelled countries, institutions 
and people towards an interdependent global economy, economic boundaries 
have become largely redundant. The move towards world-wide economic 
integration has been marked by agreements between countries and groups of 
6 This precis of the research on the character of globalisation is representative of the 
many inquiries and perspectives presented in the literature. A detailed study of the 
evolution of globalisation and its implications for firms appears in Parker ( 1996). 
7 Paradoxically, national borders have generally had their genesis in the imperatives of 
international business. The Egyptian, Greek, Roman and Phoenician empires were 
built on foreign trade (Dunning, 1996:96; Punnett, 1989:7), Europe's commercial 
houses were driving forces in establishing colonial dominions (Selvarajah, 
199lb:l33), and the U.S. secession from Britain primarily resulted from divisions 
over trading arrangements (Kolde, 1985:285). Thus national borders evolved as 
markers of both political and economic independence. 
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countries which provide for the free movement of goods, services, capital and 
labour across borders (Root, 1992). The most visible of these include the WTO, 
the European Union (EU), the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Free Trade Area, and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFfA). 
International Management 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1995) note that the demands of globalisation have put a 
high premium on building the organisations and strategies capable of meeting 
the requirements of a borderless world. This has placed a substantial onus on 
those charged with managing worldwide business activities. International 
management is defined by Phatak: (1997:3) as 
... a process of accomplishing the global objectives of a firm by (1) effectively 
coordinating the procurement, allocation, and utilization of the human, financial, 
intellectual, and physical resources of the firm within and across national 
boundaries and (2) effectively charting the path toward t:he desired organizational 
goals by navigating the firm through a global environment that is not only 
dynamic but often very hostile to the firm's survival. 
From Phatak's description, it is evident that international management involves 
the same functions as domestic management (for example: planning, organis-
ing, sourcing, marketing, production, financing, strategy development and 
implementation, and human resource management), but in a different milieu. 
Foreign environments have a substantial impact on the management process 
because the nature and outcomes of each function need to be varied according to 
the unique set of factors in each specific environment. 
The distinction between domestic and international management was not widely 
recognised until the 1950s when there was a gradual awakening that managerial 
behaviour differed from one nation to another (Peterson, 1993). Whilst this 
recognition spawned studies in the fledgling disciplines of international 
management and comparative management, scholars of that time 
... either ignored the roles of environment and culture or treated them rather 
superficially. The main thrust of work in these areas [was] nomothetic - that is, 
looking for relationships that are universally applicable (Nath, 1988:4). 
By the 1960s, researchers began to explore the notion that environmental 
variables impact on all aspects of management, and ••managerial behavior had 
elements of both universalism and particularism" (Peterson, 1993:14). 
A number of organisation theories which explain the development and form of 
MNEs relative to their environments are discussed at a later point in this chapter. 
Rooted variously in economic, sociological, cultural and political principles 
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(Scott, 1987), these theories are significant contributors to under-standing 
international business and the management of MNEs. The close conceptual 
association between international business and international management has 
been examined by Buckley (1994, 1996). He argues that although "the two 
literatures are addressing similar research issues and proceed on parallel lines" 
(1996:47), the philosophical approaches taken in researching the two disciplines 
have been too divergent, and this has resulted in the literature marginalising the 
role of management in the strategic choices of MNEs. Highlighting the fact that 
firms are not driven solely by external circumstances, Buckley (1994) contends 
that more emphasis needs to be placed on integrating the tenets of organisational 
analysis with management strategies. Such integration has "a great deal of scope 
for meeting the challenge of 'putting management back in' from approaches 
entirely within the current [orthodox and neoclassical economic] framework" 
(Buckley, 1996:23). 
Multinational Enterprises 
MNEs are essentially a phenomenon of the 2om century, although a few 
companies not associated with colonial regimes developed foreign operations in 
the 1800s8 • Most early MNEs were established by individuals or partnerships 
but, as industrialisation progressed, the need for increased capital resulted in 
public companies displacing private firms (Khambata & Ajami, 1992). 
Aggressive expansion by U.S. companies following WWII extended the size 
and number of MNEs and, as other nations began to encourage international 
commerce, the influence, reach and diversity of MNEs grew rapidly. 
Described as "the primary engine for globalization" (Sundaram & Black, 
1995:9), MNEs now dominate the world economic landscape. In 1995, the 
number of MNEs had reached an estimated 39,000 with approximately 270,000 
foreign affiliates around the globe (World Investment Report, 1996). 
Collectively, MNEs had over US$2.7 trillion invested in states other than their 
home country in 1995 (World Investment Report, 1996), and they account for 
about 25 per cent of the value added in the production of all goods and services 
in the world's market economies (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1992). Due to increased 
global communication, political stability and technological advances, it is 
anticipated that MNEs will prosper and expand in the future (Alkhafaji, 1995; 
World Investment Report, 1.996). Concerning the long-term strategic focus of 
8 Wilkins (1974) and Dymsza (1987a) identify a limited number of extractive, utility 
and manufacturing firms which were operating internationally from about 1850. 
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MNEs, it is anticipated that they will (i) increasingly view the world as one 
market, rather than a composite of individual, differentiated markets, and (ii) 
make production and marketing decisions with little regard for specific national 
biases (Yip, 1995). 
THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
OF INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT 
Irrespective of individual objectives or processes, the context in which all 
MNEs operate is more complex than that of domestic firms. In crossing national 
borders, organisations are exposed to an unfamiliar realm where many of the 
assumptions which underpin their domestic activities do not hold. Accordingly, 
those managing MNEs need to achieve a significant degree of alignment 
between their operations and the prevailing environmental climate if corporate 
performance is to be achieved and maintained. This section examines the 
interdependence of MNEs and their environments. Significant external and 
internal influences are considered, with the primary focus being the manner in 
which these may be managed in order to establish and maintain an appropriate 
fit between MNE operations and business conditions in the host country 9 • The 
discussion concludes with a review of various theoretical perspectives of the 
corporate-environment relationship. 
The Demands of the Host Country: The External Environment 
Virtually all aspects of organisational and management activities are influenced, 
to some degree, by factors external to the firm. Describing the nexus between 
business and the environment, Farmer and Richman (1965:25) report that 
A productive enterprise necessarily forms part of a complex educational-
sociological-cultural-political-legal-economic whole. No enterprise or individual can 
exist entirely divorced from its environment and both influence and are significantly 
influenced by the nature of the total environment. 
The business environment of a given economy provides all firms operating 
therein with common rules, both expressed and implied, with which they must 
comply. As each environment is country specific, companies which cross 
national borders need to deal with different, and often alien, rules. For 
management, the consequences are significant; environmental factors which in 
9 The organisational and management considerations included in this thesis are not 
exhaustive, rather they are restricted to those pertaining to the case under review and 
the research imperatives presented in Chapter I. Other factors which impact on MNE 
performance include corporate and business strategy (Hamel & Prahalad, 1985), 
organisational structure (Davis 1979), and technology transfer (Alkhafaji, 1995). 
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the domestic setting could be treated as constants now become variables (Kolde, 
1985). Interpreting the nature and possible impact of each dimension of the host 
environment is therefore essential in the management of MNEs. Farmer and 
Richman's six factors may be collapsed into four basic elements: legal, cultural, 
economic, and political (Buckley, 1990; Earley & Singh, 1995). Using this 
categorisation, these environmental dimensions are considered below in terms 
of how they may influence the autonomy of MNEs and the parameters of 
corporate activities. This discussion is followed by a review of environmental 
assessment and management. 
The Legal Environment 
Despite their diminishing economic relevance, the political significance of 
national boundaries remains largely intact. Kobrin (1993:27) reports that the 
critical consequence of political borders today is the rights of self-regulation 
which they represent: 
The modem state is defined in terms of political control over geographic territory 
and an absence of supranational or central authority. State sovereignty entails 
ultimate law making and law enforcing authority within a specific geographic area 
and that requires borders that are both sharply defined and impermeable. 
The political sovereignty of the world's nations has three broad implications for 
firms engaged in international business. Firstly, as all firms are bound by the 
rights and duties imposed by the states in which they operate, reliance on home 
country laws for direction or remedy is not possible (Molz & Gedajlovic, 
1992). Secondly, MNEs must act in accordance with any treaties its home and 
host country may have between themselves or any other nation (Vernon & 
Wells, 1986). Thirdly, the absence of a global commercial legal code10 means 
that there is no supranational body which can consider matters or enforce 
judgments in the event of conflicts at law (Phatak, 1997). In considering this, 
Schwab and Smadja (1995:110) note that the "international institutions required 
to sustain, monitor, and supervise the new global economic order will need to 
be established or revamped as soon as possible. The creation of the World 
10 Various attempts to regulate international business have been made over the past 70 
years. The OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprise was initiated in 1976. The success of the OECD policies has been limited 
because their adoption and implementation is voluntary and they rely on the 
discretion of individual national governments for their enforcement. In 1990, the UN 
Economic and Social Council proposed a Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations; nations may either accept these standards as goals or adopt them into 
legislation. Whilst such guidelines may not be enforceable, they have codified a 
collective attitude towards the relationship between MNEs and governments by which 
the behaviour of the parties may be evaluated (Alkhafaji, 1995; De George, 1993; 
Donaldson, 1989). 
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Trade Organization is one important step in this respect". The latter is 
particularly problematical for MNEs as they may need to negotiate issues such 
as interpreting the content and/or spirit of certain laws, determining which laws 
and jurisdictions apply in a given situation, and understanding how the laws are 
executed (Alkhafaji, 1995). These difficulties are magnified when unwritten 
tribal laws define the rights of parties (Farmer & Richman, 1965) or religious 
codes impinge on the legal process (Fatehi, 1996). 
In general terms, the legal matters which most concern MNEs are those relating 
to establishment rights, protection of real and intellectual property rights, 
taxation treaties, international dispute settlement (Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri, 
1993), price setting, monopolisation, labour matters (Farmer & Richman, 
1965), multinational bankruptcy, and tradeoffs between off-shore business and 
home country foreign policy (Sundaram & Black, 1995). 
Concern over the legal and jurisdictional aspects of international business is not 
confined to MNEs. Host country governments also experience difficulties in 
applying laws relating to foreign corporations, and are often "seriously troubled 
because of their perception that multinational firms can and do escape from 
national regulations and laws" (Robock & Simmonds, 1989: 170). 
The Cultural Environment 
Although an agreed definition of culture is elusive (Allen, Miller & Nath, 
1988), in broad terms it may be considered as the dominant set of learned, 
shared and interrelated behaviours within a society. Hofstede (1991:5) 
considers culture to be "the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one human group from another. It is learned, not 
inherited. It derives from one's environment, not one's genes". Schein (1985) 
proposes that culture operates on three planes: i) visible symbols and 
behaviours; ii) the beliefs and values which regulate those symbols and 
behaviours; and iii) the underlying assumptions which prescribe ways of 
viewing the world, self, and others. These elements combine to "become the 
rules that exist in people's minds" (Sundaram & Black, 1995:267) which 
ultimately govern such matters as community organisation, division of labour, 
ethics, family, government, inheritance, language, law, mythology, penal 
sanctions, property rights, residence rules, status differentiation, and trade 
(Murdock, cited in Robock & Simmonds, 1989). 
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Traditional organisational thinking and practice has treated the role of culture in 
management superficially. The cultural dimension was either totally ignored due 
to 'naive parochialism' (Laurent, 1986), or it was assumed that the imperatives 
of industrialisation would diminish the significance of culture in the corporate 
world (Harbison & Myers, 1959). The past neglect of cultural influences has 
led to tensions between the managers of MNEs and their host country 
governments, customers, fellow managers, employees, and business 
associates, as well as causing personal and professional problems for expatriate 
employees (Harris & Moran, 1996; Khambata & Ajami, 1992; Stening & 
Yamaguchi, 1981). This pattern is changing as the extent of cultural influences 
on international management is recognised and accepted (Ali, Azim & Krishnan, 
1995; Lowe, 1996; Terpstra & David, 1991), and as it becomes more evident 
that cultural differences between people cannot be extinguished11 (Ford, 1994; 
Hofstede, 1987; Naisbitt & Aburdene, 1990). 
Globalisation demands that appreciation of a host country's cultural system is 
no longer an option for the managers of MNEs. While complete understanding 
of a foreign culture is almost impossible (Ricks, 1983), knowledge of the 
predominant attitudes, values, beliefs and opinions in the local environment is a 
cardinal component of international management (Adler, 1986; Franke, 
Hofstede & Bond, 1991; Khambata & Ajami, 1992; Kolde, 1985). Reflecting 
Schein's three levels of cultural influence (above), Hofstede (1987:322) 
explains the cultural dependency of management: 
... managing and organizing do not consist of making or moving tangible objects, 
but of manipulating symbols which have meaning to the people who are managed 
or organized. Because the meaning which we associate with symbols is heavily 
affected by what we have learned [from] society, management and organization are 
penetrated with culture ... and if we see what effective organizations in different 
cultures have done, we recognise that their leaders did adapt foreign management 
ideas to local cultural conditions. 
Hofstede's recommendation that management approaches be tailored to the local 
situation recognises that culture is relative and acknowledges the need for 
managers to avoid the imposition of home country conditioning by making 
allowances when dealing with those from other cultures (Harris & Moran, 
1996). 
Because "one cannot necessarily assume that cultural boundaries correspond to 
national (political) boundaries" (Child, 1981:307), cultural generalisations are 
fraught with difficulties. Rugimbana and Zeffane (1995) suggest that attempts to 
11 The convergence-divergence-crossvergence debate is discussed later in this chapter. 
20 
generalise need to consider historical as well as cultural elements, and Kolde 
(1985) warns against not accounting for subcultural variations such as regional 
factors, social classes, religion, gender and age. Au (1997) supports Kolde's 
argument, but proposes that cross cultural diversity is actually caused by intra-
cultural differences. This means that, although the influence of culture is 
pervasive, it is not absolute at the individual level and each person holds 
peculiar views which are often camouflaged under the surface of culturally 
conditioned behaviour (Maruyama, 1992). Clearly, these are significant 
variables which further complicate the task of effectively moulding management 
approaches to local attitudes and behaviours. 
Beyond understanding the differences between and among cultures, 
international managers must also know when these differences are important 
(Dowling, Welch & Schuler, 1999). Whilst the cultural significance of each 
encounter turns on many variables, much depends on the willingness of a given 
society to accept the thought and behaviour patterns of another culture. 
Fayerweather (1978) reports that receptiveness varies considerably among 
societies, and the degree to which 'cultural importing' occurs is based on the 
established cultural pattern of that society. 
Despite the complexity of successful cross-cultural management, it is an 
essential element of international business. The traditional approach of trying to 
change the expectations and behaviours of the local community must be 
reversed; it is foreign companies and managers which must adapt. MNEs 
require cosmopolitan managers capable of translating an understanding of 
cultural differences into actions which maximise personal and corporate 
outcomes (Hutton, 1988; Terpstra & David, 1991; Sanyal, 2001). 
The Economic Environment 
In practical terms, the interdependence of the economic environment and the 
political environment (below) precludes their separation (Luostarinen & Welch, 
1990), however, for conceptual clarity, each is considered individually in this 
thesis. Movements in the economic conditions of host countries are a major 
source of concern to MNEs and thus firms need to account for the size and rates 
of change in various economic and socio-economic factors on an ongoing basis. 
Although the economic indicators used by MNEs vary according to each 
organisation's particular interests (Ronen, 1986), all factors should be observed 
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as they may suggest corporate opportunity or risk. Such factors include the size 
of the economy, income levels and distribution, overall and sectoral growth, 
degree of global integration, external dependence (Robock & Simmonds, 
1989), economic philosophy, stage of development, (Nath, 1988), interest rates 
and commodity prices (Ghoshal, 1995). As well as the above, MNEs need to 
assess the size of their host's black market economy and the extent of 
countertrade arrangements (Huszagh & Huszagh, 1991), neither of which are 
included in published economic data. Generally, non-cash settlements are 
prevalent in LDCs where holdings of convertible foreign currencies are 
relatively small (Sundaram & Black, 1995)12 • Combined, these elements drive a 
country's exchange rate which, if volatile, will cause unexpected changes in the 
value of firms in the economy (Lessard & Nohria, 1990)13 • 
The socioeconomic characteristics of a country concern the size, density, 
geographical dispersement, literacy rates, age and gender distribution of its 
population (Lee, 1991). Baily and Friedman (1991) report that these indicators 
assist MNEs in determining the nature of an economy's labour force (skill 
levels, worker productivity issues, the likelihood of labour unrest, etc.) as well 
as gauging its market potential (for example, income distribution and 
consumption patterns). 
The economic analysis undertaken by MNEs is more complex than that of their 
domestic counterparts. Not only are there more economies to contend with, but 
they are often highly divergent, thus policies designed for the conditions in one 
economy may be unsuitable for the conditions in another (Prahalad & Doz, 
1987). The vulnerability occasioned by exposure to the vagaries of foreign 
economies requires management to thoroughly appraise a country's economic 
landscape prior to establishing ventures there (Garland et al., 1990), and 
12 i) The black market is not confined to the illicit trade of goods. In countries with 
exchange control, the illegal sale of foreign currency is common when the 
official rate is below what it would be with a free rate (Khambata & Ajami, 
1992: 85). 
ii) Countertrade is the exchange of goods for goods (barter), or transactions in 
goods and services by other forms of payment in kind which may include some 
movement of cash (Hibbert, 1997:296). Although traditional barter exchange 
was simple, and involved a simultaneous transfer of goods being concluded under 
one contract, modem countertrade is generally more complex, often requiring 
more than one contract and usually involving dimensions that are not readily 
apparent (Liesch, 1991: 1 ). 
iii) Cohen and Zysman (1986:41) note that while the full extent of non-cash 
exchange is not known, it is estimated that it accounts for 20 to 30 per cent of 
international trade. 
13 The risk attached to fluctuating exchange rates is termed economic 'exposure' (Lessard 
& Nohria, 1990:187). 
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continue such monitoring during the currency of their association (Phatak, 
1983). Whilst every MNE is open to some degree of economic risk (Erb, 
Harvey & Viskanta, 1996), LDCs are generally subject to greater economic 
instability than developed nations (Casson, 1995) and thus should be accorded 
even higher levels of scrutiny. 
The Political Environment 
The political environment of host countries or regions is vital to MNEs as 
unforeseen shifts in government policies or power structures can pose 
significant risk to the firm. Political risk is defined by Bartol, Martin, Tein and 
Matthews (1995:628) as "the probability of political actions resulting in loss of 
enterprise ownership or significant benefits from conducting business" 14• 
Although there is a strong relationship between the volatility of the political 
climate and the risk faced by foreign corporations (Hill, 1994 ), politically stable 
countries may also act to the detriment of MNEs by demanding impositions 
such as unilateral contract negotiations, joint venture requirements, and 
increased local value-adding (Shapiro, 1987). 
Political risk emanates from two sources: policies occasioned by legitimate 
governments and actions beyond the control of authorities. Changes in 
government policies which have deleterious results for MNEs include 
confiscation, expropriation, nationalisation, domestication (Selvarajah, 1991a), 
minimum wage laws, discriminatory taxation, restrictions to markets, controls 
on outputs or imports, currency restrictions, price regulation, demands to 
provide infrastructure (Hoogvelt & Puxty, 1987), and campaigns against 
foreign goods (Kobrin, 1982). Politically motivated events over which 
governments have little control include war, revolution, terrorism, industrial 
unrest, disruption to operations by hostile groups, and nationalistic suppliers or 
consumers (de la Torre & Neckar, 1991). 
Politically inspired changes, legitimately sanctioned or otherwise, may target all 
MNEs operating in a country, or may be confined to particular sectors of the 
economy or certain foreign businesses (Kobrin, 1979). Thus, political actions 
may affect individual companies differently. Robock and Simmonds (1989) 
14 Although the term 'political risk' is widely used throughout the literature, Ghoshal 
(1995:33) argues 'policy risk' is more appropriate as the risk emanates from "policy 
actions of national governments". 
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report that while changes affecting all MNEs are more dramatic, selectively 
targeted changes are more prevalent. 
Because management can rarely control political activities (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1995) and their occurrence can be "fast and furious" (Ronen, 1986:359), MNEs 
must continually assess the overall political conditions of their host country or 
region and, where possible, predict the nature of any changes and their potential 
consequences for the operation. The need for monitoring the political climate is 
summarised by Garland et al. (1990:77-78): 
All countries have some element of risk to the foreign investor . . . the risk that the 
MNC faces is immeasurably greater than that faced by the purely domestic firm, for 
discrimination against foreign investment is virtually a universal trait. . .. risk 
assessment is of strategic importance, and that it must be an ongoing process rather 
than just an ad hoe project proceeding the initial investment decision. 
Notwithstanding the adverse effects discussed above, not all politically 
motivated intervention results in negative outcomes for MNEs. Robock and 
Simmonds (1989) cite China, Chile and Canada as countries where political 
changes have led to an improved environment for foreign companies, and 
Prahalad and Doz (1987) claim that India's shifting attitudes to MNEs has 
encouraged considerable off-shore investment. 
Environmental Assessment and Management 
As the foregoing demonstrates, there is a patent need for MNEs to judge the 
risks involved in establishing, extending or maintaining operations in foreign 
countries. Research into risk assessment suggests that management is becoming 
more aware of its importance: Kobrin (1979:68) found that most managers' risk 
assessment practices are "general, subjective, and superficial" but 18 years later, 
Phatak (1997) reports that contemporary international businesses usually take 
steps to manage or diffuse risk. 
The type of information and the level of detail required in forecasting 
environmental risk is dependent, inter alia, on the nature of the host country and 
the nature of MNEs' business activities (Jain, 1994; Kobrin, 1979). MNEs can 
use quantitative and/or qualitative approaches to environmental appraisal. 
Quantitative measures rely on the statistical analysis of historical data from 
which countries may be compared according to weighted scores of various risk 
criteria; the firm is then able to determine which scores represent an acceptable 
level of risk (Dichtl & Koeglmayr, 1986; Green & Korth, 1974; Weiner, 1992). 
Qualitative systems are based on subjective judgments, and usually rely on the 
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following approaches: i) 'Grand tours' involving senior managers visiting 
prospective countries to experience the environment and interview officials; ii) 
the 'old hands' method whereby external consultants with expertise in the 
relevant countries are engaged; and iii) the 'Delphi' technique in which a number 
of experts and internal executives judge the importance of various environmental 
elements via a complex, interactive process (Rummell & Heenan, 1978; 
Shrivastava, 1994a). Phatak (1997) argues that each of the systems noted above 
ignore the fact that nations are not isolated from events beyond their borders, 
and that country risk evaluation should also account for the possible impact of 
incidents in the international arena. 
Irrespective of the approach used, and the realisation that no prediction can be 
guaranteed (Vernon & Wells, 1986), systematic environmental analysis is 
fundamental to managing MNEs. Being aware of the presence, nature and 
extent of external forces enables management to deal with the environment in a 
proactive and planned manner. Failure to do so could critically affect the 
performance of a company (Yip, 1995). 
The relationship between MNEs and the external environment is of a reciprocal 
nature; just as the abovementioned contextual factors influence the operations of 
MNEs, so MNEs are a determining influence in the environment. International 
firms are powerful institutions which make a considerable contribution to their 
host countries. By harnessing the economic and political strength of MNEs, 
management is able to counter or reduce potential environmental risks or 
mitigate those which are extant (Donaldson, 1989; Doz, 1979; Dunning, 1981). 
According to Sundaram and Black (1995), the 50 largest MNEs hold around 
US$3 trillion in global assets of which approximately 40 per cent (US$ l .2 
trillion) are located outside their respective home countries, and the annual value 
of goods and services traded internationally is estimated at US$4 trillion (nearly 
20 per cent of the total world output). The economic might of large MNEs is 
further evidenced by their annual sales, some of which exceed the GNP of 
smaller countries 15 • The control of such vast assets and productive capabilities 
provides MNEs with considerable influence over the macroeconomic climate 
and policies in both their home and host countries (Alkhafaji, 1995). 
15 For example, in 1996 General Motors' (GM) sales of US$168.37 billion (Forbes, 
1997:218) was larger than the GNP of both Norway (US$140.5 billion) and Denmark 
(US$155.4 billion) (World Development Report, 1997), and the individual 1996 sales 
of GM, Ford, Shell, Exxon and Toyota (Forbes, 1997:218) all exceeded Singapore's 
1996 GNP (World Development Report, 1997). 
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Besides direct economic power, corporations hold indirect sway over states by 
virtue of i) their supply of scarce resources such as capital, technology and 
management skills, and ii) ownership of the processing and distributive abilities 
required for the exploitation of raw materials and/or the production of'goods and 
services (Gardner & Vambery, 1987). The significance of these contributions to 
host countries, particularly LDCs, puts MNEs in a strong position when 
bargaining with governments (Sanyal, 2001). 
The extent to which MNEs deploy their direct and indirect influence to gain 
concessions from host countries or counter the impact of national controls 
depends on their bargaining strength and that of the respective government 
(Fagre & Wells, 1987), as well as the prevailing political issues in both the host 
and home countries (Prahalad & Doz, 1987). Firms may increase their 
bargaining power by changing (or threatening to change) their business 
activities, relocating or dispersing operations, withholding new technology, or 
controlling access to markets. Political pressure may also be exerted by enlisting 
home country support, developing local allies, sharing ownership with 
nationals, or influencing local authorities through lobbying (Robock & 
Simmonds, 1989). 
A non-political response to allaying potential losses from environmental changes 
is insurance against particular contingencies such as expropriation, insurrection, 
inconvertibility exposure or natural disasters. This not only indemnifies the 
MNE against financial disadvantage, but also reduces shareholder anxiety about 
unfamiliar or risky aspects of investing in foreign operations (Paradine, 1996). 
The cost of cover varies according to the country, the underwriter, and the 
nature of the risk. 
Organisation and Management: The Internal Environment 
Porter (1980) and Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990) conclude that harmonious MNE 
relationships with the external environment rely, in large part, on the alignment 
of corporate policy and practice with important properties within that 
environment. Based on the outcomes of environmental analysis, managers in 
MNEs are able to determine those strategic and operational approaches which 
are consonant with local conditions. Adjusting the internal aspects of a company 
to suit its environment may encompass actions such as modifying organisational 
structure or design (Dunning, 1981 ), introducing location-specific technology 
(Alkhafaji, 1995) or revising certain human resources practices (Fombrun, 
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Tichy & Devanna, 1984). Three organisational issues concerning internal-
external congruency are pertinent to this study: the degree of convergence/ 
divergence/crossvergence in management systems, management philosophy, 
and corporate culture. 
Convergence, Divergence and Crossvergence 
Peterson's reference to 'universalism and particularism' (noted earlier) alludes 
to the convergence-divergence-crossvergence debate in the international 
management literature. Convergence theory emerged in the late 1950s, 
hypothesising that the common requirements of technology will ultimately force 
all firms to adopt standardised organisational and management practices. 
Harbison and Myers (1959:5) propose that "the logic of industrialization [will 
lead] to uniformity rather than diversity", and Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and 
Myers (1960) reason that "the industrialization process is leading societies from 
many different points ... towards a common future" (1973:8). Haire, Ghiselli 
and Porter (1966) and Likert (1967) concur. Widing (1973) also supports 
convergence theory, but contends its potential is not realised because of 
management's lack of will to implement it. The appeal in pursuing a global 
management strategy is the synergy available to MNEs from coordinating 
activities and functions in all countries, as this offers competitive advantage 
(Wortzel, 1991). 
Arguments against the convergence approach are founded on the need for the 
management of MNEs to satisfy the requirements of the local environment 
discussed above. Divergence theory holds that individuals within organisations 
will preserve their culturally defined values and work attitudes irrespective of 
the advancement of industrialisation or the prevailing economic philosophy 
(Child, 1981; Hofstede, 1987; Laurent, 1986; Oberg, 1963). Thus, "the 
divergence hypothesis postulates that the form and content of functional 
specialization that develops with growth would vary according to culture" 
(McGaughey & De Cieri, 1999:237). 
Between these polarised views, Adler, Doktor and Redding (1986), Nath 
(1988) and Dowling et al. (1999) believe that convergence and divergence are 
occurring simultaneously, as does Sparrow, Schuler and Jackson (1994:267) 
who claim: 
there is indeed a convergence in the use of HRM for competitive advantage [but] 
there are some clear divergences, nuances and specific themes ... that will take the 
fore and in the way in which specific aspects such as culture, work structuring, 
performance management and resourcing will be utilized. 
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Similarly, Ralston, Gustafson, Cheung and Terpstra (1993:257) contend that 
"neither convergence nor divergence accurately explain the phenomenon", and 
suggest an integrative approach termed crossvergence, in which cultural and 
ideological influences combine to form a distinctive value system. According to 
Ralston, Holt, Terpstra and Kai-Cheng (1997:183) crossvergence occurs when 
a person "incorporates both national culture influences and economic ideology 
influences synergistically to form a unique value system that is different from 
the value set supported by either national culture or economic ideology". 
The concurrent forces for universalism and particularism emphasise the need for 
management to establish a balance between global organisational imperatives 
and responsiveness to the immediate situation. This suggests that management 
approaches should be pitched at both the macro-environment and the micro-
environment. At the macro-level, Farmer and Richman (1965:16-18) claim 
MNEs have little choice but to adhere to the universal functions of management 
which ultimately direct organisational structure and technology. They hold that 
if a complex, productive enterprise is to continue operating, certain common 
functions of management must generally be performed regardless of [the nature of] 
the enterprise ... the basic functions of management are classified as planning 
(including decision making and innovation), control, organization, staffing, and 
direction (including supervision, motivation, and leadership). Even poorly managed 
business firms ... engage in the above basic functions. 
Hickson, Hinings, McMillan and Schwitter (1974) also support the rationale of, 
and need for, functional administration. Ejiofor calls for balance however, and 
proposes that striving for macro-level symmetry produces deficiencies at the 
micro-level because it "tend[s] to overlook the effects of multiplicity of cultural, 
organizational, situational, and individual differences facing management" 
(Cited in Nzelibe, 1986:7). Schwartz and Saville (1991:57) note that managers 
who "carry a static mental model of the interaction of the organization with its 
environment will be at a disadvantage". Management systems and processes 
therefore need to accommodate the myriad of micro-level variables which are 
inherent in the host country environment and, because cultures are not being 
homogenised (Adler et al., 1986), managers remain caught between the 
universal, familiar tenets of logic and uniformity, and the uncertainty of diverse, 
individualised behaviours and social systems. 
Despite widespread support in the literature for an appropriate balance of 
convergence and divergence, the former depends largely on the transfer of 
management practices and styles from one culture to another. As Teagarden and 
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Von Glinow (1997:11) note however, the practicalities of such transfer are not 
easily resolved: 
... which dimensions of...management can or should be generalized in cross-cultural 
settings? Which are or should be locally-specific? Which are or should be company 
specific, having been integrated into the fabric of the business strategy supported by 
a strong, idiosyncratic corporate culture? Which emic or culturally-bound challenges 
inhibit generalizability (Laurent 1983, 1986; Hofstede, 1983, 1984, 1991; 
Hofstede/Bond 1988; Schneider 1988)? Finally, are there etic or universal, culture-
free resolutions to these challenges? 
Teagarden and Von Glinow's questions suggest that, while the application of 
common approaches to management may be possible, the rate and extent to 
which these may be adopted are contingent upon the strength of the forces 
driving divergence. Cavusgil and Das (1997) consider the fundamental 
pressures for divergence emanate from culture, as does Tayeb (1994:429) who 
notes that 
the major strength of cultural perspective as a whole is its recognition of (1) the 
fact that. cultural values and attitudes are different in degree at least, if not in 
absolute terms in some cases, from one society to another, (2) the fact that different 
cultural groups behave differently under similar circumstances because of the 
differences in their underlying values and attitudes, and (3) the important role that 
culture plays in shaping work organizations and other social institutions. 
It may be concluded therefore, that because MNEs are embedded in the cultural 
dynamics of their host environment, etic assumptions about the management of 
multinationals are not appropriate. Attempts to generalise management 
approaches across cultures ignores the strong arguments for divergence 
discussed above. In contrast, the emic approach, which "see[s] how the natives 
conceptualize the world" (Ronen, 1986:48), provides the foundations of a 
management system which avoids parochialism by incorporating dimensions of 
the local culture. Thus, the ability of MNEs to transfer management practices 
and styles is a matter of degree which is directed by their particular cultural 
milieu. 
Management Philosophy 
Katz (1974) contends that the requisite skills of management are technical, 
human and conceptual, and notes that the importance of human and conceptual 
competency increases in proportion to ascendancy in the managerial hierarchy. 
Human and conceptual abilities are vital in managing MNEs because, as noted 
earlier, firm performance is dependent on recognising the relationship between 
the firm and its environment (conceptual skills), and understanding and 
influencing those of other cultures (human skills). According to Wills and 
Barham, conceptual and human skills are not acquired vicariously, rather they 
emanate from "a deeper core competence of the individuals' essential nature or 
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identity" (1994:43). Citing prior works by Chowdhry and Pal (1960) and Pugh 
(1963), Negandhi and Prasad (1971) contend that the personal characteristics of 
managers is an essential element in organisational outcomes. Perlmutter (1995) 
categorises MNEs as ethnocentric, polycentric and geocentric 16 in their outlook, 
and in doing so, considers the managerial states of mind which foster these 
corporate orientations. The common thread of these studies is their 
consideration of management's disposition towards the various entities with 
whom the MNE deals. This theme is reflected in Negandhi and Prasad's 
(1971:22) definition of management philosophy17 : 'the expressed and implied 
attitude of the managers of an organization towards its consumers, employees, 
suppliers and distributors, the government, the community, and the workers' 
organizations". 
Several issues emerge from the literature concerning management philosophy. 
Firstly, the philosophies held by managers are critical in the global economy 
"since the business philosophy of a country depends ... upon the values held by 
those in management" (Ralston et al., 1993:270). Secondly, management 
philosophy is considered to be an important variable in successfully managing 
MNEs (Bigelow, 1994; Erez, 1986; Fatehi, 1996; Hibbert, 1997). Thirdly, the 
cultural conditioning to which individual managers are exposed results in the 
ideologies which drive their thought and behaviour being culturally defined and 
culturally bound (Ali et al., 1995; Harris & Moran, 1996; Kelly & Worthley, 
1981; Mamman & Richards, 1996). Fourthly, research in the area appears to be 
dominated by comparative studies which seek to identify similarities and 
differences between the philosophical orientation of managers from diverse 
cultural backgrounds (see, for example, Brooks, 1995; Harrison, 1994; 
Matthews 1995; Schwind & Peterson 1985; Whitely & England, 1977). 
Finally, the relative importance of management philosophy and environmental 
factors in management effectiveness is unclear and may vary from country to 
country (Ronen, 1986). 
16 Ethnocentrism refers to a home-country orientation, polycentrism refers to a host-
country orientation, and geocentrism refers to a world orientation. Perlmutter sub-
sequently added a further attitudinal dimension: regiocentrism, which refers to a 
regional orientation (Heenan & Perlmutter, 1979:20). 
17 In this thesis, 'management philosophy' is a generic term which encompasses those 
personal characteristics which various writers believe influence a manager's 
perception and outcomes of various facets of his/her work. Individual commentators 
emphasise different characteristics; for example, attitudes (Ronen, 1986), beliefs 
(Humble et al., 1994), values (England & Lee, 1974; Ralston et al., 1993) and patterns 
of logic (Maruyama, 1994 ). Following Negandhi and Prasad (1971 ), this thesis uses 
the label 'management philosophy'; other terms in use are 'managerial mind-set' 
(Kobrin, 1994), 'management mindscape' (Maruyama, 1994) and 'executive traits' 
(American Society for Training and Development, cited in Beamish et al., 1994). 
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Sustaining Negandhi and Prasad's proposal (above) that management 
philosophy is reflected in executives' attitudes towards those with whom their 
firms interact, Phatak (1997:350) argues that an essential quality for 
international managers is 
a personal philosophy that accepts value differences in other people and the ability 
to understand the inner logic and rationale of other people's way of life. He [sic] 
must be tolerant towards foreign cultural patterns and avoid judging others by his 
own values and criteria. 
Phatak goes on to note however, that a philosophy appropriate to international 
management is a difficult characteristic to identify. Generally, one can only infer 
its presence (or absence) from personal and social traits such as tolerance, 
flexibility, adaptability (Knotts, 1989), open-mindedness (Schwartz & Saville, 
1991), patience, prudence (Heller, 1980), emotional stability and maturity 
(Phatak, 1997), and the ability to consider and resolve value dilemmas 
(Anderson, 1997). Evidence of these characteristics in senior managers implies 
they possess the cultural interpretation and adaption abilities which are a 
prerequisite to international management18 (Morden, 1995). 
Although the personal attributes listed above may be considered as indicators of 
an appropriate managerial philosophy, the identification of those attributes 
appears to be problematical for MNEs. Ioannou (1995:55) found that 
Only eight out of the 52 companies [in her research] bother to identify the well-
known core personality traits and competencies that make for successful expatriates. 
Instead, they select people wholly on the technical requirements of the job and the 
immediate business needs of the company. Yet half of all managers posted abroad 
fail, and 80 percent of those are due to the inability of the manager ... to adjust to 
the new culture. 
Ioannou then proposes that the success of expatriate managers would be 
enhanced by submitting candidates to psychological tests to determine whether 
they have the inherent abilities to adjust to a new culture and to operate 
effectively within it. Notwithstanding, Dowling et al. {1999), citing Torbiom 
(1982), Willis (1984) and Sparrow and Hiltrop (1994), warn that the reliability, 
validity and use of such tests are subject to considerable debate. 
18 The philosophical perspectives of managers is not the sole determinant of their 
success in international assignments. Other organisational and personal factors which 
impact on the management of MNEs include assignment length, cultural similarity, 
job complexity and responsibility, managers' technical, administrative and 
leadership competence, relational and language abilities, skills to cope with 
environmental variables, commitment to the international mission, fit with career 
development stage, and an amenable family situation (Arthur & Bennett, 1995; Black, 
Gregersen & Mendenhall, 1992; Mendenhall & Oddou, 1985; Shaffer & Harrison, 
1998; Tung, 1981). As these issues were not investigated as determining variables in 
the case under review, they are not pursued in this thesis. 
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The question of management philosophy is conceptually and practically 
difficult. Whilst there is a "reasonably strong relationship between the level of 
success achieved by managers and their personal values" (England & Lee, 
1974:418), understanding the nature of that relationship is complex, as is 
identifying and describing the manner in which certain values and attitudes are 
important to international management. In broad terms, it seems the attributes 
required of MNE executives are those which combine to produce an awareness 
of culture and of self (Beamish et al., 1994). Cultural awareness is perceiving 
how another culture affects one's own behaviour, while self awareness is 
perceiving how one's native culture affects his or her behaviour. In this way, 
managers are able to move towards thinking in global terms about people and 
resources. 
Organisational Culture 
Cultural influences on MNEs are not restricted to those emanating from the host 
country environment; firm performance is affected by culture at both the 
national19 and organisational level (Terpstra & David, 1991). Whereas national 
culture refers to the people and places in which managers conduct business, 
organisational culture is the base from which managers operate20 (Harris & 
Moran, 1996:70). Siehl and Martin describe organisational culture as "the glue 
that holds an organisation together through a sharing of . . . values, beliefs, and 
expectations" (cited in Martin, 1992:54). In simple terms, a company's culture 
defines "the way we do things around here" (Bower, cited in Bolman & Deal, 
1991:268), and embraces such matters as the structure and design of the 
organisation, work practices, corporate policy, planning and decision making, 
management and employee behaviour, conflict resolution, fonnal and informal 
communication patterns, company folklore, and the like (Brown, Derr, Renn & 
White, 1993; Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Schein, 1990). 
Organisational culture is moulded by two previously discussed forces: the 
external environment in which it operates, and management philosophy. 
19 
'National' culture refers to the collective character of groups within a given 
geographic area; that is, the cultural component of the external environment discussed 
previously. Hofstede (1980) notes the vagueness of the term, but also acknowledges 
the absence of more precise description (cited in Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1995). 
2° Corporate culture is developed, perpetuated and manipulated by management. This is 
particularly evident when new organisations are established, and the founder's ideals 
and visions imbue the organisation with a particular 'personality'. Thereafter, 
successive managers tend to interpret their role as that of continuing and reinforcing 
the original culture (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Doktor, 1990; Peters & Waterman, 1982; 
Schein, 1985). 
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National and corporate cultures are inextricably linked and impact on one 
another (Parkhe, 1995). For domestic firms, synergy with the wider 
environment is somewhat taken for granted as their cultures are largely a 
reflection of the domestic culture (Terpstra & David, 1991). For MNEs 
however, organisational culture is determined by the national cultures of both 
the home country and the host country or countries (Al-Shammari, 1994), and 
therefore the management of foreign companies need to modify internal 
operations "to value the giving of due consideration to the host cultures in all 
decisions and operations" (Maddox, 1993:72). Because the most effective 
means of changing organisational culture is via management intervention (Deal 
& Kennedy, 1982), it follows that executives must place high value on cultural 
congruency in the first place. The influence of management philosophy on 
firms' internal culture is reflected in Redding and Ng's observation that an 
organisation is "an ideological system pursuant to the mindset of the managers 
in charge" (cited in Fuller & Peterson, 1992:193). Laurent (1986:92) is more 
pragmatic, noting that managers "hold particular sets of assumptions, ideas, 
beliefs, preferences and values [which] get translated into particular policies, 
systems and practices". 
Traditional views of organisational culture espouse an integrative perspective 
whereby management devises and maintains particular cultural codes as a means 
of control (Harris & Hartman, 1992; Schneider, 1991). The logic of this model 
is that organisational effectiveness is optimised by the consistency, consensus 
and clarity prescribed by the corporate culture (Martin, 1992). Whilst applicable 
to domestic firms where the national and corporate cultures are homogenous, 
this approach may not work for MNEs as home country perspectives are often 
incongruent with prevailing national cultures (Schlesinger, Sathe, Schlesinger & 
Kotter, 1992). Prahlahad and Doz (1987) also advocate the need for MNEs to 
abandon the pursuit of an integrated corporate culture in favour of aiming for 
differentiated approaches which can simultaneously accommodate the global 
coordination and local responsiveness noted in the prior discussion of 
convergence. 
The conceptually simple duality espoused by Prahalad and Doz presents various 
practical barriers to developing a suitable organisational culture, however. 
Firstly, as cultural differences are not restricted to political borders, the culture 
of the host society may not align with the culture of the host country. Where 
cultural differences between local and national communities exist, an MNE may 
have opposing criteria upon which to model the culture of a subsidiary. This is 
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particularly difficult where a company is bound by national laws and economic 
imperatives which run counter to local ideologies. Secondly, 'ecological fallacy' 
needs to be overcome. This is the tendency to project cultural values known to 
be held by a group onto an individual who is a member of that group (Glick & 
Roberts, 1984; Richards, Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1990). Management 
needs to recognise that cultural homogeneity is not an absolute; there are those 
who hold different perspectives than the general population, and this must be 
accounted for in the development of corporate culture. Thirdly, communities 
which accept or foster racism are invariably incongruent with the corporate 
culture of Western MNEs. Whereas international firms are adopting a geocentric 
orientation which "do[es] not equate superiority with nationality" (Perlmutter, 
1995:8), "racial and national discrimination [exists] in varying degrees in most 
... societies" (Kerr et al., 1973:98). On this issue, it seems that reconciliation 
between local and organisational culture could be a long, if not impossible, 
process. Fourthly, having identified the need to adapt a firm's culture to its 
environment, management has the problem of implementing the necessary 
changes. Because people are resistant to cultural change (Hannagan, 1995), 
orchestrating a shift in an organisation's culture involves planning and 
executing the difficult task of modifying often deeply held attitudes and values 
(Martin, 1992). 
National and organisational cultures do not have equal influence on individuals' 
behaviour. Because cultural conditioning is mostly absorbed unconsciously 
from an early age (Hall & Hall, 1990; Namenwirth & Weber, 1987) and people 
today appear to be increasingly "holding tightly to the deeper values of their 
culture" (Maddox, 1993:12), national culture is virtually retained for life 
(Terpstra & David, 1991). Organisational culture is not so immutable; it is 
assimilated at a more conscious level and may be acquired or dismissed at will, 
as Hofstede (1991:18) observes: 
An organization is a social system of a different nature than a nation; if only 
because the organization's members usually [have] a certain influence in their 
decision to join it, and are only involved in it during working hours, and may one 
day leave it again. 
Because participation and the level of immersion in a firm's culture is a matter of 
personal choice, national culture generally prevails when an individual perceives 
that the two are in conflict (Laurent, 1986; Weber, Shenkar & Revah, 1996). 
Despite the difficulties associated with the incorporation of the host country 
culture within vital elements of the MNE corporate culture, Fatehi (1996: 158-
159) holds that success is largely possible through 'constructive neutrality': 
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Although cultural adaption to national cultures is axiomatic, no direct, one-to-one 
correlations between the MNC's corporate culture and host country cultures is 
conceivable. Instead of seeking intimate identification with the host cultures, it is 
practical to aim for the avoidance of cultural incompatibility. Therefore a more 
realistic expectation is to achieve a certain degree of compatibility, or constructive 
neutrality, with the host country cultures ... constructive neutrality is a positive 
system of principles and norms to guide the decision-making processes of an 
MNC's entities and affiliates to avoid or minimise clashes with its various national 
environments, and to facilitate optimal involvement and participation of the 
company in the productive system of its host country. 
Given that complete congruence between host country and organisational 
cultures is not possible, MNE management must have the flexibility and will to 
adjust sensitive facets of the internal culture to suit the cultural systems of the 
host society. Instituting an appropriate corporate climate cannot be achieved by 
modeling it on an 'either/or' choice between host and parent country cultures, 
rather it should be a blended system which maximises the benefits and 
minimises the costs of each (Al-Shammari, 1994). Pursuing differentiation 
entails compromise, innovation, the abandonment of ethnocentrism, and 
political neutrality (Kolde, 1985). Ultimately, the extent and process of 
developing the desired organisational culture is a matter of degrees which is 
determined by the surrounding culture (Alk:hafaji, 1995). 
Theoretical Perspectives of the Relationship 
between Multinational Enterprises and the Environment 
The relationship between organisational forms and actions and external 
conditions has been the subject of considerable research (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
Although MNEs have not been the primary focus in the development of 
organisation theory, the knowledge which has emerged therefrom is significant 
in informing the field of international management (Bartlett, Doz & Hedlund, 
1990; Ghoshal & Westney, 1993). The following reviews four models which 
make a notable contribution to understanding MNEs. 
Institutionalisation theory is founded on Selznick's (1957) concept that 
organisations respond to societal pressures. Accordingly, organisations adopt 
structures, practices and processes through which they might achieve 
isomorphism with their institutional environment, thereby gaining the legitimacy 
they need in order to succeed (Scott, 1987; Zucker, 1988). That is, 
organisations react to external institutional elements in order to receive societal 
approval and resources consonant with the values which society accords the 
organisation or its outputs. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three 
mechanisms which drive isomorphic change: (i) coercive isomorphism, which 
results from formal and informal pressures exerted by other organisations, 
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cultural expectations, and authorities; (ii) mimetic isomorphism, whereby 
organisations model themselves on other organisations; and (iii) normative 
isomorphism, where organisations embrace patterns arising from the sharing of 
similar professions. The institutional perspective thus rejects the premise that 
organisations follow rational models, rather it emphasises the influence which 
social and cultural pressures exert on organisations to comply with prevailing 
conventions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). For MNEs, the increased need for local 
responsiveness proposed by Prahalad and Doz (1987) translates into greater 
local isomorphism. 
Population ecology theory (PET) applies to populations of organisations as 
opposed to particular organisational units, and is concerned with determining 
why some organisations survive and others do not. Conceived on the premises 
of Darwinism, the theory postulates that organisations involved in similar 
activities constitute organisational groups (populations). As these populations 
can sustain only a limited number of organisations, competition between them 
leads to the extinction of some organisations (hence the paradigm is also termed 
'natural selection theory' and 'environmental determination theory'). The 
continued participation of an organisation within its population is dependent 
upon its capacity to adapt its structure to the characteristics of the environment. 
Under conditions of uncertainty or rapid change, severe internal and external 
constraints are placed on the organisation's capacity to effect this adaption. This 
situation is termed 'structural inertia', which results in organisations becoming 
uncompetitive and being forced out of the population (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977). Barney and Hesterley's (1996: 115) suggestion that this theory 
is "a somewhat under-developed appreciation for the complexity of the modem 
firm" may be relevant in its application to MNEs, as it is a "model of organ-
ization in which its design, functioning and development are treated as the direct 
outcomes of universal and immanent forces which cannot be influenced 
... through strategic action" (Reed, 1996:39). By focusing on reactive adaption, 
population ecology theory proposes that management, in either domestic or 
multinational companies, can have little substantive impact on their wider 
surroundings. 
Resource dependence theory claims that organisations are not self-sufficient and 
are therefore forced to exchange with the environment. As the environment 
provides the scarce and valuable resources upon which they depend, 
organisations are vulnerable to the vagaries of external entities. This theory 
emphasises the power relationship between the organisation and externalities 
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which, by virtue of their control of resources, have the potential power to 
control the organisation. Accordingly, management takes a proactive approach 
to manipulating the environment in order to secure more favourable terms of 
exchange and minimise the organisation's environmental dependence (Child, 
1997; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Given the strategic importance of the 
relationship between MNEs and their environments (Doz, Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990), the resource dependency model is instructive as it views organisations 
[as] capable of changing, as well as responding to, the environment. Administrators 
manage their environments as well as their organizations, and the former activity 
may be as important, or even more important, than the latter (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 
1976, cited in Scott, 1987:111). 
While the three theoretical perspectives discussed above focus on the interaction 
between the environment and the structure, behaviour and survival of organ-
isations, each is based on divergent philosophical foundations and places a 
different emphasis on the nature of the environment-organisation connection. 
Institutional theory concerns the political and cultural actions through which 
stakeholders' interests are institutionally enacted to advance particular organ-
isational forms, population ecology theory considers competitive forces as the 
key determinant of organisational systems, and resource dependence theory 
emphasises power relationships in the configuration of organisations. 
The resource-based view of organisations does not account for the benefits and 
disturbances which arise from organisations' relationship with exogenous 
elements. This theory holds that a company's ability to devise and achieve 
competitive advantage turns on its endogenous resources and capabilities which 
are considered strategic assets. These assets include the organisation's financial, 
physical, organisational and human resources. For an organisation's internal 
assets to generate competitive advantage, they must (i) provide the organisation 
with the ability to capitalise on opportunities in the environment (or mitigate 
threats); (ii) be unique among the organisation's competitors; (iii) be difficult or 
costly to imitate; and (iv) have no precise substitutes. The implications for 
MNEs and domestic companies therefore, is management's need for corporate 
introspection so as to recognise and maximise those resources and capabilities 
which meet the four criteria listed (Barney, 1991). 
Several issues emerge from the foregoing review of theories which seek to 
explain the form and structure of organisations. Firstly, there is considerable 
emphasis on the reciprocity of the organisation-environment nexus: just as 
external forces influence the characteristics of organisations, the internal 
37 
arrangements of organisations affect the environment. Second, organisations 
are not completely subject to the caprice of the contexts in which they operate. 
Thirdly, the competing approaches espoused by the theories highlights the 
inadequacy of one particular view in explaining the interaction of organisations 
and their environments. To reveal the manner in which MNEs' complex internal 
and external elements permeate one another, a combination of paradigms is 
necessary. This requirement is emphasised in Parker's (1996:501) summary of 
prior calls for conceptual integration in this field of inquiry: 
One particular demand is for more interdisciplinary research (Dunning 1989; Inkpen 
and Beamish 1994), and Dunning (1993) warns that future scholars will reach their 
full potential only by combining the knowledge of disciplinary scholarship with 
insights provided by other disciplines. Multinational organizations are believed to 
have developed beyond the relevance and legitimacy of single academic disciplines 
to explain them (Sundaram and Black, 1992). 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONGRUENCY AND 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
The contrasting perspectives of the relationship between organisations and their 
contexts are highlighted in the varying emphases of the above models; whereas 
some propose that organisations adopt forms and structures in response to 
external demands, others suggest that organisations' characteristics define the 
environmental domain in which they operate. Despite this distinction however, 
both paradigms recognise the tenets of environmental congruency which holds 
that the alignment between an organisation's internal and external constituents 
has a direct bearing on its effectiveness (Bums & Stalker, 1961; Galbraith, 
1974; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 196721 ). Bowden (1985:51) 
considers the achievement of fit to be an "integral part of the firm's process of 
management", reporting that the match between an organisation's particular 
competences and the environment in which it operates is the key aspect of the 
strategic process. Applying this principle to international human resource 
management (IHRM), Milliman, Von Glinow and Nathan (1991:320) under-
score the significance of congruence in the management of MNEs: 
In terms of the external fit, a central purpose of IHRM practices is to facilitate 
effective cross-cultural interaction... MNCs must deal not only with the cross-
cultural environment, but also with the cross-national environment...of various 
foreign countries in which they operate ... 
21 These authorities have identified environmental uncertainty as a major threat to 
organisational effectiveness, and have proposed various approaches to reduce the 
impact of external conditions: encouraging more flexible approaches to management 
(Bums & Stalker, 1961); adapting organisational structures to provide for more 
specialised units (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967); improving coordination and control 
systems (Thompson, 1967); and enhancing organisations' ability to process 
information (Galbraith, 1974). Such changes are designed to in:iprove organisations' 
interaction with the environment, and to expedite responsiveness to changes therein. 
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Davis, Kerr and Von Glinow (1987:488) also advocate environmental fit, but 
warn against "merely grafting [foreign systems] onto incongruent cultures and 
structures". They reason that effective alignment between MNEs and their 
surroundings results from an "integrated syndrome of congruent practices", 
which requires a process of synthesising societal influences, organisational 
features and management practices. 
Notwithstanding the above, environmental congruency alone may not be 
sufficient in the pursuit of firm performance. Milliman et al. (1991:320) claim 
that while fit between an organization and its environment is assumed to result 
in enhanced organizational effectiveness, "fit does not necessarily guarantee 
organizational success, and that organizations can sometimes achieve effective-
ness without it". Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall (1988:460) Rropose that 
flexibility is the essential ingredient, contending that "maximising fit can be 
counterproductive if ... the firm has adopted conflicting competitive goals to 
correspond to a complex competitive environment". Wright and Snell 
(1998:757) argue that both fit and flexibility are important as each focuses on 
different aspects of the organisation. They note that 
One can view fit as a state that exists at some point in time ... that has both internal 
and external components. Because fit deals with relationships among some set of 
dynamic contingent constructs, it can only be assessed as a snapshot: fit at time 1 
in no way guarantees fit at time 2. 
Flexibility, however, is not a temporary state, but an actual characteristic of an 
organization ... In contrast to fit's focus on an interface of two variables - one 
internal and one external - flexibility is purely internal...that enable a firm to adapt 
to some change in the environment. 
Wright and Snell's complementary view of fit and flexibility suggests that 
congruence is fluid rather than fixed, and thus sustained environmental 
alignment is dependent upon dynamic organisational characteristics and 
strategies. This approach accords with Boxall' s proposal that "we need to define 
fit in a more dynamic fashion: an organisation is effective to the extent that it 
achieves fit in a succession of different environments" (1992:69). 
THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN 
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Although the understanding of, and adaption to, local environmental conditions 
are universal imperatives for MNEs, firms located in the developing world face 
particular issues which are not typically present in industrialised nations. 
This section identifies the general characteristics of emerging economies, and 
39 
examines the implications these have for international business and the 
operations of MNEs. 
The Nature of Less Developed Countries 
Of the world's estimated 5.5 billion people, around 80 per cent live in LDCs 
(Postel, 1994). These nations generate only 20 per cent of world output and, 
with the exception of NICs and some oil exporting countries, their economic 
growth is generally much slower than that of the industrialised world (World 
Development Report, 1997). 
Because the world economy is not homogeneous, it is grouped according to two 
major economic divisions: DCs composed of the industrialised economies, and 
LDCs composed of underdeveloped or emerging economies (Casson, 1995). In 
reality, the degrees of economic development are not as clearly differentiated as 
these two labels imply, and there is no defined point at which a country moves 
from one category to another. Several measures are used to classify states 
according to their relative wealth, including mean income, adequacy of food 
supply, average life expectancy, average level of education, and gross national 
product (GNP) per capita (Simpson, 1988; Todaro, 1994). 
Using GNP per capita, the World Bank ranks countries into four bands. DCs, 
with GNP/capita above A$17 ,800 (US$11,570), are listed in the 'top' band, 
and emerging economies constitute the lower three bands as follows. Band 3: 
upper-middle income LDCs with an average GNP/ capita of A$6,400 
(US$4,160), band 2: lower-middle income LDCs with an average GNP/capita 
of A$2,200 (US$1,430); and band 1: low-income LDCs with GNP/capita of 
A$500 (US$325) or less (World Development Report, 1997). 
Alkhafaji ( 1995) notes that industrial structures have also been proposed as a 
means to distinguish between the degree of economic development among 
LDCs. Four classes are identified: 
i) Subsistence economies, where the majority are engaged in simple agri-
culture. People consume all their output and barter for goods and services. 
ii) Raw material exporting economies are rich in natural resources, but are poor 
in other respects. Most external revenue is gained from resource exports. 
iii) Industrialising economies, where manufacturing accounts for 10 to 20 per 
cent of GNP. These countries have a middle class which demands services 
and consumer goods. 
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iv) Industrial economies which are major exporters of manufactured goods and 
investment funds. These are the NICs noted previously. 
It can be seen that this approach produces a similar hierarchy to the World Bank 
classification, but .it also incorporates an insight into socioeconomic conditions. 
While there is no single, defining factor by which to identify the economic 
development of nations (Simpson, 1988), the various schemes in use 
demonstrate the existence of an international scale of development. This 
continuum, irrespective of how it is measured, is a vital instrument for MNE 
managers as it serves as an indicator of the possible business conditions which 
may prevail from country to country. 
The Heterogeneity of Less Developed Countries 
The monetary, industrial and social indicators noted above emphasise the 
relative or absolute poverty and the general lack of economic development 
which is universal to the emerging nations as a group. This common quality 
does not suggest that LDCs are homogeneous, however. Individually, LDCs 
differ widely in political systems, economic ideologies and policies, and social 
characteristics (Hoogvelt, 1991). The causes of each country's economic ills are 
as equally diverse, but may be ascribed to any or all of the following elements 
which highlight their heterogeneity yet typify their economic deprivation. 
Incomes are low and unevenly distributed, resulting in a vast poor population 
with small middle and wealthy classes. High productivity and incomes are 
concentrated in certain locations while other areas suffer from little economic 
development (regional dualism). Malnutrition, health disorders, high mortality 
rates, rapid population growth, and low levels of literacy are symptomatic of the 
widespread poverty and insufficient educational facilities. Political instability, 
large foreign debt, high dependence on a few export products and low rates of 
saving leave the economy excessively vulnerable to detrimental external forces. 
Labour markets are plagued by high unemployment and underemployment, with 
much of the working population earning a living in relatively unproductive 
sectors such as subsistence farming. Where modem technology is in use, it is 
generally confined to certain sectors while other industries and services rely on 
primitive equipment and processes (technological dualism). Finally, the 
topography of emerging countries is often inhospitable; many are located in 
regions with a preponderance of deserts, mountains and/or tropical forests 
(Arnold, 1988; Brown, 1994; Casson, 1995; Donaldson, 1989; French, 1994; 
Harris, 1986; Hibbert, 1997; Hoogvelt, 1991). 
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Less Developed Countries and External Intervention 
Historically, the benefits arising from international commerce has been biased in 
favour of industrially and militarily advanced nations. The patterns of trade in 
colonial empires were typified by government sanctioned firms which 
manipulated LDCs' governance, human capital and natural resources for the 
economic and military advantage of the home country (Ansprenger, 1989; 
Arnold, 1988). Exemplary of this practice was. Britain's involvement in India 
(Krishnan-Katty, 1985), and the domination of the African continent by various 
European nations (Lanning & Mueller, 1979). Whilst limited benefits accrued to 
the host country, many profiteers exploited the indigenous people, often 
conscripting them to work in poor conditions or selling them to the slave trade 
(Parry, 1971). 
In the aftermath of World War I (WWI), imperialism began to decline as 
colonies began to seek partial or complete separation from their respective 
'mother' countries. As well as political sovereignty, these countries aspired to 
economic and industrial modernisation, often inspired by nationalist leaders 
and/or revolutionary intellectuals (Kerr et al., 1973). This trend accelerated after 
WWII, as countries throughout Africa, Asia and the Middle East achieved 
formal independence (Connor, 1971; Hutton, 1988). For many 'new' states 
however, the road to prosperity has been tortuous: 
Emancipation from alien rule was accompanied by a growing political 
consciousness within these countries and by demands for modernization and 
progress. They entered political independence with a backlog of deep poverty, with 
little accumulated capital or experience of industrialization, and with only a vague 
understanding of the complexities of rapid change in their societies and economies. 
Many considered political independence and economic development synonymous, 
unaware of the long and slow process by which the power and affluence of the 
industrialised countries had been reached (Report of the Commission on 
International Development, 1970:25-26). 
Today, many of the countries which had previously restrained the progress of 
LDCs are actively attempting to address the imbalance between industrialised 
and developing nations. Regrettably, their efforts to alleviate economic 
disadvantage and human suffering through transfers of technology and massive 
injections of funds22 have had minimal impact (Baily & Friedman, 1991). The 
income gap between the First and Third Worlds continues to increase (Pritchett, 
1996). This disparity is exacerbated by many of the economic and social 
difficulties noted above, as well as the environmental degradation associated 
22 Austin ( 1990:20) reports that official sources provide 56 per cent of net flows to 
LDCs: 31 per cent from government-to-government bilateral aid, 4 per cent from OPEC 
bilateral aid, and 21 per cent from multilateral agencies such as the World Bank. 
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with industrialisation (Postel, 1994), rampant urbanisation (Wahba, 1996), and 
the uneven distribution of foreign investment among LDCs (Bergsman & Shen, 
1995). 
Multinational Enterprises and Less Developed Countries 
Despite the mutual benefits which flow from the involvement of international 
business in emerging economies, the co-existence of MNEs and developing 
countries is not always harmonious. Based on ideological differences and a 
general lack of trust about the motivations and methods of foreign firms, 
government policy and unofficial agitation in LDCs can present MNEs with a 
difficult, and sometimes hostile, operating environment. 
The Rationale for Multinational Enterprises 
Investing in Less Developed Countries 
Although approximately two-thirds of MNE subsidiaries are located in 
developed nations (Phatak, 1997; Vernon & Wells, 1986), the volume of 
foreign investment in many developing economies is increasing steadily 
(Mockler & Dologite, 1997). By locating subsidiaries in LDCs, advantages 
accrue to all major stakeholders: the investing MNE, the host country, and the 
country from which the firm originates. These are considered below23 • 
The primary benefit which MNEs gain by establishing in LDCs is access to the 
vast populations of these countries. The people of emerging economies 
constitute the world's largest bloc of buyers, suppliers, competitors, and users 
of capital. As buyers, LDCs account for over one quarter of the world's 
imports, 60 per cent of which are supplied by developed countries. This 
consumption pattern will increase as both the population and economies of 
LDCs are expanding at a faster rate than those in the First World24 • As 
suppliers, LDCs represent 28 per cent of world exports, with 70 per cent of 
their sales made to the developed world and 30 per cent to other LDCs. The 
industrialised nations depend on LDCs for about 28 per cent of their total 
international purchases. As competitors, over recent years LDCs have 
23 This discussion is limited to the pragmatic reasons for MNEs operating in LDCs. It is 
recognised that offshore investment also rests on various economic theories (for 
example, Monopolistic advantage, Product and factor market imperfections, and 
International product life cycle), however economic theories of development are 
beyond the scope of this thesis which is primarily focused on international 
management. 
24 Brown (1996: 13) reports that the economic growth of LDCs (in aggregate) stands at 6 
per cent which is approximately 2.5 per cent higher than the developed world. The 
spread of this progress is extremely uneven however, with many LDCs experiencing 
negative growth. 
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consistently gained competitive advantage in labour intensive industries, 
capturing market shares from producers based in developed countries. This 
phenomenon does not rely solely on the expansion of MNEs, as indigenous 
LDC firms have become significant players in the marketplace. The growing 
competitiveness of LDC companies has resulted in MNEs entering various 
strategic alliances (e.g. joint ventures) which have been positive for both 
parties. As capital users, subsidiaries in LDCs generally provide more 
favourable rates of return to firms than do their domestic operations (Austin, 
1990; Jones, 1995; Mockler & Dologite, 1997; Porter, 1990). 
For host LDCs, the advantage of l\1NE participation in their economies is the 
promotion of local self-sufficiency through improvements to their stock of 
economic and human capital (Najafbagy, 1985). Apart from the immediate 
advantages of direct investment and employment opportunities, MNEs promote 
the formation of local capital by (i) breeding confidence among other foreign 
investors looking for a suitable location, (ii) utilising service industries to meet 
the various external needs of the firm (banks, accounting firms, advertising 
agencies, etc), and (iii) requiring extended and/or improved infrastructure 
facilities (Jain & Puri, 1984). 
Also important to LDCs is the significant contribution MNEs make to export 
earnings. These revenues are vital as they generate the hard currencies required 
to purchase goods, services and technologies from industrialised countries 
(Hibbert, 1997), as well as to service foreign debt (Beamish, 1988). The 
inefficiencies inherent in most areas of LDC economies are ameliorated when 
MNEs enter a given sector and introduce more sophisticated technology, 
management expertise and work practices (Dunning, 1993; LaPalombara & 
Blank, 1984). 
Notwithstanding the above, many LDCs resist the involvement of MNEs in 
their economies for a wide range of reasons. These are investigated on 
subsequent pages. 
The majority of governments in developed nations have long encouraged 
domestic firms to invest in LDCs by providing incentives such as favourable 
tax and trade policies and assisted loans. The logic of these schemes is listed by 
Franko (1987) as: (i) the GNP of the home country is enhanced by profits 
repatriated by their MNEs, (ii) the home country's export opportunities are 
expanded by economic growth in LDCs and increased access to LDC export 
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markets, (iii) preferential access to raw materials is often granted to the MNE's 
home country, (iv) the home country is able to shed labour intensive industries 
with declining comparative advantage in times of labour shortages, excessive 
dependence on foreign workers, and inflationary pressures, and (v) the service 
of humanitarian goals. 
Home country support for MNE investment in LDCs is not universal, however. 
Many trade unions, business people and politicians perceive that by promoting 
these schemes, the government is acting to the detriment of the local economy. 
This argument usually turns on issues such as domestic employ-ment, reducing 
balance of payments deficits, promoting infant industries, economic 
independence and national security (Krugman, 1995). The social responsibility 
of MNEs towards LDCs is also queried by some home country individuals and 
groups (see, for example, Simpson, 1988; Starke (Ed.), 1994). 
The incidence of LDC governments promoting investment in other emerging 
economies is also increasing, particularly among the least advanced countries in 
Africa, Latin America and Asia (Dunning, 1993). Support for this development 
is reflected in APEC' s25 goal to establish free trade between its developing 
members by 2020 (Mahbubani, 1997). 
The Relationship between Multinational 
Enterprises and Less Developed Countries 
The foregoing demonstrates that MNEs have the potential to facilitate the 
economic progress to which the world aspires. Casson ( 1995) notes that for 
LDCs in particular, the emerging global coalition of MNEs may be their only 
promise of relative prosperity. An earlier observation by Bhatt and Jain supports 
Casson's view: 
Whatever may be said against MNEs, no institution is better equipped to deal with 
the massive problems of poverty, hunger, and ignorance in [LDCs]. With their 
capital resources, technology, and managerial capabilities, MNEs are in a position 
to undertake the arduous task of eliminating economic backwardness ... On human 
grounds, too, given the advent of modem knowledge and technology, it is not an 
unrealistic goal to abolish misery and squalor worldwide (1984: 157). 
This reasoning has not galvanised universal support among LDCs however. 
Individual states vary widely in how they perceive the presence of MNEs within 
25 APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) was formed in 1988 to bring together 
partners from multiple continents. Its current constituents are Australia, Brunei, 
Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mex:ico, New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, 
and U.S.A. 
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their boundaries; some actively seek overseas investment, while others remain 
hostile or indifferent to foreign companies. 
Those LDC governments which view foreign multinationals as an integral 
component in the process of development invariably devise policies designed to 
simultaneously attract MNE participation in their economy and to allay investor 
concern about political and economic risk. These policies typically incorporate 
'service packages' which include incentives like tax relief, import protection, 
rebates during establishment periods, financial inducements, administrative 
facilities, guarantees of non-discriminatory application of the law, protection 
against expropriation, and informational support (Caves, 1982; Jain & Puri, 
1984). 
For other LDCs, the desirability of foreign involvement in their economy is 
counterbalanced with an ingrained mistrust of MNEs which have, in the past, 
acted callously towards their hosts (Arnold, 1988; Turner, 1973). According to 
Garland et al. (1990), the fundamental objection to MNEs turns on a perceived 
incompatibility of the national goals of LDCs and those of foreign firms. This 
view is sustained by Gabriel (1972) who contends that, because the basic 
orientation of any MNE is that of making profit, managerial decisions must be 
more concerned with the bottom line and international strategy than they are 
with the social and economic needs of the host country. Examination of the 
specific elements of this argument are instructive in understanding many LDCs' 
ambivalence towards MNEs: 
• The promise of local employment does not always meet the expectations of 
the host country. This is the result of MNEs' tendency towards ethno-
centrism in their relations with subsidiaries in LDCs (Perlmutter, 1995) and/ 
or the use of advanced technology (Brooke, 1986). 
• Governments fear that the significant resource and technical advantages of 
MNEs may drive local firms out of business (Vernon & Wells, 1986). 
• LDCs are concerned that they may become too dependent on MNEs for 
imports of expertise, technology, and other resources critical to continued 
growth. This dependence gives foreign companies significant political power 
over government policy and operations (Hoogvelt, 1982), and may doom 
the country to remaining a factor-driven economy (Porter, 1990). 
• Bornschier ( 1984) argues that the presence of MNEs in any economy is a 
significant factor in the inequality of income distribution. He contends that 
this is more pronounced in LDCs because of MNE impact on land tenure, 
power distribution in the labour market, and state-corporate relationships. 
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• Excessive repatriation of profits by some foreign multinationals has diverted 
resources away from local development (Paul & Barbato, 1985). 
• MNEs have been accused of acting as one-way conduits of political behests. 
Emmanuel (1984: 107) claims that "certain legal prohibitions may be 
conveyed from the parent company to the subsidiary, but not vice versa"26 • 
• Legislated social responsibility is generally less stringent in LDCs than it is 
in developed countries. As a result, MNEs may be less concerned with 
various human issues, particularly those regarding the natural environment 
and employee health and safety (Simpson, 1988). 
• By necessity, all MNEs develop understandings and relationships with host 
country power brokers and government officials. The ruling elite of many 
LDCs are corrupt, demanding arrangements which profit themselves and/or 
others of their class. These 'deals' typically involve cash payments, political 
campaign contributions or personal favours (Vernon & Wells, 1986). This 
practice increases the gap between the rich and poor. (Alkhafaji, 1995)27 • 
These contemporary anxieties are exacerbated by the fact that they are often 
considered against the background of the colonial history experienced by 
many LDCs which has left a legacy of deep resentment towards foreigners 
and their business practices (Kolde, 1985). 
To safeguard themselves from the possible negative effects of MNE activities, 
most LDCs have instituted a network of regulation and control which, according 
to LaPalombara and Blank (1984), focuses on four broad areas: (i) foreign 
investment decision making, (ii) ownership, management and employment 
control, iii) regulation of taxation and financial transactions, and (iv) national 
foreign investment legislation. Each of these elements can be identified in Table 
2.1, which summarises the contemporary policies selected LDCs use to regulate 
foreign operations. Although adherence to host country controls is required 
under the chapeau clause of the OECD guidelines for MNEs, LDCs may remain 
26 To illustrate this point, Emmanuel hypothesises a scenario whereby the laws of the US 
may require the headquarters of an MNE to forbid its subsidiary in country A to export 
equipment to country B, whereas country A law cannot require the local subsidiary to 
forbid the parent company in the US to do anything. 
27 Some home countries have introduced legislation which prohibits their MNEs and 
managers from engaging in illicit dealings. The U.S. Congress enacted the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977 which makes it illegal for a U.S. citizen to make 
"a corrupt payment to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or retaining 
business for or with, or directing business to, any person ... A similar prohibition 
applies in respect to payments to a foreign political party or official of a political 
party or candidate for foreign political office". Amendments to the FCPA in 1988 
excepted 'facilitating payments' for 'routine governmental action' from prohibition 
and substantially increased fine for its violation (Phatak, 1997:418-420). 
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Country 
exposed to unscrupulous companies because acceptance of the OECD's codes 
of conduct is voluntary (Dowling et al., 1999; Roback & Simmonds, 1989). 
Table 2.1 MNE Regulatory Policies Operating in Selected 
Developing Economies 
Country 
Argentina 
Brazil 
India 
Mexico 
Foreign 
investment 
Foreign investment 
in petroleum, mines 
and banking is 
allowed, but limited 
by legislation. 
Discouraged in 
some sectors, incl. 
telecommunication, 
mining and petrol-
eum. 
Priority industries: 
up to 51 % foreign 
equity is automatic-
ally approved. 
All other foreign 
investment requires 
gov't approval. 
Foreigners may not 
own land, water and 
minerals. Prohibited 
in some sectors, 
including energy, 
satellites and rail. 
Taxation 
Same rate as national 
companies, but 12% 
taxation on dividends 
paid to non residents. 
Corporate tax rate 
of30 % 
Public companies are 
taxed at 45%. 
Repatriation 
of capital 
No restrictions. 
Repatriated without tax 
up to the sum brought 
into Brazil. 25% tax on 
additional amounts. 
Stringent controls. 
No guarantees against 
Branches of foreign cUITency 
companies taxed at ibi Ii ty. 
65%. 
inconvert-
All others taxed at 
50%. 
Corporate tax rate of No restrictions. 
35%. 
(Source: Adapted from Phatak, A. V. (1997). International Management: 
Concepts and Cases. Cincinnati: South-Western, pages 102-103; Hibbert, 
E. P. (1997). lnternational Business. London: Macmillan, pages 188-190). 
Traditionally, debate over the advantages and disadvantages of accommodating 
MNEs has translated into division and tension in host country politics. Since the 
late 1980s however, the changing global economic landscape has led to a 
gradual softening of many LDCs' policies towards foreign investment. The 
main determinants of this shift have been the political changes in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the increase of LDC multinationals, the emergence of LDC 
trade alliances, and lenders' growing resistance to injecting funds into failing 
economies (Dunning, 1993; Jones, 1995; Todaro, 1994). Thus, while 
recognition of MNEs' actual and potential role in development has been uneven 
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among LDCs, the relationship between the two is generally improving and 
therefore it may be assumed that the emerging economies will continue to 
become more attractive to MNEs in the future. 
MANAGING IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
The contextual aspects of international management presented earlier in this 
chapter assume magnified significance when considered within the LDC 
operating environment described above. Effective management in emerging 
economies rests on executives' ability to understand, analyse and manage the 
unique and dynamic features of that environment. Applying the categorisation of 
external and internal elements used previously, the following discussion 
provides a framework for the strategic and functional management of MNE 
subsidiaries situated in LDCs. The discussion is not exhaustive in its scope, 
rather it is contained to those factors which are relevant to the focus of this 
thesis. Further, while the various issues presented in this section are portrayed 
as individual themes for conceptual clarity, in reality they are interactive and 
interrelated. Managers need to comprehend the connections between these 
components of the environmental system and realise how, together, they make 
up the larger contextual picture. 
The External Environment 
Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of the developing world, the four external 
influences - legal, cultural, economic and political - can be used to examine the 
business environment in LDCs. Within each category, the management issues 
pertinent to this study are discussed in the light of how they impinge on the 
operations of MNEs. 
The Legal Environment 
Irrespective of their orientation, institutions and public policies, the majority of 
LDC governments have a particular strategy for national development, and 
these strategies typically include interaction with MNEs. The most influential 
instrument of government intervention in MNE activities is the host country's 
legal system. Three areas of LDC legislation relevant to this inquiry are 
discussed below: corporate financial obligations to the state, regulation of the 
employer-employee relationship, and the management of natural resources. 
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The financial operations of MNEs are controlled, in varying degrees, by all 
governments. However, LDCs have generally tended to be more restrictive than 
industrialised nations, as they perceive a more pressing need to supervise the 
direction of the economy and ensure that the country is not overly reliant on 
outside investment (Selassie & Hill, 1998). Even LDCs which promote more 
lenient MNE policies often encounter nationalistic pressures against foreign 
organisations and, as a result, instigate a more regulated environment (Robock 
& Simmonds, 1989). The close legal control of the cost and profit activities of 
MNEs operating in many LDCs have significant implications for firms' 
performance levels, and therefore are a determining factor in fonnulating 
corporate strategies and operational procedures. 
Of the many legislated imposts, two which are of particular concern to the oil 
and mining sectors are operating fees and offset obligations. Operating fees, 
which are generally high in LDCs, are government charges on a firm's inputs, 
and are levied in the form of concessions, licences, permits and royalties. 
Offset obligations are governmental requirements for a company to 
counterbalance the revenues it gains from its host by providing some economic 
benefit to the country. As the quantum of these expenditures is determined 
exclusively by governments, MNEs are vulnerable to unexpected and 
capricious fluctuations (Austin, 1990). 
Because indigenous employment is invariably a major economic and social goal 
of LDC governments (Harris, 1986), official intervention in the employer-
employee relationship is customary, although the degree varies widely from 
country to country. Most LDCs have minimum wage laws, and many have 
legislated social benefits such as paid holidays, social security contributions, 
education subsidies, travel allowances and severance benefits (Austin, 1990). It 
is also common for governments to prescribe the size and ethnicity of MNE 
workforces in the interests of local employment opportunities (Hibbert, 1997; 
Mangaliso, 1992). 
Although low labour costs are often an initial attraction for MNEs, LDC 
governments tend to legislate for increased wages and improved working 
conditions as the economy develops, so entry decisions based purely on this 
variable may not be sound (Alkhafaji, 1995). Furthermore, LDCs in general 
encourage trade union growth by affording them legal status and providing for 
compulsory arbitration or labour courts. Collective bargaining power and the 
right to strike are usually severely restricted, however (Kolde, 1985). 
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The legal constraints placed on the employment relationship in emergmg 
economies is clearly a matter for close management scrutiny, as they have the 
potential to reduce firms' efficiency and profit. Poole (1986) believes MNEs 
need to adopt a flexible approach to LDC employee relations and he exhorts 
managers to understand the history, society and ideologies which underpin a 
nation's labour laws. 
The availability of requisite natural resources influences the location and 
prosperity of all organisations. In many LDCs, access to these resources is 
impeded by geographical or technological variables however, in many cases 
legal requirements also affect their use. This is particularly evident in the mining 
and oil industries where laws concerning subsoil rights differ from one country 
to the next. Whereas some nations deem subsoil deposits to be the property of 
the surface land holders, others vest ownership in the government or even in 
particular rulers (Farmer & Richman, 1965). 
The ecological problems confronting all nations are generally more acute in 
LDCs. While the causes of this dilemma are various, a contributing factor has 
been a lack of comprehensive environmental controls. This has afforded MNEs 
virtually unrestricted access to, and treatment of, LDCs' natural resources. 
Although slower to react to social and international pressures concerning the 
natural environment, LDCs are now moving to enact legislation to protect their 
land, waterways and air (Brown et al., 1993). These changes are impacting 
upon deliberately exploitative firms and inherently polluting industries. 
The Cultural Environment 
A key element of MNE performance is management's understanding of the 
prevailing cultural variables and their significance to the firm's operations. 
Despite the substantial cultural diversity within and among LDCs, they appear 
to display particular characteristics which are not as widely evident in the 
industrialised world. Of these characteristics, four are pertinent to this thesis: 
the nature of social organisation, orientation towards materialism, language 
systems, and culturally defined thought patterns. These are examined in tum. 
In considering the cultures of various countries, Hofstede (1995) identified four 
dimensions of national culture which he termed power distance, individualism, 
masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. Concerning the first two factors, he 
found that LDCs have a tendency towards paternalistic relationships (large 
power distance) and collectivism (low individualism). This translates into 
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groups being structured according to ethnic, tribal and family attachments. The 
high value placed on group loyalty may result in two negative outcomes for 
foreign companies. Firstly, ethnic or community allegiances can be expected to 
take precedence over national identity and corporate commitment (Casson, 
1995) which, in tum, may fuel political instability. Secondly, Hofstede (1995) 
proposes that, due to close attachment to their own circle (the 'in-group') 
members often preclude outsiders (those from an 'out-group'). As outsiders, 
MNEs could reasonably anticipate the economic and social involvement of 
foreign people and businesses to be questioned or even rejected. 
In subsistence economies, social organisation often centres on the family and 
community, and life is typified by closed groups operating a barter system with 
no notion of saving and investment. Farmer and Richman (1965) note that, 
under these conditions, the focus on material goods is one of immediate use 
rather than accumulation. Cultures which do not emphasise the acquisition of 
assets or wealth generally seek and enjoy aesthetic and spiritual values (Phatak, 
1997). 
For various reasons, local attitudes towards wealth are a critical dimension in 
managing multinational firms which emanate from acquisitive cultures. Firstly, 
the manner in which a society directs its economic activities is governed largely 
by its cultural predisposition towards materialism (Alkhafaji, 1995). As MNEs 
are progress orientated, they may be in conflict with the local culture if they are 
located within communities which do not have a high regard for economic 
development. Secondly, there is sustained argument that technological advances 
have a detrimental effect on "family, religion, custom and, in particular, stability 
of a moral code" (Cutbush-Sabine & Petzell, 1991: 178). Thus, societies which 
embrace traditional beliefs may view alien corporations as a threat to their 
communal values. Thirdly, the environmental disturbance which typically 
accompanies economic development (Beamish et al., 1994) is likely to be 
resented by cultures which have a close affinity with their ecological realm. 
Because communication systems are culturally based, the internal diversity of 
LDCs has engendered a diversity of languages; Austin (1990) reports that 
almost 60 per cent of developing countries are linguistically heterogeneous. This 
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presents significant barriers to MNEs in managing employees, dealing with 
local authorities, negotiating agreements, and the like. Conventional wisdom 
dictates that expatriate managers learn the local language prior to foreign 
appointments (Baker, 1984; Tung, 1981), but this is extremely difficult in areas 
where multiple, and often unrelated, languages are in use. Moran, Harris and 
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Stripp (1993) suggest the use of interpreters when working in foreign nations, 
but such assistance is not readily available in LDCs where, due to educational 
deficiencies and geographic dispersement, few people speak a second language. 
The Economic Environment 
Irrespective of the country concerned, MNEs use the same economic indicators 
to judge opportunity and risk. The emphasis placed on each indicator is not 
equal however, and differs according to various national idiosyncrasies, one of 
which is the level of economic development. Porter (1990) claims that a nation's 
competitive advantages may be categorised into four dimensions28 , and notes 
that the advantages of LDCs are almost entirely dependent on their factor 
endowments29 • Four LDC factor conditions are particularly relevant to this 
thesis, and are considered hereunder: natural resources, labour, technology and 
infrastructure. 
Despite recent improvements in levels of industrialisation and economic growth 
in some LDCs (Ghosh, 1996), most still rely on agricultural goods and/or 
mineral/petroleum extraction to generate foreign exchange and to attract MNE 
investment (Arnold, 1988). Excessive dependency on a limited number of 
primary commodities leaves LDCs exposed to the wide fluctuations in world 
demand for, and the export prices of, these products (Kolde, 1985). MNEs 
operating in countries with a dominant resource base need to monitor that 
sector's performance closely, as its fortunes will impact on macroeconomic and 
microeconomic variables. At the macro level, movements will have a significant 
effect on the national economy and government policies, both of which may 
have serious consequences for foreign firms. At the micro level, a change in 
commodity prices may influence consumer demand, capital availability or labour 
supply to the detriment of the firm. 
Arguably more important than the demand and price of natural resources, is the 
ecological and sociological impact of extracting them. In the past, many MNEs 
have taken advantage of LDCs' less stringent regulations or expectations 
concerning environmental damage (discussed previously) and their general lack 
28 Porter's dimensions of competitive advantage are (i) factor conditions, (ii) demand 
conditions, (iii) related and supporting industries, and (iv) firm strategy, structure and 
rivalry (1990:547). 
29 Factor endowments are those elements which facilitate the needs of a particular 
industry such as land, resources, capital, labour and the infrastructure. Porter ( 1990) 
proposes that, if LDCs are to compete with advanced industries, they need to upgrade 
the non-factor dimensions. 
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of clear property rights regarding access to resources (Hunt, 1996). Concerning 
the former, MNEs are now beginning to adjust their policies and operations to 
align with social and political concerns about environmental protection 
(Sunderland, 1996). For management, this requires actions such as integrating 
environmental factors into strategic and tactical planning, deciding whether 
environmental policies should be organisation-wide or country specific, 
developing technology to reduce ecological damage, and substituting depleting 
resources with alternative materials (Gladwin & Walter, 1987; Ronen, 1986; 
Shrivastava, 1994b; Stead & Stead, 1992). 
LDCs persistently suffer from a low stock in human capital. The combination of 
high population growth, inadequate educational systems, low literacy rates, and 
extreme unemployment and underemployment results in most LDCs having an 
over-supply of unskilled labour and a scarcity of skilled labour. The high 
unemployment and seasonality of the rural sector contributes to the continuous 
urbanisation of LDCs (Wahba, 1996) which, in tum, magnifies the problems 
associated with regional dualism (Casson, 1995)30 • These labour market 
conditions have resulted in difficulties for MNE management in a number of 
LDCs. Whereas foreign investors initially found large pools of cheap labour 
attractive (Dowling et al., 1999), rising wages and/or host country intervention 
eventually dissipated this advantage (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1992). Further, 
excessive reliance on unskilled workers was not sustainable. As increased 
competition drove changes in technology, firms faced the expense of either 
adapting their systems to the local workforce (Watanabe, 1984) or providing 
technical training for indigenous workers (Dowling et al., 1999). As a result of 
training, employees have increased opportunities to work elsewhere, given the 
large unskilled population. To avoid high turnover in these circumstances, 
operating costs have increased due to the payment of higher wages and the 
provision of various forms of intrinsic motivators. 
MNEs have the capacity to alleviate the technological dualism noted previously. 
In many instances, it is more efficient for firms to source goods and services 
externally rather than producing them 'in house'. Generally, the less advanced 
sectors in LDCs are comprised of indigenous firms or cooperatives which have 
the capacity to supply MNEs with simple goods or basic services at a lower 
price than imported goods or expatriate workers. Further, these industries can 
30 Regional dualism refers to a social and economic climate in which one group in an 
LDC belongs to the traditional, subsistence society and another belongs to the 
modem capitalist society, and there is little direct contact between the two (Hoogvelt 
& Puxty, 1987) 
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represent a market for MNEs (Awuah, 1997; Geroy, Jankovich, Hyden & 
Wright, 1997). Not only can the fostering of commercial arrangements with 
indigenous businesses have economic benefits for MNEs, it may also be a 
valuable public relations policy. 
The widespread inadequacy of public services in LDCs has serious productivity 
implications for the private sector, be it indigenous or foreign (Miller, 1992). If 
the host country is unable or unwilling to supply the required infrastructure, 
MNEs may be encouraged to build the facilities they need after which they may 
be retained as a corporate asset or turned over to the government. In either case, 
the supply of roads, rail, ports, electricity generation, communication networks, 
health and education facilities, and sanitation systems is a valuable bargaining 
tool in corporate-host government relationships because it improves the local 
stock of human capital and encourages further foreign investment (Austin, 
1990; Lall & Streeten, 1977; Partners in Development, 1970). 
The Political Environment 
The political risk discussed earlier is universal, however it is of particular 
concern to companies operating in undeveloped economies (Diamonte, Liew & 
Stevens, 1996; Hutton, 1988). The risk inherent in most LDCs may be 
conveniently divided into three dimensions: stability, nationalism and 
international relationships. 
The economic and historical characteristics of LDCs have resulted in many of 
them having an extremely volatile political environment. The manifestation of 
this climate typically includes authoritarian governments which have no 
countervailing democratic pressures, military coups d'etat, or frequent changes 
in ruling parties or policies (Austin, 1990; Gabriel, 1972; Selvarajah, 1991c). 
The absence of democratic principles which commonly accompanies these 
factors is responsible for social instability because the beliefs, values and 
attitudes of the general population, or particular segments thereof, are not 
reflected in government policy or business practices (Miller, 1992). In the LDC 
context, the previously noted strategies for managing these variables need to be 
augmented with more long-sighted and detailed analysis, and particular 
emphasis must be placed on the ideological forces which drive potentially 
injurious actions or policies. 
Compared with the First World, governments in LDCs tend to have a much 
higher participation in business through the promotion of a large public sector, 
the maintenance of government owned/controlled companies and by taking an 
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active role in the operation of the private sector. The logic of this approach is 
based on nationalism and has the dual objectives of accelerating development 
and controlling economic institutions and the wider society (Nath, 1988). Such 
regulatory practices constrain both the scope and activities of firms by limiting 
the benefits of competition and enforcing adherence to bureaucratic procedures 
(LaPalombara & Blank, 1984). In effect, management has little choice but to 
adhere to the demands of government, but desultory outcomes may be mitigated 
by understanding the depth of nationalistic sentiment, the philosophies which 
drive it, and effectively managing the company's relationships with officials and 
bureaucrats. 
To some extent, the policies of every government are a reflection of its political 
relations with other nations. While trade and investment around the world are 
significantly affected by the interdependence of the international economic and 
political system (Phatak, 1997), LDCs are particularly susceptible to its vagaries 
by virtue of (i) their dependency on the industrialised economies (Hveem, 1973; 
Targ, 1976; cited in Kobrin, 1984), (ii) the political implications of religious 
affiliations (Ronen, 1986), and (iii) their relationships with the home countries 
of MNEs (Hibbert, 1997). Because the nature of LDCs' links with other nations 
may benefit or restrain the activities of MNEs (Kolde, 1985), management 
needs to analyse the historical and prospective aspects of its host country's 
international relationships and operate within the confines dictated by those 
factors. 
Organisation and Management 
In discussing the various approaches which may be taken in managing MNEs in 
the LDC business environment, much of the above emphasised the alignment of 
firms' policies and practices with their immediate operating context. Although 
this is common to all MNEs, the economic and human circumstances of LDCs 
require more than the adjustment of a few narrow organisational aspects; the 
entire internal orientation of the company must be committed to environmental 
congruency. The core components of symmetry between MNEs and their LDC 
hosts are (i) attaining the appropriate degree of convergence, divergence or 
crossvergence, (ii) ensuring the philosophies held by key personnel are 
appropriate to the demands of the environment, and (iii) developing an internal 
environment which concurrently holds global perspectives and local empathy. 
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Convergence, Divergence and Crossvergence 
As discussed previously, MNEs need to pursue convergence in the macro-
environment and divergence in the micro-environment. This requirement is 
particularly pronounced in LDCs. 
Most LDCs lack the managerial expertise and advanced technology required to 
advance them from excessive reliance on factor endowments (Kobrin, 1982; 
Kolde, 1985; Porter, 1990). As foreign companies are virtually the only 
reservoir of these resources, the increased involvement of MNEs in developing 
economies is a matter of priority (Hibbert, 1997; Khambata & Ajarni, 1992; 
LaPalombara & Blank, 1984). Reflecting the previously described tenets of 
institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), MNE management, in 
supplying these key elements of modernisation, act as agents for the 
dissemination of internationally accepted business and management practices in 
the developing world. By necessity therefore, MNEs perpetuate converging 
approaches to corporate organisation. 
At the same time however, the unique and diverse environmental features of 
LDCs produce an operating setting with many dimensions which contrast 
sharply with those of the industrialised world. These factors preclude the 
absolute standardisation of company procedures and policies, as Newman and 
Nollen (1996:755) note: 
Management practices that reinforce national cultural values are more likely to yield 
predictable behavior [Wright & Mischel 1987], self-efficacy [Earley 1994] and high 
performance [Early 1994] because congruent management practices are consistent 
with existing behavioral expectations and routines that transcend the workplace. 
Thus the conventional tenets of management and technology, while providing a 
degree of global integration for multinationals, can only serve as a broad 
operating framework for individual MNE units. Accounting for the 
differentiating factors between those units and incorporating them in the 
functions of the firm is of paramount importance, particularly in LDCs which 
are typified by those national characteristics discussed in the preceding section. 
Management Philosophy 
As the fundamental link between the company and society, management must 
relate to the values and expectations of all members of the social system both 
within and outside the firm. In developing nations, the need for management 
consideration of social conditions is more acute, given the nature of the overall 
environment in LDCs. As noted earlier, management's capacity for social 
responsiveness is, to some degree, a function of the personal perspectives held 
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by individual executives. The attitudes of corporate management to the human 
and economic plight of LDCs is, therefore, an essential ingredient in corporate 
and personal performance (Srinivas, 1995). 
MNEs' responsibilities in emerging economies are not limited to the issues 
discussed above concerning the congruency of organisational functions and the 
environment. Beyond the internal operations of the firm, the managers of MNEs 
have a moral duty to alleviate, as far as possible, the human suffering of their 
host population (Donaldson, 1989). According to Austin (1990:372), the extent 
to which this occurs ultimately depends on management's attitude towards the 
people living in LDCs: 
Developing countries are beset with pressing socioeconomic problems and social 
needs. The intensity and pervasiveness of poverty produce widespread human 
suffering. Managers must ... define their responsibility as helping to meet 
community needs. Managers have skills, resources, and institutional influence that 
can be mobilized very effectively to address social needs. Social responsibility and 
ethical sensitivity are essential to ... management. 
For those nationals from developed countries assigned to executive positions in 
LDCs, the general requirement of appropriate personal characteristics is 
magnified. As well as possessing the previously noted traits, these individuals 
need an innate empathy with the plight of the LDC population. The firm must 
not only recognise these characteristics, but also develop them. Although 
evidence of any correlation between managerial social responsiveness in LDCs 
and the presence of a particular philosophy is sparse, expatriate failure rates may 
infer such a relationship. Earlier studies by Desatnick (1978) and Tung (1982) 
suggest that expatriate failure rates in LDCs are considerably higher than those 
in developed countries. 
OrganisaJional Culture 
Of the various dimensions of corporate culture, three require particular attention 
in managing MNEs in LDCs. Due to the social and economic climate in most 
developing countries, the management of workplace relationships, compens-
ation policies, and workplace diversity requires flexibility and innovation on the 
part of MNE executives. Each is investigated in tum. 
The general attitude towards authority and equality which prevails in the national 
culture influences the manner in which people structure their relation-ships 
within organisations. The tendency of LDC nationals to favour large power 
distances and low individualism (noted previously) equates to employees who 
are typically more accepting of hierarchical structures and who expect 
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benevolent management practices. MNE managers therefore, could anticipate a 
workforce which provides loyalty and obedience and, in return, see 
management's obligation as extending to individual families and perhaps the 
wider community (Hofstede, 1995). Low individualism would also manifest 
itself in strong group affiliation whereby workers uphold the principles of 
mutual obligation and loyalty. These characteristics place particular demands on 
managers from industrial nations who are accustomed to low distance/high 
individualism cultures. Emphasis on task performance needs to yield to working 
through trusting relationships and assuming responsibility of the 'whole' 
employee and his/her family. 
Compensation systems may be culturally confounded. Whereas the maintenance 
of an equitable internal wage structure is vital to employee performance and 
morale in industrialised nations (Groenekamp & Yaney, 1986; Milkovich & 
Newman, 1996), the same perception of fairness may not be applicable in 
LDCs. Given the high rate of unemployment, any LDC citizen in regular paid 
work is, in relative terms, economically advantaged. MNEs which, in the 
interests of equity, pay local and expatriate workers equivalent wages for the 
same work, exacerbate the uneven distribution of LDC incomes. This situation 
may not be politically and/or socially acceptable in developing economies 
(Simpson, 1987). Management therefore, needs to account for host country 
standards and practices when designing compensation systems (Dowling et al., 
1999). 
The earlier reference to Child's (1981) observation that cultural and national 
boundaries do not necessarily correspond is most evident in LDCs. Kolde 
(1985:151) advises that "tribalism still exists and creates disjointed value 
systems and social structures in most ex-colonial countries". For MNEs 
attempting to build a collaborative, multicultural workforce, local groups which 
sustain separatist attitudes towards other communities and/or the national 
government present a difficult challenge. Manifestations of the enmity between 
indigenous clans can range from latent hostility to open warfare '(Robock & 
Simmonds, 1989), and is a contributing factor to the political instability inherent 
in many LDCs. Frictions caused by ethnic tension within the firm may "create 
disruptions, negatively affect workplace discipline, [and] decrease managerial 
control" (Austin, 1990:60). 
Solutions to this problem tum on management being aware of the cultural and 
social issues of the host LDC communities (Kolde, 1985) and its ability to 
establish a positive climate for diversity (Cox, 1993; Dymsza, 1987b). To 
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achieve a climate which gives due consideration to surrounding cultures, Ott 
(1989)31 suggests a management intervention process which entails (i) hiring 
only those who value the firm's goals of integration with the host culture, (ii) 
teaching all employees what is and is not acceptable, (iii) removing members 
who refuse to accept the modified corporate culture, (iv) providing intrinsic and 
extrinsic rewards for those who demonstrate appropriate behaviours, and (v) 
modifying the communications system (language, rites, ceremonies, etc) so as it 
supports the goals of diversity. Ott's intervention process aligns with Dyer and 
Shafer's (1999) principle of 'forging a common purpose' within organisations. 
SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature reviewed in this chapter focuses on two themes; the theories and 
studies which inform the management of MNEs, and the particular challenges 
facing MNE management in LDCs. Of the various issues which have emerged, 
three are of particular significance to this study. 
First, throughout the 20th century, the character of international business has 
evolved from cross-country trading and colonial empires to global production 
and marketing, and the advent of the MNE. The explosive growth in world 
commerce and MNEs, particularly over the past three decades, has resulted in a 
fiercely competitive global marketplace which pays little regard to national 
borders. Concomitant with these developments has been the recognition of a 
need for an international management perspective which is capable of 
evaluating, influencing, and responding to the turbulence of global business. 
Second, critical to MNE management is an appreciation of the organisation's 
external and internal operating context. At the external level, dynamic and 
diffuse legal, cultural, economic and political forces cut across virtually all 
management functions and skills. Although these forces are agents of 
opportunity, they carry an inherent threat to corporate performance. Reliance on 
home country practices and the pursuit of convergence may be ineffective or 
even dangerous, and thus managing MNEs entails understanding the 
environment and configuring the organisation appropriately. At the internal level 
31 It is evident that some of Ott's dimensions appear to contravene accepted management 
behaviour and best HRM practice. The social systems of many LDCs do not 
incorporate similar values however, and therefore Western notions of equity, justice, 
due process, and the like cannot be considered as universal (De George, 1993). As 
discussed later in this thesis, the application of home country standards by the 
management of the subject company proved to be a significant factor in its demise. 
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therefore, MNEs' structure, institutional arrangements, resource allocation, 
processes and management practices need to be amenable t:o the surrounding 
conditions. For this to occur, expatriates who manage MNEs need to move 
beyond a single country mentality to a point where they operate comfortably 
within their surroundings, working from a conceptual base which filters 
established management techniques through the requirements of local social and 
behavioural systems. This requires managers with personal characteristics 
which are appropriate to the task, and who are able to develop and maintain an 
organisational culture capable of sustaining a synergis\ic relationship with 
corporate, local and international demands. 
Finally, it has been ascertained that LDCs present corporate management with a 
volatile and seemingly contradictory business environment. Anxious to improve 
their material and social circumstances, most LDCs encourage the presence of 
MNEs as they recognise their pivotal role in national developillent. At the same 
time, they are concerned about the possible disadvantages of involving foreign 
firms in their economies. This ambivalence generates political and popular 
constraints to MNEs in terms of their location, policies., and operations. 
Managing within the complexity, diversity and instability of the social and 
economic environment of an LDC demands qualities beyond those required in 
developed countries. Technical competence and recognition of cultural 
differences are not enough; empathy and adaptability are required to produce 
outcomes which are simultaneously compatible with the perspectives and 
expectations of host governments, local societies, corporate goals, home 
governments, and the world community. 
Each of these dimensions is an integral constituent of this study of BCL. The 
company was a pioneer of Australian international business during the post-war 
period, operating in an LDC through times of economic, social and political 
upheaval in both its host country and host society. Without the benefit of 
precedent or significant literature upon which to base their decisions, the men 
who guided BCL for 25 years generally achieved the local support and 
environmental congruence which underpins much of the contemporary thought 
on international management. Whilst BCL's success may be largely attributed to 
these advanced managerial approaches, ultimately the venture still succumbed to 
environmental forces. The reasons for BCL's failure are explored in the 
following section. 
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BOUGAINVILLE COPPER LIMITED: 
AN EXAMINATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SYNERGY 
The objective of this research is to evaluate the theory and processes of 
environmental alignment as it is presented in extant literature. This will be 
achieved by investigating the nature and impact of environmental variables on 
the management and corporate performance of a large MNE, and comparing the 
results with prior research. BCL was selected as the focal case because its 
unique contextual properties, both internal and external, provide the opportunity 
to develop a singularly clear insight into those environmental elements which are 
highlighted in the literature as being significant to organisational performance. 
The Central Research Question 
This thesis investigates the management of BCL's internal and external 
operating environments through a central research question: 
In what ways might the experience of Bougainville Copper Limited be 
instructive to the study and practice of MNE management in environments 
which are significantly different to home country conditions? 
This question, which ultimately guides the exploratory focus of the thesis, has 
been further refined into seven research questions which form the basis of the 
research and constitute the major issues for analysis of the case study data. 
The Research Questions 
There is consensus throughout the literature that MNE performance depends not 
only on the nature of the internal and external environment of the firm, but also 
on the ability of management to establish congruency between these two 
influences and maintain this fit by flexibility and adaption. All management 
functions are thus contingent upon the alignment of two essential elements: the 
outcomes from the assessment of the firm's legal, cultural, economic and 
political milieu, and the extent to which convergence, divergence or cross-
vergence is pursued, the philosophies held by management, and the culture of 
the firm. Alignment can be achieved by (i) modifying organisational factors to 
match the local, national or international business environment, (ii) influencing 
external factors to meet the needs of the firm, or (iii) some combination of both. 
These elements, and the connections between them which have been proposed 
in prior research, have been summarised schematically in Figure 2.1. Depicting 
an equal influence of the internal and external environment, this diagram 
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Figure 2.1 The Relationship and Influence of Environmental 
Factors on Firm Performance 
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represents the balance necessary for optimal firm performance. This is achieved 
by management assessing the nature of the two environments, and then 
adjusting relevant organisational dimensions (internal factors) and/or by 
exerting pressure on particular areas of the operational setting (external factors). 
The literature suggests however, that the capacity of firms to manipulate 
environmental variables may be restricted. Concerning the modification of the 
internal environment, it was noted earlier that total divergence is neither 
practical or possible, and ultimately firms need to configure their organisation 
according to the dictates of efficiency and profit. Facilitating change within 
certain constituents of the external environment may also be limited. For 
example, national culture is largely immutable, and international conventions 
circumscribe corporate behaviour. Thus, the ability of MNEs to realise internal-
extemal symmetry is not only a function of the degree to which they need to 
change either or both environments, but also the degree to which those 
environments are amenable to change. This is the focus of the first research 
questions in this thesis. 
Research Question la: To what extent were elements of the internal 
operating environment of Bougainville Copper Limited (i.e. the company's 
approach to convergence/divergencelcrossvergence, management philosophy, 
and organisational culture) able to be manipulated by BCL management in the 
pursuit of attaining congruity with elements of the company's external operating 
environment (i.e. legal, cultural, economic and political factors)? 
Research Question lb: To what extent were elements of the external 
operating environment of Bougainville Copper Limited (i.e. legal, cultural, 
economic and political factors) able to be manipulated by BCL management in 
the pursuit of attaining congruity with elements of the company's internal 
operating environment (i.e. the company's approach to convergence/ 
divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, and organisational 
culture)? 
The literature indicates that LDCs present firms with operating contexts which 
are significantly different than those encountered in developed nations. These 
differences are multi-dimensional. As a group, LDCs generally diverge from 
the industrialised world across all four environmental categories. Individually, 
LDCs tend to be internally heterogeneous which results in a variety of business 
environments within their borders. The diversity of operating conditions 
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evident among and within LDCs suggests that foreign firms might experience 
greater difficulty in achieving internal-external symmetry in LDCs than they 
would encounter in developed economies. It also appears that the constraints 
inherent in LDC environments become increasingly pronounced the more those 
environments differ from the business conditions to which MNEs are 
accustomed. Accordingly, as home country and host country operating contexts 
deviate and become more complex, external factors will exert increasing 
pressure which may militate against environmental congruency. Concomitant 
with this is a weakening of the effectiveness of environmental assessment and a 
decline in the firm's influence on its surroundings. The above model may thus 
be modified to reflect the diminishing internal-external balance occasioned by 
diverging home and host operating climates. Figure 2.2 reflects these changes. 
Whereas Figure 2.1 depicts an equivalent influence of internal and external 
factors on firm performance by characterising these environments as rectangles 
of equal size, Figure 2.2 reflects the increasing influence of external factors by 
portraying this environment as a larger rectangle. This increase, in tum, results 
in the influence of internal factors diminishing (represented by a smaller 
rectangle) because the firm is either unable to adjust its organisational 
dimensions sufficiently or cannot exert adequate pressure to change its 
operational setting. 
Given the substantial differences evident in BCL's host and home countries, the 
second and third research questions investigate the nature and relative influence 
of the company's internal and external environments in order to determine the 
degree to which contextual symmetry was achieved. 
Research Question 2a: Which of the internal factors - the company's 
approach to convergence/divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, 
and organisational culture - had an impact on the legal, cultural, economic and 
political environment of Bougainville Copper Limited? 
Research Question 2b: To what extent did the company's approach to 
convergenceldivergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, and organis-
ational culture impact on the legal, cultural, economic and political environment 
of Bougainville Copper Limited? 
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Figure 2.2 The Impact of Diverging Home-Host Business 
Condiditions on Environmental Convergence 
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Research Question 3a: Which of the external factors - legal, cultural, 
economic or political - had an impact on Bougainville Copper Limited's 
approach to convergence/divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, 
and organisational culture ? 
Research Question 3b: To what extent did legal, cultural, economic and 
political factors impact on Bougainville Copper Limited's approach to 
convergence/divergencelcrossvergence, management philosophy, and organis-
ational culture ? 
The foregoing suggests that, under certain conditions, there is a point at which 
the foreign operating context becomes so divergent from the MNE home 
country that environmental congruency is difficult to achieve. Pressures from 
the external environment may be expected to substantially deplete the firm's 
ability to adapt internally, leaving outside forces as the dominant influence on 
management actions. Should this occur, firm performance declines significantly 
because management is not able to meet the needs of both environments. 
Significant environmental incongruency is presented schematically in Figure 
2.3. Here, the external factors dominate and are depicted by a very large 
rectangle. The internal factors are portrayed by a very small rectangle because, 
although still intact, they are unable to effectively influence the manner in which 
management functions are executed. With management control over the firm's 
operation severely circumscribed, the performance of the firm becomes largely 
subject to the vagaries inherent in the external environment. 
The fourth research question pursues this issue as it explores possible links 
between any environmental imbalances which emerge from the case study and 
the demise of BCL. 
Research Question 4: Was the closure of Bougainville Copper Limited's 
Panguna mine the result of a deficiency in environmental alignment? 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has reviewed theories and studies which inform the management of 
MNEs. The body of research on international management has produced two 
significant outcomes. Firstly, it has identified elements within the external 
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Figure 2.3 The Impact of Heterogeneous Home-Host Business 
Condiditions on Environmental Congruence 
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environment which impact on MNE performance and has produced an 
understanding of appropriate management responses to many of the issues 
arising from that environment. Secondly, it has emphasised the need for, and 
established approaches for achieving, congruency between an MNE's internal 
operations and systems and the local and global environment. While the 
literature acknowledges that neither of these outcomes is completely attainable in 
practical terms, both concepts are widely supported as fundamental and 
complementary contributors to MNE performance. 
Although the degree to which MNEs are able to align their internal and external 
environments cannot be measured in absolute terms, there appears to be an 
inverse relationship between attaining this objective and the heterogeneity of 
conditions in the home and host countries. That is, the probability of MNEs 
achieving internal-external congruency decreases the more the business 
environment in host countries deviates from that in the home country. This 
appears to be particularly evident in LDCs where virtually every environmental 
dimension diverges significantly from conditions in developed economies. 
By addressing the research questions, this study investigates the extent to which 
home-host country heterogeneity impacts on firms' attempts to align their 
internal and external environments. In so doing, the study aims to further 
develop an understanding of international management as it applies to MNEs 
operating under diverse environmental conditions, with a particular emphasis on 
emerging economies. In order to achieve this, the thesis analyses the history of 
Bougainville Copper Limited, an Australian based mining venture operating in 
an isolated region of a developing economy. 
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CHAPTER3 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
AND METHODOLOGY 
OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTER 
The objective of this chapter is to describe the research methodology adopted in 
this thesis. The inquiry is primarily, but not exclusively, exploratory in nature, 
and aims to contribute to management theory concerning the performance of 
MNEs by examining the case of Bougainville Copper Limited. Consistent with 
this aim, the research takes a qualitative approach which accommodates the 
induction of theory through building on existing knowledge and postulated 
relationships, yet remaining receptive to any patterns or phenomena which may 
emerge. The chapter explains the rationale and process of case study inquiry, 
and details the methodological principles and procedures which were engaged to 
investigate the research questions. 
RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
The broad aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of environmental 
influences on the performance of MNEs operating in business conditions 
significantly different than those experienced in their home countries. The 
literature review in Chapter 2 revealed that a range of endogenous and 
exogenous factors interact to determine corporate outcomes. These factors may 
be distilled into categories which establish the issues to be investigated in this 
research. These issues are presented in Table 3.1. 
As well as identifying various exogenous and endogenous factors which impact 
on firm performance, the extant literature emphasises the need for MNEs to 
achieve an alignment between these contextual elements and suggests 
·''management interventions to attain the required 'balance'. This thesis seeks to 
evaluate current understanding of environmental symmetry as it its presented in 
the literature by examining that literature in the light of the experience of 
Bougainville Copper Limited. 
Due to the human and corporate complexities embedded in the above issues, the 
investigation of the subject requires a research process which is not only capable 
of discovering the behaviour of the various parties in the Bougainville case, but 
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Table 3.1 Environmental Factors Identified in the Literature Review 
as Relevant to this Research 
Exogenous factors 
Features of the legal system which 
impact MNEs' financial operations. 
Features of the legal system which 
impact on employment relationships. 
Features of the legal system which 
impact on access to natural resources. 
The social organisation of the host 
society. 
The attitudes of the host society 
towards materialism. 
The language systems of the host 
society. 
The way in which the host society 
perceives & conceptualises phenomena. 
The economic and ecological emphasis 
placed on the use of natural resources. 
Labour market conditions in the host 
society. 
He technological capacity of the host 
society. 
The infrastructure of the host society. 
The political stability of the host 
society. 
The degree of nationalism evident the 
host society. 
The nature of political relationships 
between the host society and other 
societies and nations. 
Endogenous factors 
The degree to which the firm pursues 
convergence, divergence and cross-
vergence. 
The philosophies held by the firm's 
management. 
The firm's organisational culture as it 
relates to workplace relationships, 
employee compensation, and workplace 
diversity. 
is also able _to penetrate the intentions and motives behind those behaviours. 
Accordingly, a qualitative research strategy was adopted, as this method 
provides 
a means of accessing unquantifiable facts about the actual [subjects] ... [and] allows 
the researchers to share in the understanding and perceptions of others and to 
explore how people structure and give meaning to their daily Jives (Berg, 1989:6). 
Despite suggestions that qualitative research is subjective and lacks precision 
(Allan, 1991; Kidder & Judd, 1986), it has provided significant contributions to 
understanding human actions. Collins (cited in Newman, 1991:412) states that 
"much of the best work in sociology has been carried out using qualitative 
methods without statistical tests". 
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THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Given the open nature and methodological flexibility of qualitative research 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 1994), operational parameters must be established in order 
to control the volume of data presented in the case (Miles & Huberman, 1994 ). 
In this thesis, the parameters in the research are defined by the central research 
question and the seven sub-questions for investigation which arise from it. 
These emanated from prior inquiry, in accordance with Eisenhardt' s (1989) 
reasoning that research questions should be derived and honed from existing 
literature. 
The central research question is: 
In what ways might the experience of Bougainville Copper Limited be 
instructive to the study and practice of MNE management in environments 
which are significantly different to home country conditions? 
The sub-questions which arise from the central research questions are: 
Research Question la: To what extent were elements of the internal 
operating environment of Bougainville Copper Limited (i.e. the company's 
approach to convergenceldivergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, 
and organisational culture) able to be manipulated by BCL management in the 
pursuit of attaining congruity with elements of the company's external operating 
environment (i.e. legal, cultural, economic and political factors)? 
Research Question lb: To what extent were elements of the external 
operating environment of Bougainville Copper Limited (i.e. legal, cultural, 
economic and political factors) able to be manipulated by BCL management in 
the pursuit of attaining congruity with elements of the company's internal 
operating environment (i.e. the company's approach to convergence/ 
divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, and organisational 
culture)? 
Research Question 2a: Which of the internal factors - the company's 
approach to convergence/divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, 
and organisational culture - had an impact on the legal, cultural, economic and 
political environment of Bougainville Copper Limited? 
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Research Question 2b: To what extent did the company's approach to 
convergence/divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, and organis-
ational culture impact on the legal, cultural, economic and political environment 
of Bougainville Copper Limited? 
Research Question 3a: Which of the external factors - legal, cultural, 
economic or political, - had an impact on Bougainville Copper Limited's 
approach to convergenceldivergencelcrossvergence, management philosophy, 
and organisational culture ? 
Research Question 3b: To what extent did legal, cultural, economic and 
political factors impact on Bougainville Copper Limited's approach to 
convergence/divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, and organis-
ational culture ? 
Research Question 4: Was the closure of Bougainville Copper Limited's 
Panguna mine the result of a deficiency in environmental alignment? 
As recommended by Eisenhardt (1989), the research questions remained 
tentative during the course of the investigation and underwent various iterations 
so as to minimise researcher bias and avoid them limiting the outcomes of the 
study. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research questions are investigated using an ethnographic case study 
method. This approach satisfies the inductive aims of the inquiry, provides 
maximum flexibility to the research process, and ensures that no variables are 
excluded from the examination. 
Ethnography as a Research Paradigm 
The literature review demonstrated that tensions may arise between MNEs and 
their host LDCs as a result of each holding opposing perspectives on certain 
issues. That is, both parties define, categorise and interpret their priorities from 
divergent conceptual bases. In order to understand such divisions, this study 
needs to appreciate the factors which regulated the relationships evident in the 
case. As ethnography "show[s] how actions in one world make sense from the 
point of view of another world" (Nieswiadomy, 1993:152), it offers an 
appropriate research model. 
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Ethnography is a vehicle for investigating social interaction within and between 
groups. By examining the procedures which people use in constructing their 
social world (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 1984), individual elements of reality 
and behaviour may be identified to produce a "picture of the way of life of inter-
acting human groups" (Bryman, 1988a:45). Thus, ethnography uncovers 
connections, patterns, themes, or relationships that have meaning for the people in 
it. These themes include but are not limited to the shared knowledge, norms, 
values, belief systems, language, rituals, economics, role behaviours, or patterns 
of social interactions among members (Germain, 1986: 148). 
Using this information, the ethnographic researcher can expose and analyse 
existing social relationships in order to explain phenomena and develop theories 
concerning certain episodes (Field & Morse, 1985). Therefore, as a framework 
for research, ethnography is "theory-generating as contrasted with studies that 
are theory-testing" (Germain, 1986:149). 
Although the traditional ethnographic process requires direct researcher 
involvement with their subjects (Taft, 1988), the retrospective nature of this 
inquiry precludes participation and/or observation. Accordingly, the case study 
method was adopted because it provides the social insight available from 
ethnography without situational involvement. Stablein (1996:519) terms this 
approach the 'ethno-case' which is "oriented to representing the native 
participants' reality". Wiseman (1993: 137) similarly notes that 
case study methodology ... is an approach to research which utilises ethnographic 
research methods to obtain and portray a 'rich' descriptive account of meanings and 
experiences of people in an identified social setting. 
As this study seeks to investigate how social arrangements impact on MNE 
performance and interpret any findings to extend management theory, the 
ethnographic case study is an ideal research method. 
The Case Study as a Research Method 
Walker (1980:33) describes case research as an "examination of an instance in 
action. . . .incidents, events and information on biography, personality, 
intentions and values". Yin (1994:13) augments this with a 'technical' definition 
which differentiates case studies from other strategies. He explains that a case 
study is "an empirical inquiry which investigates a contemporary phenomenon32 
32 Yin's reference to a 'contemporary phenomenon' does not infer that case studies 
cannot be retrospective. Discussing an earlier edition of Yin's work, Rose (1991:197) 
explains that "Yin is seeking to distinguish the case study from the experiment and 
the history. While we may welcome the demarcation from the former, it is perhaps less 
satisfactory to exclude the latter". Case studies therefore, may be a vehicle by which 
one can use the past to study the present (Laurence, 1984). 
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within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident." 
The two elements of Yin's definition emphasise the flexibility of design and 
holism which case studies afford social investigation. Case studies are not a 
specific research technique, but "a way of organizing social data so as to 
preserve the unitary character of the social object being studied" (Goode & Hatt, 
1952:331). Hakim (1987:61) concurs, noting that case studies 
... take as their subject one or more selected examples of a social entity - such as 
communities, social groups, organisations, events, life histories, families, work 
teams, roles or relationships - that are studied using a variety of data collection 
techniques ... Using a variety of data collection techniques and methods allows a 
more rounded, holistic, study than with any other design. 
Being amenable to accumulating evidence from various sources and accessing 
social phenomena holistically, case studies have been widely applied to research 
in organisation studies (Dunkerley, 1988; Morgan & Smircich, 1980; Pettigrew, 
1990; Pugh, 1988; Romano, 1990) and management studies (Boxall, 1996; 
Dowling & Welch, 1988; Dyer, 1984; Larsson, 1993; Storey, 1992). 
The Purposes of Case Study Research 
Not being a prescribed research technique, the case study constitutes an 
amalgam of approaches which often overlap with other research designs, 
offering their combined and complementary strengths (Hakim, 1987). This 
eclecticism not only provides power and flexibility to the research effort but, as 
Stake (1994:236) explains, it also allows the study's design to be directed by 
what it is that can be learned from the case: 
Case study is not methodological choice, but a choice of object to be studied. We 
choose to study the case ... As a form of research, case study is defined by interest 
in individual cases, not by the methods of inquiry used. 
Thus a researcher's purpose in studying a given case is the ultimate determinant 
of the methodology employed. Yin (1994) identifies three research purposes to 
which case studies may be applied: descriptive, exploratory, and explanatory. 
The descriptive purpose of case studies is to produce a register of facts from 
which the researcher gleans evidence; it is the precursor of interpretation and 
theory development (Peshkin, 1993). By penetrating the subject's world and 
reporting the issues operating within and upon that world, a detailed portrait of 
social phenomena is available (Hakim, 1987). Van Maanen (1988:1) terms this 
portrait "a written representation of culture". This is the 'thick description' of 
social experiences which is vital to. naturalistic inquiry (Aamodt, 1991; Berg, 
1989; Eisner, 1977). By identifying and describing social phenomena as they 
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evolve over time, case studies allow the research to "retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events" (Yin, 1994:3). 
The exploratory purpose of case studies is to examine social episodes in order to 
elicit the reality of the actors' experiences. The researcher achieves this by using 
interpretation to draw contrasts and discriminations about the focal issues and 
wider influences inherent in the case. Of this, Ball reports 
The analysis of case-study is essentially concerned with interpretation. That is, the 
translation of raw data into a coherent portrayal of an institution and of institut-
ional processes. The process of interpretation involves the data coming to stand for 
and represent a field of reality as the basis for a 'theoretical' (or some other kind of) 
account of the setting (cited in Hammersley, Scarth & Webb, 1985:50). 
Because the interpretive process in case study research enables propositions to 
be advanced from this accumulated evidence, this method provides an "excellent 
vehicle for the inductive development of new theory" (Walton, 1972:74). The 
value of case studies in theory building is also reported by Miles and Huberman 
(1994), Peshkin (1993), Vaughan (1992) and Yin (1994). 
The explanatory purpose of case studies is to investigate data so as to determine 
causal relationships between phenomena present in the case (Hartley, 1994). 
Because case study research concentrates post hoe on the various issues which 
precede a known outcome, it enables the examination of processes (Schendel & 
Hofer, 1979). By inspecting antecedents (events, actions, contexts, or 
perceptions) to a given eventuality, case study research can "explain the causal 
links in real-life interventions" (Yin, 1994: 15). 
Because case studies may have a combination of goals (Williamson, Karp & 
Dalphin, 1977), the foregoing classifications are not mutually exclusive and 
researchers may expect large areas of overlap among them (Yin, 1994). Whilst 
this inquiry is exploratory in essence, elements of all the above purposes are 
embraced. 
Criticisms of the Case Study Method 
Despite the benefits of case study research in advancing social inquiry, the 
approach has been criticised for lacking rigour. The major points of contention, 
which are addressed below, are: non-standard designs (Hamel, Dufour & 
Fortin, 1993), measures of reliability and validity (Guba & Lincoln, 1981; 
Stake, 1994, Stone, 1978), and verbose reports (Barnard, Magyary, Booth & 
Eyres, 1987). 
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Critics claim that the efficacy of case studies is constrained by the absence of a 
definitive, routinised model from which to conduct research. That is, they do 
not have a standard design. Smith's (199la) observation is exemplary of this 
view: 
... there is not a great deal of literature on the use of the case-study method, at least 
not under that title. Yet, many researchers refer to case-studies. This imbalance 
seems to reflect the low status of case-study research ... and the view that it is not a 
method as such. One can find references to research methods such as repertory grid 
or comparative analysis which then produce case-studies, but they are not conceived 
as forming part of case-study method (pp 150-151). 
This argument implies that (i) case studies should follow a certain formula, and 
(ii) researchers need such a formula from which to work. In response to the first 
point, Schultz and Kerr (1986) hold that critics confuse case study as a type of 
design with the type of data collected. Thus, they advise that the case study 
method needs to be distinguished from the particular techniques by which data 
for cases is gathered. Concerning the second issue, the lack of a precise format 
is a strength of the method as it is this characteristic which provides the 
opportunity to vary the approach according to the purpose of the study. Aiming 
to build theories rather than test hypotheses (Eisenhardt, 1989), case studies 
provide "an empirical genre appropriately flexible, eclectic and capable of 
creating surprises" (Walker, 1983:155). As Hakim (1987:63) argues, freedom 
of methodological choice is not an impediment to inquiry, rather it is the feature 
which makes case studies "one of the most powerful research designs". 
Reliability and validity are the properties by which researchers judge the 
confidence they place in their data. They originate from experimental studies in 
which error is controlled by comparing measurements with the true values of the 
origirialgoal (Weiers, 1988). As qualitative inquiry does not include numeric or 
'measurable' data, the following methods of confirming reliability and validity 
may be employed. 
Reliability is "the degree to which a measurement is free from random or 
unstable error" (Emory & Cooper, 1991:185). In quantitative applications, this 
is gauged by the consistency of research instruments over repeated applications. 
Although replication in a single case study is impossible because "the operations 
involved depend upon the particular circumstances and events that occur within 
the case" (Bresnen, 1988:47), Marshall and Rossman (1989:148) suggest that 
researchers should keep thorough notes of their work, thus enabling 
... others to inspect their procedures, protocols, and decisions .... by keeping all data 
in well-organized, retrievable form, researchers can make them available easily if 
the findings are challenged or if another researcher wants to reanalyze the data. 
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Reliability in case studies therefore, is not found in reproducing the results of 
one case by doing another, but in the possibility of another party repeating or 
reconsidering that same case. 
Whereas validity in quantitative tests is the extent to which a device "measures 
what it is designed to measure" (Spector, 1981:14), in the hypothetical 
constructs of social research, validity is "the degree to which we observe what 
we purport to observe" (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984:76). Yin (1994) proposes 
three approaches to assessing the validity of information obtained from case 
studies: construct validity, internal validity, and external validity. 
Construct validity is inferred when the measure of a concept correlates with 
measures of other relevant concepts in a theoretically expected manner (Babbie, 
1989). As clear operational measures are not available in theorising from social 
phenomena, Yin (1994) offers three tactics to increase construct validity in case 
study research: (i) using multiple sources of evidence; (ii) establishing a chain of 
evidence which links the questions asked, the data collected, and the 
conclusions drawn; and (iii) having key informants review the draft report. 
Internal validity is "the extent to which the observed treatment effect in a study 
is causal" (Judd & Kenny, 1982:24). Whereas cause and effect may be directly 
noted in quantitative inquiry, the social realm is not amenable to such precise 
linkages (Krathwohl, 1985). Internal validity in qualitative research, particularly 
case studies, is susceptible to contamination by researchers allowing their own 
perceptions to influence the interpretation of data (Goode & Hatt, 1952; Neck, 
Godwin & Spencer, 1996). Thus researchers need to be vigilant in seeking 
deficiencies in their case work by scrutinising the data where doubt s~ems 
justified (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983; Livingston, 1987; Williamson et al., 
1977) and using pattern-matching, triangulation and/or explanation-building to 
strengthen the accuracy of interpretation (Blaikie, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Mccutcheon & Meredith, 1993; Trochim, 1989; Yin, 1994). Notwithstanding, 
Denzin (1989) warns qualitative researchers against being detached from 
phenomena they explore, lest the reflexive value of social inquiry be 
diminished. 
External validity is the "generalizability of the investigation's findings to other 
populations and to other environmental conditions" (LoBiondo-Wood & Haber, 
1994:205). Although Osborne (1991) claims that case study research lacks 
external validity, Taft (1988) argues that results may be generalised to a wider 
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population provided that the case study is conducted rigorously. Barnard et al. 
(1987), Michelson and Baird (1995), and Yin (1994) hold that the method does 
not seek to produce universally applicable results, and claim that case studies are 
undertaken in order to generalise findings to theory rather than to generalising 
findings to populations. Smith (1991a:152) dismisses any need for general-
isation on the grounds that it "can be a spurious basis for claiming validity". 
The final major criticism of case studies is that they result in desultory reports. 
Barnard et al. note, for example, that case study reports are "lengthy, rambling 
descriptive accounts" (1987:52). This diffuseness however, is a reflection of 
those who compose the reports rather than of the reports themselves. Bennis 
(1968:23) warns case writers to pay attention to "the very careful and rigorous 
process of description". Case studies should "create reality by describing that 
reality", thereby "the implicit is made explicit, the intuitive is made self evident 
and the abstract is made concrete" (Walker, 1983:163). Thus it behoves the 
researcher, through skilled communication, to reconstruct in the mind of the 
reader the composite issues and characterisations inherent in the case. 
The Suitability of the Case Study Method in this Inquiry 
The adoption of case study methodology in this inquiry was governed by three 
factors: the outcomes of the literature review, the experience of Bougainville 
Copper Limited, and the purposes of the research. 
The Literature Review 
The literature review revealed that MNE performance is largely dependent on the 
ability of the firm to align its internal operations and systems with the wider 
environment, and that the probability of achieving such congruity decreases as 
business conditions in the host country diverges from those in the home 
country. As this study requires a research methodology that accounts for all the 
environmental factors which influence firm performance, a flexible approach 
which is receptive to emerging themes, unexpected relationships and new issues 
is necessary. The case study method embraces these qualities (Dyer, 1984; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). Yin's (1994) definition, cited earlier, underscores the 
suitability of using a case study to investigate Bougainville Copper Limited: it 
allows the investigation of phenomena (BCL and its management) within its 
real-life context (the host society) when the boundaries between phenomena and 
context are not clear (as evident in the history presented in the case report). 
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Bougainville Copper Limited 
The mine which BCL operated was unique in terms of its history, size and 
organisation. Equally, the social and historical features of the Bougainvillean 
people are unique. These factors combined to create an exceptional situation. 
Case study research is appropriate to investigating BCL's experience, as this 
methodology is "eminently justifiable .. . where the case is a rare or unique 
event" (Yin, 1994:44). Larsson (1993:1516) concurs: 
The ability of case studies to deal with processual and multiple stakeholders 
considerations through using longitudinal, multisource data makes them well-suited 
for management inquiry into unique situations. 
The fortunes of BCL cannot be considered as a single episode. The history of 
the company is entwined with Bougainville's particular characteristics, and 
evolved out of a dynamic, interlocking series of events and perspectives which 
can only be accessed by a longitudinal inquiry33 • Rose (1991) advises that case 
study design is ideal for longitudinal research as it is amenable to both historical 
and processual aspects of investigation. Highlighting the work of Pettigrew 
(1973), Littler (1982) and Clark et al. (1988), all of whom used case studies in 
historical research, Rose (1991:199) explains that the 
methodological principle underlying [case study] design is the belief that theoretical 
concerns of a processual form require a longitudinal research design, thereby 
enabling a social system to be explored as 'a continuing system with a past, a 
present and a future'. 
Typically in longitudinal studies, the large number and diversity of variables 
present in the case history necessitate the truncation of the time span covered by 
the inquiry and/or the omission of certain contextual factors. As a result of these 
compromises, the findings of the research tend to be limited (Field & Morse, 
1985). However, because the geographical, cultural, political, organisational 
and temporal perimeters of BCL's operation are self-defined, all relevant 
dimensions may be investigated completely. This property suits the single case 
study method which allows a research entity to be explicated and understood in 
its entirety (Yin, 1994). 
The Purpose of the Research 
The descriptive, explanatory and exploratory purposes of this research are 
interrelated. The descriptive purpose is realised by creating thick descriptions of 
the issues and complexities of the case. This context-laden data, in tum, serves 
33 In this study, longitudinal research does not refer to the collection of data over an 
extended period so as to observe trends, rather it concerns the examination of events 
as they occurred over time. 
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the exploratory requirements of the thesis as it informs the process of theory 
building (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) and contributes to the explanatory purpose 
by identifying any causal links which may be present (Yin, 1994). 
Although the exploratory imperative is concerned with the discovery of theory 
from data, this study does not seek to generate grounded theory in which prior 
inquiry or the investigator's perspectives are excluded from the interpretive 
process (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Chapter 2 shows that previous research 
informs the management of contextual issues in MNEs, and it was noted earlier 
that researchers should not be detached from the subject. Through the collection 
of data from multiple sources and by employing open coding (discussed at a 
later point), the case study method may be used to both illuminate issues which 
have not been identified previously, and to refine extant concepts (Yin, 1994). 
CONDUCT OF THE RESEARCH 
The plan of this investigation is based on Yin's (1994) model for case study 
research. The processual order and content of the inquiry was modified to allow 
for the study's exploratory emphasis and to accommodate the single-case 
design. The research was sequenced as follows. 
Selection of the Case 
Four factors influenced the selection of BCL as the focal case in this thesis. 
The Bougainville operation became one of the world's largest mining ventures, 
and remained so until its forced abandonment after 18 years of production. As a 
case study, BCL is a notable example of innovation, success, and failure in 
international management. Researching an organisation which has encountered 
such profound experiences is supported by Pettigrew (1988): 
... given the limited number of cases which can usually be studied, it makes sense 
to choose cases such as extreme situations and polar types in which the process of 
interest is "transparently observable." Thus, the goal of theoretical sampling is to 
choose cases which are likely to replicate or extend the emergent theory (Cited in 
Eisenhardt, 1989:537). 
BCL provides a rare opportunity to examine the life of a large MNE in its 
entirety - from inception to closure. Unlike extant companies which are 
dynamic and constantly evolving, BCL presents a static model which affords 
the researcher access to a complete sequence of events in order to understand the 
challenges faced by management in an unfamiliar environment. As the BCL 
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experience has no parallel in international management, its research precludes a 
comparative approach (Eisenhardt, 1989) or attempts at replication logic (Yin, 
1994), rather it adheres to Yin's (1994:39) rationale for a single case design, 
where "the case represents an extreme or unique case". 
As the thesis aims to develop an understanding of managing organisations in 
diverse environments, it was essential that the management context of the 
subject MNE differed significantly from that of its home country. As emerging 
economies generally present an antithetical management setting to that found in 
industrialised nations, it was considered that the study of an Australian firm 
located in an LDC would provide a sharp contrast which allows for the 
identification of contextual variances. Operating in a province of Papua New 
Guinea34 , BCL fulfilled this requirement. 
Despite increasing corporate and academic attention being focussed on the 
Pacific Basin and acknowledgment that the Pacific Islands are an .area of 
expanding international business with a growing MNE presence (Adler et al., 
1986; Fairbairn & Parry, 1986; Harris & Moran, 1996; Kaynak, 1989), very 
little management research has been undertaken in the island communities of 
Oceania35 • According to Bailey (1994): 
Oceania provides a unique opportunity to examine international management in 
developing economies within a colorful tapestry of cultural influences in a 
microscopic environment (pg. 63). In the early to mid-1980s some studies were 
conducted on the role of multinational and indigenous business in the Pacific. 
However, international management research has been almost nonexistent, 
although incalculable amounts of monies have been invested by foreign businesses 
and governments (pp 69-70). 
As this investigation centres on Bougainville island, the study provides some 
redress to the paucity of management research in the region. 
Review of the Literature 
The literature review is reported in Chapter 2. This covers 4 major topics: the 
development of MNEs and international management, the environment of 
international management, the relationship between MNEs and developing 
34 From the defining characteristics of developing nations noted in Chapter 2, PNG may 
be classified as an LDC with a 'lower-middle' economy. Details of PNG's economic 
circumstances are recorded in Chapter 7. 
35 Oceania is the collective name for most of the 30,000 islands of the Pacific. Oceania 
is divided, by ethnic category, into Polynesia (includes American Samoa, Cook 
Islands, French Polynesia, Easter Island, Tonga, and Western Samoa), Micronesia 
(those islands located between Hawaii and the Philippines), and Melanesia (includes 
PNG, the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Vanuatu and Fiji). Australasia and the 
islands of Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan are not considered part of Oceania. 
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countries, and managing in LDCs. The examination of these topics defined the 
units of analysis, research questions and the appropriate research methodology. 
Development of the Case Study Protocol 
The protocol documents the procedures to be employed in conducting case 
research. As well as describing each phase of the inquiry, the protocol assists in 
future considerations of the case by enabling other investigators to understand 
the methodology used. Yin (1994:63) reasons that a case study protocol is 
·essential because it is "a major tactic in increasing the reliability of case study 
research and is intended to guide the investigator in carrying out the case study". 
As the protocol was essential in identifying the critical elements required in the 
planning and execution of this thesis, it was devised prior to the commencement 
of any research activities. In essence, this document was used to determine the 
design of the research, the nature and direction of the data gathering process, 
and the basic form of the thesis. The protocol is detailed in Appendix A. 
Preparing for Informant Interviews 
The specification of the respondents and data to be gathered emanated from the 
protocol. In order to obtain diverse perspectives, facilitate cross-checking of 
information, and recognise issues requiring further research, seven candidates 
were identified and approached as informants. To control the content and 
direction of the interviews, an interview guide (Appendix B) was prepared. This 
was based on the 'elements for investigation' and 'data require-ments' identified 
in the protocol. Confidentiality and anonymity was assured to all paf!icipants. 
Of the potential respondents nominated in the protocol, only three participated, 
all of whom were former BCL executives. Another past manager assisted with 
the oral history by reviewing initial drafts of the case narrative, but declined an 
interview. One former executive, of his own volition, arranged for an Australian 
who was raised on Bougainville to participate in part of his interview36 • 
36 Numerous difficulties were experienced in eliciting responses from the nominated 
informants. Although CRA's Public Relations Department provided some published 
material concerning the company's experiences on Bougainville, requests for access to 
current personnel who may have been of assistance were firmly declined. Of the three 
journalists contacted (two from the print media and one radioffV reporter), two ignored 
the researcher's requests, and one agreed to review the case narrative but ultimately 
failed to do so. The academic also did not examine the case narrative after having 
agreed to assist. All attempts to contact the critical observer (Gabriel Lafitte, refer 
Appendix K) were fruitless. The bank executive was willing to review the case narrative 
and undertake an interview, but died before either could be realised. In addition to the 
respondents noted in the protocol, Sir Michael Somare was approached when he visited 
Tasmania in 1996 but, upon learning of the subject of the interview, he refused an 
audience with the researcher. 
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Transcripts of the interviews, which were conducted in June 1998, are recorded 
in Appendix V. 
Although respondent participation was low, the research effort was not impaired 
because those informants who assisted with the inquiry had an intimate 
knowledge of the subject. As Patton (1990:185) notes ''The validity, 
meaningfulness and insights generated from qualitative research have more to 
do with the information richness of the case ... than with sample size." 
Researching the Case 
The case was researched over three years, and was conducted in accordance 
with the steps identified in the 'research design' procedure of the protocol. This 
process is detailed below. 
Combining the Research Purpose with the Research Questions 
By considering the research questions within the descriptive, exploratory and 
explanatory purposes of the study, a suitable method of data collection and 
examination was exposed. This, in tum, provided a map for the research 
process. For each of the three purposes, the data were interrogated in the 
following manner. 
In preparing the case report, the reality of each issue was elicited by composing 
thick descriptions of the subjects' views as noted previously. This was achieved 
by asking 'what' and 'how' questions which preserve "the meaningfulness of 
the phenomenon as a complex real-life process" (Barnard et al., 1987:53). 
Exploration was achieved by posing 'what' questions as these are an ideal 
vehicle for developing hypotheses (Yin, 1994 ). The subtle difference between 
descriptive and exploratory 'what' questions lay in their thrust; whereas the 
former sought to understand the subjects' reality, the latter looked at the subjects 
themselves or the objects they encountered. Because questions asking 'how' 
and 'why' can access causal links between certain phenomena, they were used 
in the explanatory aims of the study (Yin, 1994). The explanatory 'how' was 
distinguished from the descriptive 'how' by its focus on observable phenomena 
rather than human perceptions of reality. 
The interrogative process described above was applied to each piece of 
information as it emerged during the collection and analysis of the data. Some 
information demanded a single focus of inquiry, while others were multi-
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dimensional. In those instances where material displayed both descriptive and 
explanatory elements, it was interrogated twice. 
Units of Analysis 
The selection of units of analysis depends on the "way the initial research 
questions have been defined" (Yin, 1994:22). The primary unit of analysis 
which emerges from the research questions in this thesis is 'The management of 
an MNE operating in a divergent environment'. As the research concerns both 
internal and external environmental components, each dimension was subsumed 
as secondary units of analysis. These are labelled 'The host society' and 
'Outsiders' (external factors), and 'The organisation and management of the 
mine' (internal factors). Because interpretation of the environmental factors 
relied on understanding the attitudes, values and behaviours of the actors, a 
subordinate level of units of analysis was produced. Yin (1994:41) terms the 
use of several units of analysis in a single case is the "embedded case study 
design". The logic of multilevel analysis is explained by Burstein (1988:776): 
Data collected on units at a lower level ... can be aggregated to yield a characteristic 
of a unit at a higher level... This characteristic may take on special meaning at the 
higher level or simply be indicative of aggregated lower level properties. 
Figure 3.1 has been developed to depict the hierarchical nature of the units of 
analysis identified for this thesis. This figure demonstrates that the subordinate 
units of analysis were informed by the data requirements identified in the 
protocol. Babbie (1989:294) describes research data requirements as "units of 
observation". Hence the inquiry moved 'up' the hierarchy from researching the 
units of observation to understanding the primary unit of analysis. The benefits 
of using an inter-linking hierarchy of units of analysis are described by Knafl 
and Breitmayer (1991:235), who report that the merging of levels of analysis 
contributes to "a more complete understanding of the phenomenon being 
studied. The usefulness of incorporating more than one level of analysis is 
especially apparent in studies of ... organized groups and communities". 
Data Collection 
In order to fully explore the issues which emerged from the case and to verify 
the information obtained, various data gathering techniques were used. Know·n 
as triangulation, this approach is recommended by Hakim (1987), Patton 
(1987), Yin (1994) and Punch (1994). The choice of data collection instruments 
was narrowed by the requirements of the study (Marshall & Rossman, 1989) 
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Figure 3.1 Array of Units of Analysis used in this Thesis 
Primary unit of analysis 
The management of an MNE operating 
in a divergent environment 
T 
Secondary units of analysis 
External factors 
I 
The host society Outsiders 
I I 
Internal factors 
The organisation and 
I 
(Bougainville) (PNG, Australia, clergy) management of the mine 
T 
Subordinate units of analysis 
Attitudes Values Behaviours 
T 
Units of observation 
(Data requirements) 
Financial operations International relationships Labour market Language 
Employment relationships Management philosophy Technology Materialism 
Access to natural resources Modes of thinking Infrastructure Nationalism 
Organisational culture Use of natural resources Stability Social organisation 
Convergence, divergence and crossvergence 
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and access to the necessary information (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). As 
the researcher was precluded from direct access to the Bougainvillean people37 , 
data were assembled from documents, oral histories and interviews with past 
executives of the mine as described below. 
Because documentary records are a fundamental resource for historical social 
inquiry (Calvert, 1991), the initial draft of the case narrative was composed 
from published accounts of Bougainville, BCL and the mine. By reconstructing 
the past, contextual factors of the mining operation were assembled and 
clarified, and information was gleaned for further examination. Marshall and 
Rossman (1989:95) suggest researchers commence the data gathering process 
with historical material, as it is "useful for establishing a baseline or background 
prior to interviewing". 
Documentary material is classified as either a primary or secondary source: 
Primary sources are ... documents that were produced by the people being studied 
during the time when the action you are studying was actually in progress. 
Secondary sources are ... documents written after the event or by someone who was 
not personally a witness of the events (Calvert, 1991:119-120). 
The distinction is significant as it defines the proximity of the document's author 
to the subject matter. Whereas primary sources record the direct observations of 
involved parties, secondary sources are the remote observations of third parties. 
As the distance of secondary. sources may decrease validity and reliability, 
primary sources are preferred (Williamson et al., 1977). The strength of 
secondary sources however, lie in their authors' probable access to data which 
was not available to observers at the time (Calvert, 1991). This study 
incorporates primary and secondary documents as appropriate and available, 
with validation mechanisms to control validity and reliability. 
In oral histories, informants tell their own story in their own way, thereby 
giving researchers direct access to the experience of the case (Clandinin & 
Connelly, 1994). These highly individualised accounts strengthen the inquiry 
by (i) counteracting any bias that may exist in documents (Burgess, 1982b), (ii) 
adding matters of fact or detail which are only recorded in people's memories 
(Samuel, 1982), and (iii) giving voice to those not usually heard (Fontana & 
Frey, 1994). Oral histories assisted this inquiry in each of these areas because 
37 At the time of the research, Bougainville was an active war zone; the PNG government 
denied entry to all non-essential foreigners and many Bougainvilleans were extremely 
hostile to outsiders. Locating a representative sample of repatriated Australian mine 
workers was not possible as BCL's personnel records were not available to the writer, 
and locating Bougainvilleans resident in Australia proved impossible. 
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they enabled the researcher to access facets of the case which would not have 
been available by any other data gathering technique38 • 
The researcher needed to look behind and beyond the facts contained in the 
written histories by gaining an insight into the informants' interpretation of the 
issues. Hutchinson (1986: 115) reasons that the interview is the most effective 
method to achieve this as it "serves to clarify the meanings the participants 
themselves attribute to a given situation [thereby helping] the researcher 
understand the problem through the eyes of the participants". 
A standardised interview guide (Appendix B) was used for all informants. This 
facilitated the aggregation, analysis and validation of information, and enabled 
the researcher to interrogate evidence gained from other sources. The questions 
were designed to cover the necessary issues, but were framed in an open-ended 
manner so as to allow the interviewees sufficient latitude for introspection and 
open reporting of their own perspectives. As a result, the informants were free 
to pursue those matters which they considered important. Semi-structured 
interviews are recommended_ by Selltiz, Wrightsman and Cook (1976:318) 
because 
interviewers have the freedom to explore reasons and motives, to probe further in 
directions that were unanticipated [and] although the respondent is free to express 
his or her own line of thought, the direction of the interview is clearly in the hands 
of the interviewer. 
In conducting the interviews, the researcher used the principles of active and 
reflective listening (Geldard, 1993; Kennedy, 1977; Rogers, 1951), and the 
sessions followed the sequencing, techniques and conventions of traditional 
interview design (Field & Morse, 1985; Simons, 1981; Zima, 1991). With the 
permission of the participants, each interview was recorded on tape. 
Case Analysis 
The purpose of case analysis is to summarise observations in such a manner that 
they yield answers to the research question (Selltiz et al., 1976). As 
recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994), data in this study were analysed 
continuously throughout the data gathering procedure. By treating information 
as it evolved from the documents, oral histories and interviews, contradictions 
38 In this thesis, oral histories took two forms. The first tapped the respondents' 
recollections of events by having them assess the researcher's initial drafts of the case 
narrative and commenting thereupon. This activity also assisted in the validation 
process. The second - and more traditional - was by listening to informants recount the 
story of the Bougainville mine as they 'saw' it. This activity was integrated with the 
interview process. 
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were isolated, missing data were identified and alternative explanations sought. 
The process and sequence of the case analysis appears below. 
Editing the Data 
Data are edited to ensure that they "are accurate, consistent with other 
information, uniformly entered, complete, and arranged to facilitate coding and 
tabulation" (Emory & Cooper, 1991:450). Editing was canied out in the 
following manner on all information as it emerged from the documentary 
records, oral histories and interviews. 
As primary and secondary documents were generally limited to the 'hard' facts 
of the case, editing at this stage was primarily concerned with searching for 
inconsistencies and omissions within and amongst the manuscripts, as well as 
organising data in preparation for coding and categorisation. This was done as 
material was considered for inclusion in the case report. A particular difficulty 
was determining the neutrality of the authors. This was afforded close attention 
in the verification process, and instances of explicit bias were discarded. 
Because oral histories were obtained in two stages, two editing procedures were 
implemented. In the first instance, the early drafts of the case report were 
amended and augmented according to the informants' review of the narrative. 
This was particularly helpful in identifying omissions and inconsistencies as 
these people possessed an intimacy with the case which was not available from 
other sources. The data emanating from the oral histories incorporated in the 
interviews were edited simultaneously with the interviews as described below. 
As recommended by Selltiz et al. (1976), the tapes were transcribed immediately 
after the interviews. This enabled the researcher to account for the content and 
context of the exchange. The interview transcripts (Appendix V) served to (i) 
recapture the essence of the exchange, and to allow reflection on the meaning of 
what the respondent had said, (ii) force the researcher to reflect on the 
relationship between what had been recorded and the aims of the study, (iii) 
determine what material was relevant and thus worthy of coding, and (iv) make 
preparatory coding decisions. The completed transcripts were submitted to the 
informants for verification of accuracy. 
The editing process revealed material omissions in a number of the documentary 
records, the majority of which related to unrecorded periods in particular 
reports. Occasionally, accounts displayed a paucity of detail in, and explanation 
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of, the events under review. Inconsistencies within individual records were 
negligible, as was the incidence of one account being substantially inconsonant 
with another. The majority of these difficulties were rectified by reference to 
further documents, with the remainder being clarified during the interviews. 
The oral histories and interviews contained no contradictions, therefore the 
editing of these procedures was confined to data organisation. 
Categorisation and Coding 
Categorisation organises various dimensions of the data by grouping together 
attributes which relate to the concepts being examined. By devising categories 
which were mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and based on a single classificatory 
principle (Selltiz et al., 1976), aspects of the data were clustered to facilitate the 
interpretive process. The previously noted units of analysis served as 
categories, and by considering their lateral and vertical relationships, the data 
were progressively distilled through interpretation and comparison as they 
ascended the hierarchy depicted in Figure 3.1. 
Coding is the appointing of emblems to salient elements in the data in order to 
assign them to an appropriate category. This exercise simplifies the handling 
and interpretation of information by introducing 'rules of order' to the treatment 
of data. Code definition and labelling must (i) be consistent across the entire 
data bank, (ii) indicate precisely what information is constituted by each code, 
and (iii) align with the locus of the inquiry (Fleet & Camboume, 1989). A 
portion of the coding system used in this inquiry is shown in Table 3 .2. This 
excerpt refers to codes relating to the attitudes displayed by the various parties 
involved in the Bougainville mining venture, into which relevant phenomena 
from the various units of observation were apportioned. The complete coding 
system is detailed in Appendix C. 
Table 3.2 Data Codes (Partial) 
Coding 
1 
1 1 
1 2 
121 
122 
1 3 
Phenomenon 
Attitudes 
Attitudes/Bougainvilleans 
Attitudes/Outsiders (Outsiders: non-B'villean, but not mine mgmt) 
Attitudes/Outsiders/PNG 
Attitudes/Outsiders/Others (Others: Australia, foreigners & clergy) 
Attitudes/Management 
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As suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994), codes were assigned throughout 
the entire data gathering process of the research. This allowed for the discovery 
of issues for further investigation, the refocussing of the research questions, the 
generation of additional codes, and the refining of existing codes. 
Because statistical analysis fails to address the needs of doing analysis at the 
level of the whole case (Yin, 1994), only minor emphasis was placed on the 
enumeration of frequencies. Instead, the data were combed for aspects of 
relevance to the research questions. This was achieved by following the 
principles suggested by Becker and Geer (1982:245-246): 
• The coding should be inclusive. That is, any incident should be coded under a 
category, if there is initially any reason to believe that it might be considered 
relevant. Many incidents will, therefore, be coded under several categories, for 
they may be relevant to all of them. An incident which on later analysis proves 
to be irrelevant can simply be discarded. 
• The coding should be by incidents: either complete verbal expressions or 
complete acts by an individual or group. 
• The coding should be full. That is, the incident being coded should be 
summarised in all its relevant detail: the ideas expressed, the actions taken, the 
people present, the date and the setting. 
As suggested by Babbie (1989), when coding the data, all elements were 
inspected for their visible, surface components (manifest constituents) and any 
meanings which might underlie the visible elements (latent constituents). 
Collectively, the coded incidents defined the essential situations and factors 
embedded in the units of observation. By summarising and describing the 
fundamental characteristics of these units, their bearing on the study was 
illuminated and the relationships between them were assessed. 
Interpretation 
In this research, nine tactics were employed for drawing meaning from the data. 
Based on strategies proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994) and augmented 
with material from various authorities, these tactics are summarised in Table 
3.3. The information in this table is arranged from the descriptive to the 
explanatory, and moves from the concrete to the abstract. As these procedures 
are not all mutually exclusive, there was some overlap in their application. 
Verification of Conclusions 
The verification process used in this study emanates from the previously 
discussed concerns regarding reliability and validity. While Altheide and 
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Table 3.3 Processes for Data Interpretation 
Tactic 
Noting patterns 
and themes. 
Seeking plausibility. 
Clustering. 
Subsuming particulars 
into the general. 
Factoring. 
Noting relationships 
between variables. 
Finding intervening 
variables. 
Building a logical chain 
of evidence. 
Making conceptual or 
theoretical coherence. 
Procedure 
Gestalt psychology holds that, in observing phenomena, people perceive entire events rather than their constituent elements (Avery & Baker, 
1990). Thus, as data were interrogated, recurring patterns and themes were noted in order to consolidate individual facets of the information. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) propose that the recognition of thematic forms is virtually automatic in the human mind. 
Of drawing inferences from apparently plausible explanations, Miles and Huberman (1994:246) suggest that "it often happens during analysis 
that a conclusion is plausible, 'makes good sense', 'fits' ... so plausibility, and intuition as the underlying basis for it, is [valuable]." They 
warn however, that plausibility only indicates possible explanations and any conclusions made should be substantiated by other means. 
Clustering aids interpretation by grouping, then conceptualizing, objects that have similar characteristics (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In this 
research, initial clustering formed part of the coding process, followed by the grouping of more abstract elements during analysis. Clustering is 
based on content analysis, which is a method of categorising data when analyzing an interview or a document" (Wilson, 1985:408). 
The analyst "shuttle[s] back and forth between first level data and more general categories ... until the category is saturated" (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994:256). By making 'constant comparisons' across data, instances of similar phenomena may be categorised (Leininger, 1987). 
This approach was an integral part of category development in the analytic and theory building processes of this thesis. 
Factor analysis reduces the number of variables by identifying which belong together and which seem to measure the same phenomenon. By 
searching for patterns in the data, researchers are "hypothesizing that some disparate facts or words do something in common or are something 
in common. What they do or are is the "factor", and the process by which we generate it is "factoring"' (Miles & Huberman, 1994:256). 
Determining relationships between variables involves examining data to ascertain if certain variables (i) change directly (an increase or decrease 
in one variable causes a corresponding increase or decrease in another), (ii) change inversely (one variable increases as another decreases), or (iii) 
indicate no relationship at all. This process was essential to the explanatory purpose of this study as it revealed causality. 
An intervening variable is a "factor which theoretically affects the observed phenomenon but cannot be seen ... its effect must be inferred from 
the effects of the independent and moderator variables on the observed phenomenon" (Tuck.man, 1972:45). When variables in this inquiry 
seemed to be related but provided an unsatisfactory explanation, the data was searched for possible intervening variables. 
This involves the development of a related sequence of factors so that prior elements of the chain are related logically to subsequent elements 
(Sowden & Keeves, 1988). According to Miles and Hubermari (1994:261), "this is the classic procedure of analytic induction" 
Having gleaned evidence from the data which appeared to form converging patterns and identify causal relationships, theory was inducted from 
that evidence (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This tactic linked evidence with theoretical propositions which explained the phenomena in the case. 
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Johnson (1994) argue that methods for establishing confidence in qualitative 
research are poorly defined, other scholars submit a number of tactics for 
verifying the outcomes of qualitative research. Those employed in this thesis are 
outlined in Table 3.4. These tests were applied progressively during the 
interpretation process in accordance with the suggestion of Webb, Campbell, 
Schwartz and Sechrest (1966:66) that researchers should 
begin with tactics that are aimed at assuring the basic quality of the data, then 
move to those that check findings by various contrasts, then conclude with tactics 
that take a sceptical, demanding approach to emerging explanations. 
Where possible, a variety of these tests were used for each outcome and, as a 
result, the rigour of both the methodology and findings were significantly 
enhanced. 
Mode of Analysis 
The data interpretation and verification processes (refer Tables 3.3 and 3.4) 
were facilitated by QSR NUD*IST 439 software. Using this program to store, 
manage and analyse data enabled the researcher to realise the exploratory and 
explanatory purposes of the study. The application of computer based analysis 
in social research is recommended by Padilla (1991), Richards and Richards 
(1991), Richards, Richards, McGalliard and Sharrock (1992), and Tesch 
(1990). From the various programs available, NUD*IST was selected as it 
incorporated those properties recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994); 
namely capability, good displays of coding scheme structures, the generation of 
taxonomies, and the ability of theory formulation and testing. Ticehurst and 
Veal (1999:106) note that NUD*IST is "currently considered to be the most 
sophisticated package available". Richards and Richards (1994) warn however, 
that the techniques of qualitative investigation are not typical of the processes 
which computers easily support, and therefore no program can provide 
categorical solutions to the problems encountered by interpretive researchers. 
The essential elements of the interpretation and verification procedures, using 
NUD*IST, were as follows. 
The interview transcripts (Appendix V) were introduced to the NUD*IST 
program, following which the categories (discussed above) were established as 
39 QSR NUD*IST 4 is a registered trademark of Qualitative Solutions and Research Pty. 
Ltd. Copyright 1997. NUD*IST is an acronym of Non-numerical Unstructured Data 
Indexing Searching and Theorizing. Hereafter, QSR NUD*IST 4 is abbreviated in the 
text to 'NUD*IST'. 
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Table 3.4 Processes for Verifying Conclusions 
Tactic Procedure 
Checking for 
representativeness. 
Checking for 
researcher effects. 
Triangulating. 
Weighting the evidence. 
Ruling out spurious 
relationships. 
Checking out 
rival explanations. 
Looking for 
negative evidence. 
Getting feedback 
from informants. 
Comparing and 
contrasting variables. 
During the interpretive process, information from nonrepresentative sources was scrutinised, nonrepresentative events were eliminated from the 
analysis, and no conclusions were drawn from nonrepresentative data. 
Researcher influence on data analysis is a concern in all qualitative inquiry (Coe, 1991). Potential sources of contamination in this study were: 
(i) holistic fallacy, whereby extreme evidence is ignored so data are interpreted as being more patterned or having greater congruence than they 
actually are (Sieber, 1982); (ii) going native, whereby good researcher-informant relationships preclude the pursuit of further investigation lest it 
damages the rapport between the parties (Hammersley· & Atkinson, 1983); and (iii) over-reliance on particular well informed respondents 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1989). These influences were minimised by considering the material presented by a wide range of data sources. 
Triangulation is using a "combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon" (Denzin, cited in Jick, 1984:364), and may be 
applied to both data and theories (Hakim, 1987). Data triangulation was achieved by gathering material from a wide variety of sources. Theory 
triangulation engages "multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data" (Janesick, 1994:214). This was applied by using Adelman's (1981) 
model in which the researcher interprets the data emanating from each source, and then compares the conclusions with the views of others. 
To account for the fact that some data were weaker or more suspect than others, the inquiry followed Miles and Huberman's (1994) suggestion 
that differential weightings be applied to the data according to (i) informant characteristics (e.g., knowledge of/proximity to events) and (ii) 
circumstances under which data are gathered (e.g., direct or vicarious reports, volunteered or prompted material, single or multiple informants). 
Explanatory conclusions depend on inferences drawn which suggest that one factor causes the other. Kidder and Judd (1986) recommend that 
researchers inspect each apparent causality in order to ascertain that other causal processes have not produced the inferred relationship. 
As advised by Miles and Huberman (1994), no explanations were accepted until all possibilities had been explored. On finding alternative 
explanations, resolution between competing analyses was reached by retaining all probable explanations until one became more compelling as 
the result of stronger evidence or the weight of various sources of evidence. Clark and Causer (1991) warn however, that the identification of 
one 'best' explanation may not be possible or desirable as ambiguous findings may accurately capture the reality of the situation. 
Yin (1994) notes that all conclusions should be interrogated for evidence which might disprove an established result, thus this inquiry remained 
open to contrary findings. The search for countervailing evidence confirmed some interpretations but, as Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest, 
failure to identify same did not necessarily establish factual conclusions. 
Part of the triangulation process, this check involved the informants reviewing drafts of the case reports. Yin (1994) emphasises the importance 
of this test as a way of corroborating the essential facts and evidence presented in the case report and enhancing the study's construct validity. 
Sowden and Keeves (1988:525) inform that making comparisons and contrasts between persons, cases, groups, roles, activities and sites 
significantly assists the verification process. This approach was widely applied in this research. 
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a series of nodes within an index system which the software depicts as a 'tree'. 
The tree is reproduced in Appendix D. The generation of categories and 
subsequent coding occurred in two stages. 
Stage One Coding 
The initial categories were based on the subordinate units of analysis shown in 
Figure 3.1; that is, the characteristics of the case entities which the researcher 
sought to understand. These appear as nodes 1, 2 and 3 in the tree. The 
secondary units of analysis ('The host society', 'Outsiders', and 'The organ-
isation and management of the mine') were then attached to each of these nodes 
as sub-categories. The parties' operating environment was then established as 
node 4, and this was further divided into the sub-categories 'External factors' 
and 'Internal factors'. The interview transcripts were then scrutinised for 
significant terms, events and issues located therein according to the 'Units of 
Observation' and coded according to the index system. NUD*IST then searched 
the text and allocated segments of the data to their designated node. A sample of 
this process is recorded in Appendix F which shows the values the management 
of the mine appeared to embrace in its dealings with the Bougainvilleans (that is, 
the content of node 2.3 - values/management). Where appropriate, data were 
allocated to more than one node. 
Stage Two Coding 
Node 5 (Results) was then established. Unlike nodes 1-4, this node was not 
determined by the units of analysis, rather it served to group together the 
outcomes of further analysis. NUD*IST searched the preliminary coding (that 
is, the contents of all nodes established in Stage One) for those factors which 
were common to the various actors' characteristics and the environment. The 
results were assigned to sub-categories of node 5. The development of these 
sub-categories was flexible, as they were founded on data as it emerged from 
the search. A sample of this process is recorded in Appendix G which shows 
the mutual elements of the values held by mine management and the legal 
dimension of the external environment (that is, the intersection of node 2.3 
(values/management) and node 4.2.1 (environment/external/legal). 
Memos were kept to facilitate theory building at a later point. These were 
informal notes were made about the data, categories and relationships as they 
emerged. Designed to store and organise ideas about the data, they were 
eventually integrated into the analytic process. Wilson (1985:420) reports that 
memos assist in the development of theory in five ways: 
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I. They require that you move your thinking about the idea to a conceptual level. 
2. They summarise the properties of each category so that you can begin to 
construct operational definitions. 
3. They summarise propositions about relationships between categories and their 
propositions. 
4. They begin to integrate categories with clusters of other categories. 
5. They relate your analysis to other theories. 
NUD*IST has a facility for the retention of memos at appropriate nodes for later 
consideration and analysis. 
Using these memos, the reports generated by the software during Stage Two 
coding, and the material presented in the case narrative (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), 
the data were analysed according to the techniques described in Tables 3.3 and 
3.4. From this, interaction between the parties became clearer, the context of 
various phenomena surfaced, causes and effects were revealed, and motivations 
were exposed. The manner in which this material was used to develop the 
outcomes of the study are presented in the next section. 
Developing Outcomes 
In line with the stated research purposes, the analysis led to descriptive, 
exploratory and explanatory outcomes. These were achieved in the following 
manner, using the interpretation tactics discussed above. 
The Descriptive Outcome 
The case report appears in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. To meet the report criteria noted 
in the protocol, and to elicit the thick descriptions required of qualitative 
research, the report presents a detailed biography of Bougainville and the mine 
as it has been observed by over 120 commentators40 spanning a 200 year 
period. 
The role of description in qualitative inquiry extends beyond a narration of the 
phenomena of the case. It presents the "issues or themes which are core to the 
analysis, either as a way of illustrating a particular sub-theme within the overall 
analysis or as a vehicle for indicating the way a range of issues come together" 
(Allan, 1991: 186). The issues and themes in this study were context bound, and 
thus their purposes and meanings could not be captured without first 
understanding their origins. The complexity of BCL's internal and external 
environments could only be comprehended by producing thick descriptions of 
the contextual elements, thereby affording the researcher a vicarious experience 
40 Detail of the sources of information used in the case report are noted in Appendix E. 
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of the situation. This approach is recommended by Guba and Lincoln (1989). 
The literal and deep accounts of time, place, culture, and so forth embedded in 
the report facilitated interpretation of the subjects' attitudes and values from their 
concrete behavioural displays. From these translations, analytical judgments 
concerning the research questions were made, possible working hypotheses 
were generated, and causal relationships were identified. 
Because outcomes imputed from the interpretive process essentially belong to 
the researcher rather than the subjects, guarantees of complete accuracy are not 
possible. This is a recognised property of qualitative inquiry: 
There is no such thing as absolute truth. All the most objective researcher can 
report is his version of the actions and decisions of others and how they see their 
world. No one has the final word on this (Wiseman, 1979: 119). 
In most instances however, the researcher's deductions were confirmed by the 
verification procedure discussed previously. 
As no research can incorporate all aspects of a case, the report in this thesis is 
incomplete. The abridgment of peripheral data did not diminish the interpretive 
value of the investigation however. Addressing this issue, Hughes (1980:85) 
observes: 
although descriptions have a fringe of incompleteness about them ... this does not 
impair their ability to do the job, since nothing like completeness is ever attempted 
by the speaker of a natural language. Often a single descriptor will provide an 
adequate description ... the remaining particulars being, as it were, bracketed away 
for present purposes or their sense 'filled in' using the specifics of the context in 
which they are used. 
Being the instrument through which the phenomena of an episode are exposed 
(Sekaran, 1992), the descriptive component is clearly the keystone of case study 
research. Having identified the phenomena of the Bougainville case, the 
researcher could, as suggested by Polit and Hungler (1993), investigate the 
dimensions, manifestations and relationships of those phenomena. This is 
discussed below. 
The Exploratory Outcome 
The distinguishing feature of inductive inquiry is that theoretical concepts 
emerge from the case data, rather than being imposed upon it (Delbridge & 
Kirkpatrick, 1994). Inductive research stems from symbolic interaction 
(Chenitz & Swanson, 1986), a theoretical model in which investigation focuses 
on the ways people transmit and interpret meanings through the use of 
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symbols41 • By viewing the subjects' behaviour from this perspective, theories 
and propositions about social and psychological phenomena can be derived 
from the data of social research. 
Emanating from meanings extracted from narrative data, the findings of 
previous studies, and researcher preconceptions, inductive research may "not 
offer the comfortable, concrete reassurance that the hypothetico-deductive 
approach offers" (Smith, 1991b:222) but inductive theory building does 
produce valuable research outcomes which are less sterile than hypothesis 
testing (Lundberg, 1984 ). The generation of theory from case evidence in this 
study used four procedures: category development and saturation, linking 
categories, testing emerging relationships, and connecting with existing theory. 
Each is described briefly below. 
As noted previously, category development was executed using NUD*IST 
software. During the coding process, data were assigned to emerging categories 
to build a hierarchy of 'units of analysis'. In this procedure, elements of 
identified categories are accumulated until it becomes clear to the researcher 
those properties and characteristics of the elements which fit into that particular 
category. The researcher can then identify the criteria for further instances that 
would fit the specific category. A category is saturated when no new inform-
ation on the characteristics of the category is forthcoming (Field & Morse, 
1985: 111-112). 
Once a category was saturated, a definition based on its inherent properties was 
formulated so as to direct further data collection and stimulate theoretical 
reflection. Categories were refined, produced and discarded as required. 
Instances which did not fit a category's criteria were continually sought. 
The links between the various categories were identified by NUD*IST and 
integrated at Node 5 (Results). Scrutiny of the Node 5 reports facilitated 
consideration of preliminary hypotheses, as recommended by Eisenhardt 
(1989:541): 
From the within-site analysis ... overall impressions, tentative themes, 
concepts, and possible relationships between variables begin ·to emerge. The 
next step of this highly iterative process is to compare systematically the 
emergent frame with the evidence from [the] case in order to assess how well or 
poorly it fits with case data. 
41 Symbolic interactionism has its intellectual roots in the concept of the self as 
developed by G. H. Mead who argued that reflexivity was crucial to the self as a social 
phenomenon. Social life depends on our ability to imagine ourselves in other social 
roles, and this taking the role of the other depends on our capacity for an internal 
conversation with ourselves. Society was conceived by Mead as an exchange of 
gestures which involves the use of symbols. Symbolic interactionism is thus the 
study of the self-society relationship as a process of symbolic communications 
between social actors (Abercrombie et al., 1984:215). 
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To test emerging relationships, key variables within the 'Results' reports were 
identified and studied to ensure relati_onships held within and between 
categories. Although Eisenhardt's (1989:542) discussion of this process 
focuses on the multiple case study method, the principle holds for single case 
designs. Rather than testing relationships between cases, the relationships 
between individual perspectives were investigated: 
A [further] step in shaping hypotheses is verifying that the emergent 
relationships between constructs fit with the evidence in each case. Sometimes 
a relationship is confirmed by the case evidence, while other times it is revised, 
disconfirmed, or thrown out for insufficient evidence. This verification process 
is similar to that in traditional hypothesis testing research. 
Emerging hypotheses were then compared and contrasted with existing theory. 
This imperative is emphasised by Eisenhardt (1989:544): 
Examining literature which conflicts with the emergent theory is important for 
two reasons. First, if researchers ignore conflicting findings, then confidence in 
the findings is reduced. Second ... conflicting literature presents an opportunity. 
The juxtaposition . .. forces researchers into a more creative, framebreaking 
mode of thinking... The result can be deeper insight into both the emergent 
theory and the conflicting literature ... Literature discussing similar findings ... 
ties together underlying similarities in phenomena normally not associated with 
each other. The result is often a theory with stronger internal validity, wider 
generalizability, and higher conceptual level. 
Eisenhardt's approach approximates Yin's (1994) tactic of pattern-matching in 
which empirically based patterns coincide with or contradict predicted patterns. 
In summarising the exploratory process in case research, Hartwig and Dearing 
(1979:9) underscore the procedures discussed above: "The underlying 
assumption of the exploratory approach is that the more one knows about the 
data, the more effectively data can be used to develop, test, and refine theory." 
The Explanatory Outcome 
In scientific research, causal relationships are determined by hypothesising that 
one construct causes another; that is, at least one independent variable provokes 
the occurrence of the dependent variable. In qualitative inquiry, explanation 
rests on the same premise, however it proceeds from the phenomena observed 
in the case description (Williamson et al., 1977). Due to the complexity of 
causal links and the imprecise measures inherent in the interpretive approach, 
the explanatory process relies on deriving, organizing, and integrating ideas 
about the manner in which phenomena are interrelated, and which offer 
understanding of the underlying causes of phenomena (Polit & Hungler, 1993). 
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Warning that the process of explanation-building from case studies is not well 
documented, Yin (1994: 111) suggests that the final explanation results from a 
series of iterations, and recommends the following procedure: 
• Making an initial theoretical statement or an initial proposition ... 
• Comparing the findings of an initial case against such a statement or proposition 
• Revising the statement or proposition 
• Comparing other details of the case against the revision 
• Again revising the statement or proposition 
• Comparing the revision to the facts of a second, third, or more cases 
• Repeating this process as many times as is needed. 
Although Yin's process refers to multiple case studies, its basic features were 
applied to this research. Because explanatory research invariably leads to 
alternative conclusions about the same set of results (Brown & Harris, 1978), 
Yin's iterative approach clarified the outcomes by consolidating some findings 
and discounting others. 
In order to achieve an holistic understanding, and because social phenomena 
evolve over time, it was vital that this inquiry investigate the events which 
preceded the matters under review. As Hakim (1987:65) notes, a major strength 
of case study research is its ability to provide "an unusually detailed exploration 
of all possible causes, determinants, processes and experiences that might have 
contributed ... to the known outcome". 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the methodological issues relating to the research. 
Based on the need for an ethnographic strategy, the single case study method 
was used to address the descriptive, exploratory and explanatory purposes of 
the inquiry. A protocol was developed to guide the investigation and to assist in 
any further consideration of the case. Information was obtained utilising 
documentary records, oral histories and largely unstructured interviews. 
Verification was elemental to the study and was engaged at every stage of the 
inquiry. The processual elements were particularly influenced by Eisenhardt 
(1989), Miles and Huberman (1994) and Yin (1994). The categorisation, 
coding and analysis of the case data were executed on NUD*IST software, the 
reports of which are contained in the Appendices. 
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CHAPTER4 
BOUGAINVILLE: 
AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTER 
The objective of this chapter is to describe the natural, human and political 
context into which the Panguna mine was introduced. Because organisations do 
not function in a vacuum, rather they "exist as a system within an environment" 
(Kobrin, 1979:69), the unique characteristics of Bougainville prevailed upon 
virtually every aspect of the mine's operation during its term on the island. An 
overview of Bougainville' s physical properties and a portrayal of its indigenous 
people is presented. The history of Bougainville, with a particular emphasis on 
foreign involvement in its affairs, is also documented. 
THE BOUGAINVILLE ISLANDS 
This section briefly examines the physical characteristics 9f Bougainville. 
Whilst many variables contributed to the revolution which closed the Panguna 
mine, each can be traced, directly or indirectly, to the inherent properties of the 
island, or the disturbance thereof. 
Geography 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the Bougainville Islands lie in the south-west Pacific at 
the northern end of the Solomon Island chain, bounded by latitudes 4° and 8° 
south and longitudes 154° and 156° east. Although dispersed over a large 
expanse of sea, their total landmass is only 9,250 square kilometres (3,571 
square miles) of which two islands, Bougainville and Buka, represent 9025 
square kilometres (3,484 square miles); the remaining area being coral island 
groups and reefs (Encyclopredia of Papua New Guinea, 1972). Although 
widely classified as separate islands, Bougainville and Buka are, in fact, one 
body of land divided by Buka Passage, a shallow strait some 800 metres (0.5 
mile) wide (see Figure 4.2). 
Topography 
Much of Bougainville is mountainous. The Emperor Range dominates the 
northern region and terminates at Mt. Balbi, a dormant volcano which, at 2,600 
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Figure 4.1 Geographic location of the Bougainville Islands 
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Figure 4.2 Detail of Bougainville and Buka 
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metres (8,530 feet), is the island's highest point. To the south, the Crown 
Prince Range extends 80 kilometres (50 miles), reaching a 1700 metre (5,580 
feet) pinnacle. Between these ranges lie several active volcanoes (Encyclopa:dia 
of Papua New Guinea, 1972). 
Resulting from aeons of eruptions, most of the mid-altitude and lowlands 
consist of volcano-alluvial fans and plains. The flatlands are punctuated with 
frequently flooding rivers which form swamps up to 12 kilometres (7.5 miles) 
wide as they meet the ocean. The remaining coastline consists of high limestone 
cliffs, low coral platforms, swamps, and narrow beaches. (Encyclopredia of 
Papua New Guinea, 1972). The distribution of landscape types is shown in 
Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3 Major Topographic Environments 
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The wet-tropical climate produces a mean annual temperature of 26.7°C (80°F) 
at sea level with rainfall patterns ranging from 3353 millimetres (132 inches) per 
annum in the south to 2667 (105 inches) in the north. The mean duration of 
days without rain is three days for all months of the year (Oliver, 1973). 
Humidity varies between 75 to 86 per cent (Encyclopcedia of Papua New 
Guinea, 1972). 
Vegetation 
Tropical rainforests flourish to an altitude of 600 metres (1,970 feet), and cover 
63 per cent of the islands. The forests are multi-layered, with a canopy of 
around 35 metres (115 feet) under which lower storey trees grow to about 15 
metres (50 feet). The forest floor is covered with 4 to 5 metre (13-16 feet) 
shrubs. Terrain between 600 and 1200 metres (1,970-3,940 feet) supports 
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medium height trees with ferns dominating the lower layers. Growth above 
1200 metres is typified by tall palms which overhang pandanus at the lower 
story, with grasses and ferns at ground level. Swamp vegetation ranging from 
40 metre (130 feet) trees to floating mats of grass occupies about 9 per cent of 
the land area (Encyclopcedia of Papua New Guinea, 1972). 
Fauna 
Amphibians and reptiles constitute most of the native wildlife, with mammals 
restricted to possums, rodents and bats. The skies abound with approximately 
65 species of birdlife and large, colourful butterflies. About 145 varieties of fish 
inhabit local waters (Encyclopcedia of Papua New Guinea, 1972). 
Mineral deposits 
Whilst Bougainville's total mineral resources are unknown (Oliver, 1980), 
massive copper-gold reserves lie in the Panguna area of the Kawerong Valley in 
the southern Crown Prince Range. In 1967 Conzinc-Riotinto of Australia42 
(CRA) estimated the lode's yield at 203 million tonnes43 (200 million tons) of 
ore "of average grade of 0.63 per cent copper and 0.5 dwt44/ton gold" 
(Macnamara, 1974:37). 
THE BOUGAINVILLEAN PEOPLE 
Ultimately, the destiny of the Panguna mine was directed by the distinctive 
characteristics of Bougainville's indigenous people. This section focuses on 
Bougainville's traditional system of beliefs, values and social organisation, 
many facets of which have survived to the present day. 
The Essential Characteristics of the Bougainvilleans 
The earliest recording of the Bougainvillean temperament appears to be that of 
Bruny d'Entrecasteaux who, in 1792, observed the locals to be "gay, and 
friendly, and astute in bargaining" (Oliver, 1973:20). Of their countenance, de 
Bougainville had written 24 years earlier "these negroes are quite naked; they 
42 Parent company of the' operators of the Panguna mine. Refer to Chapter 5. 
43 The metric tonne is 1,000 kilograms (2,204.62 pounds). 
•• Pennyweight (24 grains of troy weight). Equivalent to l.55 grams or 0.055 ounces. 
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have curled short hair, and very long ears, which are usually bored through" 
(Oliver, 1973: 19). 
de Bougainville's report of the locals' appearance overlooked their most 
distinguishing feature. Compared with the natives of the surrounding islands 
who have brown skin (disparagingly called 'redskins' by the Bougainvilleans), 
these people are "jet black" (Hannett, 1975:290). Anthropologists cannot 
explain this extreme pigmentation, as it is not found on New Ireland whence the 
Bougainvilleans originally came (Oliver, 1991). By ethnic category, Bougain-
villeans are considered Melanesian and, despite their uniform blackness, 
physical differences are evident from one region of the island to another. 
d'Entrecasteaux's observation of the Bougainvilleans' nature appears to have 
been quite accurate, as Oliver (1973:74) reports: 
... most Bougainvillians would have regarded freedom of fear, fear of unfriendly 
spirits and of hostile humans, to be a major goal in life ... Another intangible 
evidently desired by many was prestige, the renown that derives from doing 
praiseworthy deeds. In the minds of these islanders several kinds of action merited 
praise: fine craftsmanship, skilful hunting and fishing, successful magic-making, 
aggressive fighting and, most important ... open-handed generosity. 
The exchange of goods seems to have ranged from direct barter to commercial 
enterprise. Of Bougainvillean business practices, Oliver (1973:65) writes: 
In some instances people from one place took their wares to a likely meeting place, 
and ... would proceed to barter for local products, with wary bargaining on both 
sides. Elsewhere, based on longer relationships, people from two places would meet 
at an agreed time in some neutral place to barter objects at tacitly agreed-upon 
exchange rates, ie without haggling. Still another stage was reached when certain 
kinds of objects ... were used for buying more immediate consumables. [They] were 
not novices in commerce when European traders appeared on their beaches. 
This picture of a peace-seeking, generous and commercially shrewd people veils 
the savagery of continuous tribal warfare, however. Although assault by 
massed forces was unusual, members of one district would ambush members of 
another or attack them during trade meetings. Women and children were not 
spared and, where possible, victims were dismembered and skulls kept as 
trophies. Cannibalism was customary on Buka and northern Bougainville. 
Languages 
Centuries of isolation from the inhabitants of surrounding islands and the wide 
dispersement of communities (detailed below) resulted in diversified languages 
throughout Bougainville. Oliver (1973) reports that, in 1963, nineteen distinct 
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languages (11 Austronesian45 and 8 non-Austronesian) were identified. Some of 
these languages have become mixed, featuring words and phrases from 
neighbouring tongues. This phenomenon has exacerbated the island's 
fragmented community structure, thereby further increasing the heterogeneity of 
Bougainvillean society. 
Social Structure 
Most of Bougainville's population lived in tiny settlements scattered throughout 
the island, with only a few larger villages established in coastal regions. This 
meant that while Bougainville had a large number of individual clans, they were 
very small. Tribes ranged in number from about 20 persons to seldom more 
than 300 (Oliver, 1991). The basic social unit for all clans was the family, yet 
the make-up of individual households differed. Whilst the monogamous pair 
and their children was the most common pattern, some accommodations catered 
for numerous generations of family members or a man with various wives and 
their offspring. 
The most distinctive social tradition of the Bougainvilleans was their universal 
practice of matrilineal kinship whereby each person, at birth, became a member 
of his or her mother's clan. The regulation and function of these matriarchies 
differed widely from one society to the next, however; each group had its own 
customs concerning the role of men and women, religious ceremony, selection 
of spouses, hierarchy of elders, the passing of land rights, and so forth. 
The Economy 
Following European settlement, subsistence farming was supplemented by cash 
cropping and the establishment of foreign-owned copra and cacao plantations. 
Handicraft was practised in some regions, and limited 'commercial' pig raising 
and fishing took place. The spasmodic establishment of timber mills generally 
proved unsuccessful. As roads were primitive and discontinuous, most 
commodities were transported by sea (WDS46 , 1973). 
45 Austronesian is "a vast family of languages ... which originated in South China and/or 
Formosa [which] proliferated and spread throughout Southeast Asia and all over the Pacific. 
They are found in the islands of Micronesia and Polynesia, and of Melanesia, except for 
most of New Guinea and pockets of earlier, non-Austronesian languages elsewhere, 
including those of Bougainville" (Oliver, 1991:4-5). 
46 W D Scott & Co Pty Ltd. This firm was commissioned by Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd 
to obtain an independent opinion on the future possible impact of the mine for the 
period 1972 - 1990. 
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Governance 
The clans which constituted each neighbourhood varied widely in their 
cohesiveness, ranging from loose coalitions of hamlets which only became 
unified in times of threat, to well structured regional groups with defined 
economic, administrative and judicial practices. The manner in which leaders 
evolved in these societies depended upon size and unity, as explained by Oliver 
(1991:105): 
At one extreme were those tribal neighbourhoods dominated numerically, or in 
terms of land-holdings, by one particular matrilineage. In such cases the members of 
the principal matrilineage constituted an aristocracy, and their senior member a 
hereditary chief, to be succeeded by the eldest son of his eldest sister (not by his own 
son, who would of course been a member of a different matrilineage). 
At the other extreme were those tribes whose leaders earned their positions of 
authority solely by exercising military or political skills. Usually, actual fighting 
prowess was less important than the ability to gain and inspire followers ... 
.. .it appears that certain leaders, either hereditary or self-made, were skilful enough 
to extend their sway over neighbourhoods beyond their own, but such enlarged tribal 
coalitions rarely endured past the demise of the individual leader who created them. 
In this regard, the Bougainvillean culture was typical of other Melanesian 
nations which have highly dispersed power structures (McGavin, 1994). 
The Relationship between Bougainvilleans and their Land 
As reflected in the following observation by three indigenous students, land is 
the focal element of Bougainvillean society: 
Land is our life, land is our physical life - food and sustenance. Land is our social 
life; it is marriage; it is status; it is security; it is politics; in fact, it is our only 
world. When you take our land, you cut away the very heart of our existence (Cited 
in Quodling, 1991:12). 
The structure of land appropriation on Bougainville is complex because each 
community took an individual approach to tenure. Notwithstanding, Oliver 
(1991) records certain principles which prevail throughout the islands and these 
serve as a useful benchmark in understanding the system. Tribes generally 
claimed a particular geographic region and, in tum, recognised the claims of 
others. Much of the land used for economic purposes (hunting, gardening, 
residential, etc.) was possessed by individuals or groups by universal consent, 
while uninhabited areas (considered too distant from villages or too difficult to 
clear) were left unclaimed. Individuals who cleared virgin land were entitled to 
personal occupation of that area, but singular possession rarely perpetuated as 
the individual 'developer' often widened his entitlement to include other people. 
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As a result, land could be subject to full or divided ownership. Full ownership 
occurred when owner(s) possessed exclusive access or use of certain parcels of 
land, whereas property in divided ownership rested with both its residual 
owners (landlords) and its provisional owners (tenants), with the rights and 
obligations of both parties being widely agreed upon. Oliver (1991: 107-108) 
details the practical application of these arrangements: 
... a unit of land [was] held in undivided ownership by a combination of persons 
interrelated by close matrilineal ties of kinship - say, the descendants, through 
females, of a pair of sisters four generations back. Anyone of this combination 
possessed the incontestable right to garden that land. If, however, the land unit 
contained more cultivable land than its co-owners felt they needed, it was customary 
for them to lend use of some of it to less favoured kinfolk or mere neighbours. 
In a similar way it was customary for the full owners of land to permit non-owners 
temporary use of their land and its resources, provided of course the latter were 
perceived to be friendly. 
Hence, all units of occupied land in a tribe's region were identified, by full or 
residual title, with the one of the society's matrilineages. 
Apart from the economic value of land, particular locations had religious 
prominence. Every eminent matrilineal unit owned at least one sacred shrine, 
typically an unusual geographic feature, which is believed to be significant to its 
spiritual past. Different societies used these sanctuaries for a variety of 
purposes, including holding religious ceremonies, storing valued icons, and 
burying the dead. Accordingly, most Bougainvilleans had a religious connection 
to designated areas of their land. 
The intricate and diversified rights to land usage do not imply ownership in the 
Western tradition of permanent or free title. It is more a communally sanctioned 
possession. Ogan clarifies this point: "No rights to [Bougainvillean] land are 
unconditionally guaranteed. No right possessed by an individual or group is 
ever absolute" (Cited in Quodling, 1991:12). 
Polomka (l990a:2) describes two further aspects of Bougainvillean land 
customs which were to become central to the island's future; the proprietorship 
of natural assets and admission to their territory. 
Melanesian land ownership includes all resources both upon and below the land. 
Melanesian society neither allows 'outsiders' to enter their lands without the clan 
leaders' permission, nor access to land without the landowners' permission. Land 
provides the most reliable security for the clan; so clans want to keep their land 
intact. 
Imprecise as custodianship may appear, land was the hub of the Bougain-
villeans' economy, faith, and social structure. Accordingly, any interference 
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with the land or its management would inevitably lead to the disruption of their 
traditional way of life. 
THE HISTORY OF BOUGAINVILLE 
There can be little understanding of the events of the past 30 years without 
insight into the preceding 30,000. The following is a chronological account of 
Bougainville's fortunes from its first human habitation to its incorporation with 
PNG. A brief history of PNG's move to independence is also reviewed as this 
has played an elemental role in Bougainville's recent past. 
Bougainville in Pre-European Times 
It is believed that humans first came to the Bougainville Islands about 28,000 
years ago from the area now known as southern New Ireland. This hypothesis 
is founded on several factors: (i) the maximum distance between New Ireland 
and Buka via the islands of Feni and Nissan is 72 kilometres (45 miles), (ii) 
these islands are visible one to another, and (iii) the canoes used at that time 
were capable of such voyages (Lewis, cited in Oliver, 1991:1). The reason for 
the initial migration remains unclear however. 
Over the ensuing centuries, descendants of the original settlers remained isolated 
from neighbouring societies. They proliferated and dispersed, evolving into the 
diverse tribes described previously. This isolation ended some 3,200 years ago 
as other peoples settled on the islands. The descendants of the newcomers 
eventually mixed with the earlier pioneers, and the passage of time was 
accompanied by new languages and genes, plus such innovations as pottery, 
tools, domesticated animals and gardening techniques. The population of 
Bougainville-Buka at the time of European arrival is estimated at about 45,000 
(Oliver, 1991). 
The Advent of Europeans 
Details of Europe's 'discovery' of Bougainville seem contradictory. According 
to the Encyclopcedia of Papua New Guinea (1972), the Dutch navigators le 
Marie and Schouten are credited with the first sighting in 1616, followed by 
Tasman in 1643. However Oliver (1973) proposes that the first Europeans to 
see the islands were those aboard the British ship Swallow in August 1767. 
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First contact with the indigenes was made by Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, 
after whom the islands are named. Having established a French settlement in the 
Falklands in 1764, de Bougainville navigated the Pacific in La Boudeuse to 
New Guinea before returning to France via the Cape of Good Hope (Jimack, 
1988). It was during this voyage, on 4 July 1768, that he met the Bougain-
villeans as they approached his ship in canoes (Oliver, 1991). 
Other vessels followed. In 1792 d'Entrecasteaux anchored off the coast of Buka 
and engaged in trade with the natives, as did the British ship Sarah in 1812. 
From the 1820s American, French and English ships plied Bougainville's 
waters and thus the locals acquired weapons, metal tools, tobacco and cloth. 
Some Bougainvilleansjoined the vessels as crewmembers (Oliver, 1991). 
Colonisation 
Blackbirding 
Foreign exploitation of the Bougainvilleans commenced with 'blackbirding' 
around 1870. This was a form of enforced labour whereby natives were taken 
from their own land and sent to work the plantations of Queensland47 , Fiji, 
Samoa and New Britain. The cruelty of this practice is expressed by Hannett 
(1975:286): 
Untold savagery of the kind meted out by notorious kidnappers such as Dr James 
Murray ... were quite common. In one incident, when some of the kidnapped 85 
Bukas were trying to force themselves free from the hatches of the boat, Dr Murray's 
second mate burst in boasting of killing twelve niggers before breakfast. Dr 
Murray's reply was, 'My word, that's the proper way to pop them off. 
The human rights abuses of the period are etched into Bougainville's history. A 
century later, Havini reports that stories of the atrocities of blackbirding are still 
vividly remembered by many Bougainvilleans (1990a). 
Britain and Germany 
Towards the end of the 1800s, Europe began to recognise the strategic and 
political significance of the Pacific region and in 1886 an agreement between 
Britain and Germany saw the northern Solomon Islands (which includes 
Bougainville - Buka) annexed by the Germans. A further agreement transferred 
the Solomons to Britain in 1899, but the Bougainville group remained with 
Germany as a constituent of the Bismarck Archipelago (Hannett, 1975). 
47 North-eastern state of Australia. 
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Trading posts, plantations and missions were established, and the colonial 
administration in Rabaul installed an outpost at Kieta in 1905. In 1907 the 
'Bismarck Archipelago Trading Company' became Bougainville's first 
enterprise and, as Oliver (1991:31-32) describes, it marked the start of 
indentured labour for the Bougainvilleans. 
From 1899 to 1914 the principal commercial activity on Bougainville and Buka was 
growing coconuts for export. By 1914 nearly 30,000 hectares ... had been alienated 
by whites. The manual labour used in copra production was supplied mainly by the 
two islands' own indigenes. 
The usual term of contract was three years and the legal minimum wage was five 
Marks48 a month plus keep. Most employers were officially licensed to punish their 
labourers physically, usually by flogging, for breaches of discipline; and runaways 
... were forcibly returned to work ... 
On the other hand, the Administration attempted to see to it that such labourers were 
fed, housed and doctored . . . and their employers were required to repatriate them at 
the end of their contracts. 
The Administration attempted to ensure that any individual entering into a labour 
contract did so voluntarily. However, the methods whereby unsophisticated 
indigenes were usually recruited - by inducements that never materialised, or in 
terms that they did not comprehend - rendered this measure meaningless. 
The long-term absence of a labourer affected his home community. Most indigenous 
communities ... were so small and closely knit that the absence of several of their 
productive male members left them economically and socially upset ... 
Apart from plantation managers, Bougainvillean contact with Europeans at this 
time remained limited to brief visits by traders, government officials, 
journalists, scientists, and labour recruiters. 
Australia 
With Britain at war with Germany, Australian troops captured the Bismarck 
Archipelago in 1914 (World Book; 1972), heralding seven years of military 
occupation in the region. This arrangement had little impact on either the native 
or foreign inhabitants of Bougainville as Germans who took an oath of 
neutrality were free to continue their regular interests, including the extraction of 
labour from the locals. 
The fate of German New Guinea (including Bougainville) at the end of WWI 
caused some debate. For economic and military reasons Australian control was 
expected, but due to (i) an Allied commitment to 'no territorial gains', (ii) 
growing recognition that military occupation does not create sovereignty, and 
(iii) the anti-colonialist sentiment at the Versailles peace conference, in May 
48 At the time, the Mark equated to approximately one Australian shilling (10 US cents). 
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1921 the lands were proclaimed a ward of the League of Nations under mandate 
to Australia. 
Australian concern over security and econoffilc matters resulted in most 
Germans on Bougainville being repatriated and their property confiscated. Apart 
from this, Australia took little interest in, nor had a systematic· policy towards 
the region (Wolfers, 1972). On Bougainville, the new civil administration did, 
however, institute a census, initiated exploration programs, and attempted to 
establish a political influence by grouping the thinly scattered settlements into 
larger administrative units (Mamak & Bedford, 1974). 
In 1929 gold was discovered near Kupei, followed by findings at Panguna and 
Moroni in 1934 (Pacific Islands Monthly, 1974). As small-scale extraction 
began, "gold mining became the principal revenue-producing industry of the 
Territory" (Oliver, 1991:43). This new venture employed many native and 
European citizens, but as the lodes were worked out and further exploration 
failed to reveal significant mineral deposits, the mines declined and eventually 
closed in 1941. The economy then reverted to its dependence on coconuts. 
By this time, the indigenous population was estimated at 80,000. Mission and 
Administration personnel accounted for a quarter of the 4,600 Europeans, the 
remainder being engaged in plantations, shipping and merchandising. Some 
2,000 Asians, mostly Chinese, were also present on the islands (Oliver, 1991). 
Although Australia retained the German instigated labour indenture system and 
"did not make any basic changes in its legal provisions or in its operation" 
(Fitzpatrick, 1978: 103), by the late 1930s the practice was drawing criticism in 
both New Guinea and Australia. 
World War II 
As the Third Reich swept through Europe, life on the islands remained 
unchanged except for the departure of Australians who had enlisted, and the 
establishment of a guard at the Buka air-strip. In December 1941, Japan's attack 
on Hawaii marked the end of Bougainville's peace. 
When Rabaul fell in January 1942 most of Bougainville's Australian population 
was repatriated. The Japanese landed on Buka in March that year and were 
greeted as 'liberators' by many islanders (Griffin, 1990a) due to their 
representation as ethnic cousins who adhered to local customs and encouraged 
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the revival of tribal ceremonies. The Japanese were quick to capitalise on the 
Bougainvilleans' resentment of the Europeans' flight; an irritation which still 
endures (Oliver, 1991). Japan increased its troops on Bougainville after its 
defeat on Guadalcanal, and became more active in turning the villagers against 
Europeans and Chinese. 
In November 1944 five Australian infantry brigades replaced the U.S. forces 
which had landed on Bougainville in the previous year. The Australian 
offensive opened in December 1944 with 25,000 Australians opposing 40,000 
Japanese who matched them militarily, but lacked airpower (Medcalf, 1986). 
When the Allies progressively occupied the surrounding islands, Bougainville 
became isolated. As hunger and disease weakened the Japanese army, the 
... soldiers began to raid native gardens and even turned to cannibalism when faced 
with starvation. Bougainvillean reaction ... was to rise against the Japanese, causing 
much bloodshed. Thousands of Bougainvilleans lost their lives in direct and indirect 
confrontation with the Japanese (Havini, 1990a:34). 
By the time Japan surrendered, the Australians, supported by many Bougain-
villeans, had captured most of the enemy bases and were preparing for a final 
assault. The cost of liberating Bougainville was 516 Australians dead, 1572 
wounded; 8,500 Japanese were killed in action, plus 9,800 perishing from 
disease and starvation; no figures of indigenous casualties are available (Oliver, 
1991). 
The integral role played by the Bougainvilleans in the WWil is recounted by 
Havini (1990a:34 ): 
Bougainvilleans formed part of the famous Bougainville coastwatchers. These brave 
men eventually helped in the defeat of the Japanese garrison in the Solomons. It is 
sometimes said that the Bougainville coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal and 
Guadalcanal saved the Pacific. 
The true effect of the war on Bougainville is difficult to judge. Apart from the 
death, injury, and destruction occasioned by the conflict, for Bougainvilleans 
the Japanese represented yet another change of foreign 'masters' - but one more 
cruel than any they had known. 
The Post-War Years 
Two distinct yet inseparable histories influenced the situation on Bougainville 
following the war: the emergence of Papua New Guinea (PNG), and the events 
surrounding Bougainville's subsumption into PNG. At this point, PNG's 
chronicle is pursued as it establishes the wider context in which Bougainvillean 
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issues developed. Bougainville's particular circumstances are explored in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
Civil administration was re-established on 15 May 1946 as a result of the United 
Nations giving Australia exclusive trusteeship over the former Mandated 
Territory of New Guinea. The first moves towards a degree of self-government 
for Papua and New Guinea (the two regions being combined for administrative 
purposes) came in 1949 when the PNG Legislative Council was chartered. To 
ensure administrative control as well as resident representation, the Council 
comprised sixteen official members and twelve non-official members; the latter 
including three nominated natives and three members elected by the European 
population. Almost immediately, complete self-government for PNG became an 
issue. The European non-official members were most vocal in this regard while 
the "indigenous members tended to hew to the administration's line" (Oliver, 
1973: 136). Officially, Australia supported self-government, but believed 
political power should be withheld until the people were sufficiently educated to 
undertake such responsibility, possibly a century hence (Dorney, 1990). 
A United Nations mission visiting PNG in 1962 criticised both the Australian 
administration and the PNG Legislative Council because, despite enlarged 
numbers since 1961, it had only seven indigenous members. The mission 
recommended a new assembly with no special electorates for European 
members. As a result, a 64 member House of Assembly was established in 
which 10 seats were officially appointed, 10 'special electorates' were reserved 
for non-indigenous candidates, and 44 'open electorates' were available to all 
citizens (Dorney, 1990). 
Papua New Guinea Independence 
The first House of Assembly elections were held in 1964 following an intensive 
education campaign. The outcomes of these elections are reported by Oliver 
(1973:139-140): 
... over 70 per cent of the Territory's eligible voters cast their votes ... a remarkable 
turn-out for a country often characterised as politically undeveloped. Also, six out of 
the forty-four victors in the open electorates were Europeans and two were mixed 
race, an indication that all the indigenes were at that time not yet eager to go it 
entirely on their own .... the ethnic composition of the first House of Assembly was 
twenty-six Europeans, two of mixed race, and forty-six indigenes. For the first time 
in the Territory's colonial history, its indigenes were offered an opportunity to 
legislate for themselves, subject ... to the Australian government's ultimate veto 
power, and limited, in fact if not in theory, by the indigenes' experience in operating 
within the complex and alien procedures of the Westminster parliamentary system. 
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PNG's first political party, the Pangu Pati, was formed in preparation for the 
second House of Assembly elections in 1968. The United Party and the 
People's Progress Party were established shortly thereafter. Pangu Pati's 
Michael Somare (see Appendix H) took the seat of East Sepik in that election 
and became Leader of the Opposition49 • Australia's Leader of the Opposition, 
Gough Whitlam, visited PNG in 1969 and proclaimed that self-government 
should be granted by 1972 and independence by 1976. He pledged Australia's 
support in this endeavour if the ALP won office in 197250. 
The 1972 elections saw Somare leading the now 100 member House in coalition 
with independents and members of the People's Progress Party. Self-
govemment was granted on schedule on 1 December 1973, with independence 
promised for 1974. Various issues intervened however, not the least of which 
were threats of separation by both Papua and Bougainville as well as Whitlam's 
rescission of Australia's A$500 million (US$670 million), three-year aid 
promise. Independence became a reality on 16 September 1975, with Somare as 
Prime Minister. 
Today, the country is governed with a 109 member House drawn from the 19 
provinces plus the National Capital District (see Appendix I). Parliament is 
regulated by the PNG constitution which is described by Dorney (1990:215-
216) as 
... an impressive ethical document. It begins [by] defining national goals and 
directive principles. These goals and principles commit the country to the pursuit of 
integral human development; equality; political and economic independence; the use 
and replenishment of natural resources for the benefit of all; and the application of 
primarily Papua New Guinean forms of social, political and economic organisation 
to achieve development. The rights of the country's citizens to freedom of speech, 
movement, religion and assembly are all spelt out. 
Parliamentary terms are set at five years and, unlike Australia, the Prime 
Minister cannot seek the early dissolution of parliament from the Govemor-
General51. The parliament decides who should be Prime Minister, and he or she 
is subject to overthrow through votes of no confidence. 
49 Under the British Westminster system, the Leader of the Opposition is the person 
appointed as leader of that political party which does not hold government. 
so The Australian Labor Party (ALP) won government on 2 December 1972 and remained 
in office until l l November 1975. 
s• The Governor-General is the titular head of government, representing the British 
Crown. He/she may summon, adjourn and dissolve parliament, as well as appoint and 
dismiss the prime minister and other ministers. 
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BOUGAINVILLE'S RELATIONS WITH PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
As an elemental member of PNG during its colonial administration, 
Bougainville became a province of that country when PNG's independence was 
declared. The PNG constitution defines a federal system of government, 
granting its 19 provinces autonomy in all matters except defence, currency, and 
foreign affairs. North Solomons Province, which incorporates Bougainville, is 
no exception, as Islam (1990:33) explains: 
Bougainville is represented on the National Government and Parliament through its 
elected representatives. Its provincial government is composed of the elected 
members of the Bougainvilleans who also enjoy the benefits of a local government 
council [which] consists of community leaders. Bougainville has been governed by 
representative governments both at the national and provincial levels ever since 
independence. 
The notion of a united nation is more apparent than real however. PNG's 
nationhood came about rapidly, mainly due to "Canberra pushing for a quick 
end to Australia's colonial rule" (Dorney, 1990:48). But in their haste to attain 
this status, the architects of independence in Port Moresby and Canberra gave 
scant regard to the difficulties of unifying one of the "most stateless and varied 
of small societies on earth" (Lafitte, 1993:290). The legacy of attempting to 
'decolonise' a country whose 700 tribes (Polomka, 1990a) had never been 
adequately integrated during colonisation is apparent in the deep divisions which 
fragment PNG today. Nowhere is this more conspicuous than on Bougainville. 
To these people who "have never felt a kinship with the Papuans and New 
Guineans, [and] who are different from them in colour, language and culture" 
(West, 1972: 130), joining PNG seemed little more than the advent of another 
colonial administration. 
The Bougainvillean desire to escape external control has been a long-standing 
issue. The first public evidence of this came in April 1962 when several N asioi 
villagers, anxious to be free of Australia, requested a visiting UN mission to 
transfer the administration of the islands to the United States. Six years later a 
small group lodged a petition with a Bougainville MHA calling for a plebiscite 
to determine whether the island should separate from PNG. In 1975 
Bougainville declared its independence and remained apart (at least politically) 
from the national government for almost a year. Finally, in 1988 the people· 
embarked on a civil war to tear free from foreign domination. These activities 
are explored fully in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Bougainville's environment has largely defined its human biography. The 
island's isolation, terrain and thick vegetation explains in part the uniqueness 
and cultural diversity of its people, its strategic and political importance, its low 
agricultural value, and its relatively low economic exploitation. While the 
climate is detrimental to the health of humans and destroys virtually all man-
made materials, it supports a fragile eco-system on which the islanders depend. 
Bougainvillean life has three defining elements. Firstly, the people are unique. 
In appearance, language, and social customs, they are different from their island 
neighbours. Secondly, being Bougainvillean is not a comprehensively shared 
sense of character or loyalty. Given the size and isolation of social units, the 
people do not think of themselves as Bougainvillean; to them, the collective 
'we' is an individual and relatively small grouping. Thirdly, in keeping with 
Melanesian tradition, Bougainvilleans are at one with their land. Land is not 
only the sustainer of temporal life, but also central to tribal identity and mystic 
beliefs. 
In the past two centuries, foreign interference has irreversibly changed the 
Bougainvillean way of life. Although many other peoples in the region were 
subjected to similar invasion, Bougainville is unusual in that it was unilaterally 
ceded to Britain, Germany, Australia (twice), Japan, and PNG within 75 years. 
The injustice of this experience, together with the Bougainvillean perception of 
being a race apart, has resulted in a general distrust of 'outsiders' and repeated 
attempts to be recognised as an independent nation. Perhaps the Bougainvillean 
attitude towards foreigners is best summed in the remarks of an Australian 
Government official (Cited in West, 1972:130): 
These Bougainvilleans are anti-Europeans, anti-Australian especially, anti-Chinese -
in fact, just about anti-everybody. They just don't want us or our Government. Least 
of all do they want the "redskins" of Papua and New Guinea. 
Clearly, Bougainville's social and political history did not provide an ideal 
environment for the establishment of a new mining venture, particularly one 
predominantly owned by Australia and the PNG government. However the 
Panguna copper mine was developed and, as discussed in the following 
chapter, management was compelled to conduct its affairs within the particular 
constraints of its hosts. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE OPERATION, MANAGEMENT AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE PANGUNA COPPER MINE 
OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTER 
The primary objective of this chapter is to provide a history of the Panguna 
copper mine and detail the consequences of its presence on Bougainville. 
Commencing with the initial mineral exploration in 1963 and concluding with 
the mine's last full year of production in 1988, the following presents an 
overview of Panguna's corporate and productive characteristics, management's 
relationship with its hosts, and the operation's impact on its social, cultural and 
physical environment. Particular attention is focused on the company's efforts 
to balance its commercial priorities and social responsibilities with the diverse, 
and often conflicting, demands of the host communities and the host country. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PANGUNA MINE 
This section explains the history and structure of the company which was 
chartered to operate the Panguna mine, and describes the prospecting and 
inaugural developmental phase of the project (1963 to 1970). The company's 
early involvement with the Bougainvillean people is investigated, and its 
·preliminary negotiations with local landowners and the PNG authorities are 
examined. 
Bougainville Copper Limited 
The Rio Tinto Company was established in England in 1873, taking its name 
from the Rio Tinto region of Spain from which copper has been extracted for 
some 3,000 years. In 1962, the company merged with another British mining 
firm, Consolidated Zinc (CZC) to form Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation Limited 
(RTZ). RTZ is involved in the extraction, processing and marketing of minerals, 
via subsidiaries and associated companies, throughout the world. 
The 1962 merger resulted in the joining of Consolidated Zinc Proprietary 
(CZC's Australian subsidiary) and Rio Tinto Mining Company of Australia 
Limited to form Conzinc-Riotinto of Australia (CRA). Following the discovery 
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of substantial ore deposits on Bougainville, CRA registered Bougainville 
Mining Ltd and a further subsidiary, Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd (BCP), with 
a view to developing the resources in the island's Panguna region. In 
accordance with PNG's Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Ordinance 
1967, the government took up a 20.2 per cent interest in BCP in 1970 and the 
following year saw Bougainville Mining Ltd make a public issue. A 
reorganisation in 1973 eliminated Bougainville Mining Ltd from the ownership 
structure and BCP was established as a public company, incorporated in PNG, 
under the name Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL) (Vernon & Wells, 1986). 
Figure 5.1 shows the subsequent distribution of equity. 
Figure 5.1 Ownership and Capital Structure of Bougainville Copper Ltd 
PNG Government 
20.2% 
Rio Tinto-Zinc Corp. Public 
80.6% 19.4% 1----
Conzinc RioTinto of Australia 
53.6% 
Public 
26.2% 
, _______ __ 
Bougainville Copper Limited 
Equity Capital: 
• 267,375,000 shares@ A$0.50 per share. 
• 51,664 shareholders, 8002 of which are PNG investors. 
• 20 largest shareholders own 79.93% of the equity. 
Debt Capital (December 31, 1972): 
• Bank of America consortium loans 
(a) Seven-year loans 
(b) Intermediate term loans 
• Japanese bank cash loan 
• Japanese equipment loan 
• Export-Import Bank loan 
• Australian loans and guarantees 
• Commonwealth Savings bank of 
Australia housing loan 
US$67.4 million 
US$96.0 million 
US$30.0 million 
US$23.l million 
US$54.6 million 
A$2 l .2 million 
A$12.5 million 
(Source: Annual Reports, 1972 and 1973, Bougainville Mining Limited. Cited in Allan, G 
B, Hammond, JS and Wells, L T (1974). Bougainville Copper Ltd. President and Fellows 
of Harvard College. Harvard Business School case 9-174-104.) 
Negotiations between CRA and the Villagers 
For both the Bougainvilleans and CRA, the most frustrating issue surrounding 
the founding of the Panguna mine was the lack of understanding each party had 
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of the other. This was not born of insensitivity or intransigence, rather it turned 
on the cultural and legal gulf between the two. 
The Difficulties Experienced by the Company 
In its early dealings on Bougainville, CRA was ignorant of the people, their 
languages, and their societal arrangements52 • Conscious of this, and the 
potential difficulties of such a situation, the company allowed its geological 
pioneers to come to equitable arrangements with the villagers as they saw fit, 
according to individual encounters. K. M. Phillips (see Appendix J), who led 
the first exploration party in 1964, engaged the services of a Niuginian53 to 
assist in negotiations with the locals. Of this endeavour, Phillips (cited m 
Quodling, 1991 :98-99) noted: 
Neville Robinson was a native gold mining assistant with the ... Land Department 
based in Moresby but with most PNG contact with Highlands people in the late 
1950s/early 1960s. Robbie ... himself generated the idea that he should act as our 
liaison ... Although his background of dealing with highlander primitives was the 
wrong one for Bougainville we felt it was better than nothing at all ... 
Similarly, the architects of the CRA's procedural operations on Bougainville 
were 'navigating uncharted waters'. Quodling (1991:46) notes that " ... policies 
had to be established in a virtual vacuum, since there was little in the way of 
precedent to call on throughout developing countries and virtually none within 
the Melanesian land ownership culture". 
When the viability of the Panguna venture became apparent, the company's need 
to understand and communicate with the villagers intensified. Accordingly, the 
assistance of Australian universities was sought but, due to the prevailing 
political climate, "Australian academics were loathe to be seen helping mining 
companies in those days" (Vernon, Personal communication, 1995). CRA 
subsequently enlisted the aid of anthropologist Douglas Oliver (see Appendix 
K), who recalls: 
From 1968 to 1978 I was employed by Bougainville Copper Ltd as a part-time 
consultant, to advise the company on how to conduct their operations so as to shield 
Bougainvillians as much as possible from the harms that inevitably accompany such 
mining. (199l:xiv) 
52 This problem was multi-dimensional. Given the diverse nature of Bougainvillean 
communities (refer Chapter 4), the customs and language of the villagers encountered 
by the exploration party often differed from one another, thus knowledge gained at 
one settlement did necessarily apply in another locality. 
53 The term 'Niuginian' is Pidgin (an English-based language widely used in PNG) for 
New Guinean, and is commonly used in reference to PNG natives. The name is not 
applied to the indigenes of islands beyond the PNG mainland, irrespective of their 
PNG citizenship. 
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Thus, initially obliged to deal with the locals in an "ad hoe, play-it-by-ear 
manner" (Oliver, 1991:151), followed by reliance on "the studies of 
anthropologists in Melanesia" (Carruthers & Vernon, 1990:1), CRA embarked 
on the development of the Panguna mine. Although the future would bring 
accusations of corporate apathy towards the natives54 , CRA appeared to be 
committed to constructive arrangements with the Bougainvilleans during the 
establishment phase, but was uncertain as to how these arrangements might be 
achieved. 
The Difficulties Experienced by the Bougainvilleans 
When exploration commenced, the Bougainvilleans were unaware of Australia's 
Mining Ordinance 1927-40 which governed prospecting and mining in the 
trustee territory. Under this legislation, all sub-surface mineral rights were 
vested in the government which meant: 
• prospectors were not required to obtain the locals' permission to search or 
work on their land; 
• mining organisations were obliged to negotiate the terms of land access or 
compensation with the Australian/PNG government rather than the host 
society55 ; and 
• rental for land and royalties derived from mining was to be paid to the 
Administration for the benefit of the entire Territory. There was no provision 
for recompensing the actual landowners apart from an obligation to pay for 
disturbance and/or damage to buildings, trees and gardens. 
Not only were such laws alien to Bougainvillean society, but "to be acknow-
ledged as owner of the land's surface and not of the things under it, was 
difficult to comprehend and virtually impossible to accept" (Oliver, 1991:126). 
By excluding from negotiation and substantial compensation those whose lives 
would be most affected by the mining operations, the Administration spawned a 
divisive relationship between the villagers and the company. The people felt 
bewildered and aggrieved, and CRA was hampered in its efforts to ameliorate 
these feelings. 
54 See, for example, the 'Bougainville Initiative' discussed later in this chapter. 
55 Insistence that land acquisition was solely a matter for the Administration was 
designed (ostensibly) to prevent the exploitation of local people (Carruthers & 
Vernon, 1990:66). 
122 
Exploration 
Hopes of resurrecting the island's mining exploits of the 1930s to a commercial 
scale were generally regarded "by expatriate officials and planters as a pathetic 
pipe-dream" (Oliver, 1973:157). However, possibilities were revived in 1960 
when an Administration geologist examining land in the Kupei area discovered 
the presence of low-grade copper deposits. As new technology enabled the 
profitable mining of low-grade ore, in 1963 New Broken Hill Consolidated Ltd 
and CRA formed a joint venture, CRA Exploration (CRAB), to determine the 
feasibility of mining on Bougainville. Under the terms of PNG's Mining 
Ordinance 1927-40, CRAB gained prospecting rights to 630 square kilometres 
(243.25 square miles) between 1963 and 1965 (Bedford & Mamak, 1977). 
Phillips' exploration party arrived at Kieta (see Figure 5.2) in April 1964. 
Proceeding to Kupei, they conferred with members of that village plus members 
from surrounding communities to explain the CRAB' s plans and the provisions 
of the prospecting rights. Vernon (see Appendix J) claims that the meeting was 
fruitful, and "the people appeared to be quite satisfied with [the] discussions and 
gave CRA every co-operation" (cited in Bedford & Marnak, 1977:8). In August 
however, Oni (chief Bougainvillean spokesman at the April conference) 
unexpectedly told Phillips that CRA was not welcome, and asked the group to 
leave the area. At a subsequent meeting attended by representatives of the 
District Administration56 , the landowners consented to the company's activities. 
Exploratory drilling commenced in the November, but many locals remained 
opposed to the operations despite CRA's payment for timber and produce, and 
its policy to employ only people from the area. As the geologists' activities 
extended over a larger area, resentment to their presence increased. The deterior-
ating situation at that time is recorded by Phillips (cited in Quodling, 1991:102): 
Meanwhile discussions with the people on the subject of what they were going to 
get out of it all increased in frequency - often these were with Oni and a few 
villagers ... But Denehy [see Appendix K] and I were becoming more worried about 
what future obstacles might arise. 
In June/July 1965 I was away in the U.S. for about five weeks ... My replacement ... 
tried to push the program along too vigorously and [sent] a party into Mainoki 
without any forewarning. They were told to go home and despite lengthy discussions 
with Denehy the next day refused to change their attitude - a situation which still 
exists... On my return ... we were being asked to confine our activities to the 
Eastern side of the Kawerong. 
56 The District Administration during this period was responsible to the PNG House of 
Assembly for overseeing government policy on Bougainville. 
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Figure 5.2 Major Roads and Principal Urban Areas (1972) 
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(Source: Oliver, D (1973). Bougainville. A Personal History. 
Carlton: Melbourne University Press, page 137). 
Matters were exacerbated by the use of helicopters between Kieta and the 
drilling sites. In places, locals had set i tambu (forbidden) signs on their land 
which could not be seen from the air. The explorers' apparent disregard of the 
notices understandably increased the people's hostility. 
In the light of these developments, Phillips, Denehy and Haddon King (see 
Appendix J) travelled to Port Moresby to advise the PNG Administration of 
their problems, the locals' objections as they perceived them, and to suggest 
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solutions. Little resulted from this submission except assurances that the 
Administration would do all it could to enable the team to carry out its mission. 
On his return, wanting to work on land occupied by the Moroni and Pakia 
communities, Phillips negotiated directly with the natives and, by promising to 
provide a water supply to the Moroni township, gained agreement to work on 
their land. In other areas entry was denied as the people waited to see what 
benefits and damages accrued from the work at Moroni before they considered 
granting access to the prospectors. 
Despite this enclave of consensus, other events added to the growing antipathy 
between the company and the Bougainvilleans. Due to a combination of the 
withdrawal of labour by men from Guava and Kokorei and the general 
unreliability of the local workforce (Bedford & Mamak, 1977), CRAE was 
forced to recruit employees from other areas of the island which was contrary to 
its undertaking to the local landowners. In early 1966, five men from the Guava 
region were imprisoned when they dismantled a company campsite. Although 
the exact charges against the men are unclear57, the action represented the first 
forceful action taken against the Bougainvilleans. 
Negotiations between CRA Exploration and the 
Papua New Guinea Government 
By 1966, when prospecting in the Panguna Valley had revealed the potential of 
massive deposits of copper and gold bearing ore, there was "a very strong fear 
amongst the landowners that the Company and Administration were going to 
'steal their land"' (Bedford & Mamak, 1977: 10). The resultant opposition to 
exploration activities was now threatening the continuance of the program. 
CRAE, frustrated by the ongoing confusion and hindrance, and Territorial 
officials, concerned that CRAB might cease operations, began to pressure the 
District Administration to (i) enforce the land access provisions of the Mining 
Ordinance 1928-40, and (ii) amend the legislation to permit the payment of 
occupation fees to landowners within the Prospecting Authority. Oliver 
(1991: 131) reasons that the payment of fees was motivated by "a wish to reduce 
local opposition to the prospecting, along with an evidently sincere desire to 
compensate the affected owners for use of their lands". 
57 Bedford and Mamak (1977: 10) claim they were convicted for forcibly ejecting 
geologists from their land, while Phillips (cited in Quodling, 1991: 107) maintains 
they were indicted for damaging property. 
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The 1966 Mining Ordinance 
Originally refusing to consider that any part of minerals income should go to 
landholders (King, cited in Carruthers & Vernon, 1990), but realising the 
political necessity of paying the locals for the use of their land, the PNG 
government moved to revise the Ordinance in 1966 to include compensation 
with regard to: 
• damage to surface and improvements (including economic trees and crops); 
• loss of surface rights and access; 
• consequential damage; and 
• payment of occupation fees for private land subject to Prospecting Authorities 
at the rate of A$1 (US$1.45) per acre58 and mining tenements at the rate of 
A$2 (US$2.90) per acre59 • 
These proposals did not allow for any payment of mining income to the locals, 
but when the bill was debated in June 1966 the House of Assembly was forced 
to consider the question of such royalties. Paul Lapun (see Appendix L) 
proposed that five per cent of the total royalty paid to the Administration be 
returned to the owners of the affected land. Lapun was supported by other 
Niuginian members, but the amendment was lost by 8 votes. The defeat of the 
proposal "only added to the confusion on Bougainville and made those hostile to 
CRAE's operation even more determined to reject the whole mining operation" 
(Bedford & Mamak, 1977:15). Lapun again brought the royalty issue before the 
House in November 1966 and on this occasion his amendment was successful. 
Regardless of having gained compensation for occupation and damages plus 
royalties for the value of the minerals, many Bougainvilleans still resisted the 
company's intrusion onto their land. Police were required to escort surveying 
and prospecting parties operating outside established drilling sites. Losing 
patience with the villagers' objections, the Administration strengthened its 
resolve to preserve CRAE's presence, as is evidenced in the House of Assembly 
debate records (Vol. 1, No. 12, 2308) of February 1967: 
... this House ... fully supports the present prospecting programmes and proposed 
future activities of large mining companies in the Territory ... and ... declares its hope 
that these activities will lead to the sustained production of minerals and the 
establishment of a stable industry (cited in Bedford & Mamak, 1977:19). 
58 A$2.47 (US$3.58) per hectare. 
59 A$4.94 (US$7.16) per hectare. 
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The 1967 Agreement 
While the legislature debated the compensation issues associated with the 
proposed venture, CRA was negotiating the conditions under which it might 
develop the Panguna ore deposit. In August 1967 the PNG House of Assembly 
passed the Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Ordinance 1967, under 
which the company completed its evaluations, constructed facilities and 
commenced production. Oliver ( 1991: 134-135) reports the principal provisions 
of this Act as: 
• the approval of current leases; 
• an option for the Administration to take up to 20 per cent equity in the mining 
company (at par) once feasibility was established; 
• an undertaking by the company to complete current investigations and finalise 
all necessary construction required for mining, processing and shipping within 
five years; 
• an undertaking by the company to provide roads, port facilities, and off-site 
housing for employees; 
• the company was bound to erect and temporarily fund a hospital on behalf of 
the Administration; 
• the provision of a three year tax holiday, following which 20 per cent of net 
revenues from copper sales would be tax exempt; 
• a 50 per cent ceiling on total imposts until the twenty sixth year of operations, 
thereafter increasing by one per cent each year up to 66 per cent; and 
• a royalty of 1.25 per cent of the 'free on board' value of concentrate produced 
to be paid to the Administration. 
Of this arrangement, Carruthers and Vernon (1990:64) note: 
Given that CRA was taking ail the risks on exploration and feasibility, this was an 
offer unprecedented in mining projects in under-developed countries, and to the 
authors' knowledge, has still not been matched voluntarily by any other company 
anywhere in the world. 
During the negotiation with the Australian Government representatives, Frank Espie 
(the first Chairman of Bougainville Copper) consistently maintained that what he 
wanted was an agreement which, while providing a viable operation, would be seen 
as satisfactory by the first Prime Minister of an independent Papua New Guinea. 
Advance contacts with overseas markets for copper concentrate were negotiated 
for the fifteen years following the commencement of production. Japan agreed 
to 1,025,000 tonnes (C008,800 tons), Germany required 787,500 tonnes 
(775,060 tons), and Spain 180,000 tonnes (177,160 tons). Over time, 
substantial sales were also made to the People's Republic of China, South 
Korea and the Philippines (Oliver, 1991). 
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The feasibility studies were completed in 1969 and the decision to proceed was 
taken shortly thereafter. Total expenditure on the project thus far stood at 
A$21.43 million (US$31 million). Major construction began in July 1969 under 
the management of Bechtel-Western Knapp Engineering. 
The Arawa and Rorovana Land Disputes 
As the minesite area was an unsuitable location for a township to accommodate 
company personnel, it was decided to establish a village on the east coast. Three 
venues were considered in 1968: the Rorovana area, the Tunuru mission, and a 
plantation at Arawa Bay owned by an Australian named McK.illop. The former 
was found to be too small, and while the company favoured Tunuru, (Bedford 
& Mamak, 1977) the Administration (being responsible for land procurement) 
chose to acquire the Arawa plantation plus 150 hectares (370.6 acres) of 
adjacent Bougainvillean-owned land (refer to circled area in figure 5.3). 
Figure 5.3 Detail of the Arawa Land Acquisition 
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(Source: Bedford, R D and Mamak, A F ( 1977). Compensating for Development: 
The Bougainville Case. Christchurch: Bougainville Special Publications, page 28). 
This decision was primarily based on the assumption that resuming the bulk of 
the land from a European would arouse less opposition than if the entire require-
ment was taken from Bougainvilleans (Oliver, 1991). Although McKillop was 
not willing to leave his property, he sold it under threat of compulsory 
acquisition. 
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Due to McKillop's personal popularity and resistance to the forced sale of any 
Bougainvillean land, the purchase met strong opposition from McKillop's 
indigenous neighbours. At a meeting in Kieta in April 1969, the 1,200 attendees 
passed a resolution which (i) protested the lack of consultation over land 
matters, (ii) condemned the notion of compulsory acquisitions, and (iii) 
requested the Arawa decision be reversed. When presented to the House of 
Assembly in June, the Administration "would not review their decision on the 
site for the town and refused to bring BCL directly into negotiations with either 
McKillop or the Arawa villagers" (Bedford & Mamak, 1977:24). However, the 
annexure of the 150 hectares of local land was postponed. 
At that time, another dispute over land acquisition had arisen. In 1964 CRA had 
purchased expatriate-owned land on Anewa Bay which it used as a base for its 
survey ship. Deciding this site would be ideal for its port and power station, the 
company requested the Administration acquire an adjoining 70 hectare coconut 
grove belonging to the Rorovana people. The Rorovanans refused to either sell 
or lease the property. At first, the Administration disallowed work to commence 
in the area until a settlement had been reached but, under pressure from the 
company, ordered sorveyors to commence on 1 August 1969 warning the 
Rorovanans that the land would be leased by compulsion if they did not relent. 
The resultant confrontation between the locals and CRA workers drew such 
adverse media coverage in PNG and Australia that the Administration requested 
BCL to halt construction until "a better understanding could be reached with 
landowners" (Bedford & Mamak, 1977:25). For three months the problem was 
debated at meetings in Bougainville, Melbourne and Canberra. Oliver 
(1991:141) reports the outcomes: 
The Rorovanans held out for a higher price; but the Administration did not want to 
allow a precedent for land acquisition elsewhere. Finally, in order to avoid very 
costly delays in the mining project - estimated by the company to be around 
[A]$30,000 a day - the Administration gave in to the company's urgings. It 
negotiated an agreement with the landowners that included a leasehold occupation fee 
of [A]$7000 per annum for 56 hectares ... plus a large lump-sum payment to 
compensate the owners for the destruction of buildings already on the land. In 
addition, the owners were given an option of purchasing 7000 shares in the company 
when the first issue was made. 
The Rorovana agreement set a number of precedents which were considered a 
substantial breakthrough for both the company and the Bougainvilleans, and it 
was hoped these developments would reduce land access problems: 
• The Administration agreed to provide the owners' village with an access road 
and electricity (Oliver, 1991). 
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• In 1970, the landowners agreed to lease the 150 hectares which BCL required 
for Arawa (above) for 99 years at an annual rental of A$18,600 (US$27,500) 
subject to periodic review, and payment of A$40,000 (US$57,000) in lieu of 
existing improvements (Bedford & Mamak, 1977). 
• The company was now allowed to become more active in land acquisition and 
compensation issues, as it had consistently sought, although still under 
government supervision (Carruthers & Vernon, 1990). 
THE PANGUNA MINING COMPLEX 
The Panguna mine commenced production in 1972. Massive both in dimensions 
and output (Connell, 1990b), its domination of Bougainville is evident when 
considered in the context of its remote and undeveloped setting. Oliver (1991) 
notes the industrial, domiciliary and civic components of the complex: 
•At Panguna 
- The open-cut pit and the crushing and concentrating facilities, 
- 323 family residences and a number of two-bedroom flats, 
- ten three-storey blocks of rooms for single employees, 
- dining halls, a supermarket, sports facilities, an olympic-size swimming 
pool, a cinema, and an interdenominational chapel. 
• At Arawa (the provincial capital, 30 kilometres (18.6 miles) from Panguna) 
- 399 houses, 
- a hospital and other community facilities, 
- commercial stores and offices. 
• At Loloho (on Anewa Bay) 
- The concentrate processing and storage areas, 
- the port capable of berthing ships of up to 40,000 tonnes (39,350 tons), 
- a 135MW oil-fired power station (the output of which doubled the amount 
of electricity generated throughout the rest of PNG at the time). 
• Infrastructure 
- Sealed roads connecting the towns and sites, 
- the pipeline carrying the concentrate from Panguna to Loloho, 
- an electricity grid, 
- disposal facilities for the over-burden and tailings, and 
- a pumping station to lift 140 million60 gallons of water per day from the 
Jaba River to Panguna, 11 kilometres (6.8 miles) east. 
60 168 million US gallons I 636.43 million litres. 
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The locations of these facilities arc shown in Figure 5.4 
Figure 5.4 Location of the Panguna Mining Facilities on Dougaioville 
(Source: Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea. l 972. Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, page 93). 
Brown (1974) records the cost of the complex at this point as A$400 million 
(US$477.2 million). Moulik (1977) notes that, of the islands' total area of 
9,250 square kilometres, the mining leases covered 150 square kilometres (60 
square miles) being 1.6 per cent of the landmass, 70 per cent of which was 
related to tailings disposal (refer Figure 5.5). Despite this relatively small area, 
BCL's operations encompassed four language groups (Quodling, 1991). 
In simple terms, the mine's operational process was as follows. Earth was 
excavated from the pit at an average rate of 155,000 tonnes (152,500 tons) per 
day (Gilles, 1977). The waste, amounting to 70,000 tonnes (68,894 tons) per 
day, was moved to the Kawerong Valley and the remaining 85,000 tonnes 
(83,657 tons) - containing approximately 0.5 per cent copper and 0.5 grams/ton 
gold - was concentrated by way of a flotation process. The tailings61 from this 
process flowed into the Jaba River, whilst the concentrate was pumped as a 
slurry through a 25 kilometre (15.5 mile) pipeline to the port at Loloho. At the 
61 Tailings are the liquefied waste produced by the 'flotation' method of extracting 
minerals from ore. This is discussed in more detail in the following section. 
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Figure 5.5 Ilougainville Copper Limited's Mining Leases 
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Carlton: St Leonards: Centre for Independent Studies Limited, page xii. 
port, the slurry was filtered and dried ready for export. The low ratio of 
recoverable ore to gross material excavated explains the huge size of the pit. 
Eventually measuring 1 kilometre by 1.5 kilometres (0.62 by 0.93 miles) at the 
rim and 600 metres (1,970 feet) deep, Panguna became the world's third largest 
open-cut pit (Dorney, 1990). A diagram of the ore extraction procedure appears 
in Figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6 Schematic of BCL's Process for Producing Copper Concentrate 
1.0PEN PIT MINING, PANGUNA 
The Panguna copper mine Is an open pll. The ore, of approximately V..% copper, wlll be 
extracted by digging a large hole wllh huge shovels. Giant trucks will carry away 100 tons 
at a tlma, aome of which Is waste and some copper-bearing ore. 
2. PRIMARY CRUSHING 
The ore to be treated goes first Into a machine which prepares It for concentratlnp by 
crushing It to a smaller size. The Panguna concentrator handles 90,000 short tons o ore 
each day. 
3.COARSE ORE STOCKPILE 
After primary crushing the ore Is taken by conveyor bell to the stockpile. From here the 
concentrating process begins lls three stages-line crushing, grinding and flotation. 
Considerable electric power Is needed for concentrating. 
4.FINE CRUSHING 
Fine crushing consists of two further stages lo reduce the size of the ore. Secondary 
crushing reduces the ore from pieces less than 8 Inches to pieces ol leas than one hall 
Inch. 
5.SCREEN HOUSE 
The acreen house checks the size of the ore. Any pieces greater than one hall Inch are 
retumed to the crushing process before further screening. 
6. FINE ORE STORAGE 
To feed the concentrator wllh a consistent supply, fine ore will be stored In a large shed 
that can. hold 80,000 short tons. 
7. CONCENTRATOR-GRINDING 
The second stage In 'Concentrating Is the grinding of the fine ore until II becomes fine 
partlcle&-llke sand. Grinding at Panguna will be done In eight ball mllla which will use 
about 20,000 tons of Iron grinding balls a year. 
8. CONCENTRATOR-FLOTATION 
Flotallon separates the valuable copper and other minerals from the rock by agitating the 
fine ore In water containing chemicals. The concentrate produced contain• about 30% 
copper. Tailings, which are left over alter llotallon, are not wanted and are dlspoaed of. 
9.CONCENTRATE PIPELINE OVER MOUNTAINS 
The concentrate mixed wllh water ls then pumped In a steel pipeline over the Crown Prince 
mountain range to the port at Anewa Bay. The pipeline ls burled under the shoulder of the 
mine-port road. 
10.CONCENTRATE FILTERING AND DRYING 
The final process before shipment Is to reduce the water content of the concentrate. This 
Is done al the port by vacuum llllerlng and rotary kiln drying. The concentrate at this atage 
la almost dry. 
11.CONCENTRATE STORAGE 
Near the wharf Is a shed to hold 60,000 short tons of concentrate. From this stockpile will 
be drawn the loads of concentrate to be shipped. 
12.SHIPMENT OVERSEAS 
The ahlp loading machine can put· 1,000 tons of concentrate per hour Into a ship's hold. 
The average shipment to the overseaa buyers will be approximately 20,000 tons. 
(Source: Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea. 1972. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, page 97). 133 
THE MANAGEMENT OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
ISSUES DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF THE MINE 
This section explores the dealings between the mine and the Bougainvilleans as 
the operation increasingly affected life on the island. Particular attention is paid 
to the social initiatives instigated by Panguna's management and the manner in 
which compensation issues were addressed. The role of the PNG government in 
the relationship between the mine and the landowners is also examined. The 
period under review includes the construction phase (1970-1972) and the early 
productive years of the mine (1972-1975). 
The Re-negotiation of the 1967 Mining Agreement 
Between 1972 and 1975 the mine's political and economic environment changed 
dramatically from the company's original predictions. PNG was self-governing 
with independence imminent, and Panguna's profitability had far exceeded 
expectations (partly due to huge increases in world copper prices, which were to 
collapse in 1975). In response to these developments, PNG unexpectedly 
moved to extinguish many of BCL's concessions and attempted to design a 
more equitable distribution of profits between the company and the nation. 
Quodling ( 1991 :24) interprets the· government's actions thus: "BCL's affluence 
relative to the PNG economy was a catalyst for denunciation of the 'colonial' 
agreement and a 'renegotiate or legislate' ultimatum from the government." 
Accordingly, the company's rights and obligations were redefined by the 
Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Amendment Act 1974, under which: 
• the tax-exempt period was terminated as from 1January1974, rather than one 
year later; 
• the 20 per cent tax exemption for copper sales was removed; 
• a company tax at the marginal rate of 70 per cent was imposed when taxable 
income exceeded a specified threshold; 
• BCL was forbidden to commence new exploration (even in extant Prospecting 
Authorities) without government approval; and 
• the agreement would be reviewed every seven years (see below). 
Of these revisions, Carruthers and Vernon (1990:65) propose that although "it. 
was widely interpreted as evidence of a new nation's determination and 
competence . . . company-government relations after the renegotiation remained 
cordial and cooperative". 
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Clause 26a of the 1974 amendment provided that the parties "shall meet together 
during the seventh year after (1974) and at intervals of seven years thereafter, 
with a view to considering in good faith whether this agreement is continuing to 
operate fairly to each of them and with a view to discussing in good faith any 
problems arising from the practical operation of this agreement". The 
subsequent reviews did not eventuate however62 • 
The Social and Political Policies of CRA/BCL 
Local Involvement 
The company was always cognisant that the interests of all parties could be best 
served by dealing directly with the landowners. Not only was there an ethical 
need for dialogue with those whose land was being disturbed, management was 
ambitious to "ensure that the people within the Prospecting Authorities ... 
benefited from any development which might take place" (Carruthers & Vernon, 
1990:65). Further, consultation with the locals was a practical necessity; 
Administration staff lacked the skills required to act as mediators, native social 
arrangements and land tenure was not understood, and official records of land 
custody were non-existent. Hence, despite the legal prohibition, company 
personnel had no choice but to negotiate access to sites by asking 
.. .'the natives' who owned what, and to assume that unchallenged statements made 
by what appeared to be a village's most authoritative (or most vocal!) 'leader' were 
true (Oliver, 1991:127). 
In time, this approach would lead to further problems, but it served to gain 
locally sanctioned admission to sites as well as establish communication 
between the parties. 
At the formal level, the company instituted the Village Relations Program. 
Through this initiative, Village Relations Officers were recruited from the 
townships surrounding the mine to keep the locals informed about the 
company's activities, advise them on compensation matters, assist with the 
establishment of businesses, provide information on crops and livestock, and to 
mediate between Bougainvillean and expatriate employees. Communication with 
62 A past BCL executive advised the author that, although a meeting between the 
company and the national government had been scheduled for 1981, it did not proceed 
because: "(i) BCL insisted that the Bougainville Provincial Government be 
represented; (ii) the PNG National Government could not reach agreement with the 
Provincial Government on the revenue split between the two and so; (iii) the 
Provincial Government refused to participate in the review. The company felt there 
was no future in reviewing that agreement without the Bougainvilleans and so nothing 
happened." 
135 
the villagers was done directly, or through the various Missions or meetings of 
the Local Government Councils (Carruthers & Vernon, 1990). 
Compensation for Loss and Damage 
Although the compensation agreements of 1966 and 1969 appeared satisfactory, 
many other related matters followed. Despite provisions in the Mining 
Ordinance 1927-40 for landowner compensation for damage or disturbance to 
buildings and flora, few claims were made during the exploration phase because 
activities were mainly confined to areas remote from villages. The 1966 
amendments to the Ordinance provided for the appointment of a Mining Warden 
to handle such claims and hear cases which might arise (refer Appendix M). As 
operations became more extensive, claims began to escalate, and by early 1970 
the Warden's Court had heard around 350 cases. Whilst "in the great majority 
the [court's] judgement was accepted by both parties" (Bedford & Mamak:, 
1977:31), a schedule of compensation was devised to expedite settlement (refer 
Appendix N). Under the revised compensation system, liaison between 
landowners and the company rested in the first instance with the Village 
Relations Office (VRO), and claims unable to be settled in this manner were 
heard by the Mining Warden. Whilst this approach was generally acceptable to 
all involved, the settlement of various claims proved difficult. Those 
compensation issues which were of particular concern related to cash crops, 
relocating communities, nuisance, occupation fees, fishing, and native forests. 
These are discussed below in tum. 
Since the establishment of plantations decades before, coconut, cocoa and coffee 
had largely supported the Bougainville economy. The Administration had set a 
schedule of compensation for damage to these crops, and in 1968 remuneration 
stood at A$2 (US$2.80) per mature coconut palm and A$1 (US$1.40) per 
coffee plant. In 1969 excavations for the construction of a road in the Pinei 
valley caused flooding which extensively damaged crops in the area. With cocoa 
and copra prices high at the time, a Mainku village planter named Benggong 
lodged a claim for A$30 (US$42) per cocoa tree per annum to be paid during 
the life of the mine. At the Warden's Court hearing of the case in October_ 1969 
BCL resisted the claim arguing that the compensation it paid in this region 
should be the same as that for other areas (a sum already in excess of the 
Administration's schedule). The company also sought lump sum settlements 
rather than periodical payments. Bedford and Mamak: (1977:34) describe the 
proceedings at the hearing: 
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No decision ... was taken at this Court and over the next few months BCL sought 
advice ... from agricultural officers in the Administration .... there was general 
disagreement with the principle of paying rates to local growers which were on a par 
with those given to an expatriate planter. An offer of $5 per tree was considered to be 
quite adequate by the Administration. Department of Agriculture officials were 
concerned that BCL should not establish precedents with their compensation for cash 
crops. 
Benggong's claim was considered to be an important test case by all parties. The 
settlement would undoubtedly set precedents for other cash crops ... The presence of 
extensive coconut and cocoa groves in the area being considered for tailings disposal 
was also influencing BCL's attitude to the case: a decision favouring the plaintiff 
would be potentially very expensive to the Company. 
The Court gave judgment in April 1970, ordering BCL to reimburse Benggong 
A$35 (US$49) per tree by monthly instalments over 42 years. BCL successfully 
challenged the decision, claiming the Warden had acted ultra vires of the Mining 
Ordinance 1927-66. Angry that the decision had been overturned, and rejecting 
a compromise offer of $12 (US$16.80) per tree, the Pinei growers lodged an 
appeal in the High Court of Australia. Justice Barwick63 sustained the Warden's 
right to make the decision, but emphasised that the "award in respect of his 
calculation has no binding value as a precedent for the calculation of 
compensation in other cases. Each of them will turn on their own 
circumstances" (Benggong v Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd [1971] 124 CLR 47). 
Thus the original order was restored. 
As Bedford and Mamak (1977:36-37) explain, the decision and associated court 
hearings had negative ramifications for all parties: 
The Company's public image suffered a severe blow ~ause a very large enterprise 
appeared to have been penny-pinching over a claim for adequate compensation. The 
Administration was faced with the prospect of having to accept new precedents in 
cash crop settlements. And the Public Solicitor found himself in a position of not 
being able to advise his clients, the Bougainvilleans in the Pinei valley, that BCL 
would pay the amount ordered by the Warden in all cocoa cases. 
Driven by these concerns, the PNG Public Solicitor and BCL entered into direct 
negotiations with the planters, eventually settling on lump sum payments of 
A$15 (US$21) for each coconut palm and A$13.50 (US$19) for each cacao and 
coffee plant destroyed. In addition, the company agreed "to pay compensation 
for all cash crops within a lease area as soon as its boundaries had been 
determined, and whether or not the crop had been destroyed" (Oliver, 
1991:143). 
63 Sir Garfield Barwick, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (equivalent to the 
U.S. Supreme Court). 
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As anticipated, the high rates obtained by Benggong led other growers to 
demand similar sums, but this expectation waned as the Warden's Court 
subsequently made smaller awards. Discontent with lesser amounts, some 
landowners accepted BCL's offer to replace their plantations with larger ones 
outside the leases. By December 1973 most affected cropholders had accepted 
either monetary or relocation compensation. 
Land needed for the mine's expansion was not limited to plantations. Areas 
required for development included domestic property, and it was therefore 
necessary to relocate natives residing in designated locations. In some instances 
entire communities had to be moved, including the villages of Moroni (which 
was situated on land required for stockpiling coarse ore), Dapera (where the 
rock waste would be dumped) and Banoni (which would be flooded by the 
widened Jaba River). Between 1969 and 1971, 289 people from eight villages 
in the Pinei and Kawerong valleys were resettled (Bedford & Mamak, 1977). 
In July 1969 the Mining Warden, acting under the provisions of the Mining 
Ordinance 1927-66, determined the compensation figures and standards 
applicable to the relocation of the Moroni people. The terms of this award, 
which set the precedent for other resettlements in mining leases, are detailed by 
Bedford and Mamak (1977:40-42): 
... villagers were entitled to compensation for damage to their houses, gardens arxi 
cash crops, severance of their land from other land (set at $50 per household), loss of 
surface rights of way ($50 per household), and all consequential damage which, in 
this case, was set at $200 per head for the 'hardship which will follow the enforced 
change from a traditional village environment to a European way of life, and provide 
for the additional cost of maintaining a European-style residence in an urbanised 
community'. The Company was also ordered to clear and plant gardens of equivalent 
areas to the ones destroyed, to provide rations ... while the gardens matured, to erect 
houses ... to provide road access to the new site, to construct a church and to install 
water tanks. 
Finding mutually acceptable relocation sites caused further tension between 
management and some locals. Of particular concern was the inability of the 
Dapera people to find suitable land outside the mining lease but, as Quodling 
(1991:48) notes, the company deferred to the villagers. 
Ideally, from a BCL point of view, relocation should have been to a site outside 
mining lease boundaries... However, the cultural ties of the people to their 
traditional land tracts militated against the acceptability of such a move. Accord-
ingly, the less than ideal solution of relocation within the mining lease was adopted. 
It was decided that two Dapera hamlets would initially move to a ridge above the 
waste site, then resettle on the rock fill when dumping discontinued three or four 
years hence. Although the villagers were apprehensive about the company 
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honouring the 'second' move, by September 1974 the new houses were ready 
for occupation. Just as the people were ready to take possession however, a 
new procedure for tailings disposal necessitated further dumping on the housing 
estate. This meant another 10 month delay as the houses were removed and 
stored while the extra infilling took place. Connell (1991) reports the total cost 
to BCL of the various relocation programs was Kl.639 million (US$1.25 
million). 
Those communities which wanted to be resettled within the perimeters of the 
leases came to regret their decision. The 24 hour-a-day operations required to 
bring the mine into production were difficult to live with. Accustomed to the 
tranquillity of village life, the people had to contend with intrusions such as 
dust, machinery, blasting, and deforestation. Before long, reparation was being 
sought for these impositions. Supporting the Bougainvillean claims, Kokare 
(cited in Bedford & Mamak, 1977:44-45) contended that 
... our beautiful, quiet, peaceful island is covered with mud and dust and square miles 
of rock-strewn wasteland. Thousands of ... strangers are walking all over it, and the 
hills are echoing the ceaseless roar of heavy machinery, bulldozers, trucks, construct-
ion work, drilling, blasting, digging. We did not ask for this. 
The Mining Warden's Court generally granted payments to villagers for the 
hardships associated with the enforced changes to their lifestyle. Samples of 
nuisance compensation claims are noted in Appendix 0. 
Under Lapun's 1966 amendment to the Mining Ordinance 1928-40, the flat 
occupation fees for Prospecting Authorities and mining tenements were to 
remain in place until the unimproved value of the land could be ascertained, after 
which 5 per cent of that figure would be payable to the landowners. In 1969 the 
PNG Department of Lands, Survey and Mines set the value of land in the 
mining leases at A$40 (US$56) per acre64 • Whilst BCL was content with the 
government valuation, the landowners considered A$1,000 (US$1,400) per 
acre65 more appropriate (Bedford & Mamak, 1977) given the sums involved in 
the Rorovana negotiations. In response, the company contracted J. D. Powdrell, 
an Australian valuer, to assess the unimproved values at the time the relevant 
leases were granted. This task was difficult because the Bougainvilleans classed 
land according to its customary use (arable, village, river bed, and hunting) 
rather than in cash values. 
64 A$98.50 (US$138) per hectare. 
65 A$2,470 (US$3,458) per hectare. 
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To accommodate indigenous traditions, Powdrell produced a scale of values for 
five categories of land. Concerned that "the sheer magnitude [of calculating a 
differential rate] would have made it impossible to achieve consensus among the 
landowners in the negotiating period" (Quodling, 1991 :48), BCL proposed that 
Powdrell's average of A$105 (US$147) per acre66 for arable land and A$45 
(US$63) per acre67 for non-arable land be used to calculate occupation fees68 • 
However, in October 1972 the Public Solicitor suggested A$150 (US$210) and 
A$100 (US$140) respectively would be more acceptable to the locals. The 
company recognised that if it adhered to Powdrell's figures a series of litigation 
similar to the 'cash crop' dispute was likely, but it was unwilling to adopt the 
$150-$100 suggestion. An offer of A$132 per acre (US$184.50)69 irrespective 
of location and type was made through the Public Solicitor. When the 
landowners refused, BCL negotiated directly with the locals, striking a flat rate 
of A$130 per acre (US$182)70 in June 1973. It was agreed that payment of the 5 
per cent occupation fee71 would start immediately and the unimproved value of 
land in all leases would be reassessed in 1976 (Bedford & Mamak, 1977). 
The mine's impact on native fishing first came before the Warden's Court in 
May 1970 when a villager claimed river pollutants denied his tribe of its natural 
source of protein. Bedford and Mamak (1977:49-50) outline the case: 
Because fishing rights, like land rights, were 'held in trust for future generations', it 
was proposed that annual payments to compensate for loss of fish be paid to all 
members of the clan affected. 
Under the terms of their agreement... the Company could not refuse to pay 
compensation for pollution of the Jaba and its tributaries... There was, however, 
disagreement among BCL's lawyers over the principle of making annual payments. 
At the test case [BCL] argued that 'spreading payment over 42 years could result in 
persons yet unborn receiving compensation for a loss they never suffered ... We agree 
to pay the plaintiff a reasonable sum from present loss suffered by 14 people.' 
The Court upheld the principle of annual payments and over the ensuing twelve 
months BCL and the Public Solicitor worked out a complex scheme for 
calculating compensation for the loss of fishing in the Kawerong. Based on 
66 A$262 (US$367) per hectare. 
67 A$11 I (US$155) per hectare. 
68 The company was aware that a flat rate was not an ideal solution given the various 
levels of land productivity and the resultant uneven population density in a subsist-
ence economy, however this appeared to be the only manageable option at the time. 
(f} A$326 (US$456.50) per hectare. 
70 A$321 (US$449.SO) per hectare. 
71 This equated to A$6.SO (US$9. IO) per acre. A$ l 6.05 (US$22.SO) per hectare. 
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this formula, A$25,000 (US$32,500) per annum was offered as fish 
compensation in the region. This was accepted by the locals in October 1971, 
provided that the sum was paid for five years from 1968, and that the formula 
be reviewed in 1973. BCL also agreed to pay A$3,000 (US$3,900) a year to 
recompense for other losses associated with river degradation, namely 
washing, bathing, swimming, and aesthetic appeal. 
Similar claims followed with regard to the Pinei River, two tributaries of the 
Jaba, and streams which formerly ran to the Kawerong valley. Whilst BCL had 
expected to recompense locals for river disturbance, and was prepared to do so, 
it had not foreseen the number or monetary values of the claims that eventuated. 
Concerned by endless demands from those with 'property rights', BCL, the 
Public Solicitor's Office, and the District Administration started to become less 
sensitive to landowners' compensation requests (Bedford & Mamak, 1977). 
While it could be argued that remuneration for natural vegetation was not 
required as it was accounted for in the land's unimproved value, BCL 
recognised the significance of trees to village life and agreed to compensate for 
the destruction of the bush. The value of different species of native plants, 
including hunting benefits and aesthetic attraction, were estimated from A$25.10 
to A$116.55 (US$35 to US$163) per acre72 (Bedford & Mamak, 1977), but the 
company preferred annual payments of the average value for reasons outlined 
above. In 1971, A$66.77 (US$93.50) per acre73 per annum was proposed, but 
negotiations were halted until agreement had been reached on the occupation 
fees. Discussions between the Public Solicitor and the company led to an offer 
of A$50.18 (US$70) per acre74 , but this was rejected in August 1974 as 
landowners 'held out' for a better deal. BCL, hardened by the ongoing demands 
for river compensation, did not proffer a larger sum. As Bedford and Mamak 
(1977:53) explain, the climate surrounding indigenous compensation began to 
change from this point. 
... there was growing concern both on Bougainville and in the [PNG] Government 
over amounts of money being paid to a small sector of the island's population ... 
The days of out-of-court settlements because of a fear of protracted litigation 
causing bad publicity for the Company were over. The prevailing opinion reflected 
a comment made by BCL's legal adviser in May 1970: 'the aim of compensation is 
not to make people millionaires and turn a calamity into a bonanza ... The sum 
should be reasonable and moderate rather than extravagant and generous'. 
72 A$62 to A$288 (US$87 to US$403) per hectare. 
73 A$165 (US$231) per hectare. 
74 A$124 (US$173.50) per hectare. 
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The Environment 
By today's standards, the company's approaches to the anticipated ecological 
effects of the Panguna mine may seem cavalier, but as decisions over the 
development of the venture were taken in the 1960s, contemporary opinion must 
be tempered against the attitudes, understanding and technology of the time. 
Irrespective of this caveat however, is the fact that open-pit mining involves the 
creation of a crater in one position, and complementary amounts of residue in 
other locations. This changes the landscape forever. 
As previously noted, almost half the earth excavated from the Panguna pit was 
overburden. Because this untreated waste possessed conventional soil character-
istics (Gilles, 1977), it was stacked in the Kawerong valley where, over time, it 
would add about 300 hectares (741 acres) of flat land on which BCL could 
extend its facilities. The valley and its fertile slopes were to be lost, however. 
The remaining material proceeded to the processing plant where the minerals 
were extracted and the excess (tailings) was ejected as a slurry. Tailings are 
disposed of by either release into fast flowing rivers or storage in dams where 
solids can settle and the water re-used. BCL knew that the latter was 
environmentally preferable, but opted for river dumping for reasons noted by 
Quodling (1991:29): 
Conventional tailings dams ... were ruled out. Not only would conventional tailing 
[dams] eliminate further tracts of arable land, but their stability could not be assured 
in an environment of such high seismic activity. Pipeline transport for dumping at 
sea was considered but rejected on technological and financial grounds. Furthermore, 
the leading hydrological consultant retained to advise on stream transport of tailings 
material projected that some 80 per cent of the material would move to the mouth of 
the Jaba River by natural flow. 
Thus, the tailings were discharged into the Kawerong-Jaba river system at a rate 
of about 85,000 tonnes (83,657 tons) per day, and whilst in the early years the 
company did little to mitigate the impending damage this would cause, it did not 
disguise the fact and was prepared to compensate the locals for same. 
Apart from the disposal of tailings, CRA/BCL's ecological concerns up to the 
mid 1970s were limited. This was mainly due to the findings of a report by W. 
D. Scott and Company (WOS) commissioned by the company in 1971. Of the 
environmental effects of the Panguna mine, WDS declared, in part: 
On the size scale and the time scale appropriate to the evaluation of physical 
environmental dynamics, the physical changes have been minuscule, and very 
temporary. To the observer, however, the environmental changes naturally appear 
greater. 
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The villages down the Kawerong and Jaba and in the tailings area have been ... subject 
to relocation. The area affected was generally sparsely settled and agriculturally poor. 
Atmospheric effects of the project's operations are confined to discharge of oxides 
from the thermal power station at Loloho and dust. The sealing of roads, high 
rainfall and mists and dews at the mine site means that dust is and will not be any 
problem. 
Due to high rainfall and cyclone incidence, topography at the mine site cannot be yet 
considered finally stable. Other than this and the uncertainty of tailings geography 
the environmental effects of the project are bygones. No further important changes 
are likely to occur. (1973:3-1-3-3) 
Issues such as soil contamination, the impact of destroying fauna and flora, and 
potential human harm were not deeply considered. Of the company's early 
environmental efforts, former Chairman Carruthers claimed "While perhaps we 
could have done some things differently, it is difficult ... to concede that another 
company would have performed better overall" (cited in Polornka, 1990b:55). 
Whilst management's view of the mine's ecological impact may have been 
inadequate, it was clearly more realistic than that of the PNG government. In 
1971 the Minister for Works and Mines portrayed the future of the site thus: 
"when the mining [is] finished, 3000 acres [will] be lake, a useless swamp area 
of 50,000 acres [will] be converted to pasture, and 20,000 acres [will] be 
reclaimed from the sea, also for pasture" (cited in West, 1972:119). 
Social Programs 
Aware that its objectives on Bougainville were inherently at odds with the 
islanders' way of life, management continually tried to minimise the cultural and 
psychological damage the mine would inevitably cause. It was reported in 1969 
that ''Few mining companies have ever approached the opening of a new mine 
with the careful humanitarianism being shown by the CRA men on Bougain-
ville ... " (Robinson, 1969c:4). In this spirit, the company adopted social policies 
intended to provide mutual benefits. These included matters concerning 
employment, employee relations, education and training, racial integration, 
health, indigenous business opportunities, and the establishment of a 
philanthropic institution. Each is discussed below. 
The company's practice of hiring local labour commenced with the initial 
prospecting parties and continued throughout the life of the mine. Holding that 
people should "be offered employment according to their qualifications 
irrespective of their district of origin" (Carruthers & Vernon, 1990:66), jobs 
were open to workers from throughout PNG. Unable to forecast the numbers of 
143 
indigenes who would seek work, CRA set a native workforce target of 40 per 
cent Bougainvilleans and 60 per cent from other regions of PNG. Over the 
years, Bougainvilleans constituted the "main ethnic group in the national 
workforce, averaging some 30-35 per cent" (Quodling, 1991:37). 
In keeping with its equitable employment policies, management would have 
. preferred to pay all workers equal money for equal work. However, wages paid 
to PNG citizens were lower than those of expatriates. This ostensibly 
discriminatory practice is explained by chairman Frank Espie (cited in Oliver, 
1991:150-151): 
We cannot pay indigenous employees expatriate level wages until this country as a 
whole reaches something approaching similar wage levels. The company would 
serve its own short-term interests by paying such wages: in this way we could 
attract, and hold, the cream of the country's talent. It would, by doing so, have 
destructively distorting effects on the whole manpower and economy of a developing 
country. It would particularly affect the balance between people who work for wages 
and those who live in agriculture, as do most of the people of this country. Such an 
imbalance has created grave problems ... for a number of African countries. 
Once the decision to proceed with the mine was taken, CRA, in concert with 
PNG's Department of Labour, sponsored the formation of a trade union. 
Believing "the existence of a strong and responsible union to represent the 
national workforce was necessary for long~term industrial stability" (Quodling, 
1991:38-39), the Bougainville Mining Workers' Union (BMWU) was gazetted 
in November 1969 to act on behalf of native employees. From 1969 to 1975, 
the leadership and management of the BMWU remained exclusively in the hands 
of PNG and Bougainvillean employees. 
Education in PNG was rudimentary and left largely to the churches until WWII, 
following which Australia began to fund the missions and establish government 
schools. After independence Port Moresby withdrew direct education funding in 
favour of student subsidies; an approach which succeeded because many 
overseas companies contributed to the school fees of their employees' children. 
Panguna's management made an early commitment to the vocational education 
of its employees, despite the view of many expatriates that the company was 
"both unwise and over-optimistic about the ability of PNG nationals to acquire 
and continue with complex work skills" (Carruthers & Vernon, 1990:66). To 
develop administrative and trades personnel, the company built an on-site 
training college which employed between 80 and 100 instructors. According to 
Quodling (1991:37), this school was "the best equipped and staffed technical 
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training facility in the country". Training and development accounted for about 
12 per cent of the mine's payroll, and 104 people were engaged as full time 
trainers (Bougainville Update, 1990b). Employees who displayed academic 
potential were supported through tertiary education in Australian and PN G 
universities, thereby providing Niuginians and Bougainvilleans with skills in 
areas such as electronics, computing, management, and medicine. The 
company's policy of nurturing an indigenous workforce was vindicated, as the 
program provided a pool of competent workers, accelerated its strategy to 
localise the labour force, and advanced PNG's stock in human capital. 
The company's policy of employee integration was exceptionally enlightened for 
the times. It encouraged a workforce diverse in values, norms, customs and 
languages, and "the expression of racial prejudice by any employee whether ... 
indigenous or expatriate [was] regarded as a serious matter" (Bougainville - The 
Establishment of a Copper Mine, 1974:14). 
Bougainvillean recruits were orientated to the organisation by way of a 'stepped' 
dining and accommodation system. At first they were assigned to the 
'indigenous mess', an austere barracks where traditional and Western food was 
served and they were introduced to beds, electricity, cutlery, and the like. Once 
the fundamentals of Western customs were mastered, employees moved into the 
'transit mess' where further social conventions and basic English were acquired. 
Of this, Robinson (1969b:9) reports "[The locals] would remain in the transit 
stage until management felt they were able to fit into an integrated mess without 
embarrassment to themselves or others". From here, personnel could use an 
'integrated mess' if they wished. 
BCL also catered for the social and functional acculturation of foreign workers. 
Expatriates and their spouses learned appropriate behaviour in both PNG and 
Bougainvillean society and were taught elementary Pidgin. Tradespeople and 
supervisors needed to be fluent in Pidgin because, whilst most of the locals 
could speak some English, they preferred Pidgin when discussing problems. 
To supplement the services provided by the PNG Department of Health at the 
Arawa base hospital, BCL, through the Bougainville Copper Foundation (see 
below) established and maintained the Arawa Medical Clinic which catered for 
those who required specialised attention or preferred private health care. 
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Because the advent of a large organisation in an undeveloped society opens 
opportunities for local entrepreneurs wishing to provide goods and services to 
the firm, its employees and their families, BCL moved to establish a Business 
Advisory Service (BAS) to assist in such endeavours. Supporting this concept, 
the PNG administration incorporated a clause in the 1974 agreement which 
required the advisory service to act under the direction of a steering committee to 
be established by the Bougainville provincial government. As the committee was 
never constituted, BCL developed local businesses on its own initiative. Rural 
cooperatives were formed to supply garden produce, and local contractors 
organised services such as contract labour, security, and minor building. 
Due to the locals' limited ability to provide services requiring advanced financial 
and management expertise, the Bougainville Development Corporation (BDC) 
was conceived to assist in the establishment of larger ventures. Founded by the 
provincial government with BCL's cooperation, BDC was a public company 
with provincial and community government shareholders. Among its initiatives 
were commuter air services, steel fabrication, catering services, furniture 
manufacturing, and limestone processing. 
With the bulk of government revenue from the mine allocated to the develop-
ment of PNG's national infrastructure, BCL made plans to contribute to the 
country's business, cultural, and sporting life. In 1971 the Bougainville Copper 
Foundation (BCF) was incorporated as a company limited by guarantee. BCF's 
objectives, as recorded in its Memorandum of Association, are noted by 
Quodling (1991:43): 
• to make grants and donations to Papua New Guinea for charitable, public, 
scientific, educational and artistic purposes; 
• to assist and promote participation by Papua New Guineans in commerce, 
services and industry; 
• to provide medical, educational and welfare services for people in Papua New 
Guinea; and 
• to provide and assist in the provision for people in [PNG] of training in 
professional, commercial, agricultural and industrial skills. 
Guaranteed by BCL and other CRNRTZ entities, the Foundation was floated 
with a K3 million (US$2.52 million) donation from "ijCL plus a grant of 3.6 
million BCL shares with which to fund its pursuits. The executive committee 
included representatives of the national and provincial governments, members of 
the local community, and BCL employees. By regulation, the majority of the 
committee were PNG nationals. Although the BCF was intended to benefit the 
entire country, the mine's management believed Bougainville should be given 
priority and it was "arbitrarily agreed that donations should be one-third to the 
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Panguna/K.ieta Sub-district75 , one-third to the North Solomons Province, and 
one-third to the rest of the country" (Carruthers & Vernon, 1990:68). 
THE OUTCOMES OF MANAGEMENT POLICIES 
AND PRACTICES AT PANGUNA 
This section considers the consequences of the management approaches 
discussed above. Following an overview of the mine's output during its sixteen 
years of operation, Panguna's impact is investigated from economic, 
environmental and social perspectives. The results of the company's response to 
the various compensation issues are documented, and the 'Bougainville 
Initiative' - a pivotal document in the mine's history - is introduced. Apart from 
the production details noted below, the following concerns Panguna's principal 
working years (1976-1988). 
Production 
The Panguna mine proved more productive than expected, and became the 
largest industrial enterprise in PNG. Against pre-operating estimates of 900 
million long tons (914 million tonnes) of ore assaying 0.48 per cent copper and 
0.36 dwt/ton76 gold (Espie, 1974), from 1972 to 1988, 1.215 billion tonnes 
(1.196 billion tons) of unprocessed ore was excavated (Dorney, 1990), 
producing some 10 million tonnes (9.84 million tons) of copper concentrate 
(Quodling, 1991), 304,412 kilograms (299.6 tons) of gold, and 780,875 
kilograms (768.5 tons} of silver (Oliver, 1991). 
The recovery of copper concentrate peaked in the early years with about 
650,000 dry tonnes (639,700 tons) produced in both 1973 and 1974, earning 
K158.4 million (US$111 million) and Kl 14.2 million (US$80 million) 
respectively. Thereafter, despite fairly constant production levels, earnings 
fluctuated as copper prices responded to an unsteady demand. From 1976 
onwards, net earnings averaged K49 million (US$39 million) (Oliver, 1991). In 
time, the ore yielded decreasing volumes of copper and gold. As a result, an 
increased amount of earth was excavated to maintain production. This had a 
threefold effect: the pit grew wider and deeper, reaching a rim area of 400 
75 The electorate in the North Solomons Province within which the mining leases 
were located. 
76 0.547 grams per tonne I 0.02 ounces per ton. 
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hectares (988.4 acres) by 1989; the waste dump rapidly consumed the valley, 
and river degradation accelerated. 
The Economic Impact 
By the end of 1988, A$1,500 million (US$1,080 million) had been invested in 
the Panguna project (Oliver, 1991). Sales had generated 45 per cent of PNG's 
export income and 17 per cent of government revenue (Weisman, 1990), and 
accounted for 11 percent of the PNG gross domestic product (Griffin, 1990b ). 
Given the 'flow-on' effects of such an integral part of PNG's economy, the 
mine's true economic value to the country cannot be accurately assessed, 
however the following indicators are instructive. 
Employment 
BCL became one of PNG's largest employers, directly or indirectly engaging 
"12,000 people in a slack labour market" (Griffin, 1990b). The direct workforce 
peaked at about 10,000 during the construction period, of whom over 6,000 
were PNG citizens (Moulik, 1973). Employee numbers during the mine's 
operative years averaged 3,840 (Oliver, 1991), and in December 1988, BCL had 
3560 people on its payroll (Quodling, 1991). Table 5.1 shows the ethnic and 
professional distribution of the workforce in 1988 and highlights the company's 
adherence to its early commitment to employing a large proportion of PNG 
nationals. 
Table 5.1 Niuginian Participation in the Panguna Mine 
Workforce in 1988 
CATEGORY National Non-national Localisation ( % ) 
Management and 
professional 180 250 42 
Sub-management 
and sub-professional 573 6 99 
Supervisory and skilled 787 350 69 
Semi-skilled 1,320 4 99+ 
Unskilled 90 100 
Total 2,950 610 80 
(Source: Oliver, D L (1991). Black Islanders. A Personal Perspective 
of Bougainville 1937-1991. South Yarra: Hyland House, page 150). 
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Employee Relations 
Given the general 'strike-proneness' of the mining industry (Hyman, 1981), 
BCL maintained an impressive record of industrial peace. Employee unrest was 
"usually settled quickly and satisfactorily, and occasioned very few work 
stoppages" (Oliver, 1991: 150). Notwithstanding, the company experienced a 
dispute in 1975 which was portentous of the events which were to come. In 
May the BMWU organised a march on the mine's administration building in 
support of a log of claims which had been outstanding from the previous 
December, The demonstration rapidly degenerated into two days of rampage 
which resulted in widespread damage to company and private property. The 
cleari-up operation halted production for 6 days and 82 employees (half of 
whom were Bougainvillean) were dismissed for activities against the company. 
Although Quodling (1991:39) notes that responsibility was variously attributed 
to union leadership, management and the prevailing political climate, he claims it 
was the latter element which was of most concern to the company: 
... political overtones are of particular interest. Nationalist sentiments were running 
high as the country approached independence; and a readiness to react against 
perceived colonial institutions is understandable. Probably of greater significance 
were the secessionist sympathies that were widespread in Bougainville at the time. 
The restructuring of the BMWU following the riots neutralised the PNG 
domination of the union. Leadership was transferred to Henry Moses (refer 
Appendix L) who subsequently resigned from his position with BCL to devote 
all his energies to the union, which later served as a link in his election to the 
Provincial Assembly. 
Education and Training 
BCL's perseverance in developing the work competencies of PNG nationals 
paid dividends for both the mine and the country. More than 12,000 PNG 
citizens were trained in the mine's college or, under sponsorship by BCL, in 
technical institutions in other parts of PNG or overseas. Of these trainees, 1,070 
successfully completed trade apprenticeships and a further 400 graduated from 
PNG and Australian universities (Bougainville Update, 1990b). 
A high labour turnover added to the company's human development costs, 
however BCL regarded this as one of its major contributions to its host nation. 
Armed with new skills and knowledge, past employees established their own 
businesses, took employment with other enterprises throughout PNG, or 
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entered the public service. "Former BCL scholarship-holders now make up an 
important proportion of the cadre of PNG professionals in government, the 
professions and in other major industry" (Carruthers & Vernon, 1990:67). The 
company's education of the Bougainvilleans was not limited to academic and 
industrial spheres; BCL assisted their introduction to various aspects of 
'modem' living such as hygiene, automobiles and supermarket shopping. 
Business Ventures 
Encouraging the establishment of local businesses to provide goods and services 
to support the mine yielded varying results. During the life of the mine over 200 
enterprises were established which were responsible for a significant increase in 
the locals' levels of income (Connell, 1991). In 1988 alone, BCL purchased 
over K30 million (US$25.5 million) in goods and services from nationally 
owned firms (Bougainville Update, 1990b), of which KlO million (US$8.5 
million) went to Bougainvillean and Kl million (US$850,000) to landholder 
owned businesses" (Carruthers & Vernon, 1990:68). For various reasons 
however, many ventures collapsed. Of the Bougainvilleans' early business 
attempts, Oliver (1973:195) claims: 
... most of the new and alien economic groups [were] conducted with little or no 
appreciation of the need for careful cost-accounting. Rarely [was] labour reckoned as 
a cost, and little or no allowance [was] made for equipment maintenance or 
depreciation. There [was] little understanding of the inevitability of fluctuations in 
the market values of their products ... And co-operative ventures have been plagued 
by the carelessness or misplaced generosity or deliberate malfeasance of the officials 
of some of them. Poor management and uncontrollable circumstances also plague[d] 
a large percentage of ... productive and retail enterprises ... 
Carruthers and Vernon (1990) see the problem as being more fundamental, 
citing uncompetitive performance, the aversion of many landholders to manual 
work, and the inability of livestock farms to maintain disease-free animals. The 
activities of the Business Advisory Service wound down over time, but the BDC 
continued despite occasional, and usually politically motivated, disputes over its 
management and the involvement of BCL in some of its enterprises. 
Wealth Distribution 
It was noted earlier that the mine had provided 17 percent of PNG's government 
revenue. This was generated from dividends on the government's shareholding 
in BCL (K166 million/US$142 million), company tax (K582 million/US$497.5 
million), group tax (K104 million/US$89 million) and other imposts (K211 
million/US$180.5 million). In addition, the provincial government (North 
Solomons Province) collected K75 million (US$64 million) in royalties and 
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other taxes, and K24 million (US$20.5 million) was settled on landowners in 
compensation and royalties (BCL Annual Report, 1989). 
Before the mine, Bougainville had a subsistence economy, augmented with 
income from plantation labour. Within a few years, the island had adopted a 
semi-commercial structure with enclaves of the community increasingly reliant 
on employment, consumption and investment, and submitting to the notions of 
private ownership. "Incomes in some mine-affected villages [became] quite 
significant and everywhere [were] vastly in excess of income levels before the 
mine began" (Connell, 1991:59). Increasing dependence on a cash economy 
was responsible for a number of the social changes which emerged. 
The Social Impact 
The social evolution on Bougainville since the 1960s has been both rapid and 
extreme. In general, these changes can be attributed directly or indirectly to the 
presence of the mine. 
Indirect Changes 
New-found wealth brought many islanders the 'benefits' associated with a 
Western economy. Road systems provided improved mobility (Quodling, 
1991); consumer goods, particularly radios, TVs, VCRs and 4WD vehicles, 
became requisites (Oliver, 1991); sophisticated communication services were 
established (WDS, 1973); and the locals became involved in activities typical of 
an urbanised community - education, religion, politics, medicine, sporting 
pursuits, and the like (Connell, 1991). 
Modem living has deleterious costs, however. Bougainville was now faced with 
a dual economy consisting of those with money (from employment, enterprise, 
or compensation) and those in the traditional sector (the vast majority of 
islanders) who had no affiliation with money. Classes developed in the 
egalitarian society, and with this came the attendant frictions and jealousies. 
Lives became oriented by days and hours (Connell, 1991). The influx of single 
men to the mine area resulted in "a sharp rise in vagrancy, prowling and 
burglary, and crimes associated with drunkenness" (Mornis & Ogan, 1971:39), 
and the incidence of violence escalated (Hannett, 1975). Improved roads and the 
proliferation of vehicles saw increased numbers of human and animal accident 
victims. 
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Direct Changes 
The company's social and political policies outlined previously attained mixed 
degrees of success. Whereas some initiatives achieved the desired goals for all 
concerned, others increased the hardships endured by the locals. These are 
discussed below. 
BCL's commendable integrative employment policy proved to be only mildly 
effective. The racial tensions which arose were not simply an expression of the 
'black-white' issues which the company's management had anticipated and tried 
to ameliorate, rather they were multi-dimensional. In response to the Bougain-
villeans calling the Niuginians 'redskins', the Niuginians referred to the coal-
black islanders as 'as bilong praipan177 • This name-calling was indicative of the 
antipathy between the two groups which was "conceived and nurtured over 
several decades" (Oliver, 1991:223) and ran deeper than was first estimated by 
the rnine's senior management. As increasing numbers of 'outsiders' arrived on 
the island, local resentment increased. The friction has been ascribed to assorted 
causes: skin colour (Robinson, 1969a), Bougainvillean belief that the PNG 
people are more primitive and backward than themselves (Oliver, 1991), the lack 
of female companionship for PNG men living on the island (Mamak & Bedford, 
1974), and the ascendancy of some Niuginians in BCL ranks (Oliver, 1991). 
Reports indicate that overt displays of racism were generally confined to the 
mine's early and later years, with relative peace throughout the intervening 
period. During the construction phase, Bougainvillean-Niuginian relationships 
deteriorated to a point where 
... more than 600 Bougainvillean BCL employees and local villagers met to petition 
the company to repatriate 'the trouble-makers' and restrict the occupations to 
Bougainvilleans. To ease tensions, the company very wisely adopted some of the 
group's proposals (Bedford & Mamak, 1974:12). 
Oliver's (1991: 139-140) account of the building of the port to mine road further 
illustrates the locals' regard to those they considered alien: 
[The labourers] included strangers from other parts of Bougainville and, even more 
disquieting, thousands of 'redskins'... While on their jobs and in their huge camps 
... they were only potentially menacing, but on their excursions on off-days ... they 
posed threats, real or imaginary, to villagers' security, especially that of nubile 
females. The company issued strong warnings against such excursions, and many 
villages posted 'keep out' signs - but with what success is not known. 
77 Derogatory Pidgin phrase translated as 'The arse of the frypan'. 
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The true nature of inter-tribal relationships between 1972 and 1988 is difficult to 
judge, but by 1988 the locals were again agitating for the expulsion of PNG 
nationals from the mining area, as Oliver (1991: 199) reports: "Bougainvillians in 
general expressed anxieties concerning the many unemployed and semi-
employed redskins ... and envy concerning the highly paid non-Bougainvillian 
Niuginians in company employ". 
In contrast, Bougainvillean-Caucasian relationships at the individual level were 
generally harmonious. Robinson's (1969b:9) observation provides insight into 
the apparent cultural and social comfort between the two groups: ''The area 
manager eats in the same mess as the local native foreman [sic]; Australian 
executives drink in the same wet canteen78 as white bulldozer operators and 
black clerks". As opposition to the mine became more organised and more vocal 
however, the affiliation between the islanders and the expatriates became 
strained. In time, the indigenes' attitude towards Caucasians eventually 
approached that previously reserved to redskins, as evidenced in the following 
extract from the 1987 'Bougainville Initiative' (refer Appendix P): 
While the Melanesian way is struggling with the cash society you have brought, 
BCL has shown so little understanding or appreciation of the Melanesian culture. So 
many of your employees are racist, openly contemptuous of us... You have lived 
alongside us, but not among us ... Your employees insult our national dignity ... 
(cited in Quodling, 1991:92). 
Although the actual effectiveness of BCL's positive approach to employee 
integration is elusive, it seems logical to ascribe some measure of the relative 
racial tolerance to the management efforts discussed earlier. Notwithstanding, by 
1988 it was clear that the long-held Bougainvillean concept of being a race apart 
was evolving into open contempt for all other ethnic groups. 
As well as instigating the Arawa Medical Clinic, the BCF was instrumental in 
establishing many successful ventures including poultry and pig farms, a retail-
wholesale trading complex, and diverse agricultural developments (Oliver, 
1991). Irrespective of these achievements however, many Bougainvilleans were 
of the view that the Foundation was a 'rake-off for the company (Quodling, 
1991). These accusations ignored the facts that as a registered charity the BCF 
was bound to distribute 80 per cent of its income to appropriate projects, and its 
Articles of Association barred the transfer of any income or property to BCL. 
78 The wet canteen was a bar, operated under the auspices of the company, which was 
open to mine personnel in their leisure time. 
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In an attempt to reverse this perception, the make-up of the Executive was 
amended to include a majority of locals, and donations to the North Solomons 
Province were increased at the expense of other areas of PNG (Carruthers & 
Vernon, 1990). These initiatives achieved little, and the BCF became the focus 
of antagonism and political point.,scoring. The 'Bougainville Initiative' (detailed 
in a later section) denounced the Foundation as a "public relations stunt... 
which doles out small sums to local sports clubs" and portrayed it as a 
reflection of "BCL's power of patronage" (cited in Quodling, 1991:91-92). 
Earlier accusations that Bougainville's health facilities were insufficient and 
Eurocentric (see, for example, Momis & Ogan, 1971) were not allayed by the 
establishment of the Arawa Medical Clinic. This institution was criticised as 
being elitist because it charged fees to remain viable and offered a higher 
standard of care than the Arawa base hospital (Quodling, 1991). 
As the BCF was established with altruistic motives, the negative response by the 
local people was. disappointing to BCL's managers. Refleeting on this, 
Carruthers and Vernon (1990:68) note that: "Clearly, in trying to put something 
in place to be of help in both the present and the future, in the form of the 
Foundation, we got it wrong". 
The increase of government primary schools in the 1960s and 1970s meant that, 
by the early 1980s, Western-style learning was becoming an accepted aspect of 
Bougainvillean life. As a consequence, secondary and tertiary enrolments 
increased steadily. By sponsoring the education of indigenous employees, as 
well as subsidising the school fees of expatriate workers' children, BCL 
indirectly improved the educational opportunities available to all PNG citizens 
both in quantitative and qualitative terms. 
Bougainville's educational progress had its detractors, however. Momis and 
Ogan (1971:38) argue that the social changes wrought by the mine had a 
detrimental effect on local attitudes towards education. They propose that 
Young boys, in particular, find the bustle of activities in the urban sector more 
attractive than the schoolroom. They may see uneducated older boys employed as 
unskilled labourers and draw the conclusion that education is unnecessary for an 
exciting life. Older people are more likely to specifically reject schooling as a tool of 
European exploitation .... some village leaders have forbidden school attendance as a 
direct response to BCPL's presence. 
Further, international schools, which charged high fees, were accused of elitism 
which added to socioeconomic division on Bougainville (Dorney, 1990). 
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The resettlement of people living on land required qy the mine spawned 
unexpected difficulties. In accordance with the conditions of the Mining 
Ordinance 1927-66, BCL supplied fibrolite79 dwellings with iron roofs of 
equivalent size to those destroyed, plus associated services and out-buildings. 
By the mid-1980s the problems associated with European-style housing estates 
in a harsh tropical climate were becoming apparent. Describing the housing 
situation on Bougainville, Oliver (1991:138) notes that "all buildings require 
constant and expensive maintenance and repair; iron roofs develop expensive 
leaks;· and water tanks clog with sediment." Claiming to lack the material or 
skills to execute repairs, the residents looked to BCL for ongoing assistance. 
Th~ company refused on the grounds that the upkeep of a home is the 
responsibility of the householder, and that maintenance by BCL would 
contribute to a "dependency syndrome" and "handout mentality" (Connell, 
1991:66). Similarly, tending the infrastructure of .the new townships caused 
friction as neither side would accept the responsibility of sustaining the. water 
supply and sanitation systems. The adequacy of the houses was also criticised. 
Many resettled villagers considered their accommodation to be inferior to that · 
supplied for workers in Arawa. and Panguna, and requests for improved 
dwellings were presented to BCL. 
An unforeseen problem arose because many townspeople believed the company 
was under obligation to provide accommodation for all members of the 
community, and thus BCL was expected to supply homes for villagers when 
they married. Management rejected these demands, claiming that it was their 
duty to: 
' 
... provide for those people who were actually relocated, and not their children ... or 
those who married into these villages. No houses have therefore been built for 
newly-married couples, some of whom remain in the house of one of the partners' 
parents, a situation that is in conflict with Nasioi tradition (Connell, 1991:66). 
Finally, those people who chose to be resettled in areas close to the mine faced 
the trauma of living with the ceaseless noises associated with the operation 
(Oliver, 1991). 
The villagers' vision of life in a new town with modern residences turned to 
disillusion and anger. Oliver's (1991: 139) analysis of the resettlement program 
provides some enlightenment of the bind in which the company and the 
Bougainvilleans found themselves: 
79 A cement-based sheet used to clad the exterior walls of buildings. 
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[BCL] sometimes challenged claims because of their potential for endless ramific-
ations, but most company officials known to the author acknowledged and 
expressed regret for these and other harmful consequences of their operations. This 
did nothing to reduce the victims' immediate hurts and long-term dissatisfactions. 
Oliver's observations were confirmed by a past BCL executive. Reflecting on 
this issue, the informant noted "Relocation was always a major concern for the 
company both in terms of location and materials of construction. Unfortunately, 
despite our best efforts, the Bougainvilleans refused to accept any alternative 
[location]" (Personal communication, 1998). 
Initially the company sponsored Village Relations Program (VRP) served as a 
successful conduit between the mine and the local population, but during the 
1980s its ability to deal with community concerns declined as local support for 
the initiative waned. The demise of the VRP was attributed to various factors. 
Firstly, mine site residents felt their communication with the mine's management 
. was degenerating due to the ineffectiveness of the VRO which they believed had 
become bureaucratic and insensitive to village issues (Connell, 1991). 
Secondly, the company's assertion of genuine interest in the villagers was 
questioned as it increasingly failed to address their concerns in an appropriate or 
timely manner. Griffin (1990b:75) supports this claim: "Some BCL officials 
have acknowledged that during the 1980s neither the compensation nor their 
concern had been adequate. A few senior personnel seemed quite out of touch". 
Thirdly, many locals thought Bougainvilleans employed in the VRO were 
favouring their own communities. In June 1987 the Times of PNG reported that 
"the 'Panguna landowners' [are] demanding the replacement of the non-
landowning Bougainvilleans in BCL's Village Relations Office with expatriates, 
'so that there is no bias"' (cited in Filer, 1990:7-8). This argument is sustained 
by Carruthers and Vernon (1990:65-66) who attribute the collapse of the 
program to divisions amongst the Bougainvilleans. 
The Village Relations Program, which was started with the best of intentions, failed 
because: 
a) The Village Relations Officers, even when Bougainvillean, were seen as 
"spies" and asked to withdraw. 
b) Many village people employed by Bougainville Copper were successful, moved 
into company accommodation and not infrequently married outside traditional 
Bougainville societies. Such people were seen by those left "back in the 
village" to have forgotten their roots and village obligations. 
c) Others who were successful in business enterprises went their own way, and 
were also looked on with envy and resentment. 
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Fourthly, Filer (1990:25) suggests that community liaison efforts in the mining 
industry usually fail because the rigid administrative demands of companies 
cannot be reconciled to the fluid social arrangements of indigenes. He contends: 
It is easy enough to criticise BCL's Village Relations Office for its failure to 
maintain local support for the mining project, but this only illustrates a more 
general problem with community liaison programmes in the mining industry ... The 
problem is that these programmes are part of a bureaucratic process of planning and 
consultation which precedes the signing of mining agreements. In this original 
process, company and government staff deal with individuals who appear to be the 
leaders of their communities ... But the story of the Panguna project suggests that 
the authority of these leaders within their own communities may well be 
undermined by the very fact of their having been party to some previous agreement, 
and even further undermined by the support which they seem to receive from 
community liaison officers. Since the community liaison function tends to be 
localised in the operational stage of a mining project, this means that a group of 
Papua New Guinean staff are placed in [an] invidious position ... because they 
cannot settle disputes between generations and factions within the landowning 
community, and are obliged by previous agreements to recognise the overall 
leadership of what has since become a minority faction. 
Faced with little indigenous support, BCL management had no choice but to 
virtually abandon the VRP and thus a vital link in the consultative process was 
lost. 
Under the terms of the 1980 compensation agreement, a trust fund was 
established to provide ongoing security to landowners following the destruction 
of parts of their habitat. The fund, designed to continue after mining had ceased, 
was founded to "cover all miscellaneous claims and discourage any new types of 
claim in the future" (Connell, 1991:62). Known as the Road Mine Tailings 
Lease Trust Fund (RMTLF), the new entity was chartered to act as a 'business 
arm' for the landowners, investing in long-term, income producing assets and to 
provide them with services such as education facilities, health care, 
transportation, water supplies, and the like (Connell, 1991). The RMTLF was 
funded initially by a grant from BCL, and thereafter by channelling a portion of 
the compensation payments into the trust, rather than giving it all to the 
landowners as had been the case up to this point. 
BCL intended to assist the landowners in setting up and managing the trust, but 
the company was asked, and subsequently agreed, not to become involved in 
RMTLF operations (Okole, 1990). Hence the fund was administered by 75 
landowning representatives, directed by an 8 member executive committee. For 
a time the RMTLF conducted its business to the satisfaction of most of its 
members (Oliver, 1991), investing in plantations, acquiring shares in BDC and 
other companies, and providing services to the more needy areas of the mining 
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leases. The success of the fund was not to endure however, as its effectiveness 
was weakened by internal division and political manoeuvring (detailed in the 
section headed 'Compensation for Loss and Damage'). 
The Environmental Impact 
That Bougainville's natural environment has been damaged by the mine is not 
contested by any of the parties involved. The question is the extent and 
permanency of that damage. Because the company, the Bougainvilleans, and the 
PNG government hold conflicting views on this matter, a definitive measure of 
the environmental impact of the mine is difficult to ascertain. 
The ecological issues 
The disposal of tailings into the river devastated the Kawerong-Jaba system. 
Contrary to the hydrological consultant's estimates noted earlier, only about 60 
per cent of the solids reached the sea; the remainder being deposited in the river 
basins. By mid 1971 the waterways were "silted, aggraded, and widened" 
(Oliver, 1991:137). Seventeen years later sediment had raised the river beds by 
up to 20 metres (65.6 feet) and widened them proportionately, thereby creating 
more new swamplands in some regions and infilling others. The residue which 
reached the ocean caused the delta to expand from 65 to 900 hectares (161 to 
2,224 acres) and spoiled the water far out to sea, "with some known or 
suspected lethal effects on marine life ... up and down the coast" (Oliver, 
1991:137). 
The river dumping resulted in pollution from zinc, copper, cadmium, mercury, 
lead and molybdenum deposits. Brown (1974:22) explains the problems caused 
by the pre~ence of these heavy metals in the Kawerong and Jaba: 
Although, in general, the concentrations of these metals are relatively low, several 
points should be mentioned. Discharge of metallic wastes from mine areas and 
metal-processing plants is a matter for serious concern because of their possible 
toxic properties and other adverse effects. Because of its toxicity, mercury is an 
undesirable impurity in any concentration. Molybdenum is a rather rare element and 
is accumulated by vegetation; forage crops raised on land irrigated by water that 
contains small amounts of the element may become toxic to grazing animals ... 
High concentrations of copper may be toxic. During the exploration of the Panguna 
area concentrations of 3 ppm were found. The concentrations of cadmium has a high 
toxic potential... Lead is also a serious, cumulative body poison. 
The social consequences of severe damage to the rivers is noted in a 1974 letter 
from a Bougainvillean liaison officer to the company's VRO. It states, in part: 
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I have been asked to explain to Bougainville Copper that the harvesting of the 
smaller streams was peculiarly the job of the women and that apart from the loss of 
variety in the local diet, loss of the streams has affected the social life of the women 
and children in that small co-operative fishing parties are no longer possible. As well 
as bringing about social changes at village level, the mine has affected the religious 
practices of the people as a few examples will show. Prior to the coming of 
Bougainville Copper it was the custom to take a newborn child to a particular pool 
just downstream from the Concentrator for a ritual wash; an especially important 
event if the child was the first born... Another pool not far from the confluence of 
the Kawerong and Barapinang creeks was used when a man wished to recover lost 
pigs or increase his fertility. (These pools had their associated 'masalai' or spirits) ... 
(cited in Bedford & Mamak, 1977:51) 
The legacy of river dumping has been profound. Wildlife and fish have 
departed, the locals can no longer use the waters for fishing, hunting, and 
swimming, and desolation has replaced beauty. Reflecting on this, Lafitte 
(1990: 12) noted: "pouring tens of millions of tons of grey copper-ore sludge 
into the Jaba River [has] destroyed both the river and the livelihoods of the 
Nasioi, Nagovisi and Banoni peoples." 
By the early 1980s, improvements in pipe conveyance technology meant that it 
was now possible to pump the tailings from the mine directly into Empress 
Augusta Bay, and in 1986 BCL took the decision to construct a 31 kilometre 
(19.25 miles) pipeline for that purpose. Quodling (1991:30) records this project 
as a benefit to both the mine and the locals: "Not only did it remove the 
management of tailings as a potential constraint on an extended utilisation of the 
Panguna resource; it would also facilitate rehabilitation of existing tailings 
deposits on a planned basis during mine life." Due to the mine's closure, the 
pipeline was not completed. 
Like the rivers, the waste stored in the Kawerong Valley contains heavy metal 
deposits. The volume of contaminants released by leaching in this area has not 
been assessed but, according to Quodling (1991:30), it has "not yet reached an 
environmentally dangerous level, but continued monitoring is required". 
Prior to the commencement of operations, some 220 hectares (544 acres) of 
rainforest had to be cleared. This was achieved by "poisoning the large trees and 
spraying the undergrowth with herbicide. The trees were subsequently felled 
and burned" (Brown, 1974:20). The Bougainvilleans claim that the removal of 
forests has disturbed the island's ecological balance. Symptoms cited include the 
retardation of crop growth, the poisoning of fruit trees, the disappearance of 
wild pigs, possums and flying foxes, and the advent of fish diseases (Dorney, 
1990). Although the destruction of natural habitats and chemical pollution is the 
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common explanation of these phenomena, this is not conclusive. Connell (1991) 
proposes that the use of guns may be responsible for the loss of the flying 
foxes, and overcropping and lack of replanting might explain the declining 
performance of the crops. Dorney (1990) suggests the flying fox was the victim 
of an epidemic introduced from East New Britain. 
Deforestation may have disturbed climatic conditions. According to an . 
anonymous RTZ official, a change in the rainfall pattern was an early indicator 
of the mine's effect on the island's ecology: "Before, it used to rain regularly at 
one each afternoon. Now we can go for a week without rain and then it will rain 
at night. Or we'll get two days' rain on end" (cited in West, 1972: 118)80• The air 
around the complex became polluted with emissions from the oil-fired power 
station and the countless internal combustion engines required to energise the 
operation. Dust settled throughout the townships and houses, and contaminated 
the drinking water (Connell, 1990b). 
The mine's presence was accompanied by an increase in the number and variety 
of diseases on the island, including respiratory ailments, diarrhoeal complaints, 
and skin eruptions (Connell, 1991). But, as Dorney (1990:122) reports, the 
most disturbing claim from the Bougainvilleans concerns genetic disorders: 
Our children are born with so many defects: deformed hands, legs, nose and whole 
body. We don't remember this happening before. So many people become old so 
quickly and so many die now. Before, the girls would have developed breasts before 
they began to menstruate, today the girls are very young when they menstruate. 
It is difficult to ascertain whether the changes in the population's health patterns 
are, in fact, directly attributable to the mine. Connell (1991) argues that several 
other factors must be accounted for, including the increased incidence in some 
diseases elsewhere in Bougainville and PNG, the increased size and mobility of 
the population, and an escalation of smoking. 
The Applied Geology Associates Inquiry 
In response to the environmental concerns associated with the mine, the PNG 
government commissioned an independent inquiry into the matter. In 1988 New 
Zealand consultants Applied Geology Associates Limited (AGA) were retained 
with a brief to: 
80 Apart from West's uncited reference to changes in rainfall patterns, the author was not 
able to locate any statistical evidence of this phenomenon. 
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• determine the impact that mining operations at Panguna have had on the social 
and environmental aspects of the area; and 
• determine the likely future impacts of continued mining operations at Panguna 
on the environment and the people in the area, taking into account the (nearly 
completed) tailings pipeline. 
Of AGA's research, Oliver (1991:207) reports: 
The team's members travelled widely and conducted public hearings in many 
villages. The topics investigated ranged from soil and water analysis and terrestrial 
and marine biology, to health, economics and the social conditions of the mine-
affected populace. Special attention was devoted to grievances voiced by villagers ... , 
to those listed by village leaders in their previous communications to BCL, and to 
the positions of the provincial and national governments ... 
The consultants concluded that 
although environmental damage from mining operations was substantial, there was 
no direct evidence of significant levels of chemical pollution and thus it was 
unlikely that Bougainville Copper Limited's operations were responsible for the loss 
of wildlife, declining agricultural production or a range of human illnesses 
(Bougainville Update, 1990a:3). 
Demographic Changes 
Bougainville experienced rapid population growth in the years following WWII. 
From the estimated 45,000 when the islands were 'discovered', numbers had 
risen to 72,000 in 1966 (WDS, 1973) and reached 108,726 by 1980 (Oliver, 
1991). This increase can be attributed to better health care, decreasing infant 
mortality, the control of diseases, and the relaxation of customs concerning birth 
spacing (Oliver, 1980). The population explosion was accompanied by rapid 
urbanisation occasioned by the mine (Mamak, 1978). The operation spawned 
two new towns (Arawa and Panguna), and substantial growth in Kieta. Prior to 
the mine's closure, the annual growth rate in these areas was around 3.2 per cent 
(Griffin, 1990b). 
As a result, in twenty years, Bougainville came from having one of the lowest 
rates of urbanisation in PNG to having one of the highest in the world (Connell, 
1991). This had considerable economic and social implications. The demand 
for, and ecological pressure on, arable and/or inhabitable land, already 
diminishing because of the mine, rose steeply. The male dominated migration to 
the towns led to increased prostitution, assault, rape, and alcohol abuse 
(Connell, 1990b). The problems of unemployment and underemployment, 
hitherto unknown in the subsistence economy, arose as applicants for BCL jobs 
outnumbered vacancies two to one (Oliver, 1991). 
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Compensation for Loss and Damage 
The tensions surrounding compensation did not abate over time. Whilst 
compensation issues encompassed many aspects of the economic, social and 
environmental considerations presented above, its importance to the relationship 
between the mine and the Bougainvilleans was such that it warrants detailed 
analysis. The problems may be categorised in terms of administration, adequacy 
and distribution. 
Administration 
In effect, the ad hoe management of compensation meant that the company had 
to address each claim on its individual merits. Not only was the quantum of 
settlement at issue, the mine's executives needed to assess the political 
implications of every decision. The government interference, legal actions and 
protracted negotiations described earlier frustrated both management and the 
Bougainvilleans. To a community which felt threatened by the venture from its 
inception, this ostensibly haphazard, slow and confrontational approach to 
compensation was a contradiction of the company's claims of sensitive and 
humane management. As Bedford and Mamak (1977:54) reason, "it is hardly 
surprising, under the circumstances, that confidence in administrative and 
company personnel responsible for liaison with landowners dissipated quickly." 
The success and general acceptance enjoyed by the RMTLF during its early 
years began to decline as questions concerning the honesty and efficacy of its 
administration were raised. Although the Trust was precluded from distributing 
money to individuals (Connell, 1991), loans were advanced to landowners for 
the establishment of new businesses, the development of the infrastructure, and 
the purchase of building materials. With arrears on these loans exceeding 
K300,000 (US$252,000) within three years (Oliver, 1991), Severinus Ampaoi, 
a Dapera businessman, was appointed as chairman to 'tighten' the operation. 
Ampaoi implemented strict financial management and diverted RMTLF assets 
and funds away from individual lending towards purchasing shares in larger 
ventures such as copra plantations and the BDC which would increase the capital 
of the Trust. 
The reorganisation transformed RMTLF into a relatively major operation with a 
growing income, but the locals became resentful that they now received little 
direct cash benefit from the fund (Connell, 1991). With compensation money 
being channelled into RMTLF and few tangible outcomes being evident, many 
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villagers grew suspicious, especially the younger ones who "accused the 'old 
guard' of using the funds for their own benefit and being complacent about the 
needs of the less fortunate" (Griffin, 1990b:75). Accusations of restricted 
membership, failure to produce financial reports, and the recruitment of a 
Filipino as general manager of the fund also added to the landowners' 
grievances (Okole, 1990). 
Adequacy 
From 1969 to 1989 CRA/BCL paid out K21 million (US$18 million) (Griffin, 
1990b) to some 2,000 people (Oliver, 1991) in lump-sum and annual 
compensation payments, exclusive of ancillary costs such as village relocation 
and the landowners' 5 per cent share of the 1.25 per cent royalties. This sum 
equated to an average per capita income for Bougainvilleans of about K500 
(US$430) a year (Connell, 1990b ). 
Initially, the amounts of compensation were .considered adequate, but this 
acceptance slowly turned to discontent. The reasons for the Bougainvilleans' 
change of heart is discussed by Connell (1991:63): 
Firstly ... the total amount of compensation ... was very small, relative to the 
wealth produced by the mine and the revenue gained by the national and provincial 
governments... Secondly, it was believed that the actual historic rate of 
compensation payments was derisory and that one-off compensation payments for 
cash crops were totally inadequate, because the cash crops could have been bearing 
throughout the whole period. Thirdly ... where once there had been general 
assumptions that only some land would be used, and that after the mine and lease 
ended the land would revert to its traditional owners, it was now clear that land had 
been destroyed and could never be of any social or economic use again. This was 
combined with the realization that when the mine eventually closed ... villagers ... 
would have no land left, few employment opportunities, no compensation 
payments, and more limited access to services. Fourthly, much of the compensation 
[had] been used by the recipients for short-term ends and/or local business 
development that had not been sustained ... Fifthly, the compensation money was 
received by traditional landowners and family heads. Over time those children who 
became adults found access to that money difficult; moreover, young men 
sometimes had poor employment prospects ... whilst increasing population meant 
that particular sums had to be shared between more and more people. 
This, combined with the diversion of compensation money to RMTLF after 
1980, resulted in increasing demands for larger payments. 
Distribution 
The disbursement of compensation caused ongoing. contention between PN G, 
North Solomons Province and the Bougainvilleans. Friction between the 
national and provincial governments over their respective entitlement to shares in 
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the mine's wealth escalated and, according to Carruthers (1990), this was a 
fundamental issue in Bougainville's bid for independence in 1975. 
The apportioning of royalties, occupation fees and compensation payments 
among the locals was an abiding issue which would, in time, become a pivotal 
element in the island's revolt. As early as 1971, Momis and Ogan noted that 
"compensation .. . is unevenly distributed and, in fact, largely confined to the 
[people] closest to the mine site and port developments" (1971:36). Twenty 
years later, Camilleri would similarly observe that the "deep-seated resentment 
experienced by many Bougainvilleans is clearly connected to . . . the uneven 
distribution of economic benefits" (1991 :99). This had the effect of creating a 
'moneyed class' which not only irked those who, because they did not live near 
the mine, profited little from its presence, but also concerned those who believed 
it was responsible for eroding Bougainville's largely egalitarian ways. In 
addition, a strata of wealth became apparent within the 'moneyed class' because 
entitlements from the mine were proportionate to the size of a group's 
landholdings. 
A measure of the landowners' discontent may be traced to the decision to 
calculate occupation fees at a flat rate according to area (discussed earlier), as 
this approach created an imbalance in relativities of benefits per head of 
population. The manner in which individual 'titleholders' handled compensation 
. income further exacerbated feelings of inequity. The fluidity of traditional land 
usage cannot be reconciled to the straight lines which represent mining leases on 
a surveyor's map. By segmenting the land and registering parcels to certain 
'titleholders', BCL detennined who should receive the payments due for a 
particular area. The way in which each recipient would distribute these funds 
among family groups was not a concern of the company. Leaders who did not 
share the income were accused of greed by fellow clan members, although Filer 
(1990: 12) suggests that this may have resulted from "a simple absence of 
custom which prescribes the proper way to redistribute rent". The controlling or 
keeping of the group's receipts by individuals caused anger among others with 
claims on the land, particularly younger members. In time, the 'new' generation 
would come to challenge the elders' authority to manage the groups' income 
from the mine. 
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The 1980 Compensation Agreement 
Several events in 1979-1980 led to the emergence of a revised compensation 
agreement between BCL and the villagers. Firstly, the occupation fee rate 
became due for renegotiation. Secondly, BCL was becoming aware of the 
abovementioned dissatisfactions over the quantum and distribution of payments. 
Thirdly, the Panguna Landowners' Association (PLA - refer to Chapter 6) was 
agitating for changes to the occupation fee/compensation package. Although 
slow to respond to these pressures (Oliver, 1991), the company met the PLA to 
forge an arrangement suitable to both parties. Quodling (1991:49-50) 
summarises the outcomes of these discussions: 
The result was a five-year compensation agreement formalised in 1980 to cover the 
period March 1979 to March 1984. This incorporated: 
• an occupation fee payable in respect of all BCL leased land and expressed in two 
components: statutory (K5 per hectare81 ) and Panguna regional (K25 per hectare82); 
• physical disturbance compensation payable in respect of leased land physically 
disturbed by BCL operations; KIO per hectare83 plus annual CPI84 adjustment; 
• social inconvenience compensation payable in respect of all BCL leased land: Kl5 
per hectare85 plus annual CPI adjustments; 
• bush compensation payable for loss of rights associated with the bush in leased 
areas and to be retrospective: K7.41 per hectare86 plus annual CPI adjustment; 
• river.and fish compensation: Kl50,00087 annually, subject to CPI escalation; 
• formalisation of crop compensation rates and village relocation responsibilities. 
In addition, provision was made for some of the money (in particular inconvenience 
payments and bush compensation back payments) to be made into a trust fund ... 
[That is, the RMTLF detailed previously.] 
This agreement was renewed in 1984, and formalised a second time to cover the 
period March 1986 to March 1990. 
The Bougainville Initiative 
The Melanesian Alliance Party (MAP) was founded in 1982 by Fr John Momis 
(see Appendix L) and a New Britain politician named John Kaputin. The party's 
raison d'etre turned on the priest's determination to "ensure his distributist 
81 A$3.33/US$3.90 per hectare; A$8.25/US$9.70 per acre. 
82 A$16.65/US$19.60 per hectare; A$41.l0/US$48.40 per acre. 
83 A$6.67/US$7.85 per hectare; A$16.45/US$19.35 per acre. 
84 Consumer Price Index. The average percentage change which occurs in the prices of 
commodities commonly bought by households over a specified period of time. 
85 A$10/US$11.75 per hectare; A$24.70/US$29.05 per acre. 
86 A$4.95/US$5.80 per hectare; A$12.25/US$14.40 per acre. 
87 A$100,000; US$117,700. 
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ideology would prevail over [NSP Premier] Hannett's 'capitalist road"' (Griffin, 
1990a: 11 ). As part of the MAP campaign in the 1987 national elections, Momis 
presented BCL with a manifesto titled the 'Bougainville Initiative Fund'. Under 
a thinly disguised threat of mine closure, the letter dated May 4 (reproduced in 
Appendix P) proposed a 'fresh start' for both BCL and the Bougainvilleans, 
informed of the operation's inefficiencies, accused the firm of a K60 million 
(US$54.5 million) a year transfer pricing scheme with the smelters, blamed the 
mine for fostering the island's dependency on it, and demanded payment of 3 
per cent of BCL's income (Kl2.6 million/US$12.8 million in 1986) to the NSP 
government. (The claim of transfer pricing with the smelters was strenuously 
denied by the company at the time, and the writer has been unable to find any 
evidence of this practice having occurred.) 
Although the Bougainville Initiative "received short shrift from the national 
government" (Oliver, 1991:196), "the idea of an escalation in the level of funds 
flowing direct from the mining operation to the province received wide 
provincial support" (Quodling, 1991:51). As its propositions were a feature of 
the forthcoming polls, it presumably played a part in the re-election of Momis. It 
is interesting to note that the MAP saw increased payments as the solution to 
Bougainville's enmity with the mine rather than the total withdrawal which many 
locals wanted. As intimated in the company's response dated 11 May (see 
Appendix P), BCL did not acquiesce to the Initiative's demands because it was 
bound by the conditions of the 1974 Bougainville Copper Agreement and, in 
probability, was loathe to become involved in national-provincial politics. 
On 25 May 1987, Momis forwarded a further letter which indicated wide 
support for the MAP's demands. Oliver (1991:198) quotes from this document: 
I have with me representatives of the local villages, Ministers in the Provincial 
Government with portfolio responsibility for the mine's impact on our culture. I 
also have with me the leader of the trade unions. You will also be aware that the 
[Catholic] bishop of Bougainville is keenly awaiting news of the outcome of these 
talks, to discover what progress has been made. Indeed, all people of Bougainville 
now expect concrete results, and your detailed response to our original Bougainville 
Initiative. 
Quodling (1991:52) regards the Bougainville Initiative as the prime catalyst of 
the war which was to come. He writes: "The people of North Solomons 
Province, their expectations raised by pre-election rhetoric but shattered by the 
realities of post-election politics, had just cause for frustration and discontent". 
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CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The history of the Panguna mine is, to a large degree, a reflection of the social 
and political environment discussed in Chapter 4. Initially viewed by Australia 
and later by PNG as a means of making an emerging country financially viable, 
successive administrations encouraged CRNBCL in its endeavours with little 
apparent regard to the unique nature of Bougainvillean culture. Although bound 
by the law and relying on monetary solutions, both of which were alien to 
Bougainvillean traditions, the mine's management displayed a cultural sensitivity 
and propriety far beyond that of the various levels of government in PNG, and 
appears to have taken all reasonable measures to make the mine acceptable to the 
people of Bougainville. That the relationship between Panguna and the 
Bougainvilleans was always strained and all but collapsed by 1988 is evidence 
that management efforts were insufficient. Yet a review of the fundamental 
issues indicate that local dissatisfaction with the mine resulted from factors 
exogenous to, and often beyond the control of, management. These included (i) 
environmental degradation, (ii) land alienation, (iii) government indifference to 
the needs and desires of the islanders, the provincial authorities and the 
company, (iv) the Bougainvilleans' perception of their ethnic identity, (v) the 
problems associated with an escalating population, and (vi) the landowners' 
disputes among themselves about the distribution of compensation funds. 
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CHAPTER6 
THE BOUGAINVILLE REBELLION 
OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter reviews and analyses the situations which developed from the 
histories discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. The chapter has three objectives. First, to 
describe the events which led to the Bougainville rebellion and to detail the war 
itself. Second, to consider how PNG and its neighbours responded to the crisis. 
Third, to explain the effects of the revolution on those involved. The events and 
issues which emerge in this chapter provide understanding of the human and 
economic consequences of operating foreign ventures in a developing society, 
and of the challenges and uncertainties which confront the managers of MNEs. 
BOUGAINVILLE'S DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE 
Introduction 
The war which engulfed Bougainville cannot be regarded as the start of the crisis, 
rather it is the culmination of a discontent which had been simmering since 
European settlement. As the preceding two chapters have demonstrated, the 
culturally unique islanders have struggled to retain their dignity, identity and land 
for almost a century. This section investigates the Bougainvilleans' reactions to 
the circumstances of their modem history. 
Emerging Nationalism 
Before WWII, the Bougainvilleans seemed to grudgingly accept their domination 
by foreigners, but the particular horrors which were the hallmark of the Japanese 
throughout Asia and the Pacific somehow forged a psychological readjustment to 
their perception of outsiders. Reflecting on this, Oliver (1991 :77) writes: 
... the changes undergone in the mental attitudes of some of them · towards whites 
and towards themselves - served to ensure that relations between the two would never 
again be as they were before the war. . .. the whole war experience seems to have 
nourished a view among them that no colonial regime is necessarily perpetual. 
Peace found Australia redefining its relationship with PNG. Its previous 
indifference was replaced with policies of material and political development, as 
well as encouragement for eventual independence. The two factors which drove 
Australia's commitment to PNG were gratitude and self-defence. Australia was 
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indebted to the Niuginians, without whose legendary and heroic assistance in the 
war, the Allies could not have succeeded in defending the region (Standish, 
1984 ). Australia was also mindful of PNG's strategic importance, as E. J. Ward, 
then Minister of Territories, noted: "for its own protection Australia cannot afford 
to permit the territories to remain undeveloped or its native population to remain 
in a backward stage" (cited in Oliver, 1973: 143). Thus Canberra phased out the 
indenture system, introduced universal primary education, paid around A£1 
million (A$2 million/US$2.9 million) in war compensation, and subsidised the 
developing PNG economy. 
Although official post-war policies voiced concern for the well-being of the 
Territory's people, much of the Bougainvillean population believed this to be 
hollow rhetoric. There was little "genuine economic development that the 
Government could boast of' (Hannett, 1975:288), the Administration head-
quarters at Sohano (in the Buka Passage) was isolated from those it professed to 
serve, and the programs which emanated therefrom were devised in Canberra and 
Port Moresby with little consultation. The introduction of local government 
councils in the early 1950s was seen by many as a move to 'Westernise' the 
locals. As a result, pockets of Bougainvilleans began to agitate for an end to 
Australia's trusteeship, as evidenced by the 1962 Nasioi petition for the UN to 
transfer the mandate to the USA (refer Chapter 4). 
The 1964 elections for the new House of Assembly gave Bougainvilleans their 
first opportunity to have some input into their affairs. Nine indigenous aspirants 
contested Bougainville's 'open electorate' (for PNG citizens) with Paul Lapun, a 
candidate with an indifferent attitude towards the Administration (Oliver, 
1973:156), winning by a wide margin. Votes in the 'special electorate' (reserved 
for whites) numbered only 58 per cent of those cast in the open electorate. 
Lapun registered Bougainville's interest in joining the Solomon Islands in March 
1967 (Bedford & Mamak, 1977:21), but it was 18 months before the matter was 
considered formally. In September 1968 a group of North Solomons politicians, 
public servants and students asked Lapun to petition the Administration to: 
allow Bougainville to go it alone, or else arrange for a plebiscite or referendum to 
find out conclusively the Bougainvillians' views on the following political 
alternatives: 
• whether Bougainville should form an independent nation on its own; or 
• leave Papua New Guinea and unite to form one nation with the British Solomon 
Islands south of Bougainville; or 
• remain with Papua New Guinea (Oliver, 1991:183). 
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The basis of the representation (fully documented in Appendix Q) was the widely 
held Bougainvillean sentiment that they are fundamentally distinct from the 
Niuginians. The Administration was not persuaded to conduct a referendum on 
secession, however. 
Bougainvillean Associations and Alliances 
Foreign administrations, missionaries, the war, and expanding commercial 
activities provided avenues for wider social contact among the hitherto isolated 
and individualistic Bougainvillean communities. Their exposure to each other, as 
well as Niuginians and Europeans, "developed a sharpened sense of common 
ethnic identity amongst themselves" (Oliver, 1973:202). The evolving sense of 
commonality not only fostered a diminishing sense of belonging to Australia or 
the united PNG that was emerging, but also gave rise to the realisation that their 
relative powerlessness could be overcome, at least in part, by organising the 
wider indigenous community in political and commercial activities. 
The Hahalis Society 
The first demonstration of collectivism came in the 1950s when two Buka 
students formed a co-operative with 30 others to sell local goods to traders. 
Registered as a private company in 1966, the Hahalis Society grew to 50 share-
holders with 5,000 participants in its economic ventures. While its ethic of self-
reliance and hard work was lauded by the Administration and missions (Oliver, 
1973), some aspects of the Society's philosophy were not well received by the 
'establishment': 
Its ideology was a melange of cargoist88 thinking about the possible nexus between 
ritual, productivity and money, opposition to an administration and a Catholic 
Church which had failed to provide material progress, desire for communal 
autonomy, and sexual permissiveness aimed at, among other things, restoring 
putative traditional practices and at the same time breaking (by then) customary 
constraints on the availability of women (Griffin, 1990a:l8). 
In 1962 the Society, whose members refused to join the local government council 
on the basis that Port Moresby had done nothing to advance the B uka region, 
refused to pay an annual head tax to the council (Havini, 1990b). As 
Administration officials were unable to collect the tax from Hahalis leaders, police 
were sent to arrest them. This resulted in a riot. A further 155 officers arrived, 
88 The 'cargo cult', prevalent on Bougainville since the 1950s, is described by Ogan 
(1974:118) as " ... a form of supernatural recipes for obtaining European goods. 
Rituals, including new songs and prayers to the Virgin Mary and other figures in the 
Christian pantheon, were held in cemeteries, implying that the spirits of the dead were 
to produce money, clothing, Land Rovers and other implements from opened graves." 
170 
but these were quickly repelled by the crowd. The disturbance was finally quelled 
when 400 reinforcements moved in and arrested 256 Bukas. Receiving jail 
sentences ranging from 3 to 6 months, the offenders were freed after 2 months on 
a legal technicality. Upon their release, the rebels "resumed their opposition to 
missions and administration, and large numbers of other Buka islanders flocked 
to join them, further swelling their ranks" (Oliver, 1991 :89). 
As an expression of political self-determination, the Hahalis protest proved a 
victory for Buka people and resulted in the Administration building a road which 
greatly assisted the Society's trade. Griffin (1990b:73) believes the 1962 revolt 
... had at least three effects: it shocked the Catholic Church into greater concern for 
the material welfare of its flock; it alerted the mission to the need to assume the 
mantle of "justice for the people" lest, in schism and shame, it lost a jewel in its 
crown to cultists; it began a North Solomonese conviction that Port Moresby would 
act on their behalf only if its authority was threatened. 
The Hahalis Society continued to be a political force, having a representative on 
the Bougainville Special Political Committee (see below). 
The Fifty Toea Movement 
Several communities around Panguna formed the Bauring Society in the 1960s. 
Its 4,000 members were committed to retaining Bougainvillean traditions and 
refused to accept any form of 'modernisation'. Oliver notes that the movement 
... opposed formal schooling for their children. They were against development, 
advocating that minerals should be left in the ground, and were against the 
government, having refused to vote in national or provincial elections. The tenets 
also included beliefs in kago (cargo) ... (1991:181). 
The movement became known as the 'Fifty Toea Government' because of its 50 
toea monthly subscription. Many of its members would eventually join Ona's 
group of revolutionaries (May, 1990). 
The Bougainville Special Political Committee 
Mounting grievances against various entities (particularly the Administration and 
BCL), and wide-spread disenchantment with local members of the House fuelled 
calls for secession in the early 1970s. PNG Chief Minister Somare responded by 
promising that Bougainville's views would be included in the agenda of the 
Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) which was structuring PNG's forth-
coming independence. A local group was formed to make recommendations to 
the CPC, and to "explore ways to improve relations between the central 
government and the Bougainville District" (Oliver, 1991: 189). This body was 
short-lived, however. At the Combined Local Government Council Conference in 
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February 1973 it was resolved that a separate party, the Bougainville Special 
Political Committee (BSPC), would be established to replace Somare's 
committee. With Hannett, Momis, Lapun and Moses (refer Appendix L) in 
charge, the BSCP abandoned its agenda of secession in favour of seeking "ways 
by which the district could obtain and operate its own, more autonomous 
government within [PNG]" (Oliver, 1991:191). Of the BSCP's 6 member 
executive, 2 held positions in BCL, and Moses was the leader of the BMWU. 
The inaugural BSPC conference in May 1973 was attended by 4 members of the 
House of Assembly, the presidents of the local government councils, members of 
the Panguna Mungkas Association (see below), representatives from outer 
islands, village elders and urban workers (Mamak & Bedford, 1974). Havini 
(1990b:21), a BSPC member, describes the mood of the conference: 
A comprehensive report was prepared by BSPC especially relating to draft a proposal 
for provincial government. There was a feeling that through this second tier of 
government, provided it was endowed constitutionally with substantial autonomy 
politically, administratively and financially, Bougainville would be happy to remain 
with [PNG]. 
The national government rejected the BSPC proposal which included local control 
of natural resources, collection of major taxes, and Bougainvillean receipt of 
mining royalties. The submission appears in Appendix R. Faced with renewed 
threats of secession, Somare agreed to negotiate and Bougainville's district 
government was born on 5 July 1974. "Called the Provincial Government, it was 
composed of elected officials and had a few administrative duties . . . but no 
substantial taxing or legislative powers" (Oliver, 1991:193). Angered by the 
Provincial Government's lack of localised power, many Bougainvilleans refused 
to acknowledge its authority and declared independence on 1September1975. 
The Panguna Mungkas Association 
The mine brought large numbers of Bougainvilleans together for the first time 
and, inevitably, the indigenous workers developed informal groups through 
which they could exploit their new opportunities and protect their common 
interests. In April 1973 a band of employees established the Panguna Mungkas 
Association (PMA), a fraternity "founded on the unity of Bougainvillean workers 
in contradistinction to other ethnic groups employed by the company, and in 
opposition to company policies which were perceived to 'threaten' them" (Mamak 
& Bedford, 1974: 15). 
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Initially the PMA concerned itself with infringements of native workers' rights 
which went undetected by the BMWU, but when a Bougainvillean suspected of 
shoplifting was assaulted by company security officers the Association found its 
sense of community, drafted a constitution, and resolved to take an active role in 
protecting the legal rights of all Bougainvilleans living in the area. In July 1973 
BCL officially recognised the PMA and established liaison with its officials. 
The PMA did not prove to be as effective or influential as its founders had hoped. 
The primary problem was competition for loyalty; many PMA members were 
variously associated with the BSCP, the BMWU, and other staff associations 
which dealt with their particular concerns. Also, some PMA leaders held high 
positions in BCL. Despite the company's sanctioning of the movement, it was 
reluctant to deal with the association on two counts. Firstly, affording the PMA 
any treatment not available to all employees was discriminatory, and secondly, as 
Bougainvilleans formed over 30 per cent of the workforce, there was a danger of 
organised actions against the company's interests. 
The Panguna Landowners' Association 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Bougainvillean landowners generally acted 
independently. Dealings between themselves, with CRA/BCL, and with the 
various authorities were conducted on an ad hoe basis. In order to provide a 
forum in which they could discuss common issues and present a united front, the 
Panguna Landowners' Association (PLA) was formed in 1979 under the 
leadership of Michael Pariu. The Association was directed by an executive 
comprising landholders and village elders (Dorney, 1990), and membership 
encompassed all landowners within the leased areas (Oliver, 1991). 
Once established, the PLA presented BCL with a list of long-standing grievances. 
The company's lack of response (Oliver, 1991), and its non-recognition of the 
PLA's authority (Griffin, 1990b) resulted in a demonstration at the minesite 
headquarters and the looting of a company supermarket. BCL then responded and 
negotiations were set for 4 July 1980, the outcome of which was the 1980 
Compensation Agreement (detailed in Chapter 5). The signing of the agreement 
strengthened the PLA because (i) it forced formal recognition from both the 
provincial government and the company (Okole, 1990), and (ii) winning 
substantial increases in fees and compensation enhanced the executive's 
credibility among its constituents (Quodling, 1991). A new era seemed to have 
dawned among the landowners. Content with the executive, they now operated in 
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a co-operative spmt, met at regular intervals, and had a good working 
relationship with BCL (Dorney, 1990). 
The heterogeneity characteristic of Bougainvillean society eventually overtook the 
PLA however. Its demise has been attributed to various factors: 
• As the regularity of meetings declined, members had to 'bottle up' grievances 
which caused an accumulation of bad feeling (Okole, 1990); 
• Poor education or not understanding the responsibilities attached to their office 
led some executives to only nominally occupy their positions (Okole, 1990); 
• The executive had not been formally elected (Dorney, 1990); 
• Regardless of what monetary packages the PLA might win for the landowners, 
many members were becoming concerned about the increasing social and 
environmental damage caused by the mine (Oliver, 1991); 
• The difficulties experienced by the RMTLF reflected on the PLA within which 
the Fund had been established (refer Chapter 5); 
• There was an increasing perception amongst members that the PLA board was 
accommodating BCL at the expense of landowners' welfare (Okole, 1990); . 
• Young people became less willing to accept their status of junior members of 
their landowning groups, and demanded a larger share of the money received 
by the older members (Oliver, 1991); and 
• Because recent compensation agreement did not provide the large increases in 
payments which had characterised the 1975 and 1980 arrangements, many 
members blamed the competency and/or resolve of the older negotiators 
(Quodling, 1991). 
The PLA split into two factions with the formation of a breakaway group headed 
by Perpetua Serero and Francis Ona (see Appendix L) resulting in "two different 
organizations representing the interests of the landowners; these were known as 
the 'old' PLA and the 'new' PLA" (Okole, 1990:20). On 2 September 1987 
Serero wrote to BCL informing that all its future dealings with the PLA were to 
be directed through herself, and threatened "Any slight move or involvement of 
your office with those out-going committees will result in massive 
demonstration" (cited in Oliver, 1991:205). Pariu distanced the 'old' PLA from 
Serero/Ona group in a letter to BCL on 29 September, claiming these people were 
"manipulated" and "not representative of the whole area" (Quodling, 1991:57). 
Whilst neither the government nor BCL officially recognised the 'new' PLA, it 
was clear that the coup was a serious issue as it had the support of Premier Kabui 
(see Appendix L), Fr Momis, and the locally powerful Catholic Church (Dorney, 
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1990). BCL continued to deal with the 'old' executive, but sought legal advice 
from the PNG court as to who should receive the 1988 inconvenience payments. 
In April 1988, the 'new' PLA lodged a series of demands on the government and 
the mine; these are summarised by Okole (1990:21): 
(i) a general compensation payment of KlO billion [A$16 billion I US$1 l.6 
billion] to offset the amount of environmental destruction caused by the mining 
operation so far and 
(ii) a demand for landowners to acquire the 20 per cent share of the mining project 
presently owned by the national government, which was justified by the belief 
that the ... government had never paid for this shareholding in the first place. 
But these general demands were accompanied by a number of more limited demands 
which were seen to require more immediate action. These were: 
(iii) an amendment of the 1969 Land Titles Agreement, which had been used as the 
basis for subsequent compensation payments and which was said to be in 
conflict with the matrilineal inheritance customs of the landowners; 
(iv) an entirely new survey of customary land titles to be carried out in the three 
main lease zones, in order to rectify . . . mistakes which were thought to have 
been made in the original surveys; 
(v) an increase in employment, training and business opportunities for the 
landowners, which BCL was said to have neglected; 
(vi) an improvement in the monitoring of environmental damage, and in actual 
control of chemical pollution, soil erosion, etc.; 
(vii) an overall improvement in the living standards, especially housing standards, of 
the landowners, particularly those who had been resettled by BCL, in accordance 
with promises which BCL was thought to have broken; 
(iix) a general change in the condescending attitude of the company and the 
government towards landowners. 
Further, BCL was expected to pay 50 per cent of all future profit to the land-
owners and the provincial government, and transfer ownership of the mine to the 
landowners within 5 years (Griffin, l 990b ). As the company did not respond, 
the 'new' PLA blocked the road to the mine on 17 May, thereby forcing the 
government to broker a truce pending the outcome of the AGA study (noted in 
Chapter 5). 
Towards Secession 
Because the PNG government had gained a huge revenue boost from the Mining 
(Bougainville Copper Agreement) Amendment Act 1974, the provincial govern-
ment sought payment of all royalties (rather than the present 5 per cent) to the 
island claiming it was the Bougainvilleans who were suffering the negative 
consequences of the mine. Port Moresby refused the province's request, arguing 
that the entire country should benefit from mining. In response, on 30 May 1975, 
the provincial assembly under the leadership of Alexis Sarei (see Appendix L) 
voted to secede. After two failed attempts to negotiate a settlement with PNG, 
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a declaration of independence and a flag raising ceremony took place on 1 September 
1975 and the name 'North Solomons' (to signify ethnic affiliations separate from 
PNG) was adopted. This ... ceremony was followed by representations to the United 
Nations by Fr Momis, but with little apparent success (Quodling, 1991:18-19). 
PNG gained independence two weeks later and for the following eleven months 
Bougainville was in upheaval as the two sides attempted to find peace. In August 
1976 the secessionists withdrew their claims and agreed to keep Bougainville 
within PNG. Of the terms of settlement, Lawson (1993:66) notes that "the price 
for this [agreement] was an especially favourable financial fonnula for Bougain-
ville, and the adoption of the Organic Law89 on Provincial Government[s] ... This 
law has been described as 'almost a treaty' between the secessionist leaders and 
the national government." Havini (1990b) reports that between 1976 and 1987 
Bougainville was relatively peaceful, but the secessionist feelings of the 1975 
declaration did not subside. Independence was discussed continually, and became 
an open issue during the provincial and national election campaigns. 
The preliminary report of the AGA study was released at a meeting on 18 
November 1988. Predictably, many landowners present at the meeting objected 
to its findings (refer Chapter 5) and Ona declared it a 'whitewash'. He "stormed 
from the meeting and three days later resigned as a surveyor with BCL" (Griffin, 
l 990b:76). Ona then announced over national radio that, as spokesman for the 
PLA, 
... he and his associates had no confidence in BCL or in the national government; 
that the AGA scientists ... had wrongly exonerated BCL; and that in the absence of 
other measures to protect the lives and welfare of Bougainvillians, the New PLA had 
decided to close the mine (cited in Oliver, 1991 :208). 
It is unclear whether Ona also declared his intention to force Bougainville's 
breakaway with PNG during this broadcast because "the tape of the interview has 
'disappeared"' (Oliver, 1991:208). 
Rebellion 
Minor acts of sabotage had been instituted against the mine in the weeks 
preceding the broadcast, but on 22 November three men raided the BCL 
magazine and stole a large amount of explosives. Further explosives were taken 
89 The organic law was incorporated in the PNG constitution and provided for the 
incremental transfer of powers from Port Moresby to the provinces when they were 
capable of dealing with them. "The intention· of the organic laws was that the national 
government would gradually move out of a lot of legislative fields in which the 
provincial governments had responsibilities, leaving the provinces free to pass their 
own laws" (Dorney, 1990:167). 
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from another magazine in the following week. A series of arson attacks on mine 
buildings commenced on November 26, and on December 1 the stolen explosives 
were used to destroy a pylon carrying power to the ore-processing plants. True to 
his threat, Ona had halted the mine's production, albeit temporarily. He and his 
militants, now calling themselves the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), 
then fled to hide in the mountains. 
Meanwhile BCL managing director, Bob Cornelius, was in Port Moresby 
meeting with national and provincial government leaders. Originally concerned 
with compensation matters, the government officials changed tack when they 
learned of the destruction of the power pylon. Recognising that the BRA posed a 
real threat to PNG's economy, they now made peace overtures to the rebels. 
Police reinforcements were sent to Bougainville, and Fr Momis (Minister for 
Provincial Affairs) was dispatched to dissuade the militant landowners from the 
use of violence. 
Electricity was restored to the mine on December 4 only to be disrupted the next 
day by the bombing of another pylon. Concerned for the safety of its personnel 
and property, BCL suspended operations and sought a guarantee from Prime 
Minister Namaliu that the mine would be protected. Reassured by a 400 strong 
police presence and all-night curfews, the mine re-opened on December 11. 
Appeals from Namaliu and Kabui for Ona to come out of the bush and open 
negotiations were met with the following demands: 
that Bougainville Copper Limited pay the Kl0,000 million compensation 
demanded by the landowners, and immediately shut down its operations; 
• that PNG adopt a new economic order (because he stated, the country's economic 
base is controlled by a white mafia); and 
• that North Solomons Province break away from PNG unless the new economic 
order is adopted (Oliver, 1991:213). 
The rejection of Ona's ultimatum spawned renewed attacks by the BRA and 
savage responses by the police. The rapidly deteriorating situation prompted 
PNG to propose the 'Bougainville Peace Package' in May 1989; this included: 
• sale at cost price (half to the landowners, half to the provincial government) of 
4.5 per cent equity in BCL, to be paid for from future dividends, plus another 5 .1 
per cent at market price (the shares to come from the ... equity owned by the 
national government); 
• an annual compensation grant to the provincial government of K5 million [A$6.9 
million I US$5.85 million] and 
• a national government-financed development program, including the construction 
of roads, schools, and health facilities (Oliver, 1991 :213) 
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In addition, BCL agreed to undertake various construction projects desired by 
landowners, worth K41.5 million (A$57 million I US$48.5 million). Rather than 
easing hostilities, the government and company initiatives seemed to heighten 
tension and inflame further violence. Little is known about the internal 
operations, strategies and membership of the BRA during this period, but it is 
certain that its numbers were growing and several military trained men were 
recruited (Oliver, 1991). 
On May 15, BMWU members walked off the job after employees were attacked 
by "men armed with spears and other weapons" (Peers, 1989:22) and, unable to 
assure the workers' safety, management elected to defer operations. With a 
government promise of additional forces to protect employees, the union agreed 
to return to work on 21 May, but this was aborted when the BRA shot an 
Australian worker and ambushed four buses carrying BCL staff to work. These 
actions were significant in that they resulted in a number of expatriates leaving the 
island (Callick, 1989), and "was weighty evidence that the militants' intelligence 
was efficient and 'that the militants themselves did not wish mining to resume" 
(Oliver, 191:215). 
With the mine still idle a month later, BCL retrenched 600 'non-core' employees 
(Quodling, 1991) and on 26 June, Namaliu declared a state of emergency as the 
government could not convince the rebels to accept the peace plan. To this point 
"at least 15 people, including three soldiers, [had] been killed in the violence" 
(Young, 1989:7). The state of emergency was accompanied by the deployment of 
increased security forces with extended search-and-arrest powers. Under orders 
to "end the militancy as quickly as possible" (Oliver, 1991:219), the PNG troops 
immediately launched an offensive on Guava village which was "branded as the 
heart of the small but deadly insurrection on Bougainville" (Woodley, 1989:3). 
Following this, hostilities lessened and BCL began to repair its damaged property 
with a view to recommencing operations on 1 September. The mine opened on 5 
September, but was closed 8 hours later when another power pylon was 
destroyed. 
In an attempt to stem the growing occurrence and savagery of the BRA sieges, a 
traditional Nasioi peace ceremony was held in Arawa on 27 October, "calling on 
all parties to cease hostilities and to restore law and order to Bougainville" 
(Oliver, 1991:221). But little was achieved, and warfare continued unabated. 
Further attacks on Panguna's facilities occurred during November and December 
and, in the face of mounting danger to its employees, BCL placed the mine under 
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a 'care and maintenance' program. A total of 2,000 expatriate and Niuginian 
employees were dismissed (Howarth, 1989), and the care and surveillance of the 
mine was taken over by local contractors (Quodling, 1991 ). In February 1990 the 
company evacuated its remaining 300 employees (Dunstan, 1990). The Panguna 
mine was closed. 
When the rebellion erupted in November 1988, it was waged against the mine, its 
activities, and compensation issues. In April 1989 Ona advised the NSP govern-
mentthat secession, not compensation, was now his focus (Quodling, 1991). 
The continuance of the war after the mine's closure confirmed this. Not only had 
the target of the fighting shifted however, the 'tone' of the war was also 
changing. The murder of John Bika, the NSP Minister for Commerce, on 11 
September 1989 led cabinet to give the military carte blanche in its operations on 
Bougainville (Bougainville: A Pacific Solution, 1994), and offer a K200,000 
(A$275,000 I US$234,000) reward for Ona's capture (Polomka, 1990b). PNG 
troops took full advantage of this extended 'authority' and embarked on a 
campaign of destruction and human rights violations ranging from the burning of 
villages and looting to beatings, pack-rape, sexual mutilation and extra-judicial 
executions (Amnesty International, 1993; Havini, 1990a; Spriggs, 1990). 
With no evidence of Bougainvillean resolve weakening and Ona still at large by 
the end of 1989, Port Moresby ordered a foll-scale offensive on the island. On 12 
January 1990, 'Operation Footloose' was launched by about 2000 security force 
personnel (O'Callaghan & Peake, 1990) and weeks of bloody combat ensued. 
The campaign was a failure. Not only was it unsuccessful in subduing the BRA, 
the escalating incidence of murder and torture by PNG troops was reflecting 
badly on the nation. The 'St Valentine's Day Massacre', in which soldiers 
executed five civilians then threw their bodies into the sea from Australian 
supplied helicopters (Bougainville: A Pacific Solution, 1994), brought such 
criticism from home and abroad that the government agreed to negotiate. A cease-
fire came into effect on 2 March 1990, and within a fortnight the PNG forces had 
left Bougainville. 
The Bougainvilleans' determination was unexpected. In the early days of the war 
they were divided in their support for the BRA and over the question of 
secession. But as they watched their land again being invaded by a foreign army 
and their compatriots again suffering at the hands of aliens, they joined forces to 
reclaim their island. Lafitte (1993:306) explains the Bougainvillean sentiment: 
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For the first time, the entire island was united in its wish to be rid of PNG. This was 
an act of self-determination in which most of the selves were actively involved, in 
contrast to the 1975 procedures for self-determination by which PNG became a 
nation, and which lacked a popular movement behind them. 
The Declaration of Independence 
The withdrawal of the PNG militia effectively left the BRA in de facto control of 
the island. Establishing their headquarters in Panguna, the revolutionary forces 
were "charged with maintaining law and order" (Oliver, 1991:237). Anxious to 
resolve the crisis, the central government adopted a more conciliatory stance and 
declared it was willing to grant Bougainville numerous political and financial 
concessions. PNG was adamant, however, that it would not entertain demands 
for secession. Namaliu and Kabui made tentative arrangements for negotiations 
but these dissolved when, in Namaliu's absence, the PNG Executive Council 
declared a blockade of all goods and services effective from 2 May. The BRA 
responded by declaring independence (detailed in Appendix S) and on 17 May a 
ceremony was held at Arawa to announce the founding of the Republic of 
Bougainville with Ona as Interim President of a 13 member executive. 
Although there was no concern that any state would recognise the Republic of 
Bougainville (Griffin, 1990b), the declaration of independence represented a 
threat to PNG stability as a successful breakaway may have been interpreted as "a 
precedent for other secession initiatives, particularly in areas hosting other major 
mineral or oil discoveries" (Quodling, 1991:61). Namaliu and the Bougainvillean 
leaders agreed to meet in Honiara on 11 June but this was postponed when Ona 
refused to attend because he feared for his life (Oliver, 1991). The meeting was 
subsequently abandoned when PNG naval vessels sailed into Honiara. 
The human cost of the Bougainville revolution cannot be accurately judged. 
Amnesty International (1993) reports that, by May 1991, an estimated 1,500 had 
died as a direct result of the war and a further 3,000 had fallen prey to 
malnutrition and preventable diseases as a result of the PNG embargo. The Green 
Left Weekly (1997) suggests that the death toll had risen to 15,000 Bougain-
villeans and 1,000 PNG soldiers by 1997. 
Early Peace Initiatives 
The Endeavour Accord 
Wanting to commence peace talks, but with the safety of delegates concerning all 
parties, PNG approached New Zealand (NZ) to provide a neutral venue. 
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HMNZS Endeavour and two support vessels were supplied as facilities for the 
negotiations and, anchored in Bougainvillean waters, meetings commenced on 29 
July 1990. Whilst much of the dialogue was acrimonious and failed to address 
the political impasse, agreement for the restoration of services to Bougainville 
was reached on 5 August. Details of the accord appear in Appendix T. 
The Endeavour Accord failed, and the promised restoration of services did not 
eventuate. Whilst there were various political manoeuvres at play, the two 
predominant reasons for the collapse of the accord were: 
i) Disagreements as to who would administer the distribution of supplies and 
services, where the material would landed, and who would protect the people 
delivering the goods (Dorney, 1990). 
ii) The bulk of the Buka inhabitants had not supported secession (Dorney, 1990) 
and when PNG withdrew from Bougainville, the BRA began to infiltrate that 
island. In response, anti-BRA residents formed the Buka Liberation Force 
(BLF) (Oliver, 1991). In September, the BLF invited the PNG army to Buka 
for protection from the BRA. Violence flared, and Kabui refused to negotiate 
until the troops left Buka. 
The Honiara Declaration 
Perhaps concerned about the ongoing suffering the embargo was visiting on 
innocent Bougainvilleans, or maybe worried by growing international 
condemnation, on 3 January 1991 Port Moresby announced that government 
services would be restored (King, 1991). Within three weeks a second round of 
negotiations were convened in Honiara and on 24 January the Honiara 
Declaration on Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation on Bougainville was 
signed. Callick ( 1991: 15) reported the essential elements of the agreement as: 
... a joint programme of peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation, within the current 
constitutional framework; establishing legal and representative authority on 
Bougainville, and - more remarkable - "the constitutional role of the PNG Defence 
Force"; accepting a multinational supervisory team ... ; an amnesty for BRA 
members; restoring all services, including police and court; releasing all detainees 
held over the conflict; and a realistic timetable for implementation.90 
Within hours of signing of the declaration, the BRA renounced its undertaking to 
destroy or surrender its arms (Oliver, 1991), and on 19 February a BRA member 
turned away the first shipment of relief supplies (Bougainville: A Pacific 
Solution, 1994). 
90 The full text of the Honiara Declaration appears in Appendix U. 
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The events of 1988-1991 were the climax of Bougainville's history of separatist 
sentiment; for the first time in nearly a century, the island was back in Bougain-
villean hands. Although Port Moresby interpreted the uprising as a revolt against 
PNG, the insurrection was, in fact, a challenge to the legitimacy and authority of 
any non-Bougainvillean government. As Hannett (1975:287) notes, "Bougain-
villeans [have never] ceded political sovereignty to any foreign nation". Whereas 
the unrest was originally directed towards the Panguna mine, the dissidents' real 
agenda was total sovereignty of the people, their land, and their resources. 
The degree to which the mine was responsible for the Bougainville tragedy is 
difficult to assess. Because Bougainville's will for self-determination predates the 
mine, Panguna was clearly a catalyst for, rather than the cause of, the war. 
Undeniably, the mine became the focus of discontent, but this was more a 
reflection of the locals' objection to Panguna's domination of Bougainville than a 
perception of any deliberately harmful objectives or practices on the part of the 
company. To the contrary, evidence suggests that management's attitude to, and 
treatment of, the Bougainvilleans was generally positive, sensitive and 
benevolent. Nonetheless, the mine 'ruled' the island by default; its presence 
permeated the political, economic and social fabric of the island. It was, in effect, 
another foreign power which had been imposed unilaterally on Bougainville, but 
unlike the regimes of alien governments, the mine had a physical presence, 
making it an ideal target for the expression of frustration. 
Until the war actually broke out, PNG had largely ignored the deteriorating 
situation on Bougainville. However, the closure of the mine and reports of 
escalating bloodshed focused international attention on the island, thus forcing the 
national government to act. As indicated by the failure of the peace programs, 
Port Moresby's responses to the crisis were both too late and inappropriate. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BOUGAINVILLE REVOLT 
Introduction 
This section focuses on the legacy of the war as it pertains to the four key players; 
the Bougainvilleans, PNG, Australia, and BCL. This investigation of the 
consequences of Bougainville's declaration of independence provides a seminal 
example of the possible long-term and wide-ranging repercussions of conducting 
business in environments typified by cultural diversity and political uncertainty. 
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Bougainville 
The foregoing emphasis on the role o_f the Papua New Guinea Defence Force 
(PNGDF) in Bougainville's human tragedy does not imply the BRA is any less 
culpable in this regard. The rebels showed the national troops no mercy, and took 
savage revenge on islanders who expressed "any opinion short of total support 
for independence" (Lawson, 1993:68). Following the PNGDF's invited return to 
Buka in 1990, many Bougainvilleans moved there, "express[ing] their wishes for 
a return of government 'services', including protection from BRA domination" 
(Oliver, 1991:263). This display of local support for its presence encouraged 
PNG to gradually re-establish its authority in the province. Over the ensuing two 
years the army progressively recaptured Bougainville and, by mid-1993, the 
government had regained control over 90 per cent of the island (Davies, 1993). In 
1994, troops took over the mine site. Callick (1994:60) describes the significance 
of this move: 
the recapture ... of the Panguna mine depriv[ed] the rebels of their former 
headquarters and last major stronghold. After clearing away sabotaged pylons and 
working their way up a 17-kilometre jungle road, the troops took possession of the 
administration buildings ... and soon prompted a white flag from the nearby home of 
supreme rebel leader Francis Ona... "Getting in to Panguna is an historic time for 
Papua New Guinea, because [the rebellion] started from there," said Premier Wingti. 
"Panguna is the heart, the centre of everything." 
Whereas the PNGDF had failed to capture the island in 1988-1991, its later 
successes appear to be primarily attributable to two factors. Firstly, Port Moresby 
seemed committed to its Honiara undertaking to seek peace through consultation 
and dialogue rather than through the force of weapons (Post Courier, 1994). This 
particularly applied to their conduct towards the civilian population (Davis, 
1995). Secondly, as reported in Bougainville: A Pacific Solution (1994:14), the 
Bougainvilleans' alignment with the BRA was diminishing. 
A series of events in 1991 and 1992 appear to have contributed to a drift of support 
away from the BRA: 
• the BRA attempt to arrest a prominent Wakunai figure ... [was] repulsed by local 
people; 
• the holding hostage and subsequent burning by the BRA of the relief vessel, 
Cosmaris, in Kieta harbour; 
• the rounding up of Roravana villagers by the BRA leader in ... 1992 leading to an 
exodus of Roravanans into the Wakunai PNGDF post; 
• the death of former MP, Tony Anugu and two or three of his supporters at the 
hands of the BRA in April 1992; and 
• the denunciation of the BRA by Catholic Archbishop Kurongku on 27 July 1992. 
The restoration of much of Bougainville to PNG's control and the decreased 
intensity of the fighting was not an indicator of a return to normality, however. 
The PNGDF's three-year push south involved intense combat which caused 
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widespread destruction of villages and livestock, and inflicted heavy casualties on 
both sides (Amnesty International, 1993). Human rights abuses by the BRA and 
the PNGDF persisted, and medical care remained deficient (Bougainville: A 
Pacific Solution, 1994). Hostilities spilled over to Shortland Island in September 
1992 when PNG troops raided the small Solomons community suspecting that it 
was supplying food and arms to the BRA. Two Shortlanders were killed and a 
child was wounded in the action (The Economist, 1993). 
For Bougainvilleans, the twentieth century has brought war, social and economic 
upheaval, alien and neglectful administrations, significant damage to their natural 
realm, industrialisation, disease and death. Their suffering continues. Yet, in the 
face of these invasions, and as refugees on their own land, they remain 
committed to ethnic and political isolation. 
Papua New Guinea 
The Bougainville crisis had a two-fold effect on Papua New Guinea; the loss of 
the Panguna mine left a huge economic vacuum and the war shook an already 
fragile political situation. 
Economic Implications 
Aware that its viability as an emerging country depends on the exploitation of its 
vast natural resources, PNG has consistently supported mining ventures and 
viewed them as the key to national development. This philosophy has proved 
successful, as "most of the economic growth after independence [has been] in the 
mining sector" (Blewett, 1991:541). Between 1972 and 1989, Bougainville's 
copper generated Kl.7 billion (A$2.35 billion I US$2 billion), of which 67 per 
cent was returned to the PNG and NSP governments and the landowners 
(Carruthers, cited in Quodling, 1991). The vacuum left by the mine's closure has 
had a serious effect on the PNG economy. 
The abrupt loss of Panguna's contribution to gross domestic product, internal 
revenue and export earnings had an immediate and critical impact on PNG. The 
government was forced to devalue the Kina, apply to the World Bank for 
development loans, and approach Australia for increased aid. Domestic lending 
was arrested as the central bank tightened monetary policy (Korporaal, 1990). 
Beyond the immediate financial crisis were concerns over the long-term effects of 
the Bougainville revolt. Paramount among these was the damage done to PNG's 
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reputation in the world investment community. With eroded predictability comes 
heightened commercial risk and, as Stevens (1991:20) reported, mining firms 
... not already in PNG justifiably point to the risk of new ventures there. They argue 
that the events on Bougainville Island are indicative of a wider law-and-order problem 
and the closure of the mine vindicates their decision to stay out of a country that in 
recent years has provided competitors with some of the biggest-ever finds. 
Throughout the 1990s, investor confidence in PNG's mining sector slowly 
improved with the opening of the Porgera and Lihir gold mines, the Kutubu oil 
fields, and the Frieda River/Nena copper and gold prospects. Yet, as Davis 
(1995:87) observes, Stevens' earlier comments remain valid: 
PNG's record of running the resource projects that provide the bulk of national 
income is getting worse .... BHP's91 Ok Tedi is under siege from landowner litigation 
·and now the law and order and logistics difficulties at Porgera ... have been 
compounded by an environmental lawsuit in the Ok Tedi style. 
The recent law suits and indigenous resistance to mining are not remote from the 
events on Bougainville. The fundamental issues surrounding compensation 
which closed Panguna remain unresolved. With no consensus as to (i) an agreed 
quantum of compensation, (ii) the distribution of mining revenue between 
provincial and national governments, and (iii) whether landowners should be 
compensated with prescribed sums for certain losses or whether reimbursement 
should be based on the value of the wealth extracted, the potential for ongoing 
disputes is virtually unlimited. Further, the Bougainville experience has provided 
a model for landowners to "hold developers to ransom for larger compensation 
payments and benefits from projects - at the risk of disruption to operations" 
(Carruthers, 1990:40). 
The need for foreign exchange resulting from Panguna's demise has weakened 
PNG's bargaining position with overseas investors. This is manifest in the Ok 
Tedi case92 where critics claim successive governments have surrendered to 
BHP's demands. According to Nicholas Styant-Browne, the solicitor represent-
ing the Ok Tedi landowners, "as [PNG's] principal income earner, BHP is able 
to exert enormous duress" (ABC93 TV, 1995). 
91 Broken Hill Proprietary Limited 
92 In mid-1994, landowners in PNG's Western (Fly) Province launched a class action suit 
in the Victorian (Australia) Supreme Court claiming that "lives, jobs and lifestyles 
have been injured by pollution from BHP's Ok Tedi copper mine" (ABC TV, 1995). By 
1995, the Ok Tedi mine accounted for approximately 20 per cent of PNG's export 
earnings. In 1999, BHP announced its intention to withdraw from the Ok Tedi venture. 
93 The Australian Broadcasting Corporation; Australia's government-funded national 
radio and television service. 
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PNG has survived the loss of the Bougainville mine, but its economic progress 
has been severely retarded. Despite the success of new minerals and petroleum 
ventures and huge injections of overseas funds, the country needed Panguna to 
provide the human capital, employment opportunities, and infrastructure required 
to provide sustained economic growth. For PNG, the closure of CRA's giant 
mine has been an opportunity lost. 
Political Implications 
PNG's "chaotic, intensely fractional" politics (King, 1991:27) has never augured 
well for smooth government, but the Bougainville situation was, and remains, the 
country's most damaging upheaval (Filer, 1990). In the early days of the 
uprising, when the anger was directed towards BCL, Port Moresby's outward 
pragmatism over PNG's need of Panguna's revenue veiled the sympathy many 
politicians held for the Bougainvilleans (Dorney, 1990). As the problem 
deepened, Cabinet was split on how the country should approach the issue and 
the debate became polarised. Namaliu's government was virtually paralysed. 
When the strength of the secessionist sentiment and the accompanying bloodshed 
was finally recognised, PNG's political leaders "were in no position to mediate; 
the extent of grievances and demands had gone beyond their ability to achieve a 
compromise solution" (Connell, 1991:74). Bougainville's 30 year push for 
independence was becoming a reality, and with it the fragmentation which PNG 
had long feared. 
The Bougainville revolution raises questions about the political disintegration of 
PNG's young nationhood. With the post-war trend of "countries splitting apart 
along national lines" (Fukuyama, 1992:275), PNG, with its 700 'traditional 
nations', is particularly susceptible. Should Bougainville's political separation 
becomes a reality, other regions of PNG may well follow the example and further 
strain the country's already tenuous hold on unity. Such an argument is proposed 
by Ashton (1990: 13) who observes that a possible "consequence of the 
Bougainville crisis is the impetus it gives to other secessionist movements." In 
the light of PNG's federal system of government (refer Chapter 4), affording 
NSP special conditions may result in claims for similar treatment from other 
disaffected provinces. 
Disregard for the rule of law has long characterised PNG life and politics 
(Dorney, 1990). May (1990:57) believes the Bougainville crisis is an extension 
of this national characteristic: 
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... the mobilization of disgruntled elements among the Panguna landowners ... is to 
some extent a ripple effect from the more general breakdown of law and order and 
challenge to the authority of the state. 
There is concern over the potential of the Bougainville experience to exacerbate 
PNG's lawlessness. The example set by the BRA's early repulsion of the 
security forces and the government's ongoing inability to solve the crisis can only 
serve as an example to other groups who may feel similarly aggrieved. Thus the 
cycle continues. 
Although the excesses and human rights violations of the PNGDF on 
Bougainville provoked world-wide rebuke, the national government showed little 
real concern for the human dimension of the war. While Port Moresby assured 
Australia in 1990 that it had "undertaken a number of investigations" into the 
matter (Evans, 1990b:806-807), Amnesty International reports otherwise: 
Member States of the United Nations (UN) ... have passed two resolutions since 
1992 expressing concern about reports of human rights violations and urging the 
government of PNG to permit fact-finding delegations to visit the island. To date 
these resolutions have not been acted upon (1993:2). 
This is not surprising, as the troops' lack of discipline was largely a response to 
the Cabinet's decision to virtually exempt the military from governmental control; 
a policy which, according to May (1990:58), it was willing to extend to other 
areas: 
... the notice of gazettal which authorized the use of the PNGDF to support 'law and 
order' operations in North Solomons, places no limitations, either of time or place, 
on the use of troops, and the minister responsible for the state of emergency on 
Bougainville appears to have spoken enthusiastically about employing the army, 
once Bougainville was dealt with, to clean up Morobe and the highlands provinces. 
PNG's gradual retreat from this stance has generated some promise of settling the 
problem. Somare (1996) holds that the government is now "doing everything 
possible to return the [Bougainville] people to a normal life in the villages", and 
claimed that "both sides want peace". In September 1996, Fr Momis led a 
delegation to talk with the rebels at which "some understanding was reached", but 
Somare (1996) warns that a final solution will not be reached unless the national 
government remains sensitive to Melanesian traditions and shows "unqualified 
support for Bougainville's four MPs94". Within a week of Somare's optimistic 
words, unidentified gunmen assassinated Bougainville Premier Theodore 
Miriung (O'Callaghan, 1996b); an act which highlighted how distant sustained 
peace on Bougainville may be. 
94 Members of Parliament 
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The Bougainville crisis has proved a major set-back to PNG's hopes of 
progressing, or even surviving, as a functional democracy. A stagnant economy, 
secessionist sentiments, and lawlessness keep foreign investors wary. Govern-
mental instability, the state's lack of control, human rights issues, and the 
possibility of a recurrence of military intervention in politics leaves the 
international community sceptical as to whether PNG will, in the short-term at 
least, take its place as a viable and enduring player on the world stage. 
Australia 
Resulting from its 50 years as trustee/administrator, its pivotal role in PNG's 
independence, and in the interests of its own security, Australia was not able to 
remain aloof from the Bougainville crisis. Canberra's official policy was one of 
non-intervention, believing that "the Bougainville problem is one for Papua New 
Guinea [and] Australia can't construct a solution for Bougainville, much less 
impose one" (Thawley, 1991:7). Behind the rhetoric of detachment however, 
Australia tacitly supported PNG and its invasion of Bougainville. Whllst PNG 
did not specifically seek external assistance, the Australian Government was 
concerned by the BRA's challenge to PNG's constitutional authority and internal 
unity and pledged all manner of help short of providing combat personnel. 
Commenting on Australia's attitude, Hurst (1990:34) notes: 
Australia regards a unified Papua New Guinea as a vital and believes the Port 
Moresby Government must be seen to be in effective control of the country and the 
economy. 
The Australian Government, of course, will continue to provide moral, equipment 
and financial support to assist PNG authorities to bring about a settlement of the 
Bougainville and other troubles that are disrupting the young nation. 
Australia's commitment to PNG materialised in July 1989 when it supplied four 
army helicopters, assisted with the maintenance of military hardware, provided 
pre-deployment training for PNG units bound for Bougainville, and substantially 
increased its defence aid (Evans, 1990a). By December, Canberra was 
considering military involvement (Metherell, 1989) and in January 1990, Prime 
Minister Hawke stated that "should there be any deterioration of the situation in 
Bougainville which put at significant risk Australian Ii ves ... we would ... move in 
there to protect those lives" (Hurst, 1990:34-35). Australia was edging towards 
armed engagement. 
Meanwhile, human rights violations by the PNGDF on Bougainville started to 
receive coverage in the Australian press (Spriggs, 1990). The reporting of the use 
of Australian helicopters in the 'St Valentine's Day Massacre' heightened 
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opposition among many Australians to Canberra's involvement (Garrett, 1991), 
thus Hawke was prompted to raise the matter with Namaliu. Canberra censured 
Port Moresby over its decision to impose a blockade on Bougainville, but 
remained remote from the issue except for stating that it would provide 
Bougainville with humanitarian aid if it was required (Metherell, 1990). Indeed, 
such aid was required, but Australia chose not to act (Wright, 1990). In January 
1990, PNG requested an additional A$20 million (US$15.6 million) for each of 
the next two fiscal years to compensate for the devaluation and inflation 
occasioned by the Bougainville crisis (Weisman, 1990). Hawke's approval for 
this was announced on 24 May. 
The lifting of the blockade and the signing of the Honiara Declaration was 
applauded by the Hawke Government (Eccleston, 1991). Responding to 
questions in the Senate in June 1991 concerning Australia's assistance since that 
time, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade reported that the government 
... was prepared to assist with the re-establishment of telecommunications between 
Port Moresby and Bougainville and to facilitate contact between non-government 
organisations and the PNG Government. 
We have also helped in the transporting of medical supplies through the use of the 
Royal Australian Air force and we recently announced, in that respect, a contribution 
of $100,000 [US$85,000] to the Red Cross Appeal (Evans, 1991:330). 
Canberra's support for PNG's attempts to solve Bougainville's troubles through 
military intervention can only have served to reinforce the Bougainvilleans' long-
held mistrust of Australians and their policies. By firstly helping to supply the 
equipment to force them into submission, and then to withhold humanitarian aid 
until PNG had capitulated must have been interpreted as an indicator of the 
duplicity of the country which, for decades, had presented itself as Bougainville's 
patron. From the Bougainvillean perspective, it is difficult to mount an argument 
against Kabui's August 1990 accusation that Australia was "ignoring 
Bougainville's right to independence for selfish financial reasons" (cited in 
Oliver, 1991:250). Yet again, Australian involvement in their affairs seemed to 
have militated against the islanders. 
Notwithstanding, the Bougainville crisis put Australia in an invidious position. 
PNG would have interpreted refusal of assistance as an abandonment of 
Australia's responsibilities to national unity under the 1987 Joint Declaration of 
Principles95 , and it could not have supported the BRA in its attempt to dispel a 
95 As outlined in Australia's Development Cooperation Program with Papua New Guinea, 
(1990:2). 
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government in which the Bougainvilleans had had representative input (Thawley, 
1991). To leave the island open to possible aggression from a hostile neighbour 
would have been reckless (Islam, 1990). Direct support would have increased 
charges that Australia was "spilling blood for her multinational company" 
(Griffin, 1990b:78). Although Australia was in a no-win situation however, it 
cannot be exonerated from its non-involvement in the peace process. As King 
(1991:28) noted at the time: 
Australia has many levers which could open the way to a peace of reconciliation, 
devolution and reconstruction on Bougainville, above all its $300m [US$230 
million] economic aid program to PNG .... current levels of subsidy cannot continue 
in the light of the paralysis and gross political and governmental corruption which 
are undermining constitutional order. 
Australia's international standing cannot have been enhanced by its seeming 
indifference to the denial of human rights on Bougainville. Canberra seems to 
have sent a message that, for Australia, humanitarian policies can be subjugated 
by foreign policy. 
CRAIB CL 
Given that the presence of the mine was a central element in pushing Bougainville 
from contained dissent to open warfare, it is significant that the operation was not 
mentioned in either the Endeavour Accord or the Honiara Declaration. Politically, 
BCL's future was too sensitive for the negotiators to address. For its part, the 
company could do little, as chairman Carruthers explained following the closure 
of the mine: 
There are certain things about what you do in disputations, and the first thing is not 
to inflame the situation any further. The nature of the disputation is that it is 
violence against property and people and there is almost nothing the company can do 
about that except look out for the security of its own people and assets (cited in 
MacDonald, 1989:34). 
Irrespective of the company's prior role on Bougainville, it was now powerless 
to influence events on the island. With the mine only half-way through its 
productive life (Connell, 1990a), BCL has had to stand back and watch its 53.6 
per cent equity decline in value. And decline it did. Before the May 1989 shut-
. down, BCL shares traded at around A$2-70 (US$2-30); this dropped to A$1-80 
(US$1-53) in July (Gomez, 1989a:l7) and A$1-50 (US$1-27) by year's end 
(Gomez, 1989b:6). In February 1990, BCL shares were worth less than A$1 
(US$0-78) (The Australian, 1990:21). 
Panguna's halt in production was immediately reflected in BCL's figures. For the 
six months ended 30 June 1989, the company reported "profit after tax and 
before extraordinaries was 37.77 million kina [A$52 million I US$44.2 million] 
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compared with K51.8 million [A$71.2 million I US$60.6 million] for the same 
period last year" (Bromby, 1989:29). At 31 December, BCL posted a K20.6 
million (A$28.3 million I US$24.1 million) loss for the year against a net profit 
of K108.6 million (A$175.4 million I US$126 million) for 1988 (Gomez, 
1990:21). BCL remains a registered company and its shares are still traded on the 
Australian stock exchange, although it does not engage in any commercial 
activities. As at December 1999, BCL shares were valued at A$0-19 (US$0-12) 
each. 
The 1990 valuation of BCL's property, plant and equipment on the island stood 
at A$664.8 million (US$520 million) (Gluyas, 1990). Its present worth is 
unknown, and cannot be established until the company gains access to the site 
(Howarth, 199 lc ). Those buildings not damaged in the war have been 
vandalised, motor vehicles and portable equipment were stolen long ago, the 
decaying effects of the climate have taken their toll, and the jungle is regenerating 
throughout the area. In 1991 CRA deconsolidated BCL from its group accounts, 
and in its March annual report "merely listed its investment in BCL at the carrying 
book value of [A]$267 million [US$204.8 million] of the shares owned by CRA" 
(The Australian, 1991:24). 
In mid-1989 BCL lodged a A$20 million (US$17 million) claim with its insurers 
for damage to property and lost earnings arising from Panguna's closure in 
November-December 1988. The underwriters denied liability on the policy's 
exclusion from indemnifying against "insurrection, rebellion, revolution, civil 
war, usurped power, or action taken by governmental authority in hindering, 
combating, or defending against such an occurrence" (Eccleston, 1989:3). The 
matter was referred to the Victorian Supreme Court, but before the case was 
heard, BCL's claim had widened to A$300 million (US$25 5 million) to cover 
losses between October 1988 and October 1989 (The Australian, 1990a). An out-
of-court settlement of A$102.5 million (US$80 million) was reached in February 
1990 (Mcilwaine, 1990), but in April the insurers gave 90 days notice of intent to 
withdraw cover which left "shareholders totally exposed to cover the costs of 
repairs to any company property on the island" (Howarth, 1990: 18). 
Despite early considerations of abandoning Bougainville (Knuckey, 1990), BCL 
maintains that it intends to re-open its mine, but "a recommencement of 
operations ... would require the re-establishment of political stability on the island" 
(Howarth, 1991a: 17). To date, this prerequisite has not eventuated. Restoring 
production at Panguna is estimated at US$450 million (Callick, 1994). 
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The PNG Government has been ambivalent over CRA retaining ownership of the 
mine. While Foreign Affairs Minister Somare believed the sale of the mine would 
"soften the BRA's demand for secession" (Oliver, 1991:264), Namaliu claimed 
"it would be the Government's 'obvious preference' to keep CRA as the major 
shareholder in BCL'' (The Australian, 1991:24). The company has advised Port 
Moresby that it would consider selling its interest in Panguna "if it became 
obvious that CRA's continued presence was the only factor preventing a peaceful 
resolution of the political crisis" (Howarth, 1991 b:27). Thus, while its assets on 
Bougainville deteriorate daily, CRA waits for politicians to resolve the crisis. In 
the meantime, the company "can only be a bystander" (Carruthers, cited in 
Oliver, 1991:264). 
The detrimental effects of mining on Bougainville have been protracted and 
extensive. The Bougainvilleans bear the physical and psychological scars of war, 
their land and waterways are degraded, and disease and malnutrition permeates 
their dislocated communities. PNG's economy has regressed and the country's 
hopes of becoming a unified nation have collapsed. Australia's international 
integrity has suffered, and its taxpayers have contributed to the cost of remote 
political and commercial misjudgment. Finally, the company has suffered 
substantial financial losses and sustained considerable damage to its image. 
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1992 
In July 1993 the Pan-Bougainville Peace Conference Planning Group met in 
Honiara to resume negotiations. Various resolutions were passed, and over the 
next two years "slow but steady progress towards the restoration of peace and 
government services [was] achieved" (Davis, 1995:94). In 1995 fighting 
rekindled when the BRA shot two soldiers, assaulted a police officer and attacked 
government facilities. Curfews were re-introduced, civilian aviation was 
suspended, and schools and government offices were closed. Davis (1995:94) 
explains that the upsurge in BRA activities was caused, in part, by 
... the unwillingness of Port Moresby to allow the transitional government to 
negotiate directly with the BRA and its political wing, the Bougainville Interim 
Government. But at the end of [August] Prime Minister Julius Chan agreed to allow 
them to meet. .. 
As a result of Chan's compromise, rebel leaders and members of the transitional 
government met in Cairns on 16 September 1995, but to little avail (Murphy, 
1995). On 10 November the escalating violence moved Chan to cancel further 
talks scheduled for December. Of his decision, the PNG Prime Minister said 
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There will be no further talks until and unless I am satisfied all participants to any 
such meeting in future strictly adhere to the basic ground rules laid down to guide 
heir deliberations. [The] recent upsurge in rebel activity before peace talks planned 
for Australia next month [run] contrary to the spirit of achieving true peace (cited in 
Hawes, 1995:5). 
In early 1996 Chan again mobilised forces on Bougainville. After the army was 
repelled, the Prime Minister adopted a softer line and the PNGDF began winding 
back its activities on the island in July. However "fatal skirmishes between the 
country's security forces, the State-backed 'resistance' militia and the Bougain-
ville rebels ... continued" (O'Callaghan, 1996a:32). In a return to Bougainville's 
matrilineal traditions and possibly due to the failure of men to end the war, the 
island's women initiated a reconciliation program. In August 1996, under the 
~uspices of various churches, they commenced a series of conferences to plan a 
peace formula (ABC Radio, 13 August 1996). 
Progress towards a resolution of the crisis was further impeded by the murder of 
Premier Miriung on 12 October 1996. Both the BRA and PNGDF denied 
implication, and blamed each other for the killing. Describing the assassination as 
"an act of madness" (O'Callaghan, 1996c:ll), Chan initiated an independent 
inquiry which found the PNODF responsible but the government took no 
disciplinary action against those involved (Callick, 1996). Possibly in response to 
PNG's indifference to the inquiry's findings, the BRA murdered 9 Bougain-
villean villagers in November 1996 and called on Australia to cease its military 
support of PNG (SBS TV, 16 December, 1996). 
In February 1997 the Australian media revealed that the PNG government had 
contracted Sandline International at a cost of US$36 million to strike against 
identified Bougainville rebel leaders (Woodley, 1997). Rebutting international 
criticism of the use of mercenaries, Chan claimed that Sandline troops were 
engaged solely as advisers to the PNGDF and vowed that they would not 
participate in combat on Bougainville (O'Callaghan & Greenlees, 1997). When 
Ona responded to the presence of the mercenaries by ordering the BRA to 'shoot 
on sight' any foreigners not sanctioned by his interim govemment, Australia and 
USA urged their citizens (mostly aid workers) to leave Bougainville. 
Opposed to the engagement of hired soldiers on Bougainville, on March 17 the 
Commander of the PNGDF, Brigadier-General Jerry Singirok, confined his 
troops to barracks, placed the Sandline personnel under house arrest, and 
demanded the Prime Minister's resignation. When Chan dismissed Singirok, 
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describing his actions as "gross insurrection bordering on treason" (cited in 
O'Callaghan & Gordon, 1997:1), Singirok released details of the Sandline 
contract which authorised "a 'strike force' of 70 mercenaries to 'conduct 
offensive operations' aimed at securing the giant Bougainville copper mine and 
'rendering the BRA militarily ineffective"' (Scott, O'Callaghan & Greenlees, 
1997: 1 )96 • Public protests against the government's misrepresentations followed, 
forcing Chan to stand down to John Giheno on March 26. Chan re-gained the 
prime ministership on June 2, but was replaced by Bill Skate at the national 
election some two weeks later. Skate subsequently announced an inquiry into the 
'Sandline Affair' 97 • 
Because the plan to use mercenaries had been aborted, PNG paid Sandline only 
one half of the agreed sum. Sandline subsequently took legal action, and in 
October 1998 was awarded the outstanding US$18 million plus US$7 million 
costs. When Port Moresby refused to pay the debt, the bank accounts of PNG's 
mission to the European Union in Brussels were frozen and three other European 
missions were forced to clear their accounts of operating funds. Faced with the 
possibility of having its embassies closed, in February 1999 PNG announced that 
it would appeal the international ruling in the Queensland (Australia) courts 
(O'Callaghan, 1999a). 
An elemental factor in Chan' s use of mercenaries to regain control of Bougain-
ville was his government's plan to buy the Panguna mine. In January 1997, Port 
Moresby commissioned Hong Kong brokers Jardine Fleming "to secretly 
approach RTZ-CRA ... with a view to purchasing the company's 53.6 per cent 
shareholding in Bougainville Copper Limited" (O'Callaghan & Greenlees, 
1997:1). No discussions with RTZ-CRA eventuated from the broker's advances, 
however chairman David Karpin noted that the Sandline contract had "added 
significant complexity to the already difficult situation" and "it has not advanced 
any potential restart of the mining operation" (cited in Sproull, 1997:26). 
Sponsored by Australia and New Zealand, new rounds of negotiations were held 
at Burnham Camp (near Christchurch, NZ) in July and September 1997. These 
resulted in the signing of an interim truce agreement on October 10 in which the 
parties agreed to "immediate measures to stop fighting pending a formal meeting 
96 Sandline International is a subsidiary of British-registered Executive Outcomes, a 
mercenary-staffed private army, which has been involved in the civil wars of Sierra 
Leone and Angola. 
97 At the time of writing, the findings of the inquiry had not been released. 
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of leaders desirably by January 31, 1998" (ABC TV, 10 October, 1997). The 
'Burnham Truce' renewed interest in BCL stock; immediately 500,000 shares 
were traded and prices firmed 2.5 cents to A$0-49 (US$0-35). 
The planned meeting of the leaders was convened at Lincoln University 
(Christchurch, NZ) on January 19, 1998. Delegates included NZ Prime Minister 
Shipley, PNG Prime Minister Skate, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Ulufa'alu, 
regional foreign ministers, and 150 Bougainvilleans 
representing both pro- and anti-PNG factions including Joseph Kabui, president of 
the Bougainville Interim Government; Sam Kauona, general of the Bougainville 
revolutionary Army; and Gerard Sinato, premier of the Bougainville Transitional 
Government. The chief negotiator for the rebels is Martin Miriori, who represented 
the BRA in ... Honiara, but fled two years ago and now lives under refugee status in 
The Hague (Dunbar, 1998a:l4). 
On January 23 "the leaders agreed to a 'permanent and irrevocable ceasefire', to 
begin after April 30" (Dunbar, 1998b: 12). Although the peace plan had the 
support of most key rebel leaders, Francis Ona convened a meeting at Pakia 
(central Bougainville) in April at which he called for a postponement of the 
ceasefire, and declared that he still intended to be the leader of an independent 
Bougainville (ABC TV, 21 April, 1998). 
Accompanied by a symbolic laying down of arms, the ceasefire was signed at 
Arawa on April 30 before a gathering of 2000 people. Following the signing, 
Kauona told the crowd in pidgin ''Today, mipela finisim war bilong Bougainville 
(Today, the war in Bougainville has ended)" (Garran, 1998:4). Immediately 
following the declaration of peace, Ona (who was not present at the ceremony) 
issued orders to the secessionist rebels to shoot on sight any of the international 
peace keeping troops stationed on the island. (Since the commencement of the 
peace process in 1997, a contingent of soldiers from NZ, Australia, Fiji and 
Vanuatu have been based on Bougainville to monitor the cease-fire). Joseph 
Kabui responded by denouncing Ona's call, stating that "Francis Ona has left us 
no choice but to move a vote of no confidence" (ABC Radio, 4 May, 1998). 
In October 1999, PNG offered to grant autonomy to Bougainville, ceding all its 
authority with the exception of powers concerning defence, foreign affairs and 
police. In extending the proposal, Michael Somare (PNG Foreign Minister and 
Minister for Bougainville Affairs at that time) stated that " .. .I want to see that the 
year 2000 will bring a completely new Bougainville" (cited in O'Callaghan, 
1999b:2). Simultaneously, Australia announced that it would extend a financial 
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support facility of US$80 million (A$121 million) to PNG in an effort to improve 
the value of the Kina and retire some of the country's debt. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
After decades of foreign domination, the previously fragmented Bougainvillean 
communities joined forces to embark on a campaign of sabotage against the 
Panguna mine. Troops dispatched by PNG, unable to subdue the militants, 
inflamed the situation to the point where the protests against the mine became a 
rebellion against the authority of the state. The Bougainvillean desire for 
independence had found an outlet and, despite negotiations brokered by 
governments, churches and community bodies, secession had become a 
technical, if not legal, reality and the Panguna mine was closed. The costs -
human, economic and political - have been high. At the time of writing, 
Bougainville has been peaceful for two years, and autonomy seems imminent. 
Questions as to whether the rebellion would have occurred had mining not 
commenced on the island can only be speculative, however because the Panguna 
operation sparked the tragedy, consideration must be given to the implications of 
establishing and managing MNEs in undeveloped states. This matter is pursued 
in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER7 
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDY 
OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTER 
The case narrative (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) and respondent interviews (Appendix 
V) served two aims; the first was to examine and document the history and 
consequences of BCL's activities on Bougainville, and the second was to 
determine the manner in which the company was managed. This chapter 
analyses this information in order to establish the framework in which the 
research questions are considered in Chapter 8. The chapter commences with 
an overview of the fundamental features of BCL' s operations and the context in 
which they occurred. This is followed by an examination of the impact which 
significant external elements had on the management and organisation of the 
mine. The internal environment of BCL is then explored in order to establish 
how the company's endogenous characteristics affected its operations. The 
results of these investigations form the context within which the management of 
BCL is analysed, using NUD*IST software to interpret the interview data. 
Finally, the findings of the chapter are reviewed in the light of management and 
organisation theories which assist in explaining the events and outcomes of 
BCL's operation on Bougainville. 
THE CONTEXTUAL CHARACTERISTICS 
OF BOUGAINVILLE COPPER LIMITED 
This section examines the general conditions under which the Panguna mine 
was established and operated. Although many of the issues noted herein 
predate the mine or concern matters over which BCL98 management had 
virtually no control, they influenced the relationship between the company and 
its hosts, and had a profound impact on the fortunes of the mine. In essence, 
this discussion provides an overview of the contextual background against 
which the environmental analyses in subsequent sections need to be 
considered. 
98 As noted in Chapter 5, the mine operated under several companies between 1963 and 
1989; Bougainville Mining Ltd, Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd, CRAE, and BCL. For 
the sake of clarity, the mine's operators are referred to as BCL in Chapters 7 and 8. 
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The Decision to Mine Bougainville's Resources 
Whereas manufacturers and service providers base their locational decisions on 
factors such as potential and existing markets, the costs and availability of 
labour, competition, and local infrastructures (Caves, 1982; Porter, 1990), 
resource-based industries do not have the advantage of choice. Organisations 
involved in the extraction of minerals and oil are forced to establish their 
operations at the source of the natural reserves they seek. BCL therefore, did 
not select Bougainville as a site for its mine, rather the copper and gold deposits 
in the Kawerong Valley made the region a potential mine site. Accordingly, the 
essential question for the company in the early 1960s was not a matter of 
whether Bougainville was an appropriate setting in which to develop a mining 
and industrial complex, rather it was a question of whether it was viable to 
mine the ore deposits in the Panguna district. 
The viability of the venture turned on three factors: the potential of the lode in 
terms of quality and volume, the availability of technology to extract and 
process the ore in such a remote and undeveloped setting, and the cooperation 
of the host country. Each of these variables proved positive. Within a few 
years, the commercial and technical feasibility of the mine was confirmed, and 
PNG had offered financial and legislative incentives to encourage the company 
to proceed. The following examination of the host country investigates the 
motivation behind PNG's support for the establishment of the Panguna project. 
The Host Country 
Using the various indicators of economic development noted in Chapter 2, 
PNG may be classified as a less developed country99 • In recognition of PNG's 
economic condition, Australia had been supporting the country with substantial 
aid programs since the late 1940s100 • By the 1960s, Australia was taking 
99 In the mid 1960s PNG experienced high population growth, technological and region-
al dualism, high rates of illiteracy, deficient sanitary and health facilities, inadequate 
infrastructure and political instability (Australia's Development Cooperation Program 
with Papua New Guinea, 1989; Survey of Major Western Pacific Economies, 1984; 
Third World Economic Handbook, 1989). Contemporary information shows that 
economic progress remains slow; PNG is a 'lower-middle' LOC with a per capita GNP 
of A$1,722 and is still reliant on resource exports (World Development Report, 
1997). Lawson (1993:64) describes PNG as "a classic example of an ex-colonial 
'weak state' [having a] diverse population, [which was] brought together through the 
process of colonisation (and decolonisation), and which remains poorly integrated." 
100 Although PNG's economic circumstances were the main reason for Australia's aid 
programs, Canberra's motivation was not purely economic. Australia had obligations 
to PNG under the 1946 UN trustee arrangements, and there was a national conscious-
ness of the debt Australia owed to the people of PNG for their sacrifices in repelling 
the Japanese advance during WWII (Fry, 1991; Medcalf, 1986; Wolfers, 1972). 
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tentative steps to shift the focus of its assistance from direct aid to one of 
promoting self-sustaining economic growth. This change in Australian policy 
was motivated, to a large degree, by a realisation that PNG was gradually 
moving towards independence. The founding of the mine on Bougainville was 
seen by both PNG and Australia as a fundamental ingredient of the country's 
economic development and its eventual progress to representative democracy 
(Oliver, 1991). 
By the mid 1970s, the Panguna operation had exceeded the expectations of Port 
Moresby, Canberra and BCL. The profitability of the venture was much higher 
than estimated101 , and the mine was PNG's largest generator of export income, 
largest contributor to government revenue, largest private employer, and largest 
non-government developer of human capital. As hoped, the success of the mine 
was being reflected throughout the national economy; other major resource 
projects followed (Ok Tedi, Porgera, Misima, Lihir), service industries were 
expanding, the infrastructure improved, and the economic growth rate, while 
not extreme, exceeded that in most LDCs'02 • The nationwide developments 
afforded by Panguna's presence in the PNG economy were reflected in the 
political arena; within three years of the mine commencing production, PNG 
had become a sovereign state. 
Seemingly, the logic of establishing operations in LDCs (as argued in Chapter 
2) had been vindicated by the Bougainville venture. The company was 
operating profitably, the host country was reaping economic and social 
benefits, and the 'parent' country now considered its protectorate to be 
developed sufficiently for independence. The enthusiasm of BCL, PNG and 
Australia for the giant copper mine was not universally shared by those most 
affected by its presence, however. 
The Host Society 
Although Bougainville enjoyed the nation's highest concentration of the 
benefits from the mine (infrastructure improvements, markets for indigenous 
101 As noted in Chapter 5, the huge profits during the early years were largely the result of 
an unprecedented rise in world copper prices. In 1975, prices dropped and have not 
since returned to the 1972-1974 levels in real terms. 
102 In the period 1966-1970 (that is, the developmental and establishment period of the 
mine), PNG's annual economic growth rate averaged 15 per cent (Martin, 1974), but 
this stabilised to approximately 2.5 per cent per annum from 1975 to 1994 
(Australia's Development Cooperation Program with Papua New Guinea, 1989; World 
Development Report, 1997). · 
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goods and services, employment opportunities, and expanded health and 
education facilities), not all Bougainvilleans welcomed the project and the 
'progress' which accompanied it. Unlike PNG, which regarded the operation 
as a conduit to national development, the islanders' views were diverse. While 
some were receptive, a significant portion of the population resented the 
physical, economic, social and ecological intrusion of the Panguna mine. 
The contrasting perspectives held by PNG and a significant segment of 
Bougainville's indigenes was the most crucial contextual feature confronting 
BCL, as it effectively meant that those who managed the mine had two hosts 
with which to deal; the host country and the host society. In political and legal 
terms, ultimate authority over the operation rested with Port Moresby, as PNG 
was the host country. In practical terms however, the Bougainvilleans 
constituted the host society and, as history revealed, ultimate power over the 
mine rested with them. Thus, management were placed in the invidious 
position of needing to satisfy the demands of two groups who held opposing 
views on nearly every issue significant to the company's perfonnance. 
The Bougainvilleans' suspicion of the mine was, to a large degree, a reflection 
of their collective psyche. The locals harbour an ingrained sense of insularity 
which originates from a combination of geographic, social and historical 
factors. Firstly, the island's remoteness and lack of development imbues an 
almost palpable sense of isolation. For many islanders, this seclusion is 
welcomed. Secondly, as a result of the political manipulation of foreign 
powers, the population retains an enduring enmity towards outsiders. In less 
than 100 years, and without consulting the Bougainvilleans, the island has been 
annexed by Britain, handed to Germany, separated from the Solomon Islands, 
transferred to Australia, occupied by the Japanese, returned to Australia and 
then incorporated into PNG. Thirdly, the people believe that they have been 
neglected, and at times abused, by each of the countries which have governed 
their land. Finally, the Bougainvilleans consider themselves a race apart from 
the rest of the world .. In particular, they feel no affiliation with the 'redskins' of 
PNG, whom they regard as an inferior people. 
Over the years, the coalescence of the above influences has given rise to 
various organisations which have politicised Bougainville's ethnic and 
historical idiosyncrasies into a concerted effort for separatism. Apart from the 
rebellion in 1988 which closed the mine, secession was attempted in 1962, 
1968 and 1975. These expressions of discontent with foreign governance 
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provide clear evidence of the depth of the Bougainvilleans' isolationist 
sentiments, and of their desire to translate those sentiments into political 
sovereignty. 
The tense relationship between Bougainville and PNG was not the only 
division which confronted BCL's management, however. Although the above 
portrays the Bougainvilleans as a people united by their unique ethnicity and a 
common desire for political separatism, it veils the fragmentation of Bougain-
villean society. The island's population is divided into hundreds of distinct 
communities, each with a peculiar set of customs and its own sense of identity. 
The social arrangements within and between the communities are flexible, often 
unstable, and sporadically hostile, with each succeeding generation taking its 
own approach to governance and inter-tribal relationships. The diversity and 
fluidity of Bougainvillean society has generally precluded the establishment of 
mutually accepted cultural institutions, and therefore the population has not 
developed the cohesive identity generally associated with 'nationhood'. 
The foregoing illustrates the unique and extremely complex operating context 
into which the Panguna mine was introduced. Whereas the establishment of 
operations beyond the home country requires all MNEs to account for the 
prevailing circumstances of their host environment, BCL effectively had two 
distinct host environments; PNG and Bougainville. This situation was further 
complicated by the diverse, unpredictable and discontinuous nature of 
Bougainvillean society. The following section explores this situation in depth 
by analysing the legal, cultural, economic and political dimensions which 
impacted on the mine's operations. 
EXAMINATION OF THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
OF BOUGAINVILLE COPPER LIMITED 
The duality of the mine's host environment had implications for each of the 
external elements identified in Chapter 2. The following examines these 
contextual factors individually and considers their influence on the operation 
and management of the Panguna mine. 
The Legal Environment 
Because PNG's legislation and common law was imported from Australia and 
thus followed the principles of the British legal system, it was alien to 
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Bougainvillean traditions, values and institutions. Many facets of the law, 
especially those which regulated the use of Bougainvillean land, were 
incomprehensible to the villagers and often appeared to be unjust. Further, the 
long held resentment of foreign rule was fuelled by Bougainville's unilateral 
incorporation into PNG and Port Moresby's lack of consultation in the 
introduction and enforcement of its laws. As the senior managers of BCL were 
accustomed to Western concepts of law, they were able to accept its logic and 
necessity, however they remained acutely aware of its unsuitability to the 
situation on Bougainville. Both the indigenes and BCL management regularly 
petitioned the central government for change, but with little success. The 
following summarises the major legal issues which simultaneously provoked 
Bougainvillean discontent and frustrated the mine's managers. 
• The democratic convention of British law is based on the assumption that the 
government and judiciary act on behalf, and in the interests, of the country's 
entire population. As a result, the legal matters concerning the establishment 
and running of the mine were negotiated between the company and the 
national government without any direct input from the Bougainvilleans. This 
exclusion deeply aggrieved t~e Bougainvilleans. Although BCL manage-
ment recognised the locals' concern over this situation and attempted to 
address the issue in various rounds of negotiations, the executives secured 
few concessions from the government. 
• The Bougainvilleans had few lawful avenues for redress as the statutes 
which regulated mining activities contained no provisions for requests or 
complaints from local communities. 
• In the British tradition, PNG law vests ownership of mineral resources in 
the State. This effectively meant that the Bougainvilleans retained possession 
of the land, but had no control over its use. As mining changes the natural 
environment, and in some instances renders permanent damage, numerous 
communities became owners of land which was useless to their economic 
and/or psychological needs. This situation was exacerbated by the 
legislation's silence on land rehabilitation. 
• Of the substantial royalties which BCL paid to Port Moresby, only a small . 
percentage was returned to those landowners who were affected by the 
mine, with the bulk of the revenue being retained by the national government 
for the development of PNG as a whole. Attempts by both the Bougain-
villeans and the company's executives to increase the locals' share was 
strongly resisted by the PNG parliament. 
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• The law did not specify any standards of environmental protection, rather it 
provided for the parliament to determine and enforce any measures it saw fit.· 
The government did not exercise its authority in this regard, and made no 
demands on the mine concerning ecological standards or performance. 
The laws governing the mine, ·in particular the Mining (Bougainville Copper 
Agreement) Ordinance 1967 and subsequent amendments, were a clear 
reflection of Port More~by's desire to secure and sustain the Bougainville 
copper project for PNG. While few restrictions were placed on the company's 
cost and profit activities, the government levied substantial imposts on BCL1°3 • 
Furthermore, legislation imposed offset obligations on BCL. These demands, 
which primarily related to the development of Bougainville's infrastructure, 
were accepted by management, and the company consistently and voluntarily 
exceeded the legislated requirements. 
Although the unilateral decision by the national government in 1974 to reduce 
the terms of the company's concessions was detrimental to the rnine's profit-
ability and was legally questionable, BCL management did not challenge the 
government on the issue. Parliament's revision of the agreement was widely 
regarded as a reaction to political pressure from those who believed state 
assistance was unfair and unjustified, given the mine's large profits in the early 
years. 
Because the mine's employment practices were not subject to legislation, 
management was responsible for all facets of BCL' s employee relations 
program. In order to avoid the creation of excessive economic dualism, a 
differentiated remuneration policy was devised which distinguished between 
PNG citizens and expatriates. Despite the ostensible inequity of the system, this 
practice was acceptable to both the BMWU and the government, and there is no 
evidence of employee dissatisfaction over pay related issues. The proportion of 
PNG workers to foreigners was also determined by management, as was the 
ratio of Bougainvillean to Niuginian employees. Concerning the former, 
management made a conscious effort to hire as many PNG nationals as 
practicable and, to this end, embarked on indigenous training programs 
unprecedented in the country's commercial history. Concerning the latter, 
103 Following the 1974 renegotiation of the 1967 agreement, BCL considered the 
quantum of these imposts to be excessive, however a past executive reported in 
interview that "the 1974 agreement was not, in retrospect, all that unreasonable from 
both sides ... the terms were fairly similar to other like projects around the world" 
(Personal communication, 1998). 
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employing workers from other provinces of PNG caused racial terisions 
because the Bougainvilleans objected to the presence of 'redskins' on the 
island. This issue was difficult to resolve; management believed that excluding 
non-Bougainvillean nationals would have been discriminatory, and the 
government was bound by section 52 of the Constitution which guarantees 
PNG citizens freedom of movement throughout the country. 
The legal framework which PNG established for the Panguna venture 
demonstrates the government's consciousness of its need to stimulate economic 
and social development, and its awareness of the important role which foreign 
investment could play in achieving this objective. Overall, the laws appear to 
have been pitched at striking a balance between the country's structural 
adjustment imperatives and the operational and economic needs of BCL. It 
could be argued however, that PNG's laissez-faire approach to employee 
relations left its citizens open to exploitation by corporations less scrupulous 
than BCL. 
In simultaneously accommodating the requirements of both the nation and the 
company however, a legal climate was produced which paid scant regard to 
those whose lives were most affected by the mine. While Port Moresby 
remained apathetic to this issue, management was aware of the dangers inherent 
in many provisions of the law, especially its potential to hann the relationship 
between the company and the local people. BCL personnel attempted to explain 
the legislation to the Bougainvilleans, but clarifying and justifying seemingly 
incomprehensible Jaws to a people already suspicious of the mine's presence 
and motives proved difficult in the extreme, and only served to affirm their 
perception that the government was indifferent to their welfare. With PNG not 
prepared to address, or even recognise, the implications of its Jaws concerning 
Bougainvillean rights, the environment, and the distribution of Panguna's 
economic benefits, local pressure for change was inevitable. 
The Cultural Environment 
PNG is exemplary of the cultural heterogeneity found in many LDCs. Despite 
its status as a nation, PNG is so segmented by language, local ties and insular 
concerns that it remains one of the least unified countries on the globe. On 
Bougainville, this cultural division is magnified because parochial sentiments 
operate at two levels. At the macro level, Bougainvilleans consider themselves 
to be a distinct people with no affiliations to PNG or any other ethnic group or 
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nation. At the micro level, each community operates as a discrete entity having 
little contact with, or interest in, neighbouring villages. The cultural isolation of 
both the general population and of individual groups proved to be a significant 
complication in the management of the Panguna mine. 
At the macro level, Bougainvillean antipathy towards PNG resulted in the 
islanders' rejection of the authority of the national legal system. The strongest 
resentment centred on those laws which were construed as threatening the basic 
tenets of Bougainvillean culture, in particular self governance and land usage. 
BCL's stringent compliance with the law was interpreted by many villagers as a 
display of management's support for PNG, and thus anti-Bougainvillean. This 
situation made it difficult for management to maintain positive public relations, 
or to conduct negotiations with locals in an atmosphere of good faith. Matters 
were exacerbated by Niuginians migrating to Bougainville in search of work. 
'Redskins' who gained employment at the mine were seen as taking jobs, and 
hence income, from the locals. Those who were not hired by BCL often did not 
return to PNG and tended to establish settlements without the permission of 
relevant landowners, and were accused of being responsible for Bougainville's 
increasing social troubles. 
At the micro level, the mine's presence magnified customary divisions between 
Bougainvillean communities, especially over issues arising from the rapid 
increase in monetisation. While many locals eschewed money, preferring the 
traditional values associated with subsistence living, others were willing to 
embrace a commercial economy. Frictions developed among and between 
various 'monied' groups as jealousies emerged over the quantum and 
distribution of occupation fees and compensation for loss. Because occupation 
fees were calculated on land area and did not account for the number of 
inhabitants thereon, benefits per capita varied widely. This was seen as 
inequitable by villagers living within the mining leases, resulting in animosity 
between each other and towards the company. Groups living outside the 
mining leases felt aggrieved because they received no direct benefit from the 
mine. Further complications over income allocation arose within individual 
clans when some leaders, in their role of custodians of community wealth, 
refused to share the income with all members. 
Although the Bougainvilleans' custom of living a detached and individual 
existence had been marginally eroded by their experiences in WWII and the 
events of the ensuing 20 years, the establishment of the mine accelerated the 
205 
process. Economic development, industrialisation and a burgeoning infra-
structure brought the islanders into close contact with each other and with non-
Bougainvilleans for a sustained period. Increasing interaction between local 
communities, together with the economic divisions noted above, kindled latent 
rivalries between villages. At the same time, frictions were emerging in some 
communities as younger members believed that their elders' acceptance of 
development was eroding the traditional ways of Bougainvillean life. 
Concurrent with the deepening divisions between and within Bougainvillean 
communities however, was a growing awareness of the cultural similarities 
which bound them. Paramount among these was their universal dislike of 
outsiders and a common spiritual attachment to the land. As contact with non-
Bougainvilleans increased, the islanders' historical antagonism towards 
foreigners, particularly Niuginians, intensified. This behaviour reflects 
Hofstede's (1995) observation that LDC cultures typically display large power 
distances and low individualism which results in ethnic allegiances being placed 
above nationalistic sentiment and an unwillingness to accept outside 
involvement in their economic and social arrangements. 
Changes to the natural environment which accompanied the mine also had a 
significant impact on traditional Bougainvillean culture. Believing that land 
sustains their spiritual life as well as their physical life, it was almost 
impossible for the people to be reconciled to any disturbance of the land. The 
social ramifications of damage to the land were various. Firstly, dislocation 
from ancestral lands resulted in a form of emotional alienation; the essential 
fibre of individual and community life was disrupted. Secondly, because much 
of the damage to the land was permanent or would take generations to revive, 
the continuity of cultural tradition was being eroded. Thirdly, as land has a 
sacred quality, any interference with it was seen as an act of sacrilege. 
Fourthly, the link between land and productivity provided a sense of economic 
security which now appeared to be disintegrating; the growing cash economy 
meant that survival no longer resulted from the use of land, but from the 
destruction of its productive capacity. 
The cultural breakdown occasioned by the rapid changes on the island, 
although intangible, was a tragedy for the Bougainvilleans, and a problem to 
which there seemed no solution. While a more sensitive approach by PNG may 
have ameliorated some of the difficulties, it is unlikely that a great deal could 
have been achieved by legislation. BCL instigated a Village Relations Program 
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in order to plan for and control the negative social impact of the mine, but this 
was largely ineffective as it was relied on the Bougainvilleans taking a 
consensual approach to community liaison. The villagers themselves found it 
difficult to identify the underlying causes of the changes they were 
experiencing, much less propose a remedy for them. 
The Economic Environment 
The economic environment in which BCL operated may be considered from 
two perspectives; the national PNG economy and the Bougainville economy, 
both of which caused difficulties for the mine's management. 
The National PNG Economic Environment 
As noted previously, PNG was (and remains) an LDC with an economic base 
dependent upon the export of raw materials. From its inception, the Panguna 
mine was the most significant player in that economy, and therefore the 
management of BCL was subjected to various political demands which 
impinged on their actions and decisions. This situation also affected the 
objectivity of the central government in its dealings with BCL. 
With the country's aspirations for economic and social development relying 
heavily on the success of the Bougainville copper venture, the PNG 
government was exposed to a number of difficulties. Most importantly, it had 
little choice but to support BCL, irrespective of the ramifications. This is 
evident in areas such as the lack of legislated ecological protection and the 
government's use of military force during the revolution. With attempts to 
restructure the national economy so heavily dependent upon revenue generated 
by Panguna, it was inevitable that the Bougainvillean share of this money 
would be minimal. These issues clearly involved an inherent risk of Port 
Moresby further alienating the Bougainvilleans and straining tenuous national-
provincial relationships. Further, with such a narrow revenue base, PNG' s 
economic agenda was, in practical terms, directly related to the sum of money 
which the government could extract from BCL. This is highlighted by the terms 
of the 1974 agreement, which substantially increased national revenue by 
diminishing the company's concessions104• 
104 The unilateral amendment of the 1974 agreement illustrates Port Moresby's 
propensity to make significant decisions without consulting those who would be 
affected. The government was equally cavalier in its treatment of BCL as it was with 
the Bougainvillean people. 
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From BCL's perspective, its pivotal role in the PNG economy exposed it to 
sustained accusations of using its position to manipulate political, economic and 
social agendas for its own ends. In particular, many Bougainvilleans 
interpreted management's adherence to the rule of law as siding with the 
'redskins' against the locals in the interests of profit. Others variously charged 
the company with intentionally fostering Bougainville's dependency on the 
mine, ignoring ecological issues in order to save expenses, deliberately 
avoiding paying reasonable occupation fees and damage compensation, 
misdirecting the revenues of its philanthropic agencies, and exploiting local 
businesses. The motivations behind BCL's social and economic development 
programs were also brought into question. With the possible exception of the 
delay in constructing a tailings disposal pipeline, these accusations appear to be 
unfounded as this research exposed no evidence to support arguments that the 
company ever attempted to exercise its potential economic power to gain 
advantage. 
The Local Economic Environment 
The distribution of the economic benefits arising from the mine was an ongoing 
cause of discontent among the Bougainvilleans. Three issues were of major 
concern to the islanders. Firstly, although BCL made a substantial contribution 
to government revenue, returns to Bougainville in the form of development 
projects and services remained small in comparison with the rest of PNG. 
Secondly, as the vast majority BCL shares were held by foreign interests, there 
was a widespread perception that the mine existed primarily for the benefit of 
overseas investors. Thirdly, the Bougainvillean share of mine generated wealth 
was unevenly distributed between (i) the various landowners, (ii) landowners 
and other people on the island, and (iii) Bougainvillean and non-Bougainvillean 
firms and contractors associated with the mine. As management was 
sympathetic to these grievances, BCL petitioned Port Moresby on several 
occasions to change the formulae used in calculating and allocating the revenue 
being returned to the people, but to no avail. 
Because environmental damage is an inevitable consequence of any large-scale 
mining project, the Panguna operation caused substantial physical damage in its 
immediate area. Some of the ecological harm will dissipate over time, however 
some is irreversible. The actual extent and permanency of much of the environ-
mental disturbance is unknown as reports generated in the 1970s and 1980s 
were conflicting and inconclusive, and no studies have been undertaken since 
hostilities commenced. Evidence from this research indicates that BCL took 
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reasonable environmental precautions within the limitations of contemporary 
thought and understanding, the island's geographic and seismic features, and 
available technology. While this claim is open to challenge, it is significant that 
all initiatives to mitigate the environmental impact of the mine were instigated 
voluntarily by the company in the absence of any legal prescriptions. Although 
the company's expenditure on environmental protection was substantial and 
ongoing, the actual sums involved do not appear to be recorded in public 
documents. The expense of recompensing the Bougainvilleans for damage to 
the environment totalled K21 million (US$18 million) (Griffin, 1990b). 
BCL's employment policies and commitment to educating its workforce made -
and continues to make - a significant contribution to PNG's stock in human 
capital. In supporting the technical and academic development of indigenous 
employees, management was aware a percentage of its skilled workers would 
be lost to other employers (including the government), but this was viewed as a 
form of social and economic return to its host country. 
As noted earlier, one of the anticipated spin-offs from the copper mine was a 
growth in services industries throughout PNG. On Bougainville, BCL took 
deliberate steps to foster local businesses and help the communities take 
advantage of the business opportunities presented by the mine's activities. 
These efforts appear to have been moderately successful, but did not achieve 
the expectations of management due to the local work ethic and political 
problems in the Bougainville Development Corporation. 
As development on Bougainville was negligible until the 1960s, virtually all the 
island's infrastructure was constructed by BCL. Although much of this was 
established to support the mine and its ancillary operations, surrounding 
communities gained the social and economic benefits of sealed roads, reliable 
water supplies, medical services, educational opportunities, electricity, and so 
forth. The company also introduced various social and recreational institutions 
which were available to all people on the island. 
It appears therefore, that the macroeconomic climate with which the mine's 
management had to deal was typical of many LDCs. As PNG was dependent 
almost entirely on its factor endowments, it relied heavily on the Panguna mine 
to support its development program. While this situation should have fostered a 
close working relationship between BCL management and the national 
government, the association between the two was often a source of political 
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tension, criticism and misunderstanding which persisted for the life of the 
mine. Of the various local economic issues, indigenous dissatisfaction with the 
payment of compensation and occupation fees remained the most significant 
challenge to management. This problem was a factor over which the company 
had little control, and one which was never resolved. Concerning the economic 
and social development of Bougainville, BCL appears to have been exemplary 
in its efforts to meet the needs of its host society. The question of environ-
mental protection remains clouded; while the company voluntarily spent large 
sums on damage reduction, it is possible that more might have been done. 
The Political Environment 
The volatile and fragmented political environment which characterises many 
LDCs is clearly evident in PNG. Western concepts of nationhood cannot be 
applied to any region of PNG; rather than considering themselves as 'Papua 
New Guinean', individuals identify only with their own community (usually 
based on language grouping) and have little contact with, or interest in, other 
groups. While cultural insularity is typical throughout PNG, it is especially 
evident on Bougainville, given the natives' extreme ethnocentrism at both the 
micro and macro levels. 
The Bougainvillean desire of freedom from foreign domination predates the 
Panguna mine. The first manifestation occurred during WWII when a 
substantial number of islanders readily accepted Japanese promises to liberate 
the island from Australian rule. Although this was short-lived, various 
nationalist movements emerged during the post-war period as local discontent 
grew. By the 1960s, calls for independence were becoming organised and were 
being made known to the international community. Throughout this period, and 
in the time leading up to PNG's independence, both Port Moresby and 
Canberra chose to ignore Bougainville's developing self identity and its desire 
for self direction. It is difficult to determine whether the unilateral assumption 
of Bougainville into PNG in 1975 stemmed from arrogance, political 
expediency, or ignorance of the local situation, however it is clear that the lack 
of consultation on this matter is a lingering grievance with most Bougain-
villeans. Local scepticism about the benefits of incorporation with PNG has 
been justified, as the neglect displayed by previous foreign governments 
continued after Bougainville's political union with PNG. 
210 
The national government's insensitivity to the people of Bougainville is 
apparent throughout BCL's tenure on the island. Bougainvilleans had no input 
into the decision to open the mine, and were not consulted about the terms of 
the 1967 and 1974 agreements (except through the representation of Paul 
Lapun, the local member of parliament). In the 1980s, BCL attempted to 
convince the government that the locals should be granted more generous 
compensation terms, but this was summarily rejected. Similarly, PNG's initial 
response to the revolution was one of force rather than negotiation. This 
authoritarian approach is alien to the Melanesian tradition in which consensus 
emerges from an extremely protracted and informal process of consultation. 
While official indifference galvanised the islanders' objections to outside 
governance, Bougainville's internal politics were marked by increasing 
divisions between and among village communities. Of particular importance to 
the mine were the perceived inequities in the distribution of economic benefits 
(discussed above), and the rise of the 'new' generation. Over the years, BCL 
personnel had established relatively good working relationships with the heads 
of the various villages in the mining leases and, within the boundaries of law, 
matters of compensation, access, and so forth had been negotiated successfully 
with the elders. During the late 1970s however, younger members of the 
communities began to challenge the authority of the elders and questioned their 
right to make agreements with the company. This brought the young men into 
conflict with their leaders, and caused difficulties for BCL managers who were 
obliged by Bougainvillean tradition to deal with the chiefs of the villages. 
Summary 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the extent and nature of the contextual 
heterogeneity surrounding the Panguna operation. Table 7 .1 summarises and 
contrasts the main environmental characteristics of the host country and the host 
society according to the four established environmental dimensions. Whereas 
each element of the exogenous milieu may be expected to affect the manage-
ment processes of MNEs, BCL was subjected to two distinct and generally 
opposing sets of environmental forces within the one setting. The lack of 
cohesion within the host society effectively produced a sub-set of external 
variables which further complicated BCL's management of the environment. 
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Table 7.1 Summary of the Environmental Characteristics of PNG and Bougainville 
Papua New Guinea Bougainville 
Environmental factors 
Scope of the legal system. 
Permanency of individual laws. 
Ownership of sub-soil resources. 
Rights to employment on 
Bougainville. 
Embraces the entire country. 
Stable. Once enacted, laws remain valid until changed 
by parliamentary process. 
State. 
Open to all PNG citizens and expatriates. 
Applies only to the individual community. 
Fluid. Laws* change regularly, according to the immediate 
needs of the community. 
Community which occupies the relevant land 
Restricted to Bougainvilleans. 
Cultural 
* 
** 
Focus of the cultural system. National.** Parochial. 
Attitude towards ethnic division. Intermingling with PNG population encouraged. Hostile to non-Bougainvillean PNG citizens, accepting 
of whites and (generally) latently antagonistic towards other 
Bougainvillean clans. 
Land u·sage. For economic development. For sustaining temporal and spiritual life. Security. 
Local governance. Parliament has ultimate authority. Tribal leaders have ultimate authority. 
The term 'law' is used for consistency in comparing the PNG and Bougainvillean approach to governance. The legal system in Bougainvillean communities relies on 
custom, rather than Western perceptions of legislation and judicial decisions. 
A united PNG is an objective of government policy rather than a concept which is widely held by the population of the country. Most communities, like those on 
Bougainville, eschew the notion of nationhood. 
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Table 7.1 Summary of the Environmental Characteristics of PNG and Bougainville (Continued) 
Environmental factors 
Economic 
Focus of economic system. 
Papua New Guinea 
Market forces. 
Generation of personal and corporate wealth and national 
development. 
Position on foreign Welcoming. 
investment. 
Perspectives on government Distributed nationally. 
income from the Panguna 
mine. 
Environmental 
sustainability. 
Political 
Focus of political system. 
Approach to governance. 
Resolution of disputes. 
Attitude towards Bougain-
villean self determination. 
Leadership. 
Representation. 
Low priority. 
To account for all PNG citizens. 
Authoritarian. 
Situations remedied quickly by the rule of law. 
Strongly resisted. 
Elected from any of PNG's 700 ethnic groups. 
By a small number elected from the national population. 
Bougainville 
Egalitarian system akin to socialism. 
Divided between the maintenance of a subsistence economy and 
monetisation. 
Suspicious. 
Retained on Bougainville. 
High priority. 
To account for members of the community. 
Consultative. 
Slow process of negotiation. 
Strongly pursued. 
Restricted to members of each community. 
By all male community members (with considerable input by 
the females who 'own' the land). 
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EXAMINATION OF THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
OF BOUGAINVILLE COPPER LIMITED 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that MNEs need to align their organisation and 
management with the external environment if corporate performance is to be 
maximised. This is particularly important in emerging economies where the 
institutional framework of the country has evolved without the influence of a 
significant commercial sector. The key organisational components of environ-
mental congruence between MNEs and their LDC hosts were identified in 
Chapter 2. This section examines the internal environment of BCL according to 
each of these components. 
Convergence, Divergence and Crossvergence 
International management researchers began to consider convergence and 
divergence in the late 1950s. By the early 1960s, theories of convergence 
dominated contemporary thought as they appeared to offer significant 
economies in the administration of firms operating in more than one country 
(Haire et al., 1966; Harbison & Myers, 1959; Kerr et al., 1973). From the 
commencement of exploration in 1964, it was evident that BCL management 
had elected to ignore the conventional wisdom of the day. At the executive 
level, Managing Director Frank Espie (refer Appendix J) had made it clear that 
the Bougainvilleans should be involved in the venture from the outset and that 
they should benefit from the mine's presence should it go ahead. At the 
operational level, Senior Geologist Ken Phillips (refer Appendix J) was 
anxious to develop a cordial relationship with the communities he encountered 
within the prospecting areas and made every effort to achieve this objective. By 
focusing on the needs of the local environment, BCL management had 
embraced elements of the divergence hypothesis (Child, 1981; Hofstede, 1987;. 
Laurent, 1986) at a time when the theory had little academic support and the 
traditions of Western commercialism were not particularly concerned with the 
impact of economic development on foreign social systems. The endeavours 
which Espie, Phillips and their contemporaries initiated in attempting to 
accommodate the host society remained a management priority for the life of the 
mine, as evidenced in the following review of BCL's policies and practices. 
Perceptions of the manner in which land should be used remained the most 
divisive issue confronting the company and the locals. Operating according to 
Western attitudes, BCL management fundamentally regarded land as a resource 
similar to any other; a commodity to be exploited and traded for an economic 
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outcome. The Bougainvilleans however, viewed land as the keystone of their 
physical, emotional and spiritual security. Understanding that these views were 
immutable, and that the survival of both parties depended on the same land, 
BCL executives tried to compromise with the islanders within practical and 
commercial limits; only the minimum amount of land required for the mine and 
its infrastructure was used, facilities were sited in less sensitive locations where 
possible, a pipeline to divert tailings from the river was commenced105 , and 
substantial compensation for land usage was paid. 
BCL's social policies included the establishment of the Village Relations 
Program as an informational conduit, hiring as much indigenous labour as 
possible, promoting and funding education and technical training, sponsorship 
of a trade union, organising an employee integration system (which not only 
assisted local workers in acclimatising to Western living and working, but also 
instructed expatriates in PNG and Bougainvillean customs), supporting the 
formation of local enterprises through the Bougainville Development 
Corporation, and providing medical, community, recreational, worship and 
shopping facilities. 
Management maintained that the success of the mine ultimately rested on the 
relationship between the company and the Bougainvillean people, and to this 
end supported the view that the locals should be involved in any decisions 
which affected their lives. While efforts to achieve a consultative atmosphere 
were officially circumscribed by the government's objection to indigenous 
input, a large measure of mutual understanding was accomplished by company 
personnel communicating directly with the villagers despite Port Moresby's 
prohibition. 
As well as attempting to adapt its activities to the Bougainvillean environment, 
BCL management also endeavoured to accommodate PNG. With the exception 
of defying government policy by engaging in dealings with the landowners, 
management adhered rigidly to PNG's legislative and political prescriptions. 
The company's conscientiousness to conform with PNG's demands is reflected 
in its repeated reluctance to challenge the government, even over issues which 
were potentially detrimental to the operation or its relationship with the 
105 Contrary to published reports which indicate that the tailings pipeline was 
commenced as soon as appropriate technology was available, a former mine executive 
informed the writer that the company delayed construction for a period. It is his 
personal opinion that, in this regard, BCL had erred (Personal communication, 1998). 
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Bougainvilleans. Management's compliant behaviour is evident in the 
acceptance of the Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Amendment Act 
1974 which substantially reduced the mine's profitability, and its unwillingness 
to pressure the government for indigenous consultation or royalty and fee 
reforms beyond cordial petition. BCL' s acquiescence to all official requirements 
is instructive in two areas. Firstly, it is clear that management was determined to 
act with all propriety towards its host country. This is supported by Dorney 
(1990: 121): 
... Bougainville Copper Limited was an exemplary corporate citizen of PNG from 
the day the Bougainville Copper agreement was renegotiated in 1974, the year 
before Independence, till the mine was knocked out of action by sabotage attack 
fifteen years later. 
Secondly, it strongly rebuffs accusations that management attempted to exert 
economic or political pressure on the government to gain concessions for itself. 
Although it is doubtful that the mine's managers considered their actions in the 
light of convergence-divergence-crossvergence theories, they appear to have 
been intuitively aware of the need to integrate established management and 
mining practices with the prevailing environment. Contrary to conventional 
management practices in LDCs at the time and without political or legislative 
coercion, management displayed an uncommon sensitivity and responsiveness 
to the history, customs, aspirations and fears of Bougainvillean people. Much 
of the success of the company may be attributed to the ability of successive 
managers to balance the commercial and political demands of the mine with the 
peculiar human and material needs of the host society. It may be argued that in 
dealing with PNG, the company had little choice but to accept the authority of 
the host country government, and thus a measure of divergence at the national 
level was imposed on BCL. However the decision not to contest governmental 
rulings, even in the face of possible disadvantage to the company, may be 
equally construed as an indicator of management's desire to align its operations 
with the wider environment. It appears therefore, that the overall management 
approach sought by BCL executives was one of crossvergence whereby they 
aimed to combine the economic, cultural and social influences of the company, 
the host country and the host society to develop a distinctive value system 
which would meet the needs and aspirations of all parties. 
Management Philosophy 
The success of BCL's executives in synthesising largely antithetic values into a 
unique and mutually acceptable working milieu was the result of blending 
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corporate pragmatism and social responsiveness. The company's sustained 
profitability106 was the consequence of· balancing conventional and non-
traditional approaches to corporate governance and organisation, adherence to 
accepted mining practices, and a high degree of flexibility and innovation in 
dealing with contextual diversity. This reveals that BCL's management was 
able to discern which aspects of Western management practices could be 
applied directly to the Bougainville situation, and which could not and thus 
needed to be modified or discarded. The perspicacity with which management 
made the etic-emic distinction in this regard may be attributed to the 
philosophies held by the executives, both individually and collectively. 
As noted in Chapter 2, Katz (1974) claims that the requisite skills of manage-
ment are technical, human and conceptual. While attention to the technical 
aspects of running the mine were clearly a vital ingredient in BCL's success, 
this issue is not pursued in this thesis. From Panguna's consistent performance 
it may be assumed that the managers were competent in, and committed to, 
accepted mining and commercial practices. The conceptual and human abilities 
of those managers were unique however, and warrant detailed consideration. 
Documentary and interview evidence exhibits uniform acclaim for Frank 
Espie's contribution to the Panguna operation, particularly with regard to his 
work during the establishment period of the mine. A remarkable feature of all 
reports about Espie is that they are so focused on his humanitarianism, that his 
business and mining acumen, which were extensive, seem almost of secondary 
importance. This appraisal of BCL's first Chairman appears justified as it is 
clear that Espie's personal convictions about the dignity and rights of the 
Bougainvilleans were a significant factor in the company's good relationship 
with the natives, and this relationship was the cornerstone of the environmental 
congruency discussed above. The following observations by contemporaries of 
Espie provide valuable insights into his views of mining on Bougainville. 
Anthropologist Douglas Oliver (refer Appendix K): 
Espie ... create[d] and shape[d] what was for Australia a very large and new kind of 
mining project in a new and daunting geographic and political setting. [He] travelled 
almost continuously ... to plan review, and oversee field operations in Bougainville; 
and, not least, to visit Bougainvillians in their villages. Although he very much 
wanted the mine to 'go', it was just as evident (to myself and others) that he was 
sensitively aware that the mine would inevitably bring about radical changes in the 
106 Although the returns from the operation fluctuated from year to year, the company 
recorded annual profits for the life of the mine. A breakdown of yearly results is 
detailed in the BCL Annual Report, 1988. 
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lives of many Bougainvillians, and that he tried in every way known to him to 
protect them from the injurious aspects of those changes and to make it possible for 
them to share in the financial benefits produced by the mine. 
He personally visited both governments and mining operations .. .in other developing 
countries, and ensured that his other senior managers did likewise at the project 
stage and thereafter. These visits were frequently sobering, the more so when on-
ground experience modified or contradicted official and academic accounts of events. 
Espie travelled intellectually as well, attempting to secure advice and experience 
from sociologists, anthropologists, geographers. In the world mining industry of 
the 1960s this was a decidedly unusual priority, common though such consultations 
have now become. Equally unusual was his willingness to enter the open forum, 
whether at the Waigani seminars at the infant University of PNG or in local liaison. 
The late Colin Bishop, the long-term site engineer who ... developed a special talent 
for community relations, would recall with relish the blank disbelief of local 
villagers when this large sweating Chairman appeared among them in shorts and 
boots, and was introduced as 'nambawan bilong kampani' (top man of the 
company). Their reaction was 'no way' ... (Oliver, 1991: 156). 
In an interview with the researcher, a former BCL executive who worked with 
Espie for many years noted that: 
... all the credit for the success of Bougainville should go to Frank Espie. He was 
the ... person with the ideas - a man ahead of his time in terms of trying to find the 
way to do things in a foreign and undeveloped society .. _ It was because of Frank's 
thoroughness in the way he went into the background of Bougainville that things 
went so well for so long. I feel very sorry for Frank that the whole thing blew up. 
Espie travelled the world ... talking to people who W'ere involved in mining in 
Africa in particular to find out from them what went wrong in the past ... to make 
sure it did not happen in Bougainville. Frank recruited a couple of anthropologists 
[who] were very helpful in advising us on how to go about developing the area with 
minimum impact on the local people (Personal communication, 1998). 
The profile of Espie which emerges from these reports is one of an 
intellectually independent visionary whose extraordinary sensitivity to alien 
cultures was far ahead of the period in which he operated107 • 
Although the biographical details of other BCL executives are not as well 
documented as those of Espie, there are indications that they shared similar 
attitudes towards the Bougainvilleans. Empathy with the villagers and their 
situation is apparent in the recollections of Don Vernon and Don Carruthers 
(refer Appendix J) who noted after the closure of the ITiine that: 
Development has been thrust upon [the Bougainvilleans], and its effects have been 
vast, even traumatic in some cases ... some of them have lost their land forever, and 
have had to live with the intrusion of the mine into their lives, with its consequent 
social and environmental impact (Carruthers & Vernon, 1990:69). 
107 The passion of Espie's attitude towards the welfare of Bougain villeans is reflected in 
his dismissal of the CRA board's suggestion he was 'crazy' to be so concerned about 
the locals (above). In interview, the writer asked Sir Frank to elaborate on this point, 
and was informed that "mining men did not pay much attention to blacks in those 
days; I thought differently" (Personal communication, 1998). 
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Callick provides further insight into Carruthers, describing him as "the long-
suffering and humane [executive] chairman of Bougainville Copper Ltd" 
(Quodling, 1991:vii). In his 1991 history of the mine, former BCL managing 
director Paul Quodling alludes to his personal attachment to, and respect for, 
the indigenes. Of the geologist Ken Phillips (refer Appendix J), a former 
colleague noted during interview that he "was more than a chipper of rocks; he 
was a very good social thinker and he made the point that some 
Bougainvilleans were not happy ... " (Personal communication, 1998). 
As discussed previously, BCL's external environment was characterised by the 
enduring division and hostility between PNG and Bougainville. Accordingly, 
management formulated strategies and policies with the intent of sustaining the 
acceptance and support of both the host country and the host society. Attempts 
to satisfy each entity simultaneously was flawed in practical terms however, as 
a past BCL executive reports: 
The biggest error we made was to think that we, as a company, were there for the 
benefit of all [PNG] ... Our agreement was with the PNG government and we saw 
Port Moresby as our chief area of control... And so whatever we did, we had to do 
with their approval. If we had their approval, then it was legally acceptable and 
correct and we were able to do it. This was a mistake because nobody in PNG 
considers themselves as a Papua New Guinean (Personal communication, 1998). 
This observation suggests that the company's national orientation was guided 
more by political and legal imperatives than management's intimate under-
standing of the social and human realities of the situation. For the individual 
executives, private reconciliation of this duality must have been difficult. On 
one hand, their innate sympathy with the Bougainvilleans compelled them to 
maximise the mine's benefits at a local level; on the other hand, their positions 
as corporate officers required them to fulfil their obligations to the host country 
irrespective of their personal perspectives. 
In the ethnographic tradition, the above impressions of the mindsets of BCL's 
senior executives are based on observation and self-reporting and, as such, 
cannot be considered conclusive. They do however, provide an informed 
perception of the ethos which guided the management of the mine. Evidence of 
the prevailing management philosophy is reflected in the company's policies, 
its dealings with the Bougainvilleans, and in its handling of individual incidents 
(reported in Chapter 5). Further confirmation of the managers' personal 
characteristics and integrity may be inferred from the silence of the company's 
detractors; whilst BCL and the mine were subject to criticism from many 
quarters, particularly after its closure (refer Chapter 6), the researcher has 
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found no reports which question management's sincerity or intentions 
regarding the welfare of the Bougainvillean people. 
From the information available, it may be concluded that key executive 
positions in BCL were successively filled by people who possessed those 
personal qualities which Knotts (1989), Schwartz and Saville (1991), Heller 
(1980), Phatak (1997) and Anderson (1997) suggest are essential for managing 
MNEs in LDCs. Determining the origins of these characteristics is beyond the 
scope of this study, however an insight into Espie's philosophies can be gained 
from his account of his youth in Burma where he witnessed the superior 
attitudes of Western people towards the locals. 
Although BCL consistently appointed senior managers who possessed beliefs, 
values and attitudes which were appropriate to Bougainville' s human 
- . 
environment, the manner in which these inherent qualities were identified is 
elusive. There is nothing to suggest that the managers undertook personality or 
psychological appraisals to ascertain whether their disposition was suitable to 
the task. Similarly, it is doubtful that these traits were directly inculcated by the 
company as no specialised training in dealing with Bougainville's unique 
situation seems to have been administered. The phenomenon does however, 
seem to support research which indicates that the vision and ideals of the 
founder (in this case, Espie) are perpetuated in an organisation's culture {Deal 
& Kennedy, 1982; Doktor, 1990; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Schein, 1985). 
Thus, it can only be assumed that BCL's internal culture valued these 
attributes, and the selection of executives was based, in some measure, on 
judgments concerning individuals' alignment with that culture. The matter of 
BCL's corporate culture is explored in the following section. 
Organisational Culture 
Just as the organisational culture of all MNEs is a reflection of home and host 
country national cultures plus the philosophies held by management (Al-
Shammari, 1994; Laurent, 1986; Redding & Ng, 1992), so was BCL's culture 
a meld of these influences. As noted previously, the company recognised the 
importance of integrating traditional management systems with the external 
environment, and thus its policies and practices were an amalgam of Western 
approaches to organisation and commercialism, PNG's expectations, and 
Bougainvillean traditions. Equally, the influence of the managers' ideologies 
are evident in BCL's approach to its operations. The combination of these 
220 
dimensions resulted in a corporate culture that, for its time, was unique among 
large-scale mines - particularly those situated in LDCs. 
Espie's aversion to racism became fixed in the company's culture from the 
beginning and harmonious workplace relationships remained a priority for the 
life of the mine. In effect, BCL had adopted the principles of equity and merit 
years before EEO legislation was introduced in its home country. BCL's 
induction program provided for the acculturation of both indigenous and 
expatriate personnel, and company policy forbad any expression of racial 
prejudice from its employees. No place of work or recreation was segregated. 
As reported in Chapter 5, BCL's approach to integration was successful insofar 
as the relationship between the natives and Caucasians remained amicable for 
nearly 25 years and only began to deteriorate when organised opposition to the 
mine emerged. The latter day decline in this harmony accords with the 
observations of Laurent (1986), Hofstede (1991) and Weber et al. (1996) that 
when national and corporate culture are in conflict, the former will prevail. 
Whereas BCL's integrative approach to workplace relationships on Bougain-
ville was successful in fostering rapport among natives and Caucasians, it was 
inappropriate when applied to PNG citizens due to the extremely complicated 
ethnic divisions throughout the country. Bougainvillean clans had little in 
common and barely tolerated one another, the Bougainvilleans collectively 
~espised the Niuginians and vice versa, and the Niuginians who worked on the 
island were as tribally divided as the Bougainvilleans. This climate produced 
significant and ongoing racial tension which was inconsistent with BCL's goal 
of a collaborative and diverse workplace. However, because the ideals of multi-
culturalism were so deeply ingrained in the company's culture, management 
persevered with its inclusive policies rather than attempting to address the root 
of the problem. 
In effect, BCL management had only two alternatives by which it could rectify 
the matter: it could either totally exclude non-Bougainvilleans from its 
indigenous workforce, or restrict employment to ethnically tolerant people. 
While the former option would have satisfied the locals, many issues militated 
against it. Firstly, Bougainville did not have a sufficient number of suitable 
people to meet the mine's requirements, therefore a much larger proportion of 
expatriates would have been needed and this would have dramatically increased 
operating costs. Secondly, the exclusion of Niuginians may have ignited open 
conflict between the mainlanders living on the island and the locals. Thirdly, 
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discrimination in favour of Bougainvilleans, although not illegal, was likely to 
draw criticism from the PNG and Australian governments. Most importantly 
however, ~scriminatory employment practices would have violated 
management's convictions that the mine should (i) be of benefit to the entire 
nation, and (ii) utilise as much indigenous labour as possible. Hiring racially 
tolerant people would have decreased friction between workers and 
strengthened BCL's inclusive workplace relations culture. Although this 
strategy aligns with proposals by Deal and Kennedy (1982) and Ott (1989) that 
the maintenance of a diverse work environment is dependent on hiring only 
those who hold multicultural principles and removing those unwilling accept 
them, it would have been difficult to implement. 
The Bougainvilleans conformed with Hofstede's (1995) proposal that LDC 
nationals are typically collective by nature (low individualism) and prefer a 
paternalistic work environment (large power distance). The islanders' 
propensity for collectivism explains their close tribal attachments which, in 
tum, explains their aversion to people from other PNG provinces and their 
abiding suspicion of the mine. Paradoxically, the same characteristic also 
explains their dedication and application as employees; their sense of group 
affiliation produced a strong work ethic based on loyalty to the company. Of 
the indigenous workforce, a former mine executive reported in interview that: 
The workforce at Panguna was very good. Technically, the operation with the high 
local labour content of about 80% was as good as I've seen anywhere in the world. 
The Papua New Guineans and Bougainvilleans made excellent operators and 
excellent tradesmen .... costwise, safetywise and in every way, our operation was 
better than any of the other CRA operations in Australia (Personal communication, 
1998). ' 
Although management's insistence on employing a high proportion of PNG 
nationals was initially viewed by many as imprudent, it is evident that this 
policy was extremely effective. In return, the company rewarded indigenous 
employees for their contribution by way of extensive training and development 
opportunities (discussed previously) and by promoting them to responsible 
positions. In an industry where LDC citizens are often confined to manual 
tasks, BCL appointed indigenes to many technical and managerial roles108 • 
Whereas corporate benevolence in some settings may be construed as 
condescending, BCL management's paternal attitude was appropriate to the 
Bougainvillean psyche. The culture of social and economic responsibility 
108 Exemplary of this practice was the appointment of a Bougainvillean as head of BCL's 
human resources and community relations department. A Bougainvillean was also a 
member of BCL's Board of Directors. 
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which Espie had instilled into the company aligned with the Bougainvilleans' 
expectations of reciprocal obligation. The outcomes of this approach were not 
those anticipated by management, however. The PNG government used BCL's 
largesse as an excuse to largely abdicate its responsibilities to the island109 • This 
had two effects. Firstly, given PNG's past neglect of Bougainville, this attitude 
further aggravated the relationship between the Bougainvilleans and the national 
government. Secondly, a welfare mentality emerged in some quarters whereby 
locals looked to the company for most of their material needs110 • Further, 
frictions and jealousies developed among the Bougainvilleans; those who lived 
in the mining leases perceived inequities in the distribution of benefits, and 
those who lived in other regions were aggrieved that they received fewer 
advantages from the mine relative to those living in the leases. 
Summary 
From a Western perspective, it is difficult to criticise those aspects of BCL's 
internal environment which have been reviewed in the preceding pages. Based 
on the altruistic aspirations laid down by Espie, successive managers gave 
careful consideration to the outcomes of their decisions. Through an 
uncommon respect for its host country and sensitivity to its host society, 
management blended modem mining and management practices with 
inappropriate laws, diverse demands and ancient cultural traditions to develop a 
corporate culture which would largely satisfy PNG, the Bougainvilleans and 
the company for many years. BCL' s management thus engaged the essence of 
Fatehi's (1996) 'constructive neutrality'. It minimised clashes with the 
environment by manipulating the operation to suit its hosts and by working in 
concert with external entities on those issues which could not be resolved by 
organisational adjustments. 
Thus far, this chapter has explored the nature of BCL's external and internal 
operating environment and examined the company's management of the 
109 Of this, a former executive noted: 'The 1974 agreement was not ... unreasonable ... 
but it was only reasonable if both sides performed what they were supposed to 
perform, and this is where the government fell down. The government was supposed 
to provide very good facilities ... but they did not... so we had to hire our own security 
group to assist the police... build our own hospital... supplement the education 
budget... I'm sure the government felt that if the Bougainvilleans needed things badly 
enough, the company would make sure they got it (Personal communication, 1998). 
110 Although PNG's relinquishment of its obligations to Bougainville was largely 
responsible for this phenomenon, other forces may have been involved. There is 
evidence to suggest that the advent of a large enterprise in a small community tends to 
spawn an attitude of local dependence on that company (see, for example, Moss 
Kanter's (1995:186-189) report on Honda's facility in Marysville, Ohio, U.S.A.). 
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demands of these environments in the light of the prior research presented in 
Chapter 2. The investigation has revealed that, across the stated contextual 
dimensions, BCL management generally adhered to the principles of 
appropriate MNE governance espoused in the literature. This approach proved 
to be effective; the company traded profitably year after year, and its 
relationship with the host country and host society was, in the main, mutually 
agreeable. Notwithstanding, BCL's financial and social success came to an 
abrupt end. This suggests that certain features of the company's management 
and organisation were not, in fact, appropriate to the prevailing conditions. 
Those factors which appear to have contributed to BCL' s failure are examined 
the following sections. 
ANALYSIS OF THE MANAGEMENT 
OF BOUGAINVILLE COPPER LIMITED 
This section has two aims. First, the manner in which the data were analysed is 
explained. Building on the procedures of analysis presented in Chapter 3, the 
process of interpreting the respondent interviews using NUD*IST software is 
described. Second, the findings of the analysis are discussed. The fundamental 
considerations of this analysis are: (i) how management addressed the issues 
which emerged from BCL's external and internal environment, (ii) the principal 
determinants of BCL's failure, and (iii) the identification of any connections 
between management actions and the closure of the mine. This section is 
structured according to the environmental elements noted previously. 
Data Analysis and Interpretation 
As described in Chapter 3, 'Stage One Coding' resulted in the production of a 
series of data categories (nodes) into which portions of interview text were 
grouped according to significant terms, events and issues which emerged from 
the data. Using the NUD*IST software Index Search facility, 'Stage Two 
Coding' was conducted. This process scanned the data within each existing 
node, identified segments of text containing related themes, created new nodes, 
and saved the results of the search at those nodes. As NUD*IST produced 
these new nodes, they were appended to node 5 (refer Appendices D and G). A 
summary of this analysis, that is the intersection of 'Stage One' nodes, is 
displayed in Table 7.2. This matrix depicts the subjects' characteristics on the 
vertical axis and environmental factors on the horizontal axis. Each cell reports 
the incidence of the data in the intersecting nodes as determined by the 
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NUD*IST program and shows the appropriate node reference111 • In order to 
facilitate the interpretive process which followed, the numeric products 
generated by NUD*IST were converted to descriptors ranging from 'Nil' (no 
common themes between the actors' characteristics and environmental elements 
were identified) to 'Very High' (a significant number of common themes 
between the actors' characteristics and environmental elements were identified); 
this is presented in Table 7.3. Guided by the informants' perceptions arrayed in 
Table 7.3, the entire body of data (interview material, case narrative and 
previously compiled memos) was subjected to the interpretation processes 
described in Table 3.3. The outcomes of the interpretive analysis were then 
verified according to the procedures listed in Table 3.4. The findings are 
presented below. 
The External Environment 
Legal factors 
Table 7.3 supports assertions by May (1990) and Oliver (1991) that the 
disposition of the various groups towards the prevailing legal environment was 
polarised. Whereas the Bougainvilleans, the Niuginians and third parties 
displayed indifference or hostility towards the law, the management of BCL 
exhibited a moderate to high regard for the host country's legal institutions and 
its prescriptions. As a consequence of these opposing perspectives, the legal 
system represented a substantial barrier in the relationship between management 
and the majority of those with whom they dealt. The Bougainvilleans, in 
particular, found the legal system repugnant. They considered that the laws 
which governed the mine were inappropriate and irrelevant because they were 
incompatible with many of their fundamental beliefs and institutions. As a 
result, many islanders refused to accept the rule of national legislation or court 
decisions 112 • 
111 NUD*IST calculates this relationship by expressing the incidence of matching themes 
as a percentage of the total number of text units identified during 'Stage One Coding'. 
For example, the intersection of nodes 2.3 and 4.2. l (refer Appendix G) shows 
7/0.94%; i.e. of the 741 text units scanned, 7 (0.94%) match the criteria. The common 
text segments of nodes 2.3 and 4.2.1 are stored at node '54:Index' (see Appendix D). 
112 The Bougainvilleans' rejection of imported and unilaterally imposed laws might have 
been expected, as the effectiveness of any legal system depends on it being regarded 
as fair and just by those whom it purports to serve (Coplin, 1966). 
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Table 7.2 Numeric Results of NUD*IST Interview Analysis (Stage Two Coding) 
EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
Legal factors Cultural factors Economic factors Political factors Con-cross- Management Organisational 
diver2ence Dhilosophv culture 
NUD*IST 
Node 4,2,J 4,2,2 4,2,3 4,2,4 4,1,l 4,1,2 4,l,3 
Identification 
HOST SOCIETY 
BoUl!ainville 
Attitudes 1,1 0 (5:1ndex) 3414.6 (6:1ndex) 3/0.40 (?:Index) 7/0.94 (8:1ndex) l/0.13 (2:Index) 2/0.27 (3:1ndex) 3/0.40 ( 4:lndex) 
Values 2,1 0 (33:Index) 3214.3 (34:Index) 8/1.1 (35:lndex) 1/0.13 (36:Index) 0 (30:lndex) 110.13 (31 :Index) 0 (32:lndex) 
Behaviour 3,1 0 (61 :Index) 4/0.54 (62:Index) 0 (63:lndex) 210.27 (64:lndex) 0 (58:Index) 0 (59:Index) 110.13 (60:Index) 
OUTSIDERS-
PNG 
Attitudes 1,2,J 110.13 (12:lndex) 3/0.40 (13:Index) 210.27 (14:lndex) 9/1.2 (15:Index) 0 (9:lndex) 0 (lO:Index) 210.27 (l l:Index) 
Values 2,2,1 210.27 (40:lndex) 3/0.40 (4l:lndex) 4/0.54 (42:lndex) 14/1.9 (43:lndex) 1/0.13 (37:lndex) 0 (38:lndex) 210.27 (39:Indcx) 
Behaviour 3,2,J 110.13 (68:Index) 410.54 (69:Index) 110.13 (70:lndex) 15/2.0 (7l:lndex) 3/0.40 (65:Index) 0 (66: Index) 3/0.40 (67:Index) 
OUTSIDERS-
Others 
Attitudes 1,2,2 0 (l 9:Index) 210.27 (20:Index) 0 (2l:lndex) 6/0.81 (22:lndex) 0 ( 16: Index) 0 (l7:Index) 1/0.13 (18:Index) 
Values 2,2,2 0 (47:lndex) 0 (48:lndex) 0 (49:Index) 4/0.54 (50:Index) 1/0.13 (44:lndex) 0 (45:Index) 110.13 (46:Index) 
Behaviour 3,2,2 0 (76:Index) 0 (77: Index) 0 (78:Index) 1211.6 (79:Index) 0 (73:Index) 0 (74:Index) 0 (75:Index) 
MANAGEMENT 
Attitudes 1,3 6/0.81 (26:Index) 410.54 (27:lndex) 210.27 (28:Index) 1/0.13 (29:Index) 0 (23:Index) 1211.6 (24:lndex) 8/1.1 (25:Index) 
Values 2,3 7/0.94 (54:Index) 4/0.54 (55:Index) 210.27 (56:lndex) 5/0.67 (57:lndex) 6/0.81 (5 l:lndex) 17/2.3 (52:lndex) 26/3.5 (53:Index) 
Behaviour 3,3 9/1.2 (83:lndex) 7/0.94 (84:Index) 14/1.9 (85:Index) 8/1. I (86:Index) 12/1.6 (80:Index) 6/0.81 (8l:lndex) 3214.3 (82:Index) 
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Table 7.3 Descriptive Results of NUD*IST Interview Analysis (Stage Two Coding) 
EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
Legal factors Cultural factors Economic factors Political factors Con-cross- Management Organisational 
divere:ence philosophy culture 
NUD*IST 
Node 4,2,1 4,2,2 4,2,3 4,2,4 4,1,1 4,1,2 4,1,3 
Identification 
HOST SOCIETY 
Boul?8inville 
Attitudes 1,1 Nil Very high Low Medium Very low Low Low 
Values 2,1 Nil Very high High Very Low Nil Very Low Nil 
Behaviour 3,1 Nil Medium Nil Low Nil Nil Very low 
OUTSIDERS-
PNG 
Attitudes 1,2,1 Very low Low Low Medium Nil Nil Low 
Values 2,2,l Low Low Medium High Very low Nil Low 
Behaviour 3,2,l Very low Medium Very low Very High Low Nil Low 
OUTSIDERS-
Others 
Attitudes 1,2,2 Nil Low Nil Medium Nil Nil Very low 
Values 2,2,2 Nil Nil Nil Medium Very Low Nil Very low 
Behaviour 3,2,2 Nil Nil Nil High Nil Nil Nil 
MANAGEMENT 
Attitudes 1,3 Medium Medium Low Low Nil High High 
Values 2,3 Medium Medium Low Medium Medium Very high Very high 
Behaviour 3,3 High Medium High High High Medium Very high 
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The company's management was ambivalent about the legal climate in which 
the mine operated. While ensuring BCL followed the letter of the law, the 
executives empathised with the locals' objections and made several attempts to 
persuade the central government to change various aspects of the legislation 
governing the mine. Port Moresby largely ignored their requests however, and 
steadfastly refused to consult with the Bougainvilleans on any substantial 
matters. Management's tolerance of this situation, as well as their compliance 
with the law, was interpreted by the islanders as a tacit expression of the 
executives' agreement with the PNG government. It is not difficult to 
comprehend the Bougainvilleans' confusion and their eventual anger with 
BCL. On one hand, management was claiming to understand how the law 
favoured the interests of PNG and the company while marginalising the 
interests of local communities. On the other hand, management was reluctant to 
press seriously for legislative changes. At best, BCL's managers appeared to 
lack resolve; at worst, they appeared duplicitous. Evidence from the case 
invalidates suggestions of deception on the part of management, as they were 
consistently open and sympathetic in their dealings with the villagers. 
Nevertheless, they were inadequate in their dealings with the government. Just 
as the executives accepted the 1974 amendments to the Act, they were reluctant 
to pressure Port Moresby for the legal amendments to which they believed the 
Bougainvilleans were entitled. 
Two explanations may be offered for the behaviour of Panguna's management. 
Firstly, because they were extremely conscious of BCL's position as a foreign 
corporation in an LDC, they were determined to act responsibly and with 
respect for the authority of the host country. Secondly, being Australian, the 
managers were accustomed to the logic which underpinned PNG's essentially 
British legal system. They were cognisant of the benefits which the existing 
legislation brought to the nation as a whole, and advancing PNG had been the 
fundamental mission of BCL's social program from the outset. 
Management's reticence in demanding legislative change reflects a traditional 
Western approach to corporate behaviour in regard to the law. In this case, the 
BCL executives appear to have made an error of judgment. The long term effect 
of their compliance with the host country's laws was the alienation of the host 
society, the support of which was essential to the company's survival. Former 
mine managers sustain this suggestion, noting variously: 
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We bent things as far as we could to help the locals but if we had realised things 
were going to blow up the way they did we would have pressured the government 
more. .. . we did not thump the table hard enough in terms of insisting that the 
government provide the Bougainvilleans with a bigger slice of the action, or that 
they sit down with the Bougainvilleans and renegotiate the agreement between 
themselves so they satisfied the Bougainvilleans on what should happen (Personal 
communication, 1998) . 
... it may have been better if the company could have taken a bigger role in looking 
after the Bougainville people... Maybe we should have said to the government 
"bugger you, we are going to look after these people anyway". It was not a cost 
factor ... The company tried to point out to the government that these issues needed 
to be addressed ... but it fell on deaf ears ... (Personal communication, 1998). 
Given its prominence in the PNG economy, BCL was in a remarkable position 
to persuade the national government· on most issues, particularly those 
concerning the laws to which it was subject. Management's failure to influence 
parliament would, in time, contribute to the island's rebellion, the demise of the 
company and the weakening of the PNG economy. Notwithstanding, the 
interference of MNEs in the regulation of their host countries is a contentious 
issue (Emmanuel, 1984; Hoogvelt, 1991; Vernon & Wells, 1986), and it may 
be assumed that any intervention by BCL in PNG's affairs of state, irrespective 
of its inherent wisdom, would have drawn criticism from the government's 
opposition parties, Australia, and perhaps the world community. 
Cultural Issues 
Column 4 of Table 7.3 cross-references the characteristics of the protagonists 
with the influence of cultural factors on the events on Bougainville. The results 
suggest that only two groups were substantially concerned with cultural issues; 
the Bougainvilleans and BCL's management. 
Although cultural changes on Bougainville had been evolving gradually since 
WWII, the mine brought sudden and widespread interruption to traditional 
lifestyles, especially for those communities in the Panguna region. These 
changes were critical to the villagers, and they were imposed without adequate 
consultation. Whilst BCL personnel tried to explain and justify the presence of 
foreigners on Bougainvillean land, their efforts were insufficient and lacking in 
authority as far as the locals were concerned. Thus the Bougainvilleans not 
only suffered substantial and often deleterious cultural upheaval, they could not 
understand what was happening to them, or why it was occurring. 
Espie' s initial attention to minimising the social impact of the mine commenced 
an ongoing consideration for the local culture which would be continued by 
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subsequent managers until the mine closed. This concern was translated into 
various initiatives and policies, most of which were far more advanced than 
those of comparable operations anywhere in the world. However, these 
measures were not enough to assuage the deep resentment the Bougainvilleans 
felt . about the disintegration of their culture and sense of self. While 
inadequacies in preparing the Bougainvilleans for change were largely 
responsible for discontent in the early days, the Panguna development itself 
was the major source of cultural disturbance. Although many facets of the 
mine's presence affected the Bougainvilleans' way of life, four appear to be 
particularly significant: the migration of Niuginians to the island, the 
employment of Niuginians by BCL, the consequences of land alienation and 
ecological disturbance, and the shift towards a commercial economy. These 
factors are examined hereunder. 
Responsibility for the inadequate social preparation for the mine rests with the 
PNG administration and the Australian government, as these bodies carried the 
onus of the island's stewardship. Neither authority commissioned any research 
into the potential cultural effects of large-scale mining on Bougainville113 , and 
thus it was impossible to estimate the ramifications of industrialisation, much 
less forewarn the islanders and take steps to ameliorate any impending 
problems. Given the absence of any official appraisal of the Bougainvillean 
culture, the company's founder, of his own volition, undertook the process. 
Espie's efforts, in both conception and execution, cannot be faulted, however 
they were not sufficient to the task. Transposing social knowledge gained in 
Burma and Africa to Bougainville may have provided a sound framework upon 
which to build, but it presupposes a global cultural homogeneity among LDCs 
which does not exist. As a former executive with intimate knowledge of the 
period noted: "There were not many parallels between the Bougainvillean 
situation and that in Africa" (Personal communication, 1998). Equally, seeking 
the counsel of two anthropologists reflects management's cultural sensitivity 
but, while their advice was of invaluable assistance, it was not sufficient. 
Therefore, as a result of government indifference, and despite the extraordinary 
efforts of the early executives, the company entered Bougainville with limited 
knowledge of the cultural milieu. Given these conditions, plus the difficulties 
associated with multi-dimensional language barriers, it is not surprising that the 
Bougainvilleans did not comprehend what was happening to their homeland. 
113 Official neglect in assessing the future impact of mining was not confined to the 
social domain. The authorities did not consider the environmental and economic 
repercussions of development on Bougainville. 
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This situation was exacerbated by the uncertainty surrounding the physical 
outcomes of mining. The exploration process only reveals the presence of the 
lode; it cannot accurately foretell the extent of the resource and the eventual size 
of the pit required to extract it. Reflecting on this, and its contribution to local 
confusion and scepticism, a past mine executive reported that: 
... we did not know what the mine was going to be; this is one of the great 
difficulties in exploration. In the past, companies have opened mines by· making 
stupid promises and walk out when it fails; this upsets everybody. We did not eh 
this - we were honest and told them we did not really know what the mine would be 
like. But then the people said "if you don't know, who the hell does?'' Our only 
reply could be "we don't know what's there yet". Therefore you have the landowners 
whose [land] was going to be dug up and a company who did not know how much 
it needed to dig (Personal communication, 1998). 
Thus, the early years of the mine were trying times for the Bougainvilleans. 
Preferring to Ii ve in isolation from each other and the outside world, they were 
invaded by people whose appearance, motives and behaviour were totally 
foreign. They sensed their cultural domain was under threat, but they could not 
understand it and were powerless to control it. 
The influx of people from other PNG provinces was deeply resented by the 
Bougainvilleans. The islanders' traditional mistrust of outsiders escalated to 
open hatred when they were exposed to a variety of cultures which embraced 
different values and attitudes concerning property rights, moral conduct, regard 
for local customs, and so forth. For their part, the Niuginians generally held the 
Bougainvilleans in contempt. Inter-ethnic marriages, which became more 
common over time, inflamed these tensions. The locals regarded the 'redskins' 
as another source of risk to their culture, and one which was inherently more 
dangerous than that posed by the caucasians. Aware of the depth, extent, and 
potential dangers of the friction between the Niuginians and Bougainvilleans, 
the mine's management unsuccessfully petitioned the national government to 
arrest the flow of immigrants. A former BCL executive noted that: 
Continually, management would ask the government " ... why don't you stop the 
flow of all these unemployables across the sea because they are disrupting 
everybody. They are making the communities unhappy. They are not getting jobs, 
so they are unhappy as well". But the government in its wisdom said it could not 
limit the movement of its citizens (Personal communication, 1998). 
For the government, BCL's request would have been difficult to implement as 
all PNG nationals have the constitutional right of internal migration. However, 
neither the authorities or BCL made any attempt to search for alternative means 
of managing the situation; the government ignored the issue and the company's 
managers tolerated the government's inaction. In the absence of official control 
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of the movement of Niuginians to Bougainville, management could have made 
the island less attractive to immigrants by instituting policies which restricted 
indigenous employment to Bougainvillean people. Without the possibility of 
work at the mine, the mainlanders would not have been drawn to the island. 
Although this approach would have solved many problems, it was not palatable 
to Panguna's management as it _would have been contrary to the company's 
ideals of the mine providing maximum employment and training benefits for 
PNG as a whole. In retrospect, a past manager now considers this approach 
was a mistake: 
We saw that because we were located on Bougainville, there should be a higher 
proportion of Bougainvilleans than anyone else and as a result of that we had about 
40% Bougainvilleans. But the result of having 40% Bougainvilleans meant that 
there was 60% non-Bougainvilleans. Although we thought that was a fair distrib-
ution across the country, the Bougainvilleans wanted 100% Bougainvilleans - no 
Papua New Guineans. We at no stage considered that because it was not possible to 
find the standard of people necessary if we confined recruitment to Bougainville. 
There is a copper mine on Misima Island [in PNG's Louisiade Archipelago] which 
started after we did. They agreed that they would recruit only local people and if they 
weren't available from Misima, they would recruit people from overseas. This was 
acceptable to the people of Misima because, like Bougainvilleans, they would rather 
have foreigners than other PNG races. I'm sure that if the [Panguna] mine ever 
started up again, it would be on the basis that the only nationals there would be 
Bougainvilleans (Personal communication, 1998). 
An inescapable consequence of mining is its severe impact on the physical 
environment; it changes the landscape, it is unsightly, and it has the potential to 
impair ecological systems. To the Bougainvilleans however, damage to their 
land has a greater significance than concerns for the aesthetic and disturbance to 
the balance of nature. Interference with Bougainvillean land equates to 
interference with their culture. Aware that mining was incompatible with 
Bougainvillean society, but bound to the technology and processes associated 
with mineral extraction, BCL's management could do little but attempt to 
control the inevitable damage. In pursuit of this, the mining complex occupied 
as little land as possible, vegetation was rehabilitated around non-continuous 
projects such as landfill and road construction, and the dumping of tailings was 
restricted to one river system114 • It is possi~le that management may have been 
able to do more in minimising the mine's effect on the environment, but it 
appears that this would have been of marginal benefit115 • While it is evident that 
114 As noted previously, the disposal of tailings in the river proved more problematic 
than anticipated. Early estimations that 80% of solids would wash to the sea were 
erroneous, and it was not realised that the build-up of tailings would prevent the 
Bougainvilleans from using a traditional ford for crossing the river. 
115 The exception to this would have been the earlier construction of the tailings 
pipeline. Taking the tailings out to sea however, would not have reduced ecological 
damage, rather it would have shifted it from one location to another. 
232 
disturbance to the natural realm had a significant impact on the cultural 
traditions of communities living near the mine; the true nature and extent of this 
impact cannot be reported because one would need to be a Bougainvillean to 
fully comprehend it. Therefore, the actual role of the environment-culture nexus 
in the Bougainvilleans' objections to the mine remains unclear to observers. 
The cultural impact of Bougainville's development towards a commercial 
economy is reviewed in the following section. 
Economic Issues 
Of the four external environmental dimensions investigated, economic factors 
appear to have been of least overall concern to the parties involved. Notwith-
standing, the Bougainvilleans' values and the behaviour of BCL management 
both register as 'high' on this factor. 
Conscious of the lamentable history of mining in other resource rich LDCs, 
BCL's management was determined to take a positive and beneficial role in the 
PNG economy. As well as accepting the legislated state imposts without 
contest, the company voluntarily contributed to PNG's development in various 
ways, including the offer of 20.2 per cent of its equity to the government, the 
localisation of the workforce supported by extensive training and education 
programs, the provision of various community facilities on Bougainville, and 
the establishment of the Bougainville Copper Foundation. At the national level, 
BCL continuously fulfilled Espie's objective of having a working arrangement 
which "would be satisfactory to the first independent PNG government" 
(Former mine executive, Personal communication, 1998). At the local level 
however, the economic relationship between the company and the 
Bougainvilleans was not satisfactory. Frictions emerged over the terms of 
compensation and occupation fees, the proportion of economic benefits 
accruing to the island, foreign equity, and the growing cultural effects of 
regional dualism among the locals. 
The difficulties between BCL and the villagers over land acquisition, 
occupation fees and compensation for loss and damage did not result from 
management action, rather they were primarily engendered by Port Moresby's 
reluctance to include either the Bougainvilleans or the company in the 
regulatory process. Similarly, the problems arising from PNG's retention of 
the bulk of government revenue raised from the mine were technically outside 
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the control of the mine's management. BCL executives recognised the dissent 
these issues were generating on Bougainville, yet, as discussed above, they 
displayed insufficient determination in convincing the government to modify its 
policies. 
Criticism of foreign equity had little justification in economic terms. Although 
private and corporate investors held 79.8 per cent of BCL stock, less than one 
third of the mine's income was returned to these shareholders as Carruthers and 
Vernon (1990:69) explain: 
Since the commencement of operations, the project has generated Kl 754 million 
cash for its "stakeholders" (apart from the repayment of bank loans which helped 
fund the original development). This money has been paid out as follows: 
Government of Papua New Guinea 
Government of North Solomons Province 
Landholders 
Non-Government Shareholders 
K million 
1078 
75 
24 
577 
17 54116 
% 
61.5 
4.3 
l.4 
32.8 
100 
The Government of Papua New Guinea received its income from the project as 
corporate income tax, customs duty and other miscellaneous taxes, dividends, 
dividend withholding tax and employee income tax; the Government of North 
Solomons Province as royalties, taxes and non-renewable resources fund; the 
landholders as compensation and five per cent of the royalties; and the non-
government shareholders as dividends. CRA ... has received 22 per cent of the cash 
generated, from its equity interest of 53.6 per cent117 • 
Clearly, accusations of BCL engaging in the excessive repatriation of profits 
cannot be sustained, however these figures give credence to the Bougain-
villeans' discontent over the central government's retention of the bulk of mine 
generated revenue. 
Regional dualism is an anticipated and unavoidable consequence of 
development in any subsistence economy, particularly when that development 
is rapid (Ronen, 1986). Bougainville was typical in this regard, however the 
problem may have been magnified by the fact that the development was 
concentrated in a small area. As discussed previously, the division caused by 
the creation of a 'monied class' on Bougainville was acute and multi-
116 
Government of Papua New Guinea 
Government of North Solomons Province 
Landholders 
Non-Government Shareholders 
A$ million 
1,490.33 
103.68 
33.18 
797. 70 
2,424.9 
US$ million 
1,268.27 
88.25 
28.24 
678.84 
2,063.6 
117 As PNG investors held 15.5 per cent of the non-Government equity (BCL Annual 
Report, 1973), the return to the PNG economy was larger than Carruthers and 
Vernon's figures indicate. . 
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dimensional. To mitigate the effect of this, BCL paid the indigenous workforce 
at a lower rate than expatriates, but this did not solve the problem. It is difficult 
however, to envisage any other solutions which the rnine's management might 
have offered to rectify the situation. The employment of Bougainvilleans at the 
exclusion. of all other Niuginians (proposed above) would have improved the 
income of more islanders, but not in sufficient numbers to establish a 
commercial economy throughout the island. 
From an alternative perspective, a past BCL manager pondered the wisdom of 
the company introducing elements of a market economy: 
I think you need to question the Bougainvillean need for development. They were 
poor by our standards, but they were not deprived. The mine brought them benefits 
which a lot of them enjoyed, but they really did not need them. PNG wanted a 
commercial economy more than these islanders. Their lives had gone a long time 
without materialism; perhaps they were better off without it. They were not living 
in poverty ... their health, food and lifestyle was OK before the mine. The friction 
between the tribes was there, but seldom manifested itself because they did not have 
the facility or mobility to wage war on each other or anybody else. The 
infrastructure changed this ... (Personal communication, 1998). 
This argument holds merit from an ideological viewpoint,. but it is doubtful 
whether management could have translated it into policy. For the company to 
leave the Bougainvillean economic system intact, it would have been necessary 
to isolate the mine completely from the island's affairs by paying all financial 
dues to the central government (including landowner compensation) and 
employing only Niuginians and expatriates. Even if such an approach was 
acceptable to Port Moresby, it seems reasonable to assume that the Bougain-
villeans would have objected to having their land violated with no return to 
themselves. 
Political Issues 
The generally weak emphasis on economic matters shown in Table 7 .3 
(discussed above) is in contrast with the political dimensions which display the 
highest overall ratings of all external factors. This may indicate that PNG's 
intransigence over royalties, compensation, and the like were driven more by 
political imperatives than by the actual income the country derived from the 
Panguna mine. 
From its inception, the Panguna mine had been exposed to risks which might 
arise from the political environment. The potential of political unrest on 
Bougainville is reflected in various commentaries of the early 1970s when the 
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magnitude of the operation became evident. Illustrative of these are the 
observations of West and Turner: 
The excavation, refining and shipping of [Bougainvillean] ore to the smelters of 
Japan could bring great profit over the next 20 years [but] there is a danger that 
arguments over ownership of the mine could cause political strife, even civil war, in 
this part of the South Pacific (West, 1972: 109). 
R1Z has centred its activities on a small Australian controlled island in the Pacific 
called Bougainville ... [This] project is [not] likely to run up against insurmountable 
local objections, though it is interesting to note that part of the incipient 
nationalism in Papua New Guinea, of which Bougainville is a part, is turning 
against the company's mining activities (Turner, 1973:62). 
Early concerns were also expressed by Griffin118 who, in 1990, reminded the 
chairman of BCL of his (Griffin's) remarks 21 years earlier when the develop-
ment of the mining complex had just commenced: 
.. .in 1969 the serious issue of secession had emerged. You may remember that I 
said then that your company was in the wrong place at the wrong time and that, if 
the secession issue was not resolved before independence, grievances over mining 
could only aggravate and precipitate the issue in a way that would endanger the 
emergent state of Papua New Guinea. . .. the company's mere presence made it a 
participant in this political imbroglio (Cited in Polomka, 1990:56). 
While the mine's managers were aware of the possible political implications of 
the venture from the beginning, they do not seem to have been aware of the 
magnitude of the risk. Several factors appear to have contributed to this naivety: 
encouragement by the Australian government and the PNG Administration to 
proceed with the mine (Carruthers' 19 , cited in Polomka, 1990:56), PNG' s 
assurances that it could control the situation on the island should problems arise 
(Past executive, Personal communication, 1998), management's perceived 
attentiveness to the Bougainvilleans' physical needs and cultural system 
(discussed in the preceding sections), BCL's benevolent local and national 
social policies (Quodling, 1991 ), a lack of understanding of the PNG political 
landscape (Past executive, Personal communication, 1998), and an under-
estimation of antipathy between the islanders and the Niuginians (Past 
executive, Personal communication, 1998). 
The evidence suggests that, although management's assessment of the mine's 
operating environment was well intentioned and broad in its scope, it did not 
access the submerged agendas or the subtleties of the national and local political 
arena. In explaining this situation, two factors appear to be most pertinent. 
Firstly, the initial appraisals of the external environment seems to have been 
118 An academic widely published in the history of PNG (refer Appendix K). 
119 Refer to Appendix J. 
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deficient. The company relied primarily on the 'Grand Tour' approach 
(Rummel & Heenan, 1978). While the information gained by this method was 
valuable and formed the foundation of the mine's long period of successful 
operation, it seems to have been 'one-sided'. Because discussion during the 
prospecting and establishment phases was basically restricted to negotiations 
between the company and the PNG Administration, the Bougainvilleans' 
perspectives were either ignored or marginalised at the official level. 
Management tried to rectify this imbalance by entering into direct dialogue with 
the locals and engaging an anthropologist1 20, but their efforts were impeded by 
language barriers, cultural and historical influences, and, most importantly, the 
PNG Administration's refusal to recognise the Bougainvilleans' right to a 
'voice'. The latter point effectively meant that any effort by management to 
come to suitable arrangements with the villagers would be in vain and therefore 
was possibly not worth pursuing to its ultimate conclusion. Secondly, it 
appears that BCL's management did not adequately monitor its external 
environment during the mine's operative years, especially concerning issues 
relating to the Bougainvillean people. This conclusion is drawn from a number 
of observations made by past executives during interviews in 1998: 
In retrospect, [appointing a Bougainvillean as head of the Human Resources and 
Community Relations Department] was a big mistake and it was made out of 
ignorance because we figured a Bougainvillean would be the correct person to have 
there. What we did not realise was that this man came from ... the south ... and not 
from the Nasioi area where the mine is, and consequently any complaints that came 
to him through the Nasioi group he ignored because he had no feeling for them and 
hated them ... I did not recognise this until after the whole thing blew up; I was 
always aware of the tension between the language groups on Bougainville, but I 
was not aware of the depth of their ill-feeling ... it is now obvious that the only 
thing they agree on is the fact that they hate non-Bougainvilleans [and] hate each 
other almost as much .... on one of my later trips there . .. a priest ... told me that 
this Bougainvillean executive was not telling management the truth about what 
was going on. He was telling us only what he thought we wanted to hear. 
[The 'Bougainville Initiative' letter] should have rung ... alarm bells and should 
have forced us to sit down [and] get to the bottom of the problem. One of the 
things I have learned about ... Papua New Guineans ... is that you cannot talk too 
much or listen too much. You need to talk and talk and talk and listen to what is 
really worrying them. We were more content to keep the operation running ... rather 
than worrying about the feelings behind this letter ... 
[Concerning the KlO billion demand by PLA president Serero - refer Appendix L], 
we have since been told that on Bougainville, when the men are involved we need 
to worry, but if the women are involved you have a major problem. The fact that a 
woman wrote the letter is something that we should have reacted to immediately -
although she had no authority, she was a senior woman ... 
120 The hiring of Oliver to advise on Bougainvillean ways is indicative of the 'Old hands' 
method of environmental evaluation (Rummel & Heenan, 1978). Oliver's 
perspectives were invaluable to the company in the early days., as informed knowledge 
of Bougainville was extremely sparse at that time. 
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What did the company not do right? Probably the biggest issue was a failure to 
recognise the inevitability of what happened. Had we have seen this, we might 
have done things a bit better. We had 20 years of reasonable stability, and did not 
see the importance of the few people that occasionally threw stones at us. We 
missed the fact that the younger people would not accept what the older generation 
had agreed to. There is probably a timing factor as well. There was a change in the 
management... There was no longer someone who they could talk to, who they 
knew ... Maybe we should have prepared the locals more for these company 
changes ... 
The suggestion that Panguna's managers failed to recognise a number of 
fundamental characteristics and changing attitudes in their host society does not 
imply they lacked concern for, or interest in, the Bougainvilleans. To the 
contrary, management's ostensible inattention to these matters may be 
explained by the close working and interpersonal association between BCL 
personnel and the majority of the locals. Despite PNG's ongoing efforts to 
control the relationship between the company and its host society, the two 
parties had developed an essentially favourable disposition towards each other 
over 25 years. Through unofficial consultation and mutual agreement, they had 
come to satisfactory arrangements on many of the issues which had divided 
them initially. It is proposed that the passage of time and the generally 
harmonious climate led BCL's management into an unwarranted familiarity 
with the islanders. In effect, management had become too intimate with the 
Bougainvilleans which resulted in an assumption that the degree of assimilation 
between the two was greater than it actually was. While it cannot be claimed 
that management took the locals for granted, there are indications that the 
executives saw an unrealistic homogeneity between the company and the people 
which suggests they forgot BCL was a guest, rather than a native institution. In 
other words, management became so close to important factors in the external 
environment that it could not 'see' what was happening. As a result of this 
myopia, the mine's management was not able to address the political realities 
which were emerging and were virtually paralysed when the situation 
degenerated into open violence. 
The Internal Environment 
It was anticipated that the 'Stage Two' analysis would reveal consistent 
similarities between the characteristics of management and the form of BCL's 
internal arrangements. Such an outcome is reflected in Table 7.3, which also 
shows a negligible association between parties outside BCL and the company's 
internal environment. 
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Convergence, Divergence and Crossvergence 
As noted earlier, the organisation of the mine was founded on a crossvergent 
approach to management which aimed to establish an operating system peculiar 
to the idiosyncrasies of its unique setting. Research indicates that this goal was 
generally achieved for a sustained period, and thus it may be concluded that 
BCL's management accomplished the high degree of environmental alignment 
advocated in the literature as essential to corporate performance (Bowden, 
1985; Bums & Stalker, 1961; Davis et al., 1987; Galbraith, 1974; Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967, Thompson, 1967). However, as discussed above, there are 
indications that management became too comfortable with the contextual fit 
which it had developed. In assuming that the fundamental divisions between 
the company and the majority of the Bougainvillians had substantially and 
permanently dissipated, management was prevented from appreciating the 
enduring nature of culture or recognising the changes occuning in the host 
society. 
It is considered therefore, that while the adoption of a crossvergent system of 
management and organisation was appropriate in attaining environmental fit on 
Bougainville, the efficacy of the model decreased over time due to a lack of 
flexibility in its application. It appears that, because BCL had established a 
significant degree of integration with its surroundings by the mid-1970s, 
management saw no reason to change its approach in the ensuing years, and 
thus did not always respond appropriately to the emerging needs, goals and 
sentiments of the local people. Accordingly, the mine began to lose organis-
ational fit with its surroundings. This development in Panguna's management 
sustains the 'complementary' view of fit and flexibility which proposes that: 
... both concepts are essential for organizational effectiveness since the strategic 
management challenge is to cope with change (requiring flexibility) by continually 
adapting to achieve a fit between the firm and its external environment (Wright & 
Snell, 1998:757). 
Management Philosophy 
A recurring theme which has emerged from this research is BCL's impeccable 
conduct as a corporate citizen. This is particularly evident in management's 
insistence that PNG should reap financial and social benefits from the mine's 
operation, and the company's strict adherence to PNG law. The research has 
also revealed that the pursuit of these goals was a contributing factor' in the 
closure of the mine because it was these issues which were at the heart of much 
of the Bougainvilleans' discontent. As management was aware of the potential 
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dangers of this situation, it is necessary to determine why they elected to satisfy 
the government's demands rather than insisting on the passage of those 
legislative concessions required to ameliorate the Bougainvilleans' concerns. 
The behaviour of the managers may be explained by (i) their fundamental 
beliefs and values concerning the role which BCL should occupy in PNG' s 
economy and society, and (ii) their personal commitment to the rule of law. 
Concerning the former, the executives shared Espie's conviction that the 
benefits accruing from the Panguna operation to its hosts should be maximised. 
Because the mine was located within PNG territory, 'host', at the corporate 
level, was interpreted as host country rather than host society. Thus, the 
maximisation of benefits was perceived as spreading them as broadly as 
possible throughout the nation. While it has been determined that the executives 
had some personal misgivings about the long-term wisdom of this approach, 
several reasons may be advanced to explain their reticence in pushing for 
change. Firstly, the extent of the managers' doubts at the time of their 
incumbency is difficult to judge as these were not expressed until a decade after 
the fact 121 • It is possible that these feelings were somewhat vague or subcon-
scious at the time, and therefore not potent enough to generate concrete actions. 
Secondly, the managers held a concept of 'nationhood' which was defined by 
the Western culture in which they were raised. Whereas the Australian 
perception of nationhood equates to some measure of social homogeneity and 
common good, this does not apply to PNG. Given this cultural conditioning, 
the managers construed BCL's responsibility to its host primarily in terms of 
benefits to PNG. From the perspective of Melanesian custom however, the 
company's obligations should have been accorded to the communities in which 
the mine operated. Thirdly, it is possible that a form of 'groupthink' may have 
prevailed in the management's dealings with PNG. This occurs when the 
dynamics of a cohesive group exert pressure toward conformity, even though 
individual members might have reservations about the group's decision. That 
is, there is an illusion of unanimity within the group which prevents dissent 
from surfacing (Janis, 1996). 
121 During interviews with the researcher (1998), the former executives were unanimous 
in their assertion that both BCL and the Bougainvilleans would have been better 
served had management used the company's influence to ensure PNG responded to the 
locals' more significant demands. These sentiments do not appear to be documented in 
earlier records, however. 
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The unswerving observance of PNG's legal prescriptions by BCL managers 
may also have philosophical foundations. Whilst it may be argued that the 
executives' compliance with the law resulted from public expectations of MNE 
stewardship or the requirements of the UN Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States to which Australia is a signatory, the researcher's observations 
offer an alternative explanation. In effect, BCL's managers governed an 
operation with sufficient economic power in PNG to enable them to challenge, 
or even disregard, those laws which might impair the mine's performance, yet 
this did not occur122 • Whilst there can be no definitive evidence as to the 
managers' motivations for their strict adherence to the law, the insights which 
emerge from this study suggest that these men held firm personal beliefs about 
the intrinsic value of the law, recognised the obligations of MNEs to submit to 
host countries' legal codes, and/or possessed an inherent respect for the 
sovereign authority of an MNE's host government. Irrespective of these 
imputed motivations however, the managers' behaviour displayed a rigid 
pattern of ethics, and this pattern defined the essential nature of the relationship 
between BCL and its host. 
Whereas it was proposed in the preceding section that management became so 
close to the Bougainvilleans that it forgot BCL was a guest on the island, the 
reverse appears to have occurred in the company's relationship with PNG. 
Conscious that BCL was a foreign company, the managers remained vigilant in 
their efforts to accommodate the requirements of PNG. This mindset of 
needing to meet the host's expectations seems to have inhibited the company's 
integration with the nation. Rather than giving BCL its due recognition as a 
central player in PNG's development, it appears that Port Moresby almost took 
the company for granted. It is plausible to contend that, had the mine' s 
managers been less passive and more demanding of the government, BCL may 
have been regarded as a key partner in the nation's affairs and its needs given 
more consideration by PNG's political leadership and the parliament. 
122 As noted in Chapter 5, the only allegation of illegal activity on the part of BCL was 
that of practising 'transfer pricing', and records show this to have been unfounded. 
During the writer's interviews with the former managers, no reference was made of 
BCL senior personnel consciously breaking any laws to achieve corporate goals, or 
of this ever having been considered as an option during the currency of the mine. It is 
possible that the informants may have withheld any such detail from the researcher, 
but this would have been inconsistent with the candour displayed by all participants. 
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Organisational Culture 
The case material reveals that BCL had a strong and rather intense organ-
isational culture. The workforce, at all levels, generally shared a particular 
concept of the company's identity which it translated into a 'style' of corporate 
functioning. The influence of this identity, which was rooted in Espie's 
conscious ideals of the way in BCL should conduct itself, was pervading and 
enduring, and produced a uniformity of behaviour. This uniformity guided 
managerial actions and responses and, as previously described, the approach 
both helped and hindered the mine's operation. 
Cultural leadership in BCL was focussed on maintaining the codes and values 
which were instituted in the early days, and which had served the organisation 
well for many years. In their efforts to sustain the internal status quo however, 
it appears that the Panguna executives did not give sufficient consideration to 
the changes which were gradually developing within the mine's broader 
environment. The necessity of allowing the culture to evolve was not seen and, 
over time, extant managerial approaches became less appropriate in dealing 
with the pressures emanating from external forces. As Bryman (1996:284) 
notes, organisational culture needs to develop in line with the company's 
emerging circumstances: 
Leaders who follow in the founder's footsteps often see their role as maintaining and 
reinforcing the early culture. At a later stage in their development the distinctive 
cultures that were created might come to be seen as liabilities, as environmental 
realities change ... Much of the New Leadership writing concentrates on situations in 
which the leader is confronted with a culture that is in need of change because it is 
out of tune with current realities or because the culture is a barrier to a change of 
strategic direction ... Kotter and Heskett's (1992) quantitative study of the links 
between organizational culture and firms' performance led them to conclude that the 
really critical factor is that a culture is adaptive, that is, it seeks to anticipate and 
adapt to environmental change. 
It is argued therefore, that most of the norms and standards which Espie 
envisaged for BCL were both suitable and efficacious for the greater period of 
the mine's life, but those which compelled the ongoing acceptance of PNG's 
deleterious expectations were, by the mid-1980s, out of alignment with the 
Bougainvillean community and therefore a potential threat to the company's 
future prosperity. 
Determining the relative impact of each of the above influences on BCL's 
internal environment is difficult because it is not possible to draw clear 
distinctions between the impact which crossvergence, management philosophy 
and corporate culture had on the manner in which the mine was managed. Each 
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dimension was interrelated and affected by the others. Notwithstanding, it is 
evident that some combination of these factors resulted in a static approach to 
the management of the company which ultimately impeded its ability to sustain 
congruency with the wider environment. 
The Involvement of BCL's Management in the Bougainville 
War of Secession 
The civil war on Bougainville is the touchstone of this inquiry. If peace had 
continued on the island, little public and academic scrutiny would have been 
afforded to the region in general and BCL in particular. Having analysed the 
motivations and actions of Panguna's management, consideration now turns to 
how these factors may have contributed to the Bougainville tragedy. 
The outbreak of hostilities on Bougainville cannot be attributed to a particular 
episode. Neither was it the result of the conduct of an individual person or 
group, either indigenous or foreign. Equally, the war cannot be separated from 
the mining activities on the island. Whether the actions of BCL's senior 
personnel contributed the revolution is difficult to determine however, because 
the Panguna operation was enmeshed in Bougainville's place in world history, 
and the islanders' unique cultural and political past. Whereas there is little 
evidence in the case material to indicate that BCL or its management was a 
significant factor in the outbreak of hostilities, it is equally clear that the mine's 
presence was a central issue in the grievances which sparked the war. 
The political and cultural biography which confronted the mine's managers was 
peculiar in the world. Whereas rapid 'Westernisation' was forced upon other 
countries settled during the period of European expansion, Bougainville and 
PNG were largely disregarded until the years following WWII. Even then, 
Australia's trusteeship was relatively brief and generally apathetic. In 1975, 
PNG's "independence [came] with a rush" (Dorney, 1990:48). In its haste to 
form a nation, Port Moresby and Canberra ignored the fragmentation of PNG 
society and "assumed that ethno-national aspirations would be homogenised 
with the declaration of independence" (Griffin, 1990b:74). The expected 
homogenisation did not occur however, and, as Bannett (1975:286-287) 
explains, resistance to national unity was especially resolute on Bougainville: 
... at no time in Bougainville colonial history has any foreign power formally 
established its political sovereignty over us, nor have the Bougainvilleans ever 
ceded political sovereignty to any foreign nation... We have never liked nor 
accepted British rule; we have never liked nor accepted the Germans' rule; we have 
never liked nor accepted Japanese rule, and neither will we at this late stage like the 
Australian's rule, let alone New Guinea rule. 
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Clearly, the genesis of the Bougainvilleans' discontent predated the Panguna 
mine by some 70 years. To the villagers therefore, the mine was perceived as 
yet another intruder; an extension of illegitimate governments with which they 
had no affiliation, which they did not trust, and which held inexplicable rights 
to the land they held sacred. 
Whether CRA was wise to proceed with the venture in the early 1960s is a 
moot point. Arguments as to the merits, or otherwise, of establishing the mine 
under the prevailing conditions are now immaterial. The fact remains that the 
mine was established and it became an integral element in the Bougainvilleans' 
struggle for independence. 
Although various parties, after the event, accused BCL of causing the war123 , 
the case history does not support such claims. Rather, the evidence suggests 
that the mine had a catalytic role in the tragedy; that is, its presence exacerbated 
extant feelings of discontent and injustice (Dorney, 1990; Oliver, 1991; 
Quodling, 1991). From a management perspective, the fundamental issue 
concerns whether the Bougainville revolution would have occurred had the 
mine's executives managed the operation differently. Those who are most 
intimate with the entire Bougainville situation hold abiding reservations as to 
whether any action on the part of BCL, its Australian parent, or its management 
would have changed the course of the island's history: 
Because most of the discontent was underground, it is very hard to say what the 
company could have done to avoid the closure. Maybe it could have foreseen the 
problems or maybe there was something which it could have done, but I don't know 
what (Former BCL executive, Personal communication, 1998). 
The inevitability of the revolt was not seen [by BCL management], but what we 
would have done had we have recognised it, I'm not too sure (Former BCL 
executive, Personal communication, 1998) . 
... the mine may have been able to do things differently but what happened would 
have happened sooner or later. It may have happened sooner if the mine had not 
been so well managed, it may have happened later if they had done an even better 
job. Ultimately, the mine's closure was inevitable ... Eventually, the situation 
would have blown up anyway. It may have taken another 150 years, or 50 years, 
but sooner or later, I believe that the Bougainvilleans want to be a separate group of 
people (Former resident of Bougainville, Personal communication, 1998). 
123 Reflecting on the blame which was attached to the mine after the outbreak of the war, a 
past BCL executive advised that " ... when the whole thing blew up [the PNG govern-
ment] had to find a scapegoat and who better to blame than the company? The whole 
country ended up blaming Bougainville Copper for the situation, even other mining 
operations - Porgira, Ok Tedi, you name it. The government. .. blamed us almost 
entirely for the trouble. They refused to accept any of the responsibility for 
themselves" (Personal communication, 1998). The PNG government was not alone in 
this indictment. Others who denounced BCL for the causing the revolution included 
social commentators, journalists, and a number of Bougainvilleans. 
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It is contended therefore, that while the BCL managers may have been able to 
delay the war, they could not have averted it. Throughout the history of the 
Panguna mine there is a persistent atmosphere of inevitability about the events 
which came to pass. The venture was surrounded by a plethora of diverse and 
uncontrollable variables: a proud people who had endured prolonged political 
and military occupation; an LDC divided by cultures, ideologies and politics 
which was trying to achieve nationhood; an island population bound by narrow 
parochial horizons and struggling with the changing perspectives of a rising 
generation; ecological damage to a pristine and spiritually significant environ-
ment; the disintegration of cultural traditions; and the collision of Western 
capitalism with subsistence socialism. Given these conditions, it is difficult to 
sustain an argument that, in the long term, the mine's management could have 
had a significant influence on Bougainville's destiny. 
Summary 
This analysis of BCL' s management and organisation indicates that a number 
of managerial actions and omissions may have augmented the Bougainvilleans' 
enduring grievances, and intensified the latent discontent which was evolving 
in certain sectors of the population during the 1980s. Of particular significance 
was management's reluctance to insist that Port Moresby include the Bougain-
villeans in negotiations concerning the mine's operations, return more revenue 
to the island, control the migration of Niuginians, and redefine the distribution 
of compensation among the villagers. Further, tensions would have eased if the 
executives had implemented an employment policy which restricted indigenous 
labour to Bougainvilleans. Management's reticence in addressing these issues 
turned on two factors: an adherence to Espie's original vision of the mine's role 
in the development of the entire nation, and a failure to monitor the changing 
external environment - particularly the emerging attitudes of the local people. 
The result of these oversights was a gradual, almost imperceptible, loss of 
alignment between BCL's internal and external constituents which, in tum, 
accelerated the Bougainvilleans' push for secession. Had management 
pressured PNG for legislative reform and revised its employment practices, the 
war may not have erupted at that time and BCL's tenure on the island would 
have been extended. While it is unlikely that these actions would have 
diminished the Bougainvilleans' desire for freedom from PNG, it would have 
communicated the commitment which the mine's managers genuinely held 
towards the island and its people, and may have reduced the locals' sense of 
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urgency for secession. With more time, and in a less emotional atmosphere, it 
is possible that PNG and Bougainville might have reached a negotiated 
settlement on the island's autonomy. 
Had a politically acceptable and peaceful transition to independence occurred, it 
remains difficult to predict the fate of BCL however. While the mine may have 
continued under the existing ownership structure (or perhaps as a joint venture 
between the locals and BCL), it is possible that the Bougainvilleans may have 
expelled the company at a future time in order to operate the mine themselves. 
THE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATION OF 
BOUGAINVILLE COPPER LIMITED: 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The management and organisation of BCL is now examined in terms of the 
four organisational models presented in Chapter 2. This discussion seeks to 
locate the foregoing analysis of the management of BCL within appropriate 
theoretical frameworks, and to provide support for the resolution of the central 
research question in Chapter 8. 
The importance which management attached to meeting the aspirations and 
needs of BCL's two hosts reflects institutionalisation theory, which postulates 
that because an organisation is a "product of social needs and pressures", it 
becomes a "responsive, adaptive organism" (Zucker, 1988:5). In this model, 
firms are seen to pursue legitimacy through developing similarities with their 
institutional environment, and in so doing tend to abandon the technical 
rationality which underpins traditional organisational processes and structures. 
Of DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) three sources of pressure for similarity, 
coercive isomorphism appears to be the most relevant in explaining various 
aspects of the management of the Panguna mine. Coercive isomorphism 
results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other 
organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the 
society within which organizations function. Such pressures may be felt as a force, 
as persuasion, or as invitations to join in collusion. In some circumstances, 
organizational change is a direct response to government mandate ... (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 183:150). 
In its efforts to secure legitimacy with both the PNG government and the 
Bougainvillean people, the management of BCL often ignored the dictates of 
commercial and managerial logic. This behaviour is indicated by the executives' 
passive acceptance of PNG's more deleterious demands on the company and 
the costs they incurred in assisting the Bougainvilleans in social and economic 
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terms. This conclusion does not imply however, that such actions were solely 
the result of coercion (either overt or covert) from external entities; this inquiry 
has consistently revealed that management possessed an inherent belief that the 
company should operate in the best interests of PNG and Bougainville. It ~s 
suggested therefore, that management behaviour was an amalgam of the need to 
attain corporate legitimacy from the external environment (reflecting the tenets 
of institutionalisation theory), and an innate belief that BCL, as a foreign guest, 
should act responsibly in all its dealings and philanthropically towards its hosts 
(reflecting the personal convictions of the managers and the culture which 
prevailed in BCL). 
It could be further argued that, in the company's early years, Espie adopted 
mimetic isomorphism, as he closely examined mining operations in other LDCs 
in order to determine their approach to operating in uncertain environments. His 
motives differed from DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) emphasis on imitating the 
patterns of successful organisations however, as he sought to understand 'what 
went wrong' with mining ventures in emerging economies. 
Contending that organisations depend on positive selection from within their 
population on the basis of fit between themselves and the characteristics of the 
environment, population ecology theory (PET) proposes that organisations 
survive by reactive adaption and that management cannot substantially affect 
organisational outcomes (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Reed, 
1996). As this study has revealed that the closure of the Panguna mine 
ultimately resulted from factors beyond management's control, PET assists in 
explaining the company's failure. Absolute acceptance of this model is not 
feasible however, because its focus on organisational populations neglects 
other contextual factors in which BCL was immersed. The relevance of 
environmental determinism theories to the BCL case is amplified in Chapter 8. 
Furthermore, the applicability of PET can only be assumed from the facts of the 
case. As noted in the preceding section, it is possible that, had the executives 
taken a stronger stance with PNG, the Bougainvilleans might have pursued a 
more gradual approach to achieving independence, thereby prolonging BCL's 
operations. Notwithstanding, Bougainvillean independence would not have 
guaranteed BCL's tenure as eventually the island's fragmented social structure 
and internal politics may well have expelled the company. In this case, the basic 
concepts of PET would also be relevant. 
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The central theme of resource dependence theory concerns organisations' 
relationships with those contextual factors on which they depend. Taking an 
opposing view to population ecology theory, this paradigm recognises 
management's ability to mitigate the effects of environmental influences on 
organisations, and thus proposes that management should take an active role in 
ensuring that the terms of organisation-environment exchanges minimise the 
firm's external dependence (Child, 1997; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). BCL's 
dependence on its environment was profound. The mine was bound to its 
location by virtue of the position of the ore body, and this, in tum, made the 
company's survival conditional to the ongoing support of the Bougainvilleans 
and PNG. Management was aware of this dependence, yet made few concrete 
efforts to improve BCL's bargaining position through the exercise of power, 
preferring instead to maintain the status quo by attempting to satisfy the 
demands of the institutional and social arrangements of both PNG and 
Bougainville. Had external dependence been reduced by management 
demanding legislative change, BCL's survival may have been prolonged, at 
least in the short term. Evidence suggests however, that many of the mine's 
contextual factors could not have been significantly influenced by the 
company's management (or any other non-Bougainvillean entity), therefore 
resource dependence theory is not deemed to be applicable to the governance of 
BCL. 
The resource-based view contends that corporate performance is contingent 
upon the characteristics and deployment of a firm's organisational capabilities 
(Barney, 1991). Investigation of BCL's three significant organisational 
dimensions (degree of crossvergence, management philosophy, and organ-
isational culture) indicates that each approximated three of Barney's ( 1991) four 
criteria; they were unique, inimitable and had no substitutes. It is contended that 
these characteristics were vital components in the success and longevity of the 
Panguna mine. Management philosophy and organisational culture however, 
inhibited the maximisation of opportunities and the minimisation of threats 
within the environment; factors which appear to have contributed to the ultimate 
demise of the operation. Accordingly, it is considered that the resource-based 
view accounts for BCL's performance in both the short and long term. 
A review of four organisational models has revealed that the management and 
organisation of BCL aligns with particular elements of institutionalisation 
theory, population ecology theory, resource dependence theory, ·and the 
resource-based view of organisations. While each of these explain various 
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aspects of BCL's stewardship and operation during its tenure on Bougainville, 
the enforced closure of the mine after 17 years of production lends most 
support to population ecology theory. In advocating PET, Baum (1996:78) 
does not dismiss management's influence in organisations, but warns: 
... under conditions of uncertainty there are severe constraints on the ability of 
individuals to conceive and implement correctly changes that improve organizational 
success and survival chances ... there are limits on the influence of individuals' 
actions for variability in organizational properties. 
BCL was eventually overtaken by forces beyond the control of management, 
and thus the survival of the company was not possible. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the results of the case analysis. In order to set the 
contextual framework in which BCL operated, the broad characteristics of the 
company, PNG and Bougainville were summarised. The diversity, instability 
and complexity of the host country and the host society were considered, and 
the potential problems for MNEs involved with two incompatible hosts were 
canvassed. 
BCL's external environment was discussed with reference to the impact which 
its legal, cultural, economic and political milieu had on operations. The 
influence of each of these elements was found to be significant and, in relation 
to some issues, potentially harmful. Matters of particular concern included 
PNG's refusal to acknowledge Bougainvilleans' rights regarding the presence 
and operation of the mine, the ethnic divisions among the island communities, 
the incompatibility of PNG laws with Bougainvillean society, changing cultural 
and economic traditions, the influx of Niuginians to the Panguna region, and 
environmental degradation. An examination of the internal environment 
indicated that the management of BCL attempted to balance the needs of the 
company with the needs of both PNG and the Bougainvillean people. This 
integrative approach proved to be generally successful for many years, and was 
based on a corporate culture of inclusion, equity and national development. 
This culture stemmed from the mine's founder, and its continuation may be 
attributed to successive leaders who held a strong personal commitment to 
similar ideologies. 
The management of BCL was investigated in relation to those external and 
internal elements noted above. It was proposed that a number of managerial 
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behaviours may have contributed to the gradual decline of the environmental 
balance which had been established. The managerial issues deemed to have 
been of significance were an excessive commitment to the development of PNG 
vis-a-vis Bougainville, a persistent reluctance to exercise the company's 
potential influence to force legislative change, the hiring of non-Bougainvillean 
indigenous labour, and a failure to recognise the nature and extent of the unrest 
emerging among the islanders. The latter issue may be explained by Wright and 
Snell's (1998) hypothesis concerning the complementary nature of organ-
isational fit and flexibility. BCL's management seemed to become complacent 
about its strong relationship with the locals, and this may have obscured the 
need for ongoing monitoring of the realities of that relationship. The former 
issues emanate from the managers' collective and individual perceptions about 
the mine's role in PNG's affairs, and the organisational culture which appears 
to have been static rather than adaptive. 
No evidence was found to support claims that the manner in which the mine 
was managed contributed to the Bougainville revolution. The case material does 
indicate however, that the presence of the mine may have accelerated the push 
for secession, and thus hastened the outbreak of war. The Bougainvilleans' bid 
for independence was inevitable, and the mine seems to have provided a focus 
for the peoples' discontent. Based on the case history, it is argued that BCL's 
management may have delayed demands for secession by being firmer in its 
attempts to extract concessions from PNG. This action would have alleviated 
many of the Bougainvilleans' immediate concerns, thereby providing time for 
designing a peaceful transition to self determination. The practicality of this 
proposition is unclear however. It is unlikely that PNG would have been 
prepared to negotiate on Bougainville's independence at this time, in which 
case war would have been unavoidable. As for BCL, independence on 
Bougainville would not have necessarily meant the long-term survival of the 
company. 
The application of theoretical models to BCL's management and organisation 
revealed that elements of population ecology theory provide the most plausible 
explanation of the company's failure. The nature and interrelationships of the 
mine's legal, cultural, economic and political environments were such that 
BCL's expulsion was virtually inevitable. In effect, the fundamental dilemma 
. which always faced the mine's management was not what might happen if the 
company was forced to leave, but what might happen when it was forced to 
leave. Had this been recognised earlier, management may have been in a 
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position to plan for the orderly closure of the operation or to hand it over to the 
Bougainvilleans. It is argued therefore, that while BCL's executives may have 
been able to delay the mine' s closure, the ultimate fate of the company was 
beyond their control. Various dimensions of other organisation theories are also 
evident. The company's pursuit of legitimacy in its relationship with PNG and 
Bougainville may be attributed to institutionalisation theory, the resource-based 
view exposes the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation's internal 
properties, and resource dependence theory underpins the suggestion that, by 
being more assertive, management may have been able to create an opportunity 
for Bougainville to negotiate independence with PNG, thereby extending 
BCL' s operations on the island. 
The outcomes of the analysis presented above form the basis of Chapter 8, in 
which the research questions are considered and the implications of the study 
are discussed. 
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CHAPTERS 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter concludes the thesis by reporting the principal outcomes and 
implications of the research. Commencing with a review of the thesis, the 
chapter builds on the findings of the case study analysis presented in Chapter 7 
by addressing each of the subordinate research questions in tum. From these, 
the central research question is resolved and the conclusions of the study are 
discussed. The implications of the research are then noted; these relate to 
government policy development in Australia and PNG, management practice in 
MNEs, theory development and further research. The chapter closes with a 
report of the limitations of the research. 
REVIEW OF THE THESIS 
The principal objective of this study was to extend current understanding of 
MNE management in environments which are substantially different to those 
present in the organisation's home country. Bougainville Copper Limited, 
located in PNG's North Solomons Province, was investigated in order to 
analyse and explain the management of an Australian company which operated 
in a developing economy in Oceania. 
The context of the study was established in the literature review (Chapter 2), 
which focused on four principal areas: the nature and development of MNEs 
and international management, the influence of external and internal variables 
on MNE management and corporate performance, current discourse on 
organisational-environmental alignment, and the management of MNEs in the 
volatile operating climate of LDCs. Models depicting the impact which 
diverging home-host business conditions may have on environmental 
congruency were then presented. The chapter concluded by specifying the 
central and subordinate research questions. Based on the thesis objectives and 
the literature review, these questions guide the case analysis. 
Chapter 3 detailed the research design and methodology. A single case study 
method was adopted as this approach meets the descriptive, exploratory and 
explanatory aims of the research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). Further, the 
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design flexibility of case studies enabled the researcher to access the complexity 
and meaning of real-life phenomena in an holistic manner, and to achieve 
multiple research goals through a combination of inductive and deductive 
processes (Hakim, 1987; Williamson et al., 1977; Yin, 1994). The BCL case 
provided a unique opportunity to examine the history of a large MNE from its 
inception to its closure. Unlike extant operations which are dynamic and 
evolving, BCL presented a static model which allowed for the investigation of a 
complete sequence of events in the management of an MNE operating in a 
developing economy. As the experience of BCL has no direct contextual or 
organisational parallels, researching the company precludes a comparative 
approach (Eisenhardt, 1989) or attempts at replication (Miles & Huberman, 
1994), rather it adheres to Yin's (1994:39) rationale for a single case design 
where "the case represents an extreme or unique case". 
Acknowledging criticisms of the methodology's perceived shortcomings (Guba 
& Lincoln, 1981; Hamel et al., 1993; Osborne, 1991), the rigour of the 
research was maintained by careful design and the development of a protocol. 
Construct and internal validity were achi~ved by the use of various procedures 
as suggested by Hakim (1987), Janesick (1994), Miles and Huberman (1994), 
Neck et al. (1996), Sowden and Keeves (1988), and Yin (1994). External 
validity was not an issue as no claims are made as to the universal applicability 
of the results of the study; as Barnard et al. (1987) and Yin (1994) advise, case 
studies are undertaken to generalise findings to theory rather than to generalise 
findings to populations. Although the collection of direct data was limited, 
through necessity, to a small number of respondents, this did not weaken the 
research effort. The informants had intimate knowledge of BCL and its 
environment and, as Patton ( 1990: 185) reports, "the validity, meaningfulness 
and insights generated from qualitative research have more to do with the 
information richness ... than with sample size". 
The case report was presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. This was augmented by 
transcripts of the respondent interviews, which are recorded in Appendix V. 
Chapter 4 outlined the natural, human and political environment which 
confronted the management cif the Bougainville copper venture. Chapter 5 
presented the history of BCL, commencing with prospecting in 1963 and 
concluding with the mine's closure in 1989. This chapter described in detail the 
manner in which the company and its environment were managed during 
BCL's tenure on the island. Chapter 6 examined the Bougainville civil war and 
the events which precipitated it, reviewed the reactions of PNG, Australia and 
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the world community to the crisis, and considered the effects of the war on the 
various stakeholders. The chronological progression of these chapters enabled 
the researcher to construct a logical chain of evidence, as recommended by 
Sowden and Keeves (1988) and Miles and Huberman (1994). The interview 
transcripts appearing in Appendix V represent the direct data collected for this 
research. This information, gathered from four respondents in June 1998, 
serves three purposes: to validate the indirect data which constitutes the 
narrative presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6; to gain an understanding of the 
Bougainvillean people and the mine executives' experiences in managing the 
Panguna project; and to access fine-grained detail of all aspects of the case. 
The analysis of the case is presented in Chapter 7. Here, elements of BCL's 
external and internal environments were investigated according to the literature 
review, and the company's management and organisation was examined in the 
light of the organisational models presented in Chapter 2. It was determined 
that the company's external environment had a significant impact on the 
operation and, although the mine's executives may have been able to address a 
number of marginal issues, the fate of the venture was ultimately beyond the 
control of management. This finding largely supports population ecology 
theory which, in contrast to theories advocating organisation-environment fit, 
contends that organisations may be subject to extraneous forces which greatly 
restrict management's capacity to influence organisational outcomes. In 
considering the involvement of BCL in the Bougainville revolution, this chapter 
concluded that no direct responsibility for the war may be attached to the 
company or the manner in which it was managed, however the mine's presence 
and a number of management actions appeared to have had a catalytic effect 
which may have accelerated the islanders' bid for separation from PNG. 
ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In this section, the findings of Chapter 7 are applied to the research questions 
established for this thesis. The research questions relate to both the exploratory 
and explanatory purposes of the study. The central research question for this 
thesis is: 
In what ways might the experience of Bougainville Copper Limited be 
instructive to the study and practice of MNE management in 
environments which are significantly different to home country 
conditions? 
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This question will be addressed by investigating, in tum, the seven subordinate 
questions which arise from it. 
Research Question 1 
The literature review concluded that MNE performance depends, in large part, 
on a high degree of congruency between organisations' internal operations and 
the external environment. Because the central theme of environmental congru-
ency rests on the complementary nature of organisations' internal and external 
relationships, the management of MNEs must (i) devise and effect organ-
isational components and management practices which are appropriate to the 
needs and wants of the company's operating milieu, and (ii) exert influence on 
external entities so as to ensure that the wider environment is appropriate to the 
needs and wants of the company (Bowden, 1985; Bums & Stalker, 1961; 
Davis et al., 1987; Galbraith, 1974; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Milliman et al., 
1991; Thompson, 1967). Further, exploration of various organisation theories 
revealed that the nature of the relationship between organisations and their 
environments may be explained from several perspectives (Aldrich, 1979; 
Barney & Hesterley, 1996; Child, 1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Scott, 
1987; Selznick, 1957; Williamson, 1975; Zucker, 1988). An additional view, 
advanced by Boxall (1992), Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall (1988) and 
Wright and Snell (1998), proposes that environmental congruency must be 
accompanied by organisational flexibility. These arguments however, rely on 
the assumption that MNE management is capable of manipulating corporate 
environments (both internal and external) sufficiently to achieve contextual 
alignment and organisational flexibility. The two parts of the first research 
question examine this issue in the light of evidence from the BCL case. 
Research Question la 
To what extent were elements of the internal operating environment of 
Bougainville Copper Limited (i.e. the company's approach to 
convergence/divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, and 
organisational culture) able to be manipulated by BCL management in 
the pursuit of attaining congruity with elements of the company's 
external operating environment (i.e. legal, cultural, economic and 
political factors)? 
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Convergence, Divergence and Crossvergence 
The BCL executives engaged a crossvergent approach to management through 
which they sought to provide the company with a unique value system which 
integrated corporate needs with the requirements of the host country and the 
host society. In concept, this method of organisation appears to have been 
appropriate for the mine's environment and, in practice, it proved to be largely 
efficacious for many years. Nonetheless, BCL was not able to maintain its 
synergy with a number of fundamental environmental elements in the long 
term, suggesting that management did not sustain the emic-etic balance required 
for ongoing performance. 
At the macro-level of internal operations, the managers' most significant 
problem was their inability to modify the basic functioning of the company. 
Processually, the technology of large-scale mining is invariable and results in 
ecological degradation. Although management was cognisant of the cultural 
and environmental implications of this damage, in practical terms there was 
little that could be done apart from restricting the area affected by the release of 
tailings. The difficulties of controlling the mine's ecological impact is explained 
by former BCL executives: 
We did our best to minimise the damage by using only one river system, and the 
material that was deposited in the river was in an uninhabited area so it did not 
affect the local people very much (Personal communication, 1998). 
It is hard to say if we could have handled [the disposal of tailings] differently ... 
conventional tailings dams could not be built. There were no natural structures 
there to support a dam because it was so flat and swampy. It could have been done 
by building up walls around an area and filling it... but because of the tonnage we 
were treating, we would have had to either build that over an extremely large area 
(kilometres in distance), or build it up very high. The large area option would have 
damaged a huge amount of land. If we had a small area high wall dam, because of 
the high rainfall it would never have dried out properly and because of the frequent 
earth tremors, the whole thing may have collapsed. If that happened, there would be 
this enormous tonnage of material spreading uncontrolled over a vast area, probably 
killing people. It was too dangerous to have dams124••• [The tailings area] was 
certainly an unsightly mess [but] in terms of the area affected compared with the 
island, it was very small (Personal communication, 1998). 
As well as being constrained by technology, th~ mine's operation was bound to 
traditional management and organisational systems. Being a commercial 
enterprise, the executives were obliged to observe the universal tenets of 
functional administration which form the basis of organisational structure, 
leadership, decision making, profit generation, and so forth (Farmer & 
124 The hazards of tailings dams were highlighted on 30 January 2000, when heavy rain 
caused the wall of a tailings dam in Sasa, Romania to partially collapse. The escaping 
water, contaminated with cyanide (used in gold processing), polluted rivers in 
Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia. 
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Richman, 1965; Hickson et al., 1974). For example, the financial imperatives 
which management faced are evident in the recollections of former senior 
personnel: 
As our ability to mine lower grade ore economically increased, the size of the ore 
body increased automatically. So in doing that, some of the things we did was to 
build a sorting plant, we commissioned an in-pit conveyor system, and increased 
the capacity of some trucks... All these improvements allowed us to make the 
original pit bigger ... so we could mine economically those grades of material that 
had previously been classified as waste ... As long as the company stayed within the 
lower quartile of world mining costs, it would come out in front (Personal 
communication, 1998). 
[BCL] really could not afford to be spending any more money than it already was 
on the local people; it was unreasonable to expect the company and its shareholders 
to foot the bill for everything the people wanted when it was the government's job. 
There had to be a limit (Personal communication, 1998). 
Thus, in processual and administrative terms, BCL's management had no 
choice but to conform with the standardised practices required by the economic 
and technological realities of the global market economy in which the mine 
operated. This aspect of BCL's operations reflects convergence theory as 
espoused by Harbison and Myers (1959), Kerr et al. (1960), Haire et al. 
(1966), Likert (1967), Widing (1973) and Wortzel (1991). 
At the micro-level, BCL's executives had significantly more discretion in their 
approach to managing the company and, within the restrictions noted above, 
they devised policies and customs which strove to accommodate the needs and 
aspirations of the Bougainvillean and PNG cultures (refer Chapter 5). From the 
analysis in Chapter 7, it is clear that the spirit behind this emic perspective was 
Sir Frank Espie's insight and sensitivity; a quality which would permeate the 
company's culture throughout its operational years. Accordingly, BCL 
incorporated divergent management strategies to account for the cultural 
influences present in its environment (Child, 1981; Hofstede, 1987; Laurent, 
1986; McGaughey & De Cieri, 1999; Oberg, 1963). On this issue, a past 
executive noted that 
... the human relations aspect of the Bougainville operation was by far the most 
significant single side of management responsibilities, because of its social limit-
ations and because it was an offshore operation. By human relations, I don't just 
mean the workforce, I mean the entire population of the island. It was always a 
very significant part of the management goal. The digging of dirt and shovelling of 
concentrate was fairly simple ... but from a management point of view, you must 
concentrate on the community, the political, the workforce and those types of 
aspects (Personal communication, 1998). 
It was this blend of convergent and divergent practices which gave rise to BCL's 
crossvergent management system which was, at the time, unique among multi-
national mining companies. Although this approach corresponds with theories 
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advocated by Ralston et al. (1993) and Ralston et al. (1997) and remained 
generally effective for a long period, the failure of BCL indicates that the system 
was deficient in some respect. The case evidence suggests that, while the concept 
was correct, its application was flawed. It appears that management was unable 
to maintain the cultural integration which it had established. Given the abstract 
nature of culture however, it is difficult to identify those specific aspects of the 
operation which 'lost' congruence with its milieu. After a decade of reflection, 
the past managers of BCL were able to offer some suggestions as to where they 
may have erred in some areas but, by their own admission, their conclusions are 
speculative. As one respondent noted, " ... there was nothing that could have been 
done a lot differently other than not open the mine" (Personal communication, 
1988). 
It is significant that the former executives of BCL remain perplexed about how 
they might have changed their approach to managing the mine. Their uncertainty 
echoes the questions raised by Teagarden and Von Glinow (noted in Chapter 2) 
concerning the difficulties of specifying appropriate elements in the emic-etic 
debate. These questions are: 
... which dimensions of ... management can or should be generalized in cross-cultural 
settings? Which are or should be locally-specific? Which are or should be company 
specific, having been integrated into the fabric of the business strategy supported by 
a strong, idiosyncratic corporate culture? Which emic or culturally-bound challenges 
inhibit generalizability (Laurent 1983, 1986; Hofstede, 1983, 1984, 1991; Hofstede 
[and] Bond 1988; Schneider 1988)? Finally, are there etic or universal, culture-free 
resolutions to these challenges? (1997: 11). 
Because the choice of management approach rested with the mine's executives, 
it may be claimed that the convergence-divergence-crossvergence constituent of 
BCL's internal environment was under their control. This control is illusory 
however, because the complex environmental issues attendant to the cross-
vergent model precluded the clear identification of which particular elements 
needed to be addressed. It is argued therefore, that effective manipulation by 
management of this organisational dimension was not possible. 
Management Philosophy 
It was reported in Chapter 2 that the philosophies held by key executives are 
major determinants of the manner in which they manage companies and make 
decisions, and therefore these philosophies provide an essential link between 
organisations and the wider environment (Bigelow, 1994; Erez, 1986; Fatehi, 
1996; Hibbert, 1997; Negandhi & Prasad, 1971). Because management's 
convictions direct an organisation's actions in its dealings with objects and 
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events relevant to the company, any significant ideological shift by management 
will inevitably lead to changes in corporate behaviour. This cause and effect 
relationship suggests that, for BCL to have operated differently, a prior change 
in management philosophy would have been necessary. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, many of the decisions taken by the mine's managers 
were based on (i) their perspectives of what was, and was not, appropriate 
corporate behaviour in a foreign country, and (ii) their regard for the authority 
of the PNG government and the prevailing legal system. The case material 
indicates that, despite reservations about the long term effects of deferring to the 
government and legal conformity, the managers consistently acted with 
propriety in their stewardship of the company. It is considered that the 
executives' concern for their personal integrity and that of BCL is an indicator 
of the nature and depth of the values, beliefs and attitudes they held in regard to 
the execution of their duties. 
The managers' convictions about their behaviour abide to the present day. After 
a decade of deliberation on their actions and the subsequent events on 
Bougainville, they retain the view that compliance with the host country's 
wishes was appropriate in the circumstances. They reported variously during 
personal communication (1998): 
... we saw Port Moresby as our chief area of control and they were the people who 
made the laws for the country. And so whatever we did, we had to do with their 
approval. If we had their approval, then it was legally acceptable and correct and we 
were able to do it. 
Our negotiations were with the central government, which was right and proper . 
... the mine had no choice but to rely on the government ... it was bound by the 
rules and regulations of PNG. 
The profundity of the executives' views may be inferred from these comments; 
their decisions were driven by an inherent philosophy of what was 'right' and 
'wrong' for BCL as a guest of PNG. 
It may be construed that the former managers' enduring belief in their actions 
conflict with other elements of their interviews with the researcher, as they also 
pondered whether the interests of BCL and the Bougainvilleans may have been 
better served had they demanded change from the central government. These 
latter observations however, do not testify to the executives' true feelings on the 
matter; they represent a reflective search for possible alternatives to the manner 
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in which they managed the mine, and coercive behaviour was not contemplated 
during their tenure. 
A further insight into the managers' personal ideologies is gained from the 
quality of their relationship with the Bougainvillean people. A recurrent theme 
emerging from the data analysis is the executives' unanimous respect and 
empathy for the islanders. This point was articulated by BCL's founder: 
Although the management styles of the executives differed, I believe we all had a 
common concern for the welfare of the locals ... it is fair to say that throughout the 
years of the mine's operation we were always sensitive to the people whose land 
we were using (Personal communication, 1998). 
When interviewing the former managers, it was clear to the researcher that their 
positive disposition towards the Bougainvilleans was native to their psyche. 
Each respondent retains an enduring and genuine affection for the island's 
people125 , and it is contended that this innate regard for the Bougainvilleans was 
the primary motivation for many of BCL's innovative social and economic 
policies. 
From the above, it is deemed that the philosophies held by the BCL executives 
constituted an intangible, yet fundamental, element of the manner in which the 
Panguna mine operated. It is reasoned that these philosophies formed the reality 
of the executives' managerial role as they perceived it at that time and in the 
given circumstances, and they were innate and immutable. In this case study 
therefore, it is considered that the 'management philosophy' dimension of the 
internal environment was resistant to significant variation. 
Organisational Culture 
It has been established that BCL had a strong organisational culture which was 
based on Espie's original vision for the company and this was perpetuated, 
largely intact, by subsequent managers. The case material suggests that, while 
this culture originally suited the mine's operating environment, its appropriate-
ness may have declined in the 1980s as it failed to align with the changing 
conditions on Bougainville. Consideration now turns to whether it would have 
been possible to amend this culture to sustain BCL's environmental fit. 
125 Empirical evidence for this observation is not available, rather it rests on the 
interpretive process associated with ethnographic inquiry wherein the researcher seeks 
the meaning which people attach to their behaviour, language, social connections, and 
the like (refer Chapter 3 ). 
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Perhaps the most influential factor in BCL's culture was the set of philosophies 
which guided senior personnel in their administration of the company. As 
discussed above, the managers' principles and convictions were deeply 
ingrained and therefore it is doubtful whether they would have been prepared to 
make any fundamental changes in their stewardship of the mine. Because 
corporate culture is strongly influenced by management philosophies (Laurent, 
1986; Redding & Ng, cited in Fuller & Peterson, 1992), it appears unlikely that 
significant variations to BCL's culture would have been possible without 
replacing key executives.· 
A prerequisite to any change is a recognition of the need for that change. The 
management of BCL may have been able to adjust the company's culture to 
better fit the local environment had they been aware of the Bougainvilleans' 
growing discontent with the mine and the changes it had brought to the island. 
It was noted in Chapter 7 that management remained oblivious to many of these 
fundamental tensions. This point was emphasised by a past executive: 
I think the reasons things went so wrong was that we were not able to foresee the 
forces that were building up. There was no indication from the local people of the 
feelings that were going on under the surface ... it seems that the seriousness of the 
situation was not really evident until the power pylons were blown up (Personal 
communication, 1998). 
Management's lack of perspicacity in this matter has been attributed to their 
assumption that the assi~lation between BCL and the Bougainvilleans was 
greater than it actually was, and this perceived intimacy 'blinded' management 
to the realities of the situation (refer Chapter 7). Accordingly, the need for any 
change in BCL's culture was not recognised. 
Whilst it is argued that the above issues represent the primary impediments to 
changing BCL's culture, it cannot be assumed that, in the absence of these two 
factors, significant changes in the company's dealings with external parties 
would have been beneficial or advisable. The potential dangers of extreme 
shifts in the manner in which the mine was managed (attempting to force 
legislative change, curtailing local social or economic programs, excluding 
Niuginians from the workforce, etc.) have been considered elsewhere. Further, 
as the former executives report, local dissatisfaction with the company or the 
mine was far from universal: 
It seems to me that the revolution was the result of a discontented minority rather 
than the way most people thought (Personal communication, 1998). 
The mine was really seen as a benefactor, but not by all. Gone were the days when 
everyone clapped with glee because the mine was there, but most people valued its 
input to the island (Personal communication, 1998). 
261 
Everybody who made demands on us - Momis, Kabui, Serero [refer Appendix L] 
and a couple of others - they weren't the recognised body representing the 
landowners. They were some offshoot (Personal communication, 1998). 
I think most of the native population were pretty happy ... (Personal communic-
ation, 1998). 
Had management changed its approach to meet the demands of a minority, 
those Bougainvilleans who were content with the operation would have had 
genuine cause for complaint. Such a move would have risked the company's 
good relationship with the majority of the locals. 
As stated in Chapter 2, an organisation's culture determines the manner in 
which it operates. BCL operated according to a set of enduring principles 
which, although initially amenable to the mine's surroundings, appeared to lose 
external focus over time. Thus the company's culture is considered to have 
been somewhat rigid, and not conforming with proposals that organisations 
need flexibility in their transactions with the environment (Boxall, 1992; 
Lengnick-Hall & Lengnick-Hall, 1988; Wright & Snell, 1998). The above-
mentioned factors however, militated against the management of BCL 
establishing a flexible corporate culture. 
The extent to which management was able to manipulate the internal operating 
environment of BCL in the pursuit of attaining congruity with the company's 
external operating environment was examined in Research Question la. Of the 
three internal dimensions reviewed, this research suggests that corporate culture 
was the most open to orchestrated change, but this was severely circumscribed 
by entrenched ideologies and the inability of the executives to recognise the 
almost imperceptible shifts taking place in Bougainvillean society. The 
philosophies held by the executives are considered laudable from both human-
itarian and managerial perspectives, yet paradoxically these characteristics 
restricted opportunities for substantial organisational adjustment. Balancing 
emic and etic influences in BCL's management strategy proved impossible due 
to the subtle and elusive nature of many factors inherent in the Bougainvillean 
culture. It is argued therefore, that while some opportunity existed for 
management to modify BCL's internal operating environment, a number of 
endogenous and exogenous circumstances limited any radical changes which 
may have resulted in greater environmental congruity. 
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Research Question 1 b 
To what extent were elements of the external operating environment of 
Bougainville Copper Limited (i.e. legal, cultural, economic and 
political factors) able to be manipulated by BCL management in the 
pursuit of attaining congruity with elements of the company's internal 
operating environment (i.e. the company's approach to convergence/ 
divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, and organis-
ational culture)? 
The Legal Environment 
The Bougainvilleans' resentment of many aspects of PNG's legal system 
remained a primary concern for BCL's executives. This concern had two 
origins. At a personal level, the managers recognised the inequities of the laws, 
and empathised with the Bougainvilleans' perceptions of marginalisation and 
neglect. At a professional level, they understood the potential dangers which the 
islanders' discontent posed to the operation of the mine. This thesis contends 
that the management of the mine could have utilised BCL's extraordinary 
position in the PNG economy to force the national parliament into revising 
legislation concerning greater indigenous participation and improved financial 
and social returns to the island. 
Notwithstanding, there remained other areas of the law which disturbed the 
Bougainvilleans and which, in practical and ethical terms, were beyond the 
influence of BCL's managers. Chief among these was the national 
government's constitutional duty to serve the economic and social interests of 
PNG as a whole, and the state's right to control its natural resources for the 
benefit of all citizens. As interference by any foreign company in matters so 
fundamental to the functioning of government is unacceptable in democratic 
societies, any move by BCL in this regard could not have been tolerated by 
PNG if the integrity of the parliament was to be preserved126• It is contended 
therefore, that because any influence which BCL's management may have 
exerted on the legal environment was limited to specific issues, such efforts 
126 Concerning Australia's legal stance on Australian corporations attempting to influence 
foreign governments, the Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department and the 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade advised the writer that such 
activities are not illegal under any Australian legislation or international treaty to 
which Australia is a signatory, provided that bribery was not involved in any dealings 
with the foreign government (Personal communication, 19 October 1999). 
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would have been insufficient to address many of the fundamental causes of the 
Bougainvilleans' grievances. 
The Cultural Environment 
It was noted in Chapter 7 that four aspects of the mine's activities were 
particularly disruptive to the Bougainvilleans' cultural system: the migration of 
Niuginians to the island, the employment of Niuginians at the mine, alienation 
from the land and ecological damage, and the emergence of a market economy. 
As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, BCL's managers were aware of the 
deleterious effects these factors had on the company's relationship with the 
locals and they tried to ameliorate the situation by various means. However, as 
argued below, the executives could take little practical action to remedy the 
significant aspects of the cultural disintegration taking place on Bougainville. 
For reasons previously described, xenophobia is an inherent characteristic of 
Bougainvillean culture, and it is manifest at both the micro (inter-village) and 
macro (non-Bougainvillean) level. Despite their traditional dislike of outsiders, 
the majority of the locals came to accept their Caucasian visitors over time, and 
enjoyed good work and social relationships with the foreign population127 • 
There was no thawing in the Bougainvilleans' relationship with the Niuginians 
however; their hatred of the 'redskins' (especially males) was enduring and 
profound. Recognising that this antipathy was deeply ingrained by cultural 
programming, BCL's management had to accede to the abiding friction between 
them, but instituted policies prohibiting expressions of intolerance in the 
workplace. Generally, the company's anti-racism policies were effective, but 
they could not be enforced beyond the precincts of the mine. As tensions 
heightened with the increasing number of Niuginians on the island, manage-
ment repeatedly sought intervention by Port Moresby, but to no avail. While 
management frustration over the government's ostensible apathy is under-
127 The Bougainvilleans' good relationship with Caucasians (the majority being 
expatriate Australians employed by BCL) has no clear explanation as it is contrary to 
all reports of the islanders' individual and collective disposition. The issue is not 
investigated in any literature. Interpretation of the case history, together with 
discussions held with two past BCL non-executive employees, suggests that the locals' 
change of attitude may be attributed to the manner in which they were treated by the 
mine's staff. BCL employees were the first group of foreigners to display respect and 
empathy to the Bougainvilleans and their way of life. Unlike governments, planters 
and many missionaries, the mine personnel regarded the villagers as equals. 
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standable, parliament was powerless to curtail the constitutional right of PNG 
citizens to move to Bougainville128 • 
In order to stem migration from PNG and ease racial unrest, it was proposed in 
Chapter 7 that management could have refused Niuginians employment at the 
mine. Although this option offers a feasible solution, its implementation would 
have carried inherent political and economic implications, as well as contra-
vening BCL's long-standing commitment to provide training and employment 
opportunities for the whole country. At the national level, the government may 
have reacted negatively to an MNE instituting restrictive employment practices. 
Acting of its own volition or under pressure from the electorate, it is possible 
that the parliament would have intervened by demanding that BCL reverse its 
decision or by prescribing ethnically based employment. ratios. On Bougain-
ville, it is unlikely that resident Niuginians would have appreciated the denial of 
employment opportunities, and violent reaction against the company may have 
resulted. Management would have needed to devise a method of downsizing of 
the extant Niuginian workforce; reduction by attrition would have been slow 
and may have led to Bougainvillean employees victimising remaining 
Niuginians as they became an increasing minority at the site, and the summary 
dismissal of all Niuginian workers would have been unconscionable, caused 
labour shortages at the mine and potentially dangerous. Finally, the efficacy of 
the scheme could not be guaranteed. Even with no job openings at the mine, a 
large number of Niuginians may have elected to remain on the island as work 
prospects elsewhere in PNG were poor. From an economic perspective, 
selective employment practices would have been costly for BCL. PNG 
nationals were paid less than expatriates, and there was a lack of suitably 
qualified Bougainvilleans to fill all vacancies; the exclusion of Niuginians 
would have necessitated significant increases in the number of expatriate 
employees, all of whom would have required much higher remuneration. 
Although it is difficult to establish a concrete link between damage to the 
environment and cultural disturbance, it is equally difficult to refute Bougain-
villean claims that land and river degradation was detrimental to their spiritual 
well-being. The case study indicates that some people living in the mining 
128 The PNG Constitution could have been amended by referendum, thereby allowing the 
government to control migration to Bougainville. However it seems reasonable to 
assume that attempts to restrict the movement of citizens (either in general or to a 
particular province) would not have succeeded at the polls. 
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leases were traumatised by the changes to their natural realm. Pan gun a' s 
managers were aware of this situation but, due to the nature of the open-cut 
mining process, were unable to control the ecological damage caused by the 
operation. The only opportunity for improvement was conversion to ocean 
dumping which would have diverted the tailings from the river system. While it 
appears that a pipeline could have been commenced several years earlier, it is 
doubtful that t_~is would have alleviated the cultural stress experienced by the 
communities living in the immediate area129 • Even with the pipeline in 
operation, the extant damage would remain starkly evident for generations as 
rehabilitation of the waterways and surrounding lands would be extremely 
slow. 
The Economic Environment 
The connection between cultural changes and economic development on 
Bougainville is inextricable. Many of the villagers' problems identified in this 
thesis are symptomatic of a wider predicament: the introduction of a market 
economy to an undeveloped society. Commercialism had an extreme impact on 
Bougainvillean culture. The case evidence suggests that capitalism adulterated 
the finer aspects of the island culture and magnified its baser characteristics130 • 
Although the wisdom of BCL encouraging economic development on 
Bougainville is questioned in Chapter 7, in practical terms there was little the 
mine executives could have done to contain significantly the monetisation of the 
population or reduce its impact on the indigenous culture. Economic 'progress' 
is an inevitable outcome of industrialisation. 
The Political Environment 
BCL operated in two political arenas, PNG and Bougainville, both of which 
are culturally fragmented and virtually impossible to govern as a united entity. 
Throughout the life of the Panguna mine, this situation was an enduring 
problem for the company's management. The overt and covert divisions 
between and among the host country and host society made accurate 
assessments of the political climate almost impossible, as most managerial 
129 The precise number of Bougainvilleans directly affected by damage to the river system 
is not recorded. A past BCL executive reports that only a few small villages were 
located in the area concerned. 
130 Perhaps the most poignant social consequences of the market economy were the 
Bougainvilleans' abandonment of shared values and equitable wealth distribution 
within their communities, and the escalation of inter-tribal violence which 
accompanied increased mobility. 
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actions had the potential to cause conflict between (i) rival Bougainvillean 
factions, (ii) the Bougainvilleans and PNG, (iii) the Bougainvilleans and the 
company, and/or (iv) PNG and the company. Consequently, many 
management decisions were made with incomplete information and/or were 
strongly influenced by the need to minimise possible negative political 
ramifications. 
As the political milieu severely circumscribed strategic choices, policies and 
practices were devised as individual issues arose and/or conditions changed. 
This reactive approach enabled BCL to perform strongly over many years, thus 
supporting Weick and Westerley's (1996:444) claim that adhocracies are 
"particularly good at adapting to changing environments and at innovating in 
response to environmental demands". Had the PNG government been equally 
as flexible and responded to the changing situation on Bougainville, this fluid 
management system may have been sustainable because both parties would 
have been focussed on accommodating their mutual needs, as well as those of 
the islanders. As it was, BCL's tractability was confronted by parliament's 
intransigence. This situation was untenable in the long-run because "zero-sum 
games in which the company wins but the government loses, or vice-versa, are 
usually not sustainable ... " (Austin, 1990: 168). Accordingly, this thesis has 
questioned management's judgment in maintaining political neutrality and 
suggested that the executives should have pressured Port Moresby for policy 
changes. 
The consequences of attempting to alter government policies however, may 
have had detrimental consequences. OECD and UN guidelines deem MNE 
interference in host country politics to be inappropriate (Getz, 1990), and 
therefore BCL would have risked censure from those bodies and, in all 
probability, from Australia and the international community. Nationally, 
acquiescing to BCL's demands held dangers for the PNG government because 
it may have encountered a backlash from the other provinces, most of which 
considered that Bougainville was already receiving preferential treatment. Thus, 
it is questionable as to whether the parliament would have granted the 
concessions sought, even when faced with strong coercion from BCL. Further, 
a change in the stance of the national government may not have had a 
significant effect on the situation in Bougainville. The conflict between and 
among the local communities, different generations and political factions went 
beyond their grievances with PNG, and it is probable that the traditional 
tensions and jealousies would not have abated. 
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The case material indicates that BCL management had three alternatives in its 
dealings with Port Moresby; the executives could (i) comply with governmental 
requirements, (ii) adjust corporate procedures and policies so as to avoid certain 
aspects of governmental requirements, or (iii) force a shift in government 
policy. Generally, the managers chose the first option, but resorted to the 
second when circumstances necessitated direct negotiations with the 
Bougainvilleans. Although this thesis hypothesises that BCL's tenure on the 
island may have been prolonged by management prevailing on the government 
to amend its policies, it is recognised that the outcomes of such action would 
have been uncertain in the extreme. The political climate in which the mine 
operated was treacherous and unpredictable; for BCL's management, the 
outcomes of intervention were just as ambiguous as maintaining the status quo. 
The extent to which management was able to manipulate the external operating 
environment of BCL in the pursuit of attaining congruity with the company's 
internal operating environment was examined in Research Question 1 b. In each 
of the four external dimensions examined, crucial differences between and 
among the needs and wants of the company, the host country and the host 
society were identified. These differences were multi-faceted and largely 
irreconcilable. In some instances, it is possible that managerial intervention 
may have created more amenable circumstances for the company, however the 
outcomes of such actions are unclear. Any attempts on the behalf of BCL's 
management to control its environment carried with them the potential to 
worsen, rather than improve, the extant situation. It is concluded therefore, that 
the external operating environment of BCL was fundamentally impervious to 
significant modification by the company's management. 
The two parts of the first research question sought to determine the degree to 
which the operating environments of BCL were able to be manipulated by the 
company's management. Analysis of the case evidence has indicated that, 
although BCL's internal and external operating contexts were amenable to a 
certain amount of manipulation by senior personnel, the executives' ultimate 
influence over significant environmental elements was extremely limited. 
Research Question 2 
The two parts of this research question examine the impact which internal 
factors (convergence/divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy and 
organisational culture) had on BCL's external environment. 
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Research Question 2a 
~ 
Which of the internal factors - the company's approach to 
convergenceldivergence!crossvergence, management philosophy, and 
organisational culture - had an impact on the legal, cultural, economic 
and political environment of Bougainville Copper Limited? 
Convergence, Divergence and Crossvergence 
The manner in which the Panguna mine was managed had a significant effect 
on the company's relationship with all extraneous parties. By electing to follow 
a crossvergent approach, senior personnel sought to synthesise BCL's 
operations with each of the variables present within its surroundings. As noted 
in the analysis of the first research question, the essential constituents of 
management's integrative approach may be categorised as (i) the processual and 
organisational practices by which the company functioned, and (ii) the social 
and political policies through which the company interacted with outside 
entities. Each of these factors had an effect on the external environment. 
The mining process employed by BCL affected the external environment in 
both physical and social terms. The extraction and treatment of minerals is 
inherently harmful to immediate ecosystems, especially when natural 
waterways are used for the carriage of tailings. The ecological damage on 
Bougainville was exacerbated by the lode's relatively low copper content. In 
order to sustain economically viable yields, vast amounts of earth needed to be 
excavated and this, in tum, produced a large volume of waste and tailings. 
Because of the environmental damage, the pit and tailings area were the most 
contentious aspect of the process at Panguna, however the attendant infra-
structure and facilities were also a source of discontent. Many locals regarded 
the entire complex as intrusive, as it was incongruous with its natural setting 
and occupied virgin forests or lands previously used for. agricultural and 
domestic purposes. According to Father Momis, BCL had "parked [its] bull-
dozers in our living rooms" (refer Appendix P). Such use of the land disrupted 
Bougainvillean culture, especially from a spiritual perspective. 
BCL's organisational practices had few unique features. The commercial 
imperatives of profit generation in a competitive industry dictated the basic form 
and functioning of the company. In many respects however, the principles of 
Western capitalism were incompatible with Bougainvillean traditions. Land 
which was once valued for its intrinsic and spiritual properties came to be 
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valued in economic terms. By obeying PNG legislation and court rulings, 
management alienated many locals who could not comprehend foreign laws, 
much less accept them. The focus of Bougainvillean education and training 
changed from preparing men for their role in village life to preparing them for 
employment. The payment of wages to villagers led to their dependence on the 
mine for survival, and materialistic motivations replaced the communal ethos. 
Social status for indigenous employees shifted from being a reflection of their 
position in the community to being a reflection of their position in BCL's 
hierarchy. The measurement of time changed; life became regulated by the 
clock instead of the seasons. In short, the introduction of corporate 
organisation permeated all facets of the Bougainvilleans' life and transformed 
their social institutions. 
Like its organisational system, BCL's social and political policies were founded 
on Western logic. In accordance with accepted A.ustralian perceptions of 
corporate responsibility, propriety and equity, management conformed with the 
laws which applied to the company, compensated the locals for loss and 
damage, restricted the area subjected to environmen ml degradation, paid all 
imposts demanded by the national government, observed non-discriminatory 
employment practices, paid fair wages, sponsored a trade union to represent the 
workers, devised extensive employee development programs, encouraged local 
enterprises, provided infrastructure, built social and recreational facilities, and 
endowed philanthropic bodies. While these activities, and the results thereof, 
had varying impact on those external entities with whom BCL dealt, their 
greatest effect was on the Bougainvillean people. Many policies, despite their 
altruistic objectives, had detrimental outcomes for the islanders. 
Management Philosophy 
The individual and collective philosophies of BCL' s senior personnel were 
arguably the most influential of the three internal dimensions under review. The 
manner in which BCL was managed and the nature of its culture (discussed 
below) were a direct consequence of the executives' system of values, beliefs 
and attitudes. Therefore, any impact, positive or negative, which BCL had on 
its environment may be traced back to the ideologies behind the managers' 
behaviour. The mine's founder contemplated this issue during interview: "I 
was in charge right from the start, so people may blanie me for anything that 
went wrong, but they may also give me credit for all the things that went right" 
(Personal communication, 1998). Although management's philosophies 
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pervaded all aspects of the company's operation, two are considered as having 
had critical repercussions on BCL's external milieu: insistence on legal 
compliance and a conviction that the mine should benefit the entire country. 
Organisational Culture 
As noted previously, the most outstanding feature of BCL's culture was the 
fostering of harmonious workplace relationships. Until the political situation on 
Bougainville began to degenerate in the mid 1980s, rapport between the various 
races was such that the accord between them was virtually taken for granted by 
management. The company's inclusive climate could not dispel the inherent 
rancour between the Bougainvilleans and the Niuginians, however. Over time, 
the intensifying ethnic tensions became a significant problem for BCL. The 
embodiment of racial tolerance in BCL's organisational culture was in conflict 
with the cultures of both the host society and the host country, and 
management's persistence in employing Niuginians was detrimental to all 
parties. Australian concepts of equity, which denounce discrimination based on 
ethnic extraction, were applied without sufficient regard to the local situation. 
Melanesian culture accepts, indeed encourages, racism. 
BCL's benevolence to those Bougainvilleans directly affected by the mine had 
unanticipated repercussions. Management considered that the company had a 
responsibility to look after those whose lives it had disturbed. Although this 
paternalistic approach was largely appreciated by the locals, it presented the 
PNG government with a further opportunity to disregard its obligations to the 
province, generated an expectation in some communities that BCL would attend 
to all the needs of the people, and caused resentment among those villagers 
who did not receive benefits from the company. 
The internal factors which had an impact on the external environment of BCL 
were examined in Research Question 2a. The case evidence revealed that 
particular elements of the manner in which BCL was organised and managed, 
executive philosophies, and the company's culture had repercussions on the 
natural, social and economic setting of the mine. Of particular significance was 
the ecological and cultural impact of the mining process, the company's 
application of a number of inappropriate Western standards and remedies, and 
management's culture-bound perspectives of laws, nationhood, inter-ethnic 
relationships, and corporate responsibility. The degree to which these factors 
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impacted on the company's external environment are considered in Research 
Question 2b. 
Research Question 2b 
To what extent did the company's approach to convergence/ 
divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, and organis-
ational culture impact on the legal, cultural, economic and political 
environment of Bougainville Copper Limited? 
Convergence, Divergence and Crossvergence 
BCL's operating process had an extreme impact on the physical environment. 
In particular, the pit and tailings area were unsightly and caused substantial 
ecological damage, much of it permanent. Whilst the visual impact of the 
operation was clearly evident, it is difficult to gauge the actual effects which 
land and river degradation had on the island and the local people. As reported in 
Chapter 5, perspectives differ and no concrete conclusions are available. 
Assessing the accuracy of the various claims is further complicated by the 
absence of detailed information from those most affected by the damage: the 
Bougainvilleans. Notwithstanding, the weight of evidence suggests that 
Western observers were more concerned about the environmental and social 
impact of the damage than were many of the islanders. The MAP' s 'Bougain-
ville Initiative' (Appendix P) is instructive in this respect. While the letter 
censured BCL for "pour[ing] fifty million tons of our earth into the Jaba River 
every year", it did not ask that the practice stop; the focus of the proposal was 
"that BCL set aside each year three percent of its gross income ... to be given 
directly to the North Solomons Provincial Government". In a similar vein, the 
ultimatum of the 'new' PLA required the monitoring and control of environ-
mental damage, plus KIO billion compensation and the assignment of the 
government's BCL shares to local landowners (Okole, 1990). The demands of 
the MAP and the PLA demonstrate that, while the Bougainvilleans were 
anxious about the state of their environment, they were prepared to endure the 
damage on the condition that they receive greater financial returns from the 
mine. The observations of a past BCL executive support this proposition: "I 
really don't think that the environmental question was the root cause of the 
Bougainvilleans' grievances" (Personal communication, 1998). 
Whereas BCL's operating processes had an immediate and tangible impact on 
the environment, its organisational system resulted in slower and more subtle 
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changes. The Australian and PNG administrations supported the establishment 
of the Panguna mine because they regarded it as a central instrument in the 
economic and social development of PNG. In effect, BCL had a dual charter; 
by establishing an operation based on orthodox commercial practices, the 
company had an opportunity to simultaneously generate profits for itself and 
facilitate the development of its host. These goals were achieved, but at a high 
cost to the Bougainvillean way of life. The impact of introducing a business 
economy on Bougainville was reported by Father Momis: 
The vast sums of money you [i.e. BCL] make ... has created amounts of cash 
undreamt of before. And that cash has tragically seduced some of the best leaders of 
our people . .It has robbed us of some of our finest men, who have ceased serving 
their people, and instead line their own pockets with the money of BCL. .. .it is 
your shame as much as ours131 (Bougainville Initiative, Appendix P). 
Development, as defined by Australia and PNG, was thrust upon the Bougain-
villeans. There was an assumption by outsiders that the islanders wanted 
and/or needed 'modernisation', and this could be best achieved by introducing 
a Western-style economy with BCL as the primary medium. However, as 
described elsewhere, the emergence of capitalism eroded virtually every aspect 
of the communities' social fabric. The incompatibility of Bougainvillean and 
Western perspectives on development is epitomised in the recollections of a 
past mine executive: 
The best summary of the Bougainvillean outlook was given me by a local. He said 
"I've figured out you Westerners. You are born, you have a couple of years and go 
off to school for 15 years, then you go into the workforce all your life, then you 
spend the last years of your life sitting under a tree doing nothing. Yet, we are born 
and all our life we sit under a tree and do nothing, and you have the bloody hide to 
call yourselves civilised" (Personal communication, 1998). 
It is argued therefore, that BCL's organisation system, while commercially 
sound and socially well intentioned, was a key contributor to the breakdown of 
Bougainvillean culture. Notwithstanding, consideration must also be given to 
the ambivalent attitude of the MAP and the 'new' PLA on this issue. These 
bodies claimed to be concerned about the deleterious social effects which the 
commercial economy had on the locals and denounced BCL for its role in 
'Westernising' Bougainville, yet they sought to perpetuate the situation by 
demanding increased financial returns to the island. 
BCL' s social and economic policies were founded on the same reasoning as its 
organisational systems; the imperatives of profit and a desire to contribute to 
national development. The company realised both these goals. It returned a 
131 It is significant that Momis does not blame BCL solely for the ill effects of 
monetisation on the island. Whilst the general tone of the letter is accusatory, he 
apportions the responsibility for this between the company and the Bougainvilleans. 
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profit to the shareholders every year and contributed over Kl,138 million 
(US$973 million) to the PNG and NSP economies (BCL Annual Report, 
1989). While BCL's trading results do not appear to have created significant 
dissatisfaction in terms of excessive earnings or the repatriation of revenue, 
many of its externally focussed policies attracted sustained criticism. BCL's 
adherence to the law caused a serious rift between the company and the 
Bougainvilleans who were not interested in the national benefits which accrued 
from the legislation. They regarded PNG's legal system as a vehicle through 
which Port Moresby distributed the profits from their land among the despised 
Niuginians, and management's compliance was interpreted as tacit agreement 
with the law. Management's observance of the government's formulae for 
compensation similarly aggravated many islanders. Local initiatives also caused 
dissent. As noted in Chapter 5, the resettlement program was condemned by 
those it was designed to assist, some accused the Arawa Medical Clinic of 
being elitist, company sponsored education was considered in some quarters as 
Eurocentric, and the Business Advisory Service, Bougainville Development 
Corporation, Bougainville Copper Foundation and Road Mine Tailings Lease 
Trust Fund failed to reach their objectives. According to traditional measures of 
corporate behaviour, BCL's social and political policies were thoughtfully 
developed, ingenuous, and sympathetic to the company's societal setting, but 
they proved to be divisive within the host society. 
It was argued in Chapter 7 that BCL's success may be largely attributed to the 
adoption of a crossvergent management system which provided a high degree of 
environmental fit between the company and its hosts. It was also suggested that 
the efficacy of this system declined over time because management failed to 
adapt it to the changing needs of the local people. The above discussion of the 
extent to which BCL's management approach impacted on its external 
environment supports this reasoning. The company's processes, organisational 
systems and policies affected virtually every aspect of the villagers' lives, but 
the Bougainvilleans' attitude towards the impact of those elements was shifting 
by the mid 1980s. Management failed to appreciate the depth of the islanders' 
need for change, and in so doing allowed BCL to become increasingly divorced 
from its social environment. Acknowledging this, one past executive noted: 
Probably the biggest issue was a failure to recognise the inevitability of what 
happened. Had we seen this, we might have done things a bit better. We had 20 
years of reasonable stability, and did not see the importance of the few people that 
occasionally threw stones at us. We missed the fact that the younger people would 
not accept what the older generation had agreed to (Personal communication, 1998). 
274 
Management Philosophy 
BCL's crossvergent management approach is attributed to the executives' 
convictions that the company's integration with PNG and Bougainville should 
be maximised. However, it is evident from the case that, despite the managers' 
extensive efforts to synthesise BCL with its surroundings, the company 
remained essentially 'Western' in its perspectives. This is particularly apparent 
in the determination of management to assist with the development of the entire 
nation and to comply with the law. This behaviour suggests the coexistence of 
opposing opinions within the individual psyche of the executives; on one hand 
they wanted to achieve the highest level of local environmental congruence, and 
on the other hand they recognised the necessity of traditional corporate 
governance. Given that the demands of conventional management and 
organisational systems prevailed, it may be inferred that the executives 
harboured a culturally bound philosophy of their stewardship of BCL. Although 
all senior personnel were highly sensitive to the aspirations and needs of the 
Bougainvilleans, they were ultimately governed by their Western ideologies 
regarding market economics and managerial responsibility. The strength of 
Western influences on management behaviour emerges from much of the 
interpretation of the case data, but it was also clearly expressed by one former 
executive in interview: 
Another mistake we made was not taking the [Bougainville Initiative] more 
seriously. That should have rung all sorts of alarm bells and should have forced us to 
sit down with Father Momis to get to the bottom of the problem. One of the things 
I have learned about people in general and Papua New Guineans in particular, is that 
you cannot talk too much or listen too much. You need to talk and talk and talk and 
listen to what is really worrying them. We were more content to keep the operation 
running at maximum output rather than worrying about the feelings behind this 
letter. In retrospect, keeping the mine running meant absolutely nothing; if we had 
shut the operation down the day we got the letter and left it shut for 6 months while 
we talked and did nothing else, it would have been a hell of a lot better than what 
has happened over the past 10 years. So instead of writing this one page reply which 
said this is not possible (thus taking a Western-style approach), we should have 
gone to every length to get to the bottom of it. I must emphasise that our response 
was agreed to by everybody - it was not a Paul Quodling only response . 
... I don't think the situation was beyond recovery. I think all the rebels were doing 
at that stage was demonstrating their frustration and saying "Listen to us". But what 
the company did and the government did was to take a Western attitude that these 
people were breaking the law and they have to be taken in hand. When the first 
pylon was exploded, the company should have shut down and started talks. We did 
not do that. What we did was to show them how good we were from an engineering 
point of view by getting the pole up again and ·power on in about 16 hours. Then 
they blew the next one down. Looking back, that was a ridiculous thing to do. And 
we were all guilty of this; not just one executive. We were mainly interested in 
keeping things going and normal (Personal communication, 1998). 
The management philosophy at BCL therefore is judged to have been Western 
in its outlook and widely shared among the individual executives. Because 
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these philosophies drove the company's actions and policies, it is proposed that 
this internal dimension had a most significant impact on BCL's external 
environment. Irrespective of management's desires for the mine's integration 
with Bougainville and their application of crossvergent principles, BCL was a 
reflection of ideologies with which the islanders had little affiliation and which 
they often interpreted as anti-Bougainvillean. 
Organisational Culture 
BCL's organisational culture had a severe effect on all ethnic groups on 
Bougainville. By defining the company's culture in terms of Australian 
concepts of social equity and corporate obligation, management inadvertently 
provoked violence and exacerbated pre-existing tribal divisions. The intensity 
and complexity of ethnic separatism in PNG and Bougainville makes racial 
harmony a virtual impossibility; the island communities barely endure one 
another, the Niuginian clans are openly antagonistic and divided, the 
Bougainvilleans consider themselves superior to the people of PNG, the 
Niuginians despise the Bougainvilleans, and both groups only accept 
Caucasians with a detached regard. The congregation of the heterogeneous 
islanders and Caucasians at Panguna was an inevitable, and potentially volatile, 
consequence of the mine, but one which caused no significant difficulties due to 
the Bougainvilleans' emerging sense of common identity and BCL's sensitive 
management practices. The employment of Niuginians however, was 
unacceptable to the Bougainvilleans and racial tensions arose. Overt hostility 
was uncommon at the mine site, but elsewhere violence was rife. Local 
sentiments are described by a former BCL executive: ''The Bougainvilleans are 
generally placid, but when they are stirred up, they are pretty fierce, and they 
would attack these Niuginians; the highlanders were scared of them (Personal 
communication, 1998). As noted elsewhere, management came to appreciate the 
extent of this problem in time, but many issues, both endogenous and 
exogenous, militated against the exclusion of Niuginians, so the matter 
remained unresolved. For both the Bougainvilleans and immigrant Niuginians, 
the consequences of incorporating Western ideals of integration into BCL's 
culture was disorder and brutality. 
Although the managers of the mme appeared to deal with PNG and 
Bougainville in an even-handed manner, their basic sympathies lay with the 
islanders. The company's relationship with the host country was amicable, but 
it was formal and essentially founded on protocol. Conversely, BCL's core 
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culture was characterised by an uncommon affinity with the Bougainvillean 
people. As a result, management empathised with the islanders' grievances with 
the government and attempted to rectify the inequities where possible. As 
reported previously, these attempts were largely unsuccessful because PNG 
increasingly abdicated its responsibilities, the locals developed a welfare 
mentality, and jealousies emerged over the distribution of company payouts. 
Hence BCL's culture served to polarise the already divided Bougainvilleans and 
intensify their dislike of PNG. 
The degree to which BCL's internal constituents effected its external environ-
ment was considered in Research Question 2b. A number of the company's 
endogenous elements were found to have had a significant impact on the setting 
in which BCL functioned. The mine's operating processes caused substantial 
and irreversible physical damage, its organisation systems brought a new 
economic order which transformed local customs and traditions, and its social 
policies exposed in-grained resentment and hostilities. Management 
philosophies, although sensitive to the Bougainvilleans, were constrained by 
the demands of commercialism and legal conformity, both of which were 
foreign to the islanders' way of thinking. The corporate culture of BCL, while 
laudable by Western standards, proved to have socially divisive consequences. 
The focus of the two parts of the second research question concerned the nature 
and extent of the effects which BCL's internal environment had on its wider 
milieu. Evidence from the case suggests that the introduction of the mine to an 
undeveloped society had a substantial environmental impact, particularly in 
terms of social and economic changes. This phenomenon appears to have been 
exacerbated by the dominant nature of BCL's presence on the island. Thus it is 
considered that almost every aspect of the company's functioning had critical, 
and generally negative, environmental consequences. 
Research Question 3 
The two parts of the third research question examine the impact which 
exogenous factors had on the management of BCL's operations. The discussion 
focuses on the four external dimensions considered throughout this thesis, 
namely Bougainville's legal, cultural, economic and political milieu. 
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Research Question 3a 
Which of the external factors - legal, cultural, economic or political -
had an impact on Bougainville Copper Limited's approach to 
convergence/divergence/crossvergence, management philosophy, and 
organisational culture ? 
Legal Factors 
With the exception of matters concerning employee relations and the natural 
environment, the management of BCL was very much regulated by PNG's 
legal system. It is possible that BCL was more constrained than most 
enterprises in the country at the time because it was subject to legislation 
specifically designed for the Bougainville project - the Mining (Bougainville 
Copper Agreement) Ordinance 1967. Although many of the terms of this, and 
other statutory and judicial controls, restricted managerial prerogatives, these 
provisions did not significantly effect the execution of the company's business 
as they concerned issues common to most corporations - company tax, 
employee income tax, occupational health and safety laws, and so forth. There 
were however, a number of legal prescriptions which had a profound impact on 
BCL's operations. Chief among these were State ownership of sub-surface 
minerals, the exclusion of indigenous landowners in negotiations over access 
and compensation, and the collection of all mining imposts by the national 
government. Repeated attempts by BCL management to have the parliament 
address these issues were unsuccessful. Port Moresby's intransigence may 
have been the result of the enduring tensions in the PNG-Bougainvillean 
relationship, however the former BCL executives unanimously suspect that 
control of mine-generated revenue was the root cause of the government's 
refusal to negotiate on these issues (Personal communication, 1998): 
Port Moresby did not care what happened to the island so long as the government 
got the money. 
I don't think the PNG government was very interested in the Bougainvilleans. They 
might have had some concerns about the natives' grievances, but not to a very large 
measure; they were more concerned by the revenue. 
From the National Government's point of view, Bougainville was their big 'milch 
cow' and they did not want to 'rock the boat' ... it could have been a lot better if 
PNG had done more for the Bougainvillean people. 
Although PNG's laws were not intended to impinge on BCL's relationship with 
the Bougainvilleans, they were largely responsible for the friction between the 
two parties; friction which would eventually lead to the mine's closure. 
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Cultural Factors 
It was reported in Chapter 2 that cultural differences between home and host 
countries are an expected, yet complicating, factor in the management of MNEs 
which operate in LDCs. Conscious that congruity with the island's culture was 
fundamental to the Bougainvilleans' welfare and the mine's success, BCL's 
managers structured the mine's organisation and processes (within limits) to 
achieve this end. Similarly, they developed various programs designed to 
establish and maintain congenial relations between the expatriates and the 
natives. The focus on 'black and white' aspects of integrating the company and 
the locals was too narrow however; management was not aware of the diverse 
and complex cultural climate which permeated Bougainvillean society. Cultural 
division among the island communities is deep and extensive (a situation which 
was amplified by the emergence of the commercial economy and difficulties 
over compensation) except for their collective hatred of the Niuginians. 
In time, long held aspirations for political independence began fermenting, rifts 
between older and younger village members developed over leadership, 
differing attitudes on land usage evolved, and resentment of PNG's laws 
escalated. As these matters were changing the dynamics of Bougainvillean 
society, BCL's management was confronted by three problems. First, the 
existence and intensity of each issue had to be identified. Second, the executives 
needed to comprehend the interrelationships of the individual elements. Third, 
the impact of these fluid cultural arrangements on the mine had to be ascertained 
and appropriate action taken. Given the obscurity, multi-dimensionality and 
intricacy of Bougainville's aggregate cultural environment, aligning it with 
BCL's internal configuration was a complex and ongoing task. 
Economic Factors 
PNG's dependence on the Panguna mine to fund most of the country's plans for 
economic development placed the management of BCL in an invidious position. 
The central government regarded mining revenue as a national benefit. The 
islanders believed they should be the major benefactors. The company's 
executives appreciated both views, but firmly believed that Port Moresby's 
expenditure on Bougainville was grossly insufficient: 
The administration was trying to help the whole country with the proceeds of the 
mine, but the Bougainvilleans could not get away from the fact that they were being 
neglected and PNG was being developed with their money. 
The company tried to point [this] out to the national government. .. I drafted a letter 
to the national government stating the issues we wanted to address; principal among 
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them was the aspirations of the Bougainvilleans. I devised an action plan for greater 
local benefits, but it fell on deaf ears because Father Momis when he got back into 
parliament did not appear to be interested in his electorate (Former BCL executive, 
Personal communication, 1998). 
As noted earlier, the past managers consider that PNG's desire to retain the 
bulk of mining revenue was the crux of the legal tensions between the 
Bougainvilleans and the government. This issue remained unresolved and 
caused divisions between the Bougainvilleans and the company. A similar 
problem emerged from the government's intractable stance on the calculation of 
compensation monies. By refusing to negotiate with the landowners concerned 
and insisting that BCL apply government formulae to determine the quantum 
and distribution of funds, parliament was instrumental in further eroding the 
communities' confidence in Panguna's management. 
Beyond the difficulties caused by government policies and inaction, other 
economic matters strained the Bougainvillean-BCL relationship. Management 
initiatives to stimulate local business were not adequately developed by the 
islanders, BCL's philanthropic undertakings were criticised, the company was 
accused of encouraging the locals' reliance on the mine, and dissension over the 
emergence of economic 'classes' was growing in the local communities. The 
'Bougainville Initiative' reflects some of these concerns: 
You pay taxes to the national government, you pay wages, you pay royalties, you 
trumpet your public relations stunts such as the Bougainville Copper Foundation, 
which doles out small sums to local sports clubs and the like. You build 
infrastructure, you compensate landowners. Yet those very monies are also very 
much the problem . .. our economy has been reduced to colonial dependence 
(Appendix P). 
Although the above perspectives were not universally held among the Bougain-
villeans, the critics constituted a significant (and eventually influential) segment 
of the population. Management knew of these criticisms, but failed to appreciate 
the extent of dissatisfaction and the importance of those who voiced it. 
Political Factors 
A pivotal issue which emerges from the Bougainville case is the differing 
perception of PNG's nationhood held by BCL management and the country's 
citizens. Although the executives recognised the political divisions within the 
population, they regarded PNG as a single state and operated the company 
according to this precept: "We wanted to be a model citizen and we made sure 
that what we did was to the benefit of the country as a whole" (Former BCL 
executive, personal communication, 1998). The Papua New Guineans however, 
have no sense of nationhood, and therefore BCL's actions were not acceptable -
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particularly to the Bougainvilleans. Austin (1990) claims that this proclivity is 
common to the inhabitants of many LDCs because of the enduring strength of 
ancient tribal relationships. In defining nationhood, Connor (1971:337) notes: 
The essence of the nation is psychological, a matter of attitude rather than of fact... 
We can describe the nation as a self-differentiating ethnic group. A prerequisite of 
nationhood is a popularly held ... belief that one's own group is unique in a most 
vital sense. In the absence of such a popularly held conviction, there is only an 
ethnic group. A distinct group may be apparent to [outsiders], but without a realiz-
ation of this fact on the part of a sizeable percentage of its members, a nation does 
not exist. 
BCL's managers did not realise the distinction to which Connor refers. Using 
their own abstractions of nationhood132 , they conceptualised PNG as an 
essentially cohesive society with commonly shared aspirations for develop-
ment. Based on this understanding, management attempted to arrange BCL's 
internal elements to correspond with those aspirations. Because the nation of 
PNG was (and remains) an illusion, the task of achieving organisational 
alignment with the national environment was an impossibility. 
Despite annexation by Germany, Britain, Australia, Japan and PNG, the 
Bougainvilleans have maintained their resolve for isolation. All foreigners, 
irrespective of their intentions or treatment of the locals, are fundamentally not 
welcome (Lafitte, 1993; Oliver, 1991; Polomka, 1990a). Although BCL forged 
an amicable relationship with the people over time, the company and its people 
were unable to achieve the deep assimilation they desired. To many locals, BCL 
was yet another intruder. Just as foreign countries had imposed their cultural 
and political systems on the islanders, the mine brought alien approaches to 
work methods, resource allocation, social practices, and the like. Aware of 
these issues, BCL's management attempted to arrange the mine's organisation 
and processes so as to align with the host environment as much as possible. 
These alterations to the company's internal arrangements resulted in certain 
inefficiencies, as resources were diverted from the 'business' of extracting ore. 
The islanders' inherent sense of insularity was intensified by PNG's political 
manipulation and neglect of Bougainville. Whereas the Bougainvilleans treat all 
strangers with an element of disdain, they loathe the Niuginians. The people 
were deeply offended by Port Moresby having official authority over the mine, 
132 Whilst it is assumed that the executives' cultural conditioning was responsible for their 
perceptions of what does, and does not, constitute nationhood, the admin-istrations of 
Australia and PNG were accountable for the perpetuation of these notions. Both 
governments promoted PNG as an emerging Pacific nation and encouraged BCL to 
participate in its development, yet both failed to apprise management of the realities 
of PNG's political climate. 
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and BCL's submission to that authority was interpreted as tacit agreement with 
PNG and its policies on Bougainville. This situation accelerated the push for 
secession, and fermented a rift between the company and the indigenes which 
management was not able to correct. 
Notwithstanding the Bougainvilleans' common desire for political separatism 
and their collective hatred of PNG, the islanders are deeply fragmented among 
themselves. Each of the hundreds of villages has peculiar social arrangements 
which preclude a common sense of identity. For BCL's management, this 
caused difficulties in coming to a mutually acceptable agreement on virtually 
every issue. The problem was exacerbated by the fluidity of leadership within 
each community, and the changing attitudes of the younger generation. 
The external factors which had an impact on the internal environment of BCL 
were examined in Research Question 3a. From the case analysis, it was 
concluded that each contextual element in which the operation was immersed 
had a substantial effect on the form and functioning of the company. Aspects of 
the legal system caused tension between BCL and the Bougainvilleans, despite 
management's ongoing efforts to rectify the situation; cultural divisions and the 
Bougainvillean desire for independence impeded the aspirations of management 
for BCL's integration with the island communities; dissension over the 
calculation and distribution of compensation and government revenues 
exacerbated extant rifts between the local people, the company and PNG; and 
the fragmented nature of Melanesian politics divided the sympathies and 
responsibilities of the management of the mine. The degree to which these 
factors impacted on the company's internal environment are considered in 
Research Question 3b. 
Research Question 3b 
To what extent did legal, cultural, economic and political factors impact on 
Bougainville Copper Limited's approach to convergence/divergence/ 
crossvergence, management philosophy, and organisational culture ? 
Legal Factors 
The contentious legal issues noted above were not acceptable to either the BCL 
executives or the Bougainvilleans. Management was caught between sympathy 
for the host society and its obligations to the host country. Reconciling PNG's 
demands and the islanders' needs was a substantial drain on BCL's financial 
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and human resources. To offset Port Moresby's minimal support of the island 
and the inequities arising from the calculation of compensation, BCL provided 
local communities with facilities and services normally furnished by govern-
ment. Initially BCL was prepared to meet this cost, but it became prohibitive as 
PNG increasingly evaded its responsibilities and the villagers' expectations 
escalated. Further expense was incurred in the hiring of security staff to control 
the violence resulting from the growing numbers of Niuginians on the island. 
Although difficult to quantify, the legal situation placed other demands on 
BCL's management. Maintaining faith with the communities became difficult, 
relations with the government became strained by repeated submissions for 
legislative changes, court actions were required to settle disputes, and perpetual 
rounds of negotiations with the landowners were necessary. 
Parliament's indifference to enacting legislation which would solve major 
tensions on the island was indicative of PNG's general apathy towards both the 
Bougainvilleans and the company. Facing a rapidly deteriorating situation in 
1988, executives from BCL's Australian headquarters sought intervention by 
the PNG government. As revealed by one of these executives in interview, the 
company's requests were virtually ignored: 
When it reached the stage of blasting the first power pylon, we flew from Melbourne 
to hold a meeting with the [PNG] Prime Minister because we thought it was so 
serious. We needed to express our concern and to insist that a delegation from the 
Parliament goes to Bougainville and talks to them. We told [Prime Minister] Namaliu 
that this was serious and we've got to get dialogue going; he agreed this was a good 
idea. But it was just before Christmas, and he obviously thought it was not a good 
idea to hurry into action before Christmas, so he did nothing. A month later things 
got infinitely worse (Personal communication, 1998). 
The mine's legal milieu impacted on BCL's relationship with the Bougain-
villeans to such an extent that it made the effective management of indigenous 
affairs almost impossible. The managers were bound by laws which were 
personally and professionally unacceptable, the Bougainvilleans resented both 
the source and prescriptions of the laws and were angered by company's 
compliance with them, and management could not rely on the legal system 
when it was required. Bougainville's externally imposed legal environment 
obstructed the effectiveness and efficiency of the company's functioning, and is 
judged to have been a significant contributor to the mine's ultimate closure. 
Cultural Factors 
Whereas the legal climate could have been made more amenable to BCL and the 
Bougainvilleans had the government had the resolve to address the situation, the 
283 
mine's management had little choice but to work within the extant cultural 
framework. In the early years, this was largely achievable because the 
communities, although separated by tribal customs, had yet to experience the 
massive social and economic changes which were to come. As time progressed 
and the consequences of development became apparent, schisms emerged 
throughout Bougainvillean society. These dissensions transcended established 
antipathies; the divisions became widespread and multi-faceted as traditional 
village and island cultures came under increasing threat. Apart from their 
universal hatred of the Niuginians and PNG's involvement in their affairs, the 
Bougainvilleans were in conflict over land usage, differences in wealth, 
employment and education, tribal leadership, respect for the law (national and 
provincial), ecological damage, inter-ethnic marriages, and the benefits (or 
otherwise) of the mine. Uncertainty and fear had replaced the predictability of 
traditional life. 
The multi-faceted, almost chaotic, nature of BCL's cultural surroundings 
effectively sabotaged management's objectives of sustaining a significant level 
of crossvergence. The BCL executives were faced with too many cultural 
variables and community factions to successfully blend the mine's operations 
with the environment. As local divisions intensified, the ability of management 
to communicate with the Bougainvilleans declined. Central to this problem was 
the proliferation of entities purporting to represent the local people. As a former 
executive noted in interview, this became a serious impediment to the operation 
of the Panguna mine: 
This is the problem we had. Everybody who made demands on us - Momis [PNG 
Minister for Provincial Affairs], Kabui [NSP Premier], Pepetua [the 'new' PLA] and 
a couple of others - they weren't the recognised body representing the landowners. 
They were some offshoot. And we were advised by even Kabui at that stage [the 
period immediately following the 'new' PLA's demand for KIO billion] that they 
were not the main players and we should ignore them. So we did, but this was the 
wrong thing to do (Personal communication, 1998). 
The cultural environment is deemed to have had an immense impact on the 
internal operations of BCL. Cultural factors had influenced the company's 
processes and organisation from the earliest days, and a high degree of 
integration had been achieved by management's sensitivity to the Bougain-
villean 'way'. However, with widening community divisions, increasing 
resentment of PNG and an erosion of societal traditions, it became impossible 
for BCL to structure itself in a way which would be acceptable to the local 
population. In effect, the company became alienated from its host society. 
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Economic Factors 
The economic environment was a critical impediment to BCL' s operations 
because of the scale of external dependence on the mine. At the national level, 
PNG relied on revenue from the mine to substantially fund the country's entire 
development program; at the local level, the Bougainvilleans looked to BCL to 
assist in their aspirations for economic advancement and to compensate for Port 
Moresby's neglect. Legally bound to PNG's demands and sympathetic to the 
locals' plight, management tried to satisfy both parties. As a result, BCL's 
earnings for its investors were significantly eroded133 • 
Estimating the actual effect which the economic environment had on BCL is 
impossible. From the mine's inception, it had been management's goal to 
improve the Bougainvilleans' circumstances, yet every initiative appears to have 
generated increased division among the locals. Instead of assisting the islanders, 
money became a prime factor in destroying their culture and further fragmenting 
their already disjointed societal arrangements. Apart from the financial burden 
this placed on BCL in its attempts to alleviate the problems, managing the mine 
became more difficult. The executives were cognisant that the mine's internal 
organisation needed to satisfy the wider environment but, as discussed under 
'Cultural Factors' above, this could not be realised amid growing local disunity. 
Even if management had been able to identify the expectations of each faction, 
the company's internal constituents could not have been arranged to satisfy such 
a diversity of demands. 
The fundamental economic problem encountered by BCL's management was a 
difference in ideologies. The company was founded on the principles of 
Western capitalism; its raison d'etre was the generation of profits. The 
Bougainvilleans practised a form of subsistence-based socialism. Given the 
antithetic nature of these economic systems, expectations of consensus were 
unrealistic. The company could not significantly change its fundamental 
organisation and survive; the Bougainvilleans, in aggregate, were not prepared 
to abandon their way of life. Thus, the incompatibility of each party's internal 
'rules' precluded BCL from a synergistic relationship with its immediate hosts. 
133 As noted in Chapter 7, Carruthers and Vernon (1990) report that CRA (BCL's major 
shareholder) received a 22 per cent return on its 53 per cent equity over the life of the 
mine. 
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Political Factors 
Because the political environment on Bougainville operated on various planes, it 
was a treacherous field for the BCL executives to negotiate. At the macro level, 
management was required to deal with two hosts: PNG and the 
Bougainvilleans. Each group was antithetic to the other, and each made 
differing demands on the company. At the micro level, the Bougainvillean clans 
were divided among themselves, as were the Niuginians who had migrated to 
the island. Focussing predominantly on the macro level issues, BCL's 
management adhered rigidly to PNG's mandates while simultaneously taking 
unprecedented measures in accommodating the Bougainvilleans in the 
organisation and processes of the mine. The two political arenas could not be 
taken in isolation however, as growing micro level hostilities were provoking 
extant national-provincial tensions and causing local discontent with the mine. 
Over time, this amalgam of political division and dissent inflamed latent desires 
for Bougainvillean independence. 
For BCL, the Bougainvilleans' mounting secessionist sentiments were to prove 
fatal. A former mine manager described the islanders' thinking: 
The Bougainvilleans would gladly cut each others' throats based on language 
differences, but the only thing that combines the Bougainvilleans is their hatred of 
the 'redskins'. To see the 'redskins' getting most of the money generated by the 
mine really gave them reason for hate. But there was nothing they could do about 
it; they could not attack them because of the ocean between them. But here is the 
[mine] which is supplying the 'redskins' with money and creating that injustice, 
therefore, if we attack that, we are doing our best to rectify that injustice. (Personal 
communication, 1998). 
Bougainville's political climate was arguably the most significant of BCL's 
contextual factors, as it was the primary motivator in the rebellion which closed 
the Panguna mine. Whilst official authority over the mine's operation rested 
with PNG, the Bougainvilleans retained ultimate power over its presence on the 
island. Despite the executives' efforts to manage the political environment, they 
were not able to do so, and BCL became enmeshed in the Bougainvilleans' 
century-long struggle for independence. 
The extent to which external factors impacted on BCL's internal environment 
were examined in Research Question 3b. Each of the four environmental 
dimensions reviewed were found to have constrained managerial efforts to 
achieve BCL' s goals of maximising profits, advancing PNG and developing 
Bougainville. The magnitude and diversity of the island's environmental forces 
were such that management could not have configured the company's human, 
physical, financial or organisational elements to suit all parties. 
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The two parts of the third research question investigated the character and 
severity of the impact which the mine's external environment had on the form 
and functioning of the company. It has been determined that critical aspects of 
Bougainville's unique legal, cultural, economic and political setting were 
extremely influential on the manner in which the Panguna mine operated. 
Research Question 4 
Was the closure of Bougainville Copper Limited's Panguna mine the 
result of a deficiency in environmental alignment? 
While the available evidence indicates that BCL was not able to achieve the 
enduring level of internal-external alignment required to maintain organisational 
performance, it cannot be inferred that this lack of environmental congruency 
was the primary reason for the closure of the Panguna mine. 
Three pivotal issues have emerged from the findings of the preceding research 
questions. Firstly, it was determined that management was severely restricted in 
its ability to control fundamental components of BCL's internal and external 
environments. Secondly, it was determined that a number of crucial internal 
factors had a substantial and largely detrimental impact on BCL's social, 
economic and physical surroundings. Thirdly, it was determined that the mine's 
external milieu significantly inhibited the internal operations of the company. It 
may be concluded therefore, that BCL's internal and external environments 
were essentially incompatible, with each having a deleterious effect on the 
other. Thus, according to the literature discussed in Chapter 2, the failure of the 
Panguna mine may be attributable to an extreme lack of environmental 
congruence over which management had little influence. 
This proposition does not account for the Bougainvilleans' determination to 
gain independence however. It is evident from the research that the islanders 
harbour a persistent desire for political and economic isolation, and a number of 
key authorities cited in this thesis have asserted that this resolve made the 
revolution inevitable. If this argument is accepted, the relationship between 
BCL's internal and external environment is irrelevant. The mine was simply a 
victim of a predestined war, and BCL would have been evicted from the island · 
irrespective of any actions taken by management. 
It is contended therefore, that the failure of the Panguna operation did not result 
from managerial inability to achieve congruency between BCL's internal and 
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external environments. Notwithstanding, it appears that the gradual deterioration 
in the relationship between the company and various extraneous factors 
influenced the timing of the civil war, and hence the timing of BCL's closure. 
This view is sustained by a former BCL executive who reported that 
... Bougainville will [always] remain separate from PNG and divided within itself. 
For thousands of years, they have been a separate and distinct race ... It is only in the 
last 50 years that they have been welded into this massive nation called PNG. To 
force Bougainvilleans to become married to PNG [would eventually cause] 
animosity. Sooner or later the Bougainvilleans were going to tell PNG that they did 
not want to be part of that country. I believe the mine sped that process up. 
(Personal communication, 1998). 
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that BCL's tenure on the island was 
limited from the outset. This study has shown that, while a number of 
managerial actions (and lack of actions) may have been ill-advised, they were of 
little consequence in the long term. More judicious managerial decisions in some 
areas may have prolonged the life of the mine, but not averted the war which 
would lead to its demise. On reflection, a past BCL manager noted that " ... there 
was nothing that could have been done a lot differently other than not open the 
mine. Once the decision was made to start the mine, the die was cast" (Personal 
communication, 1998). 
Thus, Research Question 4 is resolved in the negative. The closure of 
Bougainville Copper Limited's Panguna mine was not the result of a deficiency 
in environmental alignment. 
The Central Research Question 
From the above outcomes of the seven subordinate questions, the central 
research question may now be addressed. This question is: 
In what ways might the experience of Bougainville Copper Limited be 
instructive to the study and practice of MNE management in 
environments which are significantly different to home country 
conditions? 
Since the late 1950s, there has been substantial discussion in the literature 
concerning the relationship between organisations and their external 
environments, particularly in relation to MNEs. Various perspectives are 
offered, ranging from absolute convergence (Haire et al., 1966; Harbison & 
Myers, 1959; Kerr et al., 1960; Likert, 1973; Widing, 1973) to absolute 
divergence (Child, 1981; Hofstede, 1987; Laurent, 1986; Oberg, 1963). 
Contemporary thought however, holds that corporate perfonnance requires a 
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balance between universal organisational and management practices and the 
preservation of culturally defined values (Adler et al., 1986; Dowling et al., 
1999; Nath, 1988; Sparrow et al., 1994). Ralston et al. (1993) argue for cross-
vergence, an integrative approach by which organisations develop an individual 
value system which satisfies both the internal and external environments. 
In addition to the convergence-divergence-crossvergence debate, numerous 
theories have been presented which attempt to explain the manner in which 
organisations interact with their wider surroundings. These include institutional-
isation theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Selznick, 
1957; Zucker, 1988), population ecology theory (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977), resource dependence theory (Child, 1997; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) and the resource-based view of organisations (Barney, 1991). 
Evidence from the BCL case suggests that, with the exception of population 
ecology theory, each of the above is flawed because they are founded on the 
supposition that management is able to influence significantly the internal and 
external environments of organisations. Through the investigation of a matrix of 
endogenous factors (organisational and management approaches, management 
philosophy and organisational culture) and exogenous factors (legal, cultural, 
economic and political influences) pertinent to the performance of BCL, the 
present research revealed that management had an extremely limited ability to 
manipulate the company's environments and therefore had little control over the 
substantive outcomes of the Panguna mine. This finding is consistent with 
Pfeffer' s ( 1981) symbolic view of management. 
The experience of BCL therefore, supports the argument of Aldrich ( 1979) and 
Hannan and Freeman (1977) for population ecology theory. This theory . 
proposes that, in certain circumstances, organisations are restrained by 
environmental factors which are impervious to management regulation or 
adaptation. In line with population ecology theory, the outcomes of this study 
sustain the postulation of the researcher noted in Chapter 2 that, when home-
host business conditions are extremely divergent, managerial influence declines. 
This loss of influence, in turn, renders a deficiency in environmental 
congruency which exposes the MNE to domination by external forces. 
Whilst the findings of this research sustain the models presented in Figures 2.1 
and 2.2, they suggest that the schematic representation of significantly hetero-
geneous home-host business conditions depicted in Figure 2.3 requires 
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modification. Initially, environmental influences were relatively balanced 
because constituents of the external milieu were largely amenable to the 
operation of the mine, and similarly the internal environment was generally 
acceptable to extraneous elements. As a result, BCL achieved highly satisfactory 
performance levels. This scenario supports Figure 2.1. As time progressed, 
external pressures began to force management into changing aspects of BCL's 
operation. As management was not able to significantly influence these 
variables, the company's internal environment was amended to accommodate 
them - but with a resultant decrease in financial performance. This outcome 
substantiates Figure 2.2. In the final years, the extreme magnitude of external 
forces made all aspects of BCL's internal environment inconsequential to 
sustained corporate performance. This situation, in tum, rendered environmental 
assessment irrelevant because internal-external congruency was not possible; 
the organisation and management of the company was solely directed by 
extraneous factors. Hence, a revised portrayal of the impact of heterogeneous 
home-host conditions on environmental congruence is presented in Figure 8 .1. 
The revised model seeks to acknowledge that, in particular circumstances, 
factors external to an MNE may be such that they overwhelm completely the 
company's ability to achieve any degree of environmental congruency. At this 
point, management is no longer in control of organisational outcomes. 
The extreme diversity of BCL's external environment is typical of the business 
climate in many LDCs (Hoogvelt, 1991; Simpson, 1988). This research has 
identified divisions between PNG and Bougainville as the cardinal factor in the 
mine's closure. Because the Bougainvilleans consider themselves to be 
ethnically and culturally discrete from PNG, BCL had two distinct (and 
mutually hostile) hosts with which to contend. The company's management 
recognised this situation, but did not afford it sufficient prominence in the 
conduct of BCL's business. Relying on Western conventions of respect for 
formal authority and corporate citizenship, senior personnel regarded PNG, not 
Bougainville, as the principal host. This was a fundamental error. 
The case evidence reveals that BCL's executives were ahead of their time in 
identifying the need to balance the requirements of management and organ-
isation with prevailing variables in the external environment. Their pursuit for 
contextual congruity was misdirected, however. This thesis contends that rather 
than aligning the Panguna operation with the demands and expectations of 
PNG, management should have focused exclusively on satisfying the needs and 
aspirations of the Bougainvilleans. It appears that BCL' s executives applied 
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Figure 8.1 The Impact of Heterogeneous Home-Host Business 
Condiditions on Environmental Congruence (Revised) 
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appropriate theory to the wrong subject. It was the islanders who had sacrificed 
much of their land and cultural tradition for the Panguna mine, yet it was PN G, 
a country with which these people felt no affiliation, which reaped the bulk of 
the benefits. BCL's managers were aware of, and sympathetic to, this situation 
but they were unable to orchestrate substantive changes once the project had 
commenced. Prior to the establishment of the mine, BCL management should 
have determined the precise nature of the cultural milieu it was entering and 
insisted that the company's dealings were primarily with the Bougainvilleans. In 
the absence of domination by PNG, it is possible that BCL may have realised 
the environmental fit which the managers sought. Such an approach may have 
also averted the war, as Bougainville would have been economically and 
socially, if not politically, independent from PNG134 • 
The failure of BCL' s management to recognise the nature and depth of the 
fundamental divisions between PNG and Bougainville appears to be typical of 
Western perceptions of LDCs. Whereas the literature acknowledges the intrinsic 
heterogeneity of many LDCs (Arnold, 1988; Casson, 1994; Harris, 1986; 
Hoogvelt, 1991), few authorities appear to appreciate that the inhabitants of 
these countries generally do not embrace the notion of 'nationhood' as defined 
earlier in this chapter. LDCs are typically multiethnic states in which primary 
identity does not extend beyond the immediate ethnic group (Connor, 1971). 
Relating this to the emerging economies of the Pacific region, Manning and 
Stern (1994:80) note that 
[although] institutions are in embryonic form, a host of economic, political, 
military, and psychological trends suggest that the cherished aspiration - a common 
psychology of belonging, reflecting shared interests, responsibilities, values and 
mutual respect - may prove to be a chimera. 
By retaining Western concepts of nationhood when dealing with many emerging 
economies, the management of MNEs remain oblivious to possibly the most 
fundamental difference between developed countries and LDCs. As the 
Bougainville case has demonstrated, political and ethnic borders are not 
necessarily synonymous and without a clear understanding of the distinction 
between 'host country' and 'host society', the aspirations of MNEs for 
achieving congruency with their external environment is in jeopardy. Although 
contemporary research in the field of international business, organisation and 
134 The practical implications of this recommendation are speculative. In the 1960s 
Bougainville was subject to Australia's trusteeship of the region, and the island's 
incorporation into an independent PNG formed part of Canberra's long-term foreign 
policy. It is highly probable that CRA would have been prohibited from marginalising 
PNG's involvement in its operations on Bougainville. In this case, the company 
should not have proceeded with the venture. 
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management emphasises the importance of MNEs' relationship with the host 
country, the literature seems to largely overlook the significance of the host 
society in corporate functioning. This thesis argues that, while the characteristics 
of the host country constitute the most significant external factors for MNEs 
operating in industrialised economies, it is the host society which requires close 
attention by the managers of MNEs operating in the LDCs of Oceania. 
The central research question of this thesis concerned the manner in which the 
experience of BCL might be instructive to the study and practice of MNE 
management in environments which are significantly different to home country 
conditions. In this regard, two significant issues emerged from the analysis of 
the case material. First, the ability of managers from developed countries to 
manipulate corporate environments in an LDC setting appears to be more 
circumscribed than it is in the home country. Second, when conducting 
contextual analyses in LDCs, particularly prior to the establishment of a venture, 
MNE management needs to place greater emphasis on assessing the host 
society. Although both the national and immediate environments can be expected 
to influence organisational performance, ultimately it is the acceptance and 
support of the local population which determines the success of businesses. In 
summary, the experience of Bougainville Copper Limited has emphasised the 
need for MNE management to identify, account for, and react to the often 
subtle, yet vital, differences between the 'host country' and the 'host society' 
when dealing with business environments which are significantly different to 
home country conditions. 
These issues may be engaged to extend and integrate population ecology theory 
(Aldrich, 1979; Hannan & Freeman, 1977) and institutional theory (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987; Selznick, 1957; Zucker, 1988). Although PET is 
a macro-organisational paradigm focusing on populations of organisations, the 
BCL case indicates that its fundamental tenets may also be applicable to 
individual organisations. Because PET assumes aggregates of similar 
organisations are the significant external system in which an organisation is 
embedded, it neglects the impact which other exogenous variables may have. By 
retaining PET's emphasis on 'natural selection', but expanding its conception of 
an organisation's 'ecology system' to include all elements of the external 
environment, the theory emerges as a micro-organisational paradigm. Within 
this revised framework, the continued participation of an organisation in its 
ecological system is viewed as being contingent upon its positive selection by 
that system on the basis of organisational structure and processes being aligned 
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with characteristics of the environment. As the BCL case has demonstrated, the 
environment to which MNE management must adapt may not be restricted to a 
single contextual dimension, but potentially consists of the totality of all 
environmental factors. The extension of PET to include all exogenous variables 
provides for the incorporation of institutional theory within its parameters. As 
the institutions with which organisations must achieve isomorphism are an 
integral element of the external environment, this consolidation of theories is 
reflexive. If an organisation is not able to gain (and maintain) similarities with its 
institutional milieu, it will be excluded from the system. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIAN AND PNG 
GOVERNMENT POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
The findings of this research present various implications for government policy 
makers in both Australia and PNG. Furthermore, these implications may be 
applicable to policy development in other countries which encourage MNEs 
from developed nations to become involved in Oceania. 
The evidence which has emerged from this study indicates that the 'Bougainville 
Crisis' may be attributed to the confluence of a number of disparate and long-
standing issues, however much of the tragedy may be ascribed to BCL's home 
and host countries. By the early 1960s, Australia was 'preparing' PNG for 
eventual independence, and Canberra regarded the Bougainville mine as an 
integral part of the emerging country's economic and financial viability (Griffin, 
1990b; Oliver, 1991; Quodling, 1991). This conviction persisted for the life of 
the mine, and partially explains Australia's resistance to Bougainville's fight for 
independence (Dorney, 1990; Martin, 1974). Throughout BCL's tenure on the 
island, Australian foreign policy failed to appreciate the Bougainvilleans' 
objection to unity with PNG, their attitude towards the laws governing the mine 
(which were established under Australia's administration) and, in particular, 
their resentment over PNG's retention of the bulk of the revenue from the 
Panguna mine. Conversely, the PNG government appears to have understood 
the sentiments behind the islanders' discontent and chose to ignore the people 
and their grievances. As noted previously, the main concerns of the PNG 
government were the continuance of Panguna's contribution to national income 
and the precedent which Bougainvillean secession would set for the other ethnic 
groups which constitute the country's tenuous federation. 
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Implications for Australian Government Policy Makers 
The relationship between Australia and PNG is unique. Based on political, 
strategic, economic and humanitarian concerns, Canberra has an enduring and 
deep commitment to PNG's development. No other donor country allocates as 
large a proportion of its total aid to a single recipient. In 1988, the year in which 
the 'Bougainville Crisis' erupted, PNG received 29 per cent of Australia's 
overseas aid expenditure. Between independence in 1975 and 1988, Australia 
provided PNG with A$3.7 billion (US$5 billion) in aid. This sum represents 17 
per cent of the PNG government's financial resources over this time period. The 
focus of Australia's program is general economic assistance (budgetary 
support), civilian aid (mainly in the areas of assisting state enterprises and 
developing the country's health, works, education, police and justice systems) 
and defence cooperation (Australia's Development Cooperation Program with 
Papua New Guinea, 1989; Evans, 1990a). However, Australia's assistance is 
not unconditional: 
Shortly before independence [Australian PM] Whitlam wrote to [PNG Chief 
Minister] Somare that a "united PNG would have first call on Australian aid". The 
implication was clear - to qualify for aid PNG had to find from its own physical and 
psychological resources the capacity to maintain its own unity (Hastings, 1976:40). 
Australia's extensive financial and political involvement in the development of 
its only 'colony' appears to have been exercised in an atmosphere of ignorance 
and arrogance. As recorded earlier in this thesis, PNG does not conform to 
Western concepts of 'nationhood'; it is a mass of land inhabited by 700 diverse 
ethnic groups with little identification with each other and even less with the 
country's illusory 'statehood' (Lafitte, 1993; Oliver, 1991; Polomka, 1990a). 
Yet Canberra has persistently assumed that independence and the introduction of 
representative government have somehow galvanised the Papua New Guineans 
into an integrated people. According to Mulgan (cited in Lawson, 1993:63) such 
assumptions are typical of Western political perspectives whereby "democratic 
principles take the existing boundaries of a state as given, and then urge political 
equality among the inhabitants of the state". Based on this premise, Australia's 
dealings with PNG have been guided by orthodox international relations; that is, 
bilateral agreements are made between central governments on the presumption 
that, in a democratic system, these bodies represent· the population. This 
abstraction does not hold in PNG's fragmented political community, particularly 
on Bougainville. Rather than cementing PNG-Bougainvillean relationships, 
independence in 1975 increased extant divisions. Huntington (1996:39) 
attributes this reaction to the 'democracy paradox': "when non-Western societies 
adopt Western-style elections, democracy encourages and often brings to power 
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nativist ... political movements. Democracy tends to make a society more 
parochial, not more cosmopolitan". Disregarding prior Bougainvillean attempts 
to secede and seemingly oblivious to the islanders' abnost passionate hatred of 
the Niuginians, Australia accelerated PNG's independence which resulted in the 
unilateral inclusion of Bougainville in the new state_ Describing the political 
atmosphere of the day, Dorney (1990:48) reports: 
In the end, independence came with a rush. It was handed over before any mass 
struggle arose. Despite the political skirmishes on the Gazelle Peninsula and 
Bougainville, a majority of Papua New Guineans were not demanding their freedom 
[but the Australian ] Government was keen on a timetable. 
Central to Australia's plans for PNG autonomy was the provision of a means by 
which the emerging country could finance the machinery of government. Of 
this, Dorney (1990:48) notes: 
Writing in 1964, eleven years before independence, [Australian Minister for 
Territories] Paul Hasluck said that he was 'quite certain' in his own mind 'that a 
form of self-government will come to Papua and New Guinea before the country is 
economically viable ... Someone other than the people of Papua and New Guinea 
will have to underwrite self-government. 
As a consequence, Australian government policy makers encouraged CRA to 
establish the Panguna mine as the central plank of national development without 
any regard for the social and cultural realities of the country it was purporting to 
assist. 
The issue of the islanders' desire for development has received scant consider-
ation in the literature. It is significant however, that those who have expressed 
doubts about the need for 'progress' on Bougainville are Father Mornis (refer 
'Bougainville Initiative', Appendix P) and a former BCL manager (refer Chapter 
7). While it is paradoxical that these adversaries should be in accord over such a 
fundamental issue, it is a question which Australian policy makers appear to 
have overlooked for nearly thirty years. Canberra's vision for PNG's 
development - which, by default, includes Bougainville - seems to have been 
founded on an assumption that the indigenous people want or need a society 
fashioned after the European model. Canberra presumed that the Papua New 
Guineans must follow Australia's progression to a liberal, democratic, capitalist 
state. This stance not only reinforces Australia's inability to comprehend PNG's 
social arrangements, but also displays a degree of arrogance in ignoring the 
validity of other cultural forms. Gabriel (1972) and Simpson (1988) contend 
that such an approach is common when DCs become involved in the economic 
and political affairs of LDCs. A theme which has repeatedly emerged from this 
research is the Bougainvilleans' desire for isolation, a central element of which 
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is a rejection of Westernisation. Australia has yet to realise that the Bougain-
villeans are economically self-sufficient - according to their own definitions. 
Australia's foreign policy contributed to Bougainville's dilemma. In its drive to 
stimulate the PNG economy and its unequivocal support for Port Moresby, 
Canberra ignored the Bougainvilleans and their escalating grievances. Only 
when the revolt started did Australian policy makers consider the islanders, by 
which time their only focus was on ending the hostilities135 • This reactive 
approach was too little, too late; the relationship between the Bougainvilleans 
and their former trustee was seriously impaired and New Zealand became the 
central peace broker. With Bougainvillean autonomy imminent136, Australia has 
an opportunity to review its association with the island's population and, in 
time, instigate political, economic and trade relationships appropriate to the 
people with whom it is dealing. 
Two considerations for Australian foreign policy development may be inferred 
from this thesis. Concerning its general relationship with PNG, Canberra needs 
to understand the extreme heterogeneity of its nearest neighbour. In the Western 
tradition, Australia's arrangements with PNG are conducted through the national 
government in Port Moresby on an assumption that the parliament's authority is 
accepted by the populace. This assumption is flawed; the primary loyalties of the 
Papua New Guineans lie with their particular ethnic groups, few of which 
recognise the legitimacy of the central government. In dealing with PNG 
therefore, foreign states need to secure community acceptance as well as that of 
the national parliament. For Australia to have an effective role in PNG's 
development, Canberra must provide local people with an opportunity to 
participate in the making of any policies which have an impact on their 
community. Concerning its trade relationships with PNG, Canberra needs to be 
more involved in Australian companies operating (or seeking to operate) in 
PNG. Rather than encouraging companies to do business in PNG and then 
135 It appears that Australia's approach to regional affairs has not changed significantly 
over the past decade. In 1998 civil war erupted in the Solomon Islands; Bougainville's 
nearest neighbour. At that time, Solomons Prime Minister Bart Ulafa'alu sought help 
from Australia - but to no avail. Following a coup which saw Ulafa'alu deposed, 
Australia evacuated its citizens and barred Qantas from flying to the islands. Of 
Canberra's refusal to intervene, Ulafa'alu noted 'The problem has been that Australia 
and New Zealand only respond when there is a crisis; they don't take preventative 
measures" (Cited in Bohane, 2000). 
136 The legislative package designed to give Bougainville greater autonomy and a 
guarantee of a referendum on complete independence is expected to pass through the 
PNG parliament by the end of 2000. However, PNG Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta 
has stated that passage of the legislation is contingent upon the BRA guerrillas 
surrendering their arms. 
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leaving expatriate executives to determine how they might achieve corporate 
goals, the Australian Trade Commission (Austrade) should provide practical 
assistance in dealing with both Port Moresby and the relevant indigenous 
groups. Given the complexity of PNG's political, economic and social environ-
ment, it is not sufficient for Austrade to merely provide Australian MNEs with 
information; the Trade Commission needs to establish mechanisms through 
which Australian companies, the PNG government and local communities can 
consult and formulate strategies which are acceptable to all parties. 
Implications for Papua New Guinean Government Policy Makers 
PNG's independence was accompanied by the adoption of a Westminster 
parliamentary system which replaced direct administration with representative 
democracy. A principal aim of this move was to "head off secessionist demands 
and to satisfy the large number of diverse ethnic groups" (Australia's 
Development Cooperation Program with Papua New Guinea, 1989:5) and 
assist "the standing of Papua New Guinea as an independent country, well able 
to manage its own economic affairs" (Blewett, 1991:543). When the civil war 
broke out on Bougainville in 1988, these aspirations had not been achieved. 
The country's wealth was tied to natural resources which are vulnerable to 
fluctuating global markets, its infrastructure was inadequate, business was 
dominated by foreigners, the government was overly dependent on Australian 
aid, and 90 per cent of the population lived in traditional ethnic groups reliant on 
a subsistence economy (Dorney, 1990; Oliver, 1991). The situation had not 
changed substantially a decade later137 ; after nearly 25 years of sovereign rule, 
PNG has not been able to realise significant levels of development. 
Whilst the slow pace of development in PNG may be attributed to various 
diverse factors, the BCL case highlights a number of fundamental issues which 
the central government must address if the country is to attract and maintain 
MNE investment. This research has revealed that the root cause of the Bougain-
ville revolt was the discordant relationship between Port Moresby and the 
islanders. Although both parties must accept a measure of responsibility for the 
tragedy, ultimate liability rests with the PNG government's inappropriate and 
insensitive administration of the province. Official policy was focussed entirely 
on Bougainville's contribution to the development of the country; it ignored the 
137 A 1998 analysis of PNG's economic and social conditions revealed that the above-
mentioned difficulties continue to inhibit the country's development (ABC TV, 23 
January, 1998). 
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Bougainvilleans' history, culture or aspirations, and expressly excluded any 
mechanisms for consultation with the locals. Under such conditions, popular 
dissatisfaction and political agitation were inevitable. As noted throughout this 
thesis, Panguna's management was cognisant of, and sympathetic to, the 
islanders' concerns, but was powerless to act. In summarising this situation, 
Oliver (1991:198-199) reports: 
BCL officials were well aware of the inequities, as Quodling had acknowledged in 
his 11 May reply to Momis [refer Appendix P]. Unfortunately for both the province 
and the company, the latter was legally bound by terms of its current Bougainville 
Copper Agreement to address such issues only with the national government during 
the periodic reviews of the agreement... The reviews, however, had been indefinitely 
postponed, largely because of the national government's refusal to include 
representatives of the province in them. The grievances which gave rise to the 
Bougainville Initiative were real and substantial... 
The Bougainville revolution has been the most serious and destructive crisis to 
have occurred in PNG since WWII. Apart from the human and financial costs, 
the war has weakened PNG's tenuous federation of provinces and gravely 
affected the country's relations with neighbouring countries, trading partners, 
present and potential investors, aid donors and intergovernmental organisations 
such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary 
Fund (Moriarty, 1998). The restoration of peace has taken a decade, and 
reconstruction has not commenced. From the evidence presented in this thesis, 
it is apparent that policy development and execution in PNG, especially 
regarding internal affairs, needs to be carefully analysed and revised. The 
following points appear to be particularly pertinent: 
• The government should aim to improve its relationship with the provinces by 
committing itself to the principles of the constitution which it purports to 
serve. As noted in Chapter 4, the constitution holds freedom of speech and 
equality as integral factors in PNG's social, political and economic life. 
• Agreements with companies, whether domestic or foreign, which impact on 
. the life of PNG citizens should be developed by way of tripartite consultation 
between the government, the company, and those affected by the operation. 
Once satisfactory arrangements have been reached, ongoing communication 
between the three must be sustained in order to address changing conditions. 
• A venues for guaranteeing the rights of landowners subject to development 
projects need to be established. These initiatives should recognise the 
contribution which the landowners are making to national and local develop-
ment, provide them with shares (stock) in the venture, secure their input to 
the management of their land, and mandate compensation formulae based on 
relevant and equitable standards. 
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• Within specified limits, communities which host developmental projects 
should (i) have first call on government revenue generated from the area, (ii) 
have priority in indigenous employment opportunities provided by the 
venture, and (iii) have preference in securing local businesses which emerge 
from the presence of the central project. 
• PNG needs to investigate ways in which it may reduce its reliance on the 
export of resources. The closure of BCL and the impending withdrawal of 
BHP from Ok Tedi (refer Chapter 6) have threatened the country's economic 
viability. 
• Environment protection legislation needs to be enacted to guard against the 
destruction of the country's natural and cultural heritage. 
• The parliament must resolve civil tensions through negotiation and political 
process rather than by confrontation and armed intervention. 
In broad terms, the PNG parliament must re-assess its attitude towards 
governing its people. Although the country has a representative democracy in 
place, those in power appear to have retained an attitude more akin to the direct 
rule of former colonial administrations. The Westminster system affords all 
citizens a voice beyond those of their elected representatives, and Port Moresby 
must grant all PNG's people equal rights and opportunities if the country is to 
realise its political, social and economic goals. The policies applied to Bougain-
ville were oppressive and inequitable, and led the country into a disaster from 
which it has yet to recover. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 
IN MULTINA TI ON AL ENTERPRISES 
Whilst the ability of researchers to apply the outcomes of a single case study to 
wider populations is limited (refer Chapter 3), a number of the findings of this 
inquiry appear relevant to the management of MNEs operating, or seeking to 
operate, in LDCs. A degree of generalisation is. possible because, as noted in 
Chapter 7, BCL exhibited various characteristics common to Western-based 
MNEs, and PNG is representative of many LDCs across a broad range of 
indicators. The implications which arise from this study focus on the influence . 
which environmental variables have on managerial practice. 
The primary theme of this thesis is the impact which the external and internal 
environments of MNEs have on corporate performance. The exogenous factors 
examined in this study include legal, cultural, economic and political variables. 
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It was determined that these variables, within the context of ethnically 
heterogeneous states, operate at both the host country level and the host society 
level with each party holding widely divergent perspectives on each variable. In 
effect, this situation presents the management of MNEs with two distinct, and 
often opposing, external environments with which to deal. As a result, the task 
of aligning organisational variables with the company's surroundings becomes 
problematical in the extreme. In the case of BCL, management was unable to 
adjust its operations sufficiently to meet the antithetic demands of its dual hosts. 
Concerning the influence of endogenous factors on the wider environment, this 
study found that many key aspects of BCL's approach to organisation, 
management philosophy and organisational culture had an adverse effect on the 
company's operating milieu. 
On the basis of evidence from the BCL case, it is proposed that MNE 
management needs to exercise utmost caution when considering the establish-
ment or continuation of operations in LDCs. The population of many emerging 
economies remain fragmented in the extreme, with communities characterised by 
cultural, religious, ideological, economic, institutional, political or language 
based divisions. Such parochialism militates against a universal sense of identity 
and a recognition of the benefits which might accrue from an integrated nation. 
Under these conditions, ethnic distinction has "a powerful capacity to create its 
own history, boundaries, and a sense of grievance against the larger society" 
(May, cited in Lawson, 1993:65), invariably leading to secessionist demands 
(Connor, 1971). If separatist sentiments gather sufficient momentum, the central 
government has little substantive influence over those whose identify themselves 
as members of a 'breakaway' ethnic group. This schism within a country creates 
a treacherous situation for MNEs, as management is bound to act according to 
the authority of the state but must work with those who eschew such authority. 
In effect, the MNE is caught in the confluence of official and illegitimate powers 
and is unable to rely on either for support. Isolated from the institutions and 
resources upon which it depends, the company is virtually paralysed and 
sustained performance is not possible. An attendant risk in this situation is 
physical attack by a belligerent party or being enmeshed in a war between two 
factions. 
Based on the above, it is argued that the issue of ethnic distinction is a key 
consideration for the management of MNEs involved in certain LDCs. 
Companies conducting environmental analysis, whether in regard to the 
establishment, continuance or extension of operations, must account for the 
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ethnic consciousness of the host country. Notwithstanding, Connor points to 
the difficulties associated with such an undertaking, noting that it is not possible 
to predicate a group's fundamental identity on overt elements such as language, 
religion, customs, economic inequity, and so forth: 
[The] reason for failure of authorities to pay proper heed to ethnicity [is their] 
tendency to perceive ethnic nationalism in terms of its overt manifestations rather 
than in terms of its essence... Because the essence of the nation is a matter of 
attitude, the tangible manifestations of cultural distinctiveness are significant only to 
the degree to which they contribute to the sense of uniqueness. Indeed, a sense of 
vital uniqueness can come about even in the absence of important, tangible cultural 
characteristics of a distinctive nature ... (1973:336-337). 
Thus, ethnic distinction may not be detected by those involved in an MNE's 
environmental analysis due to its inherently abstract nature. Further, Connor 
(1973:336) warns that, even when this characteristic is identified, its "emotional 
power" is usually underrated. As demonstrated in the BCL case, management's 
inability to fully understand the constitution of, and passion associated with, 
ethnic distinction has the potential to severely impact on corporate performance. 
Assuming that the management of an MNE is able to recognise and fully 
comprehend the substance of the ethnic . identity of a relevant community in a 
socially heterogeneous LDC, legal matters must be shaped to the satisfaction of 
that community. As discussed above, such groups have scant regard for the 
authority vested in the state, and therefore contracts and agreements between the 
company and the national government are of little practical consequence. 
Management must ensure that the terms under which it operates are equally 
acceptable to the host society and host country; if this condition cannot be 
realised, the venture should not proceed or the MNE - if established - should 
withdraw from the country. Whilst the latter would be extremely costly, it is a 
more economic option than becoming involved in a significant local conflict. 
A consistent finding of this study has been the integrity and fairness with which 
BCL's management acted towards the host country and the host society. While 
remaining politically neutral, successive executives actively sought avenues 
through which the mine might assist PNG and Bougainville in human and 
economic terms. The success of these endeavours are recorded in this thesis, 
however corporate magnanimity brought few returns to BCL in the long term. 
The Bougainvilleans expelled the company, and PNG diverted attention from its 
own failings by blaming the mine for revolution: 
The central government was hopeless throughout the whole affair. They did virtually 
nothing. Of course, when the whole thing blew up, they had to find a scapegoat am 
who better to blame than the company? The whole country ended up blaming 
Bougainville Copper for the situation, even the other mining operations - Porgira, 
Ok Tedi, you name it. The government was happy to say that the Bougainville 
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Crisis was all our fault. Somare, and Chan, with whom we had had very good 
relationships over the years, blamed us almost entirely for the trouble. They refused 
to accept any of the responsibility for themselves (Former BCL executive, personal 
communication, 1998). 
A less apparent outcome of Panguna's closure is the private anguish experienced 
by those who managed the mine. One past executive revealed a little of his grief 
during a discussion following a formal interview with the researcher: 
.. .I can only try to explain what happened on Bougainville, but really I don't know 
how things could have gone so wrong. We tried so hard, all of us did. I've had ten 
years to think about it, and I've told you what we might have done differently, but I 
honestly don't think we could have done more for the Bougainvilleans ... or for 
Papua New Guinea for that matter. It's sad (Personal communication, 1998). 
Events on Bougainville reinforce the need for MNE management to give greater 
attention to ecological issues. The management of the Ok Tedi mine, operated by 
BHP138 in the PNG highlands, appears to have learned little from BCL's 
environmental mistakes, yet has more advanced technology at its disposal. The 
tailings from this mine have devastated the Ok Tedi-Fly River system in much 
the same manner as Panguna degraded the Kawerong and Jaba rivers on 
Bougainville and massive claims for compensation have been made by local 
landowners (ABC TV, 2000). The collapse of a tailings dam at an Australian 
managed mine in Romania (noted earlier in this Chapter) is further evidence of 
environmental damage occasioned by an MNE. Although mining is inherently 
harmful to the environment, the mining industry as a whole appears to be slower 
than other industries in developing technology capable of lessening the 
ecological impact of its processes. It is contended that mine management (at both 
the corporate and industry level) needs to address the environmental issue as a 
matter of urgency. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
The findings of this study, as presented in the research questions, point to a 
number of implications for theory development concerning the management of 
MNEs, particularly with regard to Oceania. 
Chapter 2 provided a review of theories and studies which inform the 
management of MNEs. While the extant literature recognises the complexity of 
coordinating resources and actualising corporate goals in disparate legal, 
cultural, economic and political settings, the primary focus remains on 
138 At the time of writing, BHP (Australia), Inmet (Canada) and the PNG government hold 
respectively 52, 18 and 30 per cent shareholding in the Ok Tedi project (BHP, 2000). 
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managing companies hosted by relatively developed countries. Presumably, the 
logic of this emphasis may be attributed to the concentration of MNEs from 
developed countries which invest in other advanced economies (Phatak, 1997; 
Vernon & Wells, 1986). The growing economic importance of emerging 
countries however, warrants more academic consideration of managing MNEs 
in LDCs. This thesis has examined the principal elements in which the business 
environment of Oceania varies from that typically found in industrialised 
nations. As these differences were shown to have had a significant impact on all 
functional and strategic areas of corporate management, there is a need for 
greater understanding of their nature and their potential influence on MNE 
performance. Using existing theories and concepts of MNE management to 
construct a framework by which PNG and Bougainville may be analysed, this 
thesis has helped to clarify those variables which distinguish between the 
developed and developing country management context. As the Bougainvilleans 
represent one ethnic group among the diverse LDC communities of the world, it 
is not possible to make broad generalisations from this research. However, the 
study has accented a number of salient characteristics of the Melanesian 
business environment which may by adapted to the identification of variables in 
other LDCs that are critical to the management of MNEs which originate from 
developed economies. 
There is an abundance of literature emphasising the need for management to 
regulate endogenous and exogenous variables in order to achieve an alignment 
between companies and the wider environment (for example, Bowden, 1985; 
Bums & Stalker, 1961; Davis et al., 1987; Galbraith, 1974; Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967; Lengnick-Hall & Lengnick-Hall, 1988; Milliman et al., 1991; 
Thompson, 1967; Wright & Snell, 1998). Various organisation theories are 
also based on the concept of environmental fit. These include institutionalisation 
theory (Selznick, 1957; Scott, 1987; Zucker, 1988), resource dependence 
theory (Child, 1997; Pfeffer & Selancik, 1978), and the resource-based view of 
organisations (Barney, 1991). The common assumption of congruency 
approaches is that management has the ability to significantly change elements 
in the internal and external environments of organisations. In addressing 
Research Question 1, this thesis investigated the extent to which BCL's internal 
and external operating environments were amenable to manipulation by the 
company's management. It was found that both environments were essentially 
resistant to management influence. Evidence from this case study suggests 
therefore, that perspectives of management and organisation based on 
environmental alignment cannot necessarily be sustained when companies are 
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exposed to environments which are substantially different to that of the home 
country. This outcome is particularly pertinent to organisations from developed 
economies which seek to operate in LDCs, given the unique nature of the 
general and specific environments found in many emerging countries. As 
symmetry between the characteristics of organisations and the characteristics of 
their environments may be unachievable in certain LDCs, this thesis argues for 
further investigation and the refinement of theory concerning environmental 
assessment and management in the LDC context. 
In contesting the universal applicability of paradigms which endorse the premise 
that management has substantive control over contextual variables, this research 
has corroborated the basic tenets of population ecology theory. This theory 
reasons that analogous organisations form populations, and that continued 
participation in that population depends upon each organisation's ability to 
compete. In dynamic or unstable environments, some organisations cannot 
compete because management is unable to influence sufficiently the prevailing 
internal or external environment. When this occurs, the organisation withdraws 
from the population (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Population 
ecology theory does not fully account for BCL's experience however, as the 
theory contends that aggregates of organisations can sustain only a certain 
number of entities and those which cannot compete with others in the population 
will not survive. This suggests that organisational populations represent the key 
conception of the environment. In BCL's case, the activities of similar 
organisations did not impact on the company, rather uncontrollable forces from 
other areas in the external environment led to its demise. Theories based on 
environmental determinism therefore, need to be expanded so as to consider the 
organisational milieu as a broader construct than just the relevant population. 
Thus, while evidence from this study has strengthened the theoretical 
foundations of the population ecology paradigm, it has also revealed that greater 
precision is needed if the environmental determination approach is to realise its 
potential contribution to theory and research in the management and organisation 
ofMNEs. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As reported in Chapter 3, Bailey (1994) has called for increased international 
management research in Oceania. This study has contributed to the small body 
of literature on the subject by investigating the management of a significant 
mining venture in PNG through a series of broad questions based on qualitative 
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research methodology. Evidence provided by the inquiry has been used to 
review a number of international management and organisation theories within 
the context of the emerging economies of the South-west Pacific, and various 
conclusions have been drawn. These include: 
i) The ethnic heterogeneity of the region's population precludes the adoption 
of one particular model of management and organisation, rather senior 
personnel need to focus their approach on the immediate society. 
ii) Variables in the external and internal operating contexts of MNEs have a 
significant, and often deleterious, impact on each other. 
iii) The nature and interaction of these incompatible variables remain largely 
beyond the control of management, and thus constrains the capacity of 
companies to actualise the environmental alignment required to maximise 
corporate performance. 
iv) As a result of management's inability to significantly influence its environ-
ments, the activities, accomplishments and ultimate survival of MNEs are 
subjugated to the vagaries of extraneous forces. 
These conclusions highlight numerous difficulties confronting MNE manage-
ment in the region and suggest that further research in this subject is necessary. 
In particular, they indicate the need for the refinement of theories relating to the 
management of MNEs from developed nations which seek business 
opportunities in Oceania. The people of the Pacific islands are accustomed to a 
level of human diversity which does not readily suit Western models of 
management and organisation. This presents a significant challenge to 
researchers because, as Manning and Stem (1994) have noted, it is unlikely that 
these communities will achieve the unity (at either the national and supra-
national level) which is assumed in traditional approaches to management and 
organisation, and therefore it is management scholars and practitioners who 
must cross the cultural and socioeconomic divide. If the mutual benefits of 
international business are to be realised in Oceania, management research must 
be pitched at seeking alternative directions and strategies. 
In devising an expanded research agenda to consolidate extant literature and 
advance international management theory applicable to the region, future inquiry 
might extend the investigations undertaken in this thesis. As this study was 
restricted to the examination of a particular MNE in one province of PNG, 
several opportunities for further research are indicated. First, the findings of 
this thesis could be validated within the context of other areas in Oceania. By 
conducting comparative analyses across various regions of different countries, 
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theories of international management may be refined and/or substantiated, and 
the generalisability of this study would be enhanced. Second, this investigation 
was limited to one MNE. This company displayed certain properties which 
might not be common to all organisations operating in the_ South-west Pacific. 
Of particular significance is BCL's Australian heritage which strongly 
influenced the behaviour of management. The examination of non-Australian 
companies - from both developed countries and other LDCs - may expose 
diffuse, culturally based managerial approaches which, in turn, couid clarify the 
impact of MNEs' nationality on their relationship with the local and national 
population. Third, this study focussed on the mining industry, which is subject 
to controversy irrespective of the location in which it operates. Research into the 
management of MNEs in other sectors may highlight the degree to which 
mining, by its nature, affects the involvement of foreign companies in the 
countries of Oceania. Fourth, because each dimension of the MNE external 
environment is evolving continually, the nature of the relationship between 
companies and their host country and host society is in a state of flux. A 
longitudinal study to examine this aspect of international management in 
Oceania over time seems appropriate. In this regard, an investigation into 
surviving foreign resource extraction ventures in PNG is suggested; for 
example, Ok Tedi (copper and gold), Misima (gold and silver), Porgera (gold) 
and Hides (gas). 
Finally, academic and practical benefits may be gained from conducting further 
research into the mining of copper on Bougainville. Approximately half the 
mineral lode had been exploited when the project was abandoned, and at various 
times since, BCL, the PNG government, the Bougainvilleans and other parties 
have expressed conditional interest in resuming operations. Should production 
resume, the organisation of the 'new' operation (whether Bougainvillean, Papua 
New Guinean, or foreign) would provide a conclusion to this inquiry. By 
comparing and contrasting the findings of this thesis with data from 
contemporary approaches to the governance of the mine, a decisive resolution to 
the questions surrounding the 1963-1989 management of the Bougainville mine 
may be achieved. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
As with all research endeavours, the findings of this inquiry need to be assessed 
in relation to the inherent limitations of the chosen methodology. It was noted in 
Chapter 3 that the case study approach was the most suitable methodology for 
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this thesis because of the exploratory and explanatory purpose of the res~arch, 
and the theory building focus of project (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994 ). It was 
also acknowledged in Chapter 3 that case study methodology has been censured 
for lacking rigour, particularly with regard to a validity and generalisability 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1981; Hamel et al., 1993; Stake, 1994). In this thesis, a 
number of measures have been employed to address these criticisms and to 
ensure that the research is as rigorous as possible. 
Concerning the construct and internal validity of the study, the possibility of 
researcher bias was minimised by the progressive application of numerous 
verification tactics during the interpretation process. These are detailed in Table 
3.3, and are based on the recommendations of Leinninger (1987), Miles and 
Huberman (1994), Sowden and Keeves (1988), Tuckman (1972) and Wilson 
(1985). The interviewees' familiarity and intimate involvement with Bougain-
ville and the Panguna project provided an ample, accurate and 'rich' source of 
information which further ensured the validity of the research (Patton, 1990). 
Notwithstanding, it is recognised that bias on the part of the informants or the 
researcher is a possibility in all qualitative inquiry (Goode & Hatt, 1952; Neck 
et al., 1996; Miles & Huberman, 1994), and that the research would have been 
enhanced had more of the potential respondents identified in the protocol been 
willing to assist in this study. The outcomes of this thesis could be authenticated 
by re-examining the management of BCL using broad-scale survey research, 
and comparing and contrasting the findings of each study. 
With regard to the external validity of the research, this thesis makes no claim as 
to the universality of the findings. Because the study focussed on MNE 
management in Oceania, the applicability of its outcomes is restricted to 
emerging economies in that region. The purpose of case study research is to 
generalise findings to theory rather than to generalise findings to populations 
(Barnard et al., 1987; Michelson & Baird, 1995; Yin, 1994). This study has 
used the outcomes of the Bougainville case' to generate theory concerning the 
management of foreign companies in Oceania. This theory, which amplifies and 
amalgamates extant paradigms, may form the foundation of further research 
which could be extended to investigate MNE management in other I.DC 
contexts. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The primary aim of this research was to provide a broader understanding of the 
management of MNEs, with particular emphasis on companies from developed 
nations involved in the diverse island communities of Oceania. Using a single 
case study approach, this inquiry investigated the key environmental factors 
responsible for the early success, but ultimate failure, of BCL - operators of 
one of the world's largest copper mines located on Bougainville in PNG's 
North Solomons Province. Specific attention was focused on the manner in 
which successive BCL executives approached the unique_ difficulties presented 
by the host country and the host society, as well as the limitations imposed by 
the company's enduring culture. In this manner, the thesis has sought to 
address the paucity of research on MNE management in the emerging South-
west Pacific region. 
The findings indicate that the fragmented nature of society in Oceania presents 
MNE management with a range of challenges which cannot be addressed by 
importing the organisational and managerial approaches which are employed in 
the home country. This study sustains the proposition of Ralston et al. (1993) 
that organisations need to develop value systems specific to their environment 
but, because 'nationhood' cannot be assumed in these countries, management 
must adopt a very narrow view of the environment. Organisations should forge 
their primary relationship with the immediate society rather than with the host 
country. Failure to accomplish this has the potential to inhibit corporate 
performance or, in the worst case, destroy the MNE. Achieving this 
relationship may be difficult however, as the research has also concluded that, 
in certain circumstances, management has very little influence over vital 
elements of both the internal and external environment. If the characteristics of 
an MNE are not intrinsically amenable to the local situation, it is doubtful that 
they can be adjusted sufficiently to align with the demands of the wider milieu. 
In the absence of absolute internal-external congruency, the company is at risk 
of being overwhelmed by external forces. 
The concluding chapter has provided an overview of the thesis, a summary of 
the findings of the study and their implications for home and host country 
government policy development, management practice, theory development and 
further research related to the management of MNEs in Oceania in particular and 
LDCs in general. It is argued that this thesis has provided a contribution to the 
literature on international management. 
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APPENDIX A 
Case Study Protocol 
used to guide the design of 
the research, data gathering, 
and format of the thesis. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
Proposed Title of the Research Project 
The Establishment, Operation and Subsequent Closure of the Bougainville 
Copper Mine: A Case Study in International Management. 
Focus of the Study 
Drawing on the case of the Panguna copper mine on Bougainville, the research 
aims to develop theory and understanding of managing environmental variables 
in multinational enterprises (MNEs). A preliminary review of the literature 
revealed that corporate performance depends on management's ability to align the 
firm's internal and external environments, and that this alignment becomes a 
more critical success factor the more host country business conditions differ from 
those experienced in the home country. The literature also suggests that, as host 
and home operating contexts di verge, external factors will exert increasing 
pressures on firms which make environmental alignment more difficult to 
achieve. It is therefore logical to suggest that, at some point, an MNE's external 
environment may become so divergent from its home country that the firm will 
not be able to adapt its internal operations sufficiently to meet the demands of that 
environment. In these circumstances, firm performance will be severely 
diminished. The internal and external elements which influence firm performance 
in divergent environments represent the issues to be investigated in this inquiry. 
These elements are listed below. 
Legal environment 
Financial operations 
Employment rel'ships 
Natural resources 
Cultural environment 
Social organisation 
Materialism 
Language 
Modes of thinking 
Organisational 
environment 
Con-cross-di verge nee 
Management philosophy 
Organisational culture 
Political 
environment 
Stability 
Nationalism 
International rel'ships 
Economic environment 
Natural resources 
Labour 
Technology 
Infrastructure 
Other environmental 
factors 
Geographic features 
Historical influences 
Ecological issues 
The study will examine the experience of Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) 
in order to determine the relative influence the above factors have on the 
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performance of an MNE operating in a business climate which is significantly 
different than that of its home country. Taking a qualitative approach, the 
inquiry is open to any patterns and relationships which emerge from the data, 
and is descriptive, exploratory and explanatory in its purpose. 
Problem Definition and the Research Questions 
Although the history of the Bougainville mine will be treated as a single entity in 
this thesis, that history unfolded over time and within the framework of the 
environmental issues listed above. While these contextual elements will be 
examined individually during the research, their interrelatedness with each other 
and with the overall history of the mine will be observed in order to preserve the 
unitary character of the case (Guba & Lincoln, 1981). 
The research implication of a simultaneously holistic and contextually based 
approach is the need to interpret the meanings which the actors ascribe to their 
own behaviour and to the behaviour of others, within the context of the 
underlying structures and perceptions of the situation (Stake, 1994). As these 
abstractions and concerns will only become apparent in the course of the 
inquiry, they will emerge as the problems which the study seeks to address. The 
identification of these problems will, in tum, define the research design 
(Burgess, 1982a). 
To access these problems, the following central research question has been 
established: 
In what ways might the experience of Bougainville Copper Limited be 
instructive to the study and practice of MNE management in environments 
which are significantly different to home country conditions? 
Based on this question, a series of sub-questions will be developed so as to 
address the exploratory purpose of the inquiry. 
CASE STUDY PROCEDURES 
The Focal Case Study 
The BCL case was identified for research in this thesis because it meets the 
criteria which emerged from the objectives of the study. These criteria are: 
• the parent of the subject company is a long-established and successful MNE 
with considerable experience in operating within diverse environments; 
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• the majority of senior and middle-level management positions were held by 
expatriate personnel; 
• the mine was located in a developing country with an operating environment 
dissimilar in most respects to that of the company's home country; 
•the legal, cultural, economic and political consequences of the company's 
presence and operations are clearly evident in the case; and 
• because the mine has closed, the BCL case presents a complete historical unit 
in which each phase of the company's life-cycle can be investigated. 
Accessing Data 
For three reasons, case information will need to rely primarily on documentary 
evidence. Firstly, the case is historical and therefore access to all key actors is 
not possible. Secondly, as Bougainville is an .active war zone, contact with the 
islanders or inspection of the mine site is prohibited. Thirdly, the case is well 
documented from the perspectives of all protagonists. Notwithstanding, data 
from documentary records will be augmented by first-hand information. To this 
end, an approach will be made to the following potential infonnants: 
• CRA Limited; 
•the executive responsible for the establishment of mine in the early 1960s; 
•senior managers involved with Panguna's operation and closure; 
•journalists who reported on PNG, Bougainville and the mine before, during 
and after the crisis; 
• a critical observer of Bougainville who is opposed to both the involvement of 
PNG in the island's affairs and the presence of the mine; 
•an executive of BCL's bankers who had a long association with the company 
and who maintained a personal interest in Bougainville and its people; and 
•an academic widely published in Melanesian affairs, particularly the 
. Bougainville situation. 
Because the case material may be personally and/or professionally sensitive to 
former mine executives, initial contact will be made through the offices of the 
Australian parent of the mine. A letter will be forwarded to CRA inviting any 
interested person to contact the researcher. As this method leaves participation 
entirely to the discretion of any interested parties, it is considered preferable to 
making direct contact with specific individuals. 
Informants will be asked to participate in largely unstructured interviews. While 
the interviews will focus on salient issues emerging from the case report and 
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literature review, the essential content of the sessions will be determined by the 
participants. The manner in which the interviews will be recorded (i.e. tape or 
written notes) is dependent on the informants' preference. Irrespective of the 
recording medium, the material will be transcribed immediately following the 
interview so as to preserve the detail of the exchange, and to aid analysis. 
Research Design 
Based on the recommendations of Denzin and Lincoln (1994) and Yin (1994), 
the following elements will constitute the research design. 
The Research Questions 
The primary determinants of the research design will be the research questions 
(Kerlinger, 1986), augmented by the problems which become evident during 
the course of the inquiry. As the reasons for wanting the questions answered 
should also be considered in the research design (Allan, 1991), the objectives 
of the study will also be taken into account 
Units of Analysis 
Having established the research questions, it will be possible to specify the 
particular elements (units of analysis) to be investigated in the study (Babbie, 
1989). The primary unit of analysis will be the management of an MNE 
operating in an unfamiliar environment. The environmental entities will be the 
firm's (i) external influences (the host society and other extraneous parties) and 
(ii) internal influences (its organisation and management); these will constitute 
the secondary units of analysis. The respective attitudes, values and behaviours 
of the actors will form subordinate units of analysis, the characteristics of 
which will be determined from the data which emerge from the case. 
Linking Data to Theoretical Propositions 
Once the data are gathered, they will be assigned to the appropriate unit of 
analysis to form 'groups' of concepts. This process is noted in 'Mode of 
Analysis' (below). 
Criteria for Interpreting the Findings 
Qualitative research depends on the ability of the investigator to reconstruct, 
through the interpretive process, the intended meaning behind the information 
which has been gathered during the inquiry (Odman, 1988). Inherent in 
interpretation is the risk of making errors by attributing incorrect meanings to 
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the information supplied. Mistakes can be minimised by applying various 
checks and tests to verify emergent propositions and explanation (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1989). The dominant criteria for interpretation in this thesis will be 
the comparison of evidence and apparent meanings from alternative sources, 
and testing outcomes against rival interpretations. 
Developing Theory 
Given its exploratory emphasis, this thesis will rely substantially on inductive 
reasoning whereby data are analysed in order to propose or refine theory. 
Eisenhardt (1989) reports several advantages of building theory from case 
studies. In analytic induction, theory generation not only occurs after data 
collection, but also before and during that process (Marshall & Rossman, 1989; 
Yin, 1994 ). In this study therefore, theory construction and conducting 
research will be undertaken as parts of the same process, with all research 
activities being guided by the emerging theory. 
Mode of Analysis 
Data will be managed and analysed using QSR. NUD*IST 4 software. This 
system explores and codes documents, links them to the categories determined 
by the researcher, produces an index system, and searches text and codes to 
assist in the construction and testing of theories. 
Case Report 
As the research will take an ethnographic approach, all issues relating to BCL's 
presence and operations on Bougainville will be included in the initial narrative 
of the case. Material found to be superfluous will be excised at a later point. 
The case report will be presented as three chapters; one detailing Bougainville 
island and its people, one concerning the history of BCL and the Panguna 
mine, and one focusing on the rebellion which closed the mine. Drafts of the 
case report will be presented to all informants for consideration, expansion and 
factual correction before the narrative is accepted into the study. In writing the 
report, three factors will be considered: content, audience, and composition. 
Content 
As Stake (1994) suggests that the infinite number of observations available on 
social objects requires limitations be placed on research and case reports, the 
entire Bougainville history will not be recorded in detail; only the relevant 
factors will be abstracted. These factors, which will dictate the point at which 
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the research is adequate, are to be determined by the purposes of the study and 
the research questions (Guba & Lincoln, 1981). 
Audience 
Yin (1994:129) observes that 
Because case studies have more potential audiences than other types of research, an 
essential task in designing the overall case study report is to identify the specific 
audiences for the report. Each audience has different needs, and no single report will 
serve all audiences simultaneously. 
Whilst the academic community constitutes the primary audience of this thesis, 
it will also seek to communicate with the wider population. In particular, the 
report will be styled in such a way that the research subjects will be able to 
make judgments concerning the plausibility of its contents and conclusions. 
Composition 
Because the meaning of qualitative research "is in the reading" (Berg, 
1989: 117) the report will be aimed at gaining and holding reader interest. 
Walton (1972) believes that case reports should provide readers with a 
vicarious experience of the case, therefore this thesis will use 'thick 
descriptions' to engage its readers. Through the case report, readers may be 
able to assess the researcher's findings, draw their own conclusions, or be 
motivated to generate further investigations on the subject. 
INFORMATION REQUIRED 
The substance of the research questions requires the examination of the internal 
and external environmental influences of the case, as categorised above. These 
factors are the 'units of observation' which constitute the fundamental issues to 
be investigated in this study. They are detailed on the following pages. 
1 Legal Environment 
Data Requirements 
The indigenous and foreign governance of Bougainville. 
Bougainvillean attempts to gain independence. 
The evolution of independence in PNG. 
The subsuming of Bougainville into PNG. 
PNG laws relating to the financial operations of MNEs. 
PNG laws regulating employer-employee relationships in MNEs. 
PNG laws relating the use and protection of natural resources. 
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Bougainvillean interpretation and acceptance of the PNG legal system. 
Panguna's relationship with Bougainvillean and PNG laws. 
Data Sources 
Published material on 
• Bougainvillean community traditions; 
• the German, British and Australian administration, and the Japanese 
invasion of Bougainville; 
• the Westminster system of government; 
• international law; 
Accounts of the Bougainville civil war. 
Former executives of the Panguna mine. 
PNG Hansard, parliamentary reports, and government research papers. 
Australian Hansard, parliamentary reports, and government research 
papers. 
2 Political Environment 
Data Requirements 
The political history of Bougainville and PNG. 
The genesis and nature of the tensions between Bougainville and PNG. 
Foreign involvement in the affairs of PNG and Bougainville, particularly 
that of Australia. 
The political implications of an Australian company on Bougainville. 
Data Sources 
Published authorities_ on Melanesian history, society and politics. 
News reports and the personal observations of journalists. 
PNG Hansard, parliamentary reports, and government research papers. 
Australian Hansard, parliamentary reports, and government research 
papers. 
CRA/BCL reports and publications. 
Former executives of the Panguna mine. 
3 Cultural Environment 
Data Requirements 
The organisation of Bougainvillean society, with particular emphasis on 
its diverse community structures, land tenure, the relationship between 
the islanders and their habitat, and indigenous attitudes towards the 
commercial economy and foreign involvement in their affairs. 
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Data Sources 
Studies by anthropologists, sociologists and historians. 
Accounts of Bougainvillean life published by indigenous writers. 
Anecdotal evidence from foreign journalists and visitors. 
Former executives of the Panguna mine. 
4 Economic Environment 
Data Requirements 
The nature of the Bougainvillean traditional economic system and the 
locals' attitudes towards economic development. 
The economic system of PNG and the national government's attitudes 
towards economic development. 
The contribution made by the Panguna mine to the Bogainville and PNG 
economies. 
The attitude of Panguna's management towards the economic 
development of Bougainville and PNG. 
The constituents, accessibility, extent and economic value of 
Bougainville's mineral deposits. 
Indigenous attitudes towards the extraction of Bougainville's mineral 
deposits. 
Data Sources 
Anthropological and sociological accounts of Bougainville's economic 
traditions. 
Published accounts of PNG government policy on development. 
Economic data produced by CRA/BCL and PNG government sources. 
Former executives and documented histories of the Panguna mine. 
Reports on Bougainville's geological characteristics, prosecting activities 
and mining ventures. 
Reports and publications prepared by CRA/BCL. 
Observers of Bougainvillean life and society. 
5 Organisational Environment 
Data Requirements 
Information concerning the nature of open-cut mining and the mineral 
extraction process, the location and size of the Panguna mining complex, 
and its physical properties, processes and infrastructure. The manner in 
which the Bougainville mine was managed. 
CRA/BCL policies regarding 
• social issues; 
• political issues; 
• human resource management; 
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• environmental matters; 
• compensation for loss and damage; 
• transacting with the local people; 
• racial integration. 
Management's philosophies concerning 
• social issues; 
• political issues; 
• human resource management; 
• environmental matters; 
• compensation for loss and damage; 
• transacting with the local people; 
• racial integration. 
Data Sources 
Documents concerning the procedures of mineral extraction. 
Histories of the Panguna mine. 
Former executives of the Panguna mine. 
Previous academic inquiries into Panguna's operations and practices. 
Historical accounts of Panguna's activities. 
The observations of employees (expatriate and indigenous) and the 
relevant trade union. 
CRA/BCL reports and publications. 
Former executives of the Panguna mine. 
6 Other Environmental Factors 
Geographic Features 
Data Requirements 
Overview of Bougainville's location, topography and climate, plus 
essential details of endemic vegetation and fauna. 
Data Sources 
Encycloprediae and atlases. 
Historical Influences 
Data Requirements 
The natural and social history of Bougainville prior to European 
settlement. 
The social and political history of Bougainville following European 
settlement. 
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The social, economic and political history of PNG during the 20th 
century. 
The history of the Panguna mine. 
Data Sources 
Commentaries by explorers, historians, anthropologists, sociologists, 
politicians, journalists, and military personnel. 
CRA and BCL reports and publications. 
Former executives of the Panguna mine. 
Ecological Issues 
Data Requirements 
The nature of Bougainville's environmental systems. 
Indigenous attitudes towards their environment. 
The attitude of the PNG government towards Bougainville's 
environment. 
The attitude of the mine's management towards Bougainville's 
environment. 
The ecological impact of open cut mining in general and of the Panguna 
enterprise specifically. 
Data Sources 
Anthropological and social accounts of the Bougainvillean people. 
Former executives of the Panguna mine. 
Published material on the environmental impact of the mine from: 
• Bougainvilleans living in the mine's proximity; 
• CRA and BCL; 
• environmental experts. 
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Processual Matters 
The focus of the interviews 
The primary objective of the interviews is to gain an understanding of 
managing a large company which operates in an environment which is 
almost totally foreign to Western corporate and managerial tradition. The 
central theme is the management of external forces (legal, cultural, 
economic and political factors) and the process (corporate culture, company 
policies, etc) of making the organisation fit within the dictates of these 
externalities. Bougainville Copper Limited's management of the Panguna 
mining venture is the vehicle for investigating these management issues. 
Confidentiality 
Any personal opinions offered during the interview will not be included in 
the thesis if the respondent so wishes. 
Anonymity 
• Full transcripts of the interviews will be included in the thesis, however 
the sources of the material will not be identified and any direct quotes 
used in the text will be attributed to 'a former BCL executive' or a similar 
annotation. 
•The frontispiece of the thesis will acknowledge the input of those who 
assisted in this research, however indi victual names will not be used. 
Data recording 
Following the transcription of the interviews, the respondents will be asked 
to read a written record of their session prior to its inclusion in the thesis. 
This is to ensure the faithfulness of the transcript, and to provide an 
opportunity to add or delete material. 
The respondents will decide whether the interview will be recorded by way 
of note-taking or tape recording. 
Fonnat 
To access the 'experience' of management in such unique circumstances, 
the interviews will be relatively unstructured. A number of particular issues 
need to be addressed however, and to this end a series of questions will be 
posed. 
Open Discussion 
A 'free' conversation is invited on the manner in which the mine's senior 
personnel approached the management of the operation, with particular 
emphasis on 
managing the cultural, legal, economic and political forces with which the 
mine had to contend, and 
attuning the internal operations of the company to these elements in the 
mine's external operating context. 
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Specific Questions 
Historical Perspectives 
1 . When the Panguna venture commenced, RTZ/CRA had long experience in 
establishing mines in foreign countries, particularly economically 
undeveloped regions. 
a) At that time, were there any indications that the historical and social 
peculiarities of Bougainville would result in difficulties for the operation 
(compared with similar areas in which the company was involved)? 
b) In those days, was the company or management concerned about the 
interface between its operations and host countries' human, economic 
and environmental circumstances? 
2. Were the risks of locating a mining complex on Bougainville assessed prior 
to its establishment? 
If so, what assessment procedures were undertaken? 
3. Published commentaries indicate that Panguna's management was 
generally sensitive to the needs and wants of the Bougainvilleans living 
near the minesite. For example, the company preferred to negotiate 
compensation issues directly with the locals, land was not entered without 
permission, native customs were respected, etc. This seems to have 
continued throughout the life of the mine. 
Was this due to (a) recognition of a potentially difficult situation, (b) head 
office policy on foreign operations, or ( c) empathy on the part of senior 
management on Bougainville? 
4. From my reading of the events, I understand the fundamental reasons 
behind the failure of the mine were: 
i) The Bougainvilleans were, and remain, opposed to foreigners on their 
land or involved in the organisation of their society. 
ii) CRAE was not able to strike a mutually acceptable arrangement with the 
locals during exploration due to language problems, the villagers' 
incomprehension of mining laws, and their suspicion of foreigners. The 
relationship between the mine and the Bougainvilleans did not seem to 
fully recover from this initial strain. 
iii)PNG's involvement in the running of Panguna seems divisive. By 
ignoring the wishes of the Bougainvilleans, the government intimated 
that it put the interests of CRA/BCL above those of the locals. On the 
other hand, insistence that land matters be handled by government 
agencies showed a lack of confidence in the rnine's management. 
iv)The mine caused more environmental problems than either the company 
or the Bougainvilleans had expected. 
v) The Bougainvilleans appear to have been ambivalent about the economic 
bepefits they derived from the mine. Some shunned it, others welcomed 
it. Further, although no amount of compensation was ever deemed 
sufficient, the mine's opponents consistently claimed money was not the 
root issue. 
From the above, it appears that the political, social and legal situation on 
Bougainville circumscribed management's ability to manage. That is, 
management was not in a position to control the mine's destiny. 
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Is this a fair assessment? 
If so, this means major decisions which should have rested with experts 
were heavily influenced by 'outsiders' - many of whom had opposing 
views. Could Panguna have been expected to succeed under these 
circumstances? 
Ecological Issues 
5. I assume that the environmental damage on Bougainville was no greater or 
less than that caused by any other similar mine. Were the Bougainvilleans 
more/less concerned about the environmental impact of mining than the 
indigenes of other countries in which CRA was involved? 
6. Did the PNG government display any concern for Bougainville's 
environment? 
7. That settling dams were considered and a pipeline was commenced when it 
became technologically feasible is an indication of corporate concern over 
the disposal of tailings. Were these initiatives inspired by empathy for 
Bougainvillean anxiety about their habitat, local agitation, or the general 
goal of industry to improve processes? 
8. In hindsight, did the company pay sufficient attention to ecological issues 
on Bougainville? 
The External Operating Environment 
9. To what extent did the company see its role as an agent of economic 
development in Bougainville and PNG? 
10. Among the criticisms levelled against foreign companies operating in 
undeveloped countries are: 
i) companies put profits before the economic needs of the host country; 
ii) local employment gains are small because the company prefers 
expatriate workers; 
iii) excessive repatriation of profits; 
iv)foreign companies tend to exacerbate inequality of income distribution. 
Similar complaints were levelled at Panguna at various times. Point (iv) 
appears to be correct, but inevitable. Are these criticisms valid in the 
Panguna case? If so, to what extent did these issues impact on the 
relationship between the mine and the local people? 
11. Regardless of the size of the compensation settlements, the Bougain-
villeans did not seem to be satisfied with them. Yet the literature does not 
appear to indicate that this dissatisfaction was the result of greed. 
a) Is this assessment accurate? 
b) Would another, non-monetary; form of compensation been more 
appropriate, given that consumerism was foreign to their culture? 
c) What alternatives were available? 
359 
12. Another criticism of foreign firms in developing countries is that as the host 
country becomes dependent on foreign companies for economic growth, 
the company assumes political power. PNG clearly depended on the 
Panguna mine, but the literature provides no evidence of CRNBCL 
exerting pressure on the government. 
a) Did the company attempt to use its importance to the PNG economy as a 
bargaining mechanism with the government? 
b) Did the Bougainvilleans perceive this to be the case? 
13. From the beginning, the mine was a political issue involving Bougainville, 
PNG and Australia. The literature consistently portrays the company as 
being neutral. 
Did the Bougainvilleans see the company as neutral? 
BCL's Internal Operations 
14. To what degree was the manner in which the mine handled its affairs a 
reflection of local management and a reflection of head office directives? 
15. Several commentators observe that the company did not have clear policies 
on dealing with indigenous matters, and that management seemed to make 
(and change) decisions according to the prevailing conditions. 
Was this a deliberate tactic, or were circumstances such that firm policies 
were impossible? 
16. From the outset, it was evident that the mine was exposed to some degree 
of threat from the forces of its surroundings. Were these threats evaluated 
regularly and how were they managed? 
17. How much emphasis did head office place on the 'psychological' 
suitability of senior managerial appointments on Bougainville? (ie attitudes 
towards the locals, sensitivity to the issues, etc.) 
18. Given hindsight, what (if anything) could Panguna's management have 
done differently? 
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APPENDIX C 
Coding Scheme 
for Classification of Interview Data 
Report produced by QSR NUD*IST software. Nodes 1 through 5 
devised by the researcher; nodes 5.1 through 186 generated by the 
software as a result of the program's 'Index Search' facility. 
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APPENDIX D 
Index Tree 
Generated by QSR NUD*IST software. 
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APPENDIX E 
Sources of information and contributors 
to the case report in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
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Documentary records 
The history of Bougainville is well documented. Commencing with the 
records of early explorers and continuing with contemporary radio and 
television broadcasts139 , most aspects of the island's unique society and 
tumultuous past has been preserved by many observers. As would be 
expected, attention peaked during the currency of the civil war and today 
commentary is restricted to sporadic news items and the corporate reports 
of Bougainville Copper Limited. It is these records which have informed a 
large part of the case narrative presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
The primary sources of documented data included 
• eye-witness accounts; 
• CRA/BCL documents; 
• books, journal articles and commentaries by 
- key mine personnel 
- Bougainvillean landowners and villagers 
- Bougainvillean, PNG and Australian politicians; 
• the findings of environmental consultants; 
• government, revolutionary, and CRA/BCL correspondence; and 
• aid agency reports. 
The secondary sources of documented data were drawn from 
• books, journal articles and commentaries by 
- explorers - political scientists 
- engineering consultants - journalists 
- anthropologists - social commentators 
- environmentalists - lawyers 
- sociologists - historians 
- foreign affairs specialists - geographers 
• PNG and Australian Hansard and parliamentary reports; 
• PNG and Australian government research papers; 
• reports of governmental committees and delegations from PNG, 
Australia and other countries; 
139 For the purposes of this thesis, material derived from the electronic media is 
classified as 'documentary' evidence. Where such sources were used, the 
researcher transcribed directly from recordings of the broadcasts. 
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• transcripts of political addresses and Ministerial statements; 
• radio, television and press reports; and 
• encycloprediae 
Oral histories 
Once the initial case report had been composed from the above material, 
comment was sought on its factual content. This exercise served two 
purposes: it injected further detail which enhanced the thick descriptions the 
author was seeking, and it formed part of the verification process. 
Although both primary and secondary informants agreed to assist in this 
process, only primary evidence was forthcoming. This was supplied by 
past executives of the mine, all of whom have intimate knowledge of the 
Bougainville saga. Each of these men added material facts to the narrative 
and, perhaps more importantly, supplied individual perspectives and 
advised of the subtleties of certain situations which would not have 
otherwise been available. 
Interviews 
The information gathered from participant interviews was central to the 
analysis of the case. However, the peculiarities of the events on 
Bougainville necessitated that particular care be taken in preparing and 
executing the interviews. As three of the four respondents were former 
executives of the Panguna mine, two issues were at the forefront of the 
researcher's mind. Firstly, the publicity surrounding the Bougainville 
Crisis has placed these men in an unenviable position. Unlike most retirees, 
they have not had the luxury of anonymity or mellow seclusion since 
leaving office; their opinions are still sought by various people, of whom 
the researcher was yet another. Secondly, nobody can know their personal 
sensitivities to the human tragedy and corporate difficulties in which they 
were enmeshed. For these reasons, the author remained conscious of needs 
of the now private citizens who graciously assisted in this endeavour. 
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APPENDIX F 
Example of Stage One Coding 
of Interview Data 
Report of preliminary data search. 
Generated by QSR NUD*IST software. 
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Q.S.R. NUD•isT Power vers;.on, revision 4.0 .• 
Licensee: School of Commerce &La~. 
PROJECT: PhD, User Graeme 4:44-prn, Dec 3, 199_8. 
******************************************************************************** 
(2 3) /Values/Mgmt 
* ** Definition: 
Values of the management of the mine concerning Bouga,inville 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Interview-Respondent Number 1 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 14 units out of 192, = 7. 3% 
++ Text units 45-47: 
I wanted the Bougainvillean people involved from the beginning, so I spent a 
lot of time getting to know them. 45 
46 It must be remembered that it was their country. 
47 ++Text units 112-112: 
And the mine had no choice but to rely .on "the government in these matters; it 
was bound by the rules and regulations of PNG. 112 ++ Text 
units 120-122: 
Compared to other mines, Bougainville was a very high tonnage operation and so 
a large amount of material went down the river system. 120 
121 This would be a problem, but in the 60s, we did not see it that way. 
122 ++ Text units 146-146: 
The company saw it as its duty to look after the Bougainvilleans as best 
could, despite the Church's urgings not to be too generous. 
Text units 150-153: 
it 
146 ++ 
We were providing good accommodation for Australian staff and we were careful 
to make sure that t~e accommodation for indigenous people was not inferior. 
150 
151 We tried very hard to maintain an equitable situation. 
152 
153 ++Text units 158-158: 
Although the management styles of the executives differed, I believe we. all had 
a common concern for the welfare of the locals. 158 ++ Text 
units 160-160: 
We ~y have put different emphasis on different points, but it is fair to say 
that throughout-the years of the mine's operation we were always sensitive to 
the people whose land we were using. 160 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Interview-Respondent Number 2 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 25 units out of 220, = 11% 
++ Text units 9-9: 
Compared to the Australian and PNG governments, the company went to no end of 
trouble to recruit international experts in all areas in order to get the best· 
advice possible as to how to go about creating an operation of this magnitude 
in such a region with a minimum impact on the local people; and wherever 
possible, with benefit to the local people. 9 ++Text units 17-17: 
Frank Espie travelled the world in great detail and spent a lot of time talking 
to people who were involved in mining operations in Africa in particular to 
find out from them what gone wrong in the past and what they would do 
differently if starting up from scratch again. 17 ++ Text units 
26-28: 
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T~is is the sort of thing that Frank Espie tried to learn from to make sure it 
did not happen in Bougainville. 26 
27 Frank recruited a couple anthropologists - one from Fiji and one from 
Harvard - and they were very helpful in advising us on how to go about 
developing the area with minimum impact on the local people. 
++ Text units 32-34: 28 
Frank believed it was essential to have as high a proportion of' Papua New 
Guineans working in the mine as was pos'sible. 32 
33 The government did not stipulate the expatriate-national ratio; Frank did it 
voluntarily because he maintained he was not interested in having an agreement 
which was satisfactory to the Australian government. He wanted an agreement 
which would be satisfactory to the first independent PNG goverrunent. And I 
think he succeeded; it was a fair and reasonable agreement. 
34 ++ Text units 42-44: 
There is no question that the preliminary work that was put into 
anthropological research and training was first class. The workforce at Panguna 
was very good. Technically, the operation with the high local labour content of 
about 80% was as good as I've seen anywhere in the world. 
42 
43 ~he Papua New Guineans and Bougainvilleans made excellent operators and 
excellent tradesmen. In every way, costwise, safetywis~ and in every way, our 
operation was better than any of the other CRA operations in Australia. This 
was mainly due to the efforts that went into training. In fact, it was so 
successful that CRA introduced the same training procedure into its Australian 
operations. 44 ++ Text units 50-52: 
The biggest error we made was to think that we, as a company, were there for 
the benefit of all Papua New Guinea. Fo.r instance, people in Australia can 
understand that the benefits of operations in Australia should be shared 
equally between all Australians, and this is done through the distribution of 
wealth by the central government. 50 
51 Our agreement was with the PNG government, and we saw Port Moresby as our 
chief area of control and they were the people who made the laws for the 
country. And so whatever we did, we had to do with their approval. If we had 
their approval, then it was legally acceptable and correct and we were able to 
do it. 51 ++ Text 
units 60-62: 
Now we were not aware of this when we went to PNG. We wanted to be a model 
citiz~n and we made sure that what we did was to the benefit of the country as 
a whole. And so everything that we did was with that in mind. 60 
61 Our negotiations were with the central government, which was right and 
proper. 62 
++ Text units 68-68: 
So there was nobody there representing the Bougainvillean issues, and then when 
we drew up our program of the workforce, our objective was to recruit the best 
people we could from the whole of the country. We saw that because we were 
located on Bougainville, there should be a higher proportion of Bougainvilleans 
than anyone else and as a result of that we had about 40% Bougainvilleans. 
68 ++ Text units 103-103: 
Another thing that needs to be recognised is that the people who created all 
the trouble and started the rebellion were not the people who were representing 
the villagers and who had been negotiating with us. We were negotiating with 
the men who were considered the heads of the villages - the relationship 
between them and the company was good, and we had reached agreement on the 
compensation and the like. But the people who created all the trouble were the 
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next generation, and they were not a recognised group; they had not been 
elected to any position and they were being ignored 
company. The company felt that the people that they 
the elders who represented the conununity. 
by their elders and the 
should be dealing with 
were 
103 ++ Text units 107-107: 
I guess there was one other mistake the company made, and that was that i·n our 
efforts to localise employment to the highest level possible, we appointed 
Papua New Guineans to senior positions whenever we could. 107 ++ Text 
units 133-135: 
We were more content to keep the operation running at maximum output rather 
than worrying about the feelings behind this letter. 133 
134 In retrospect, keeping the mine running meant absolutely nothing; if we had 
shut the operation down the day we got the letter and left it shut for 6 months 
while we talked and did nothing else, it would have been a hell of a lot better 
than what has happened over the past 10 years. 135 ++ Text units 190-
190: 
We paid them compensation, but money does not really compensate for those 
things. 190 
++ Text units 214-214: 
The PNG government made no environmental demands on the company at all. All 
such initiatives were taken by the company. 214 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Interview-Respondent Number 3 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 15 units out of 307, = 4.9% 
++ Text units 3-3: 
I think it is appropriate to recognise that the human relations aspect of the 
Bougainville operation was by far the most significant single side of 
management responsibilities, because of its social limitations and because it 
was an offshore operation. By human relations, I don't mean 'just the workforce, 
I mean the entire population of the island. 3 ++ Text units 8-8: 
But from a management point of view, you must concentrate on the community, the 
political, the workforce and those types of aspects. 8 ++ Text units 
14-14: 
The environmental impact was not all that bad. Visually, it could be construed 
as being bad because there was a lot of [material] poured down into that swamp 
area. You can't grind thousands of tons of dirt a day without leaving a bit of 
rubble, but there was no toxic environmental involvement as you do have in 
other operations such as cyanide in gold processing and that sort of thing. You 
could say it was good, clean dirt. But it was dirt, and it was ugly and it was 
different, and it did impact on some Bougainvilleans. 
14 ++ Text units 30-32: 
Therefore, you have immediately created an inequity and the real problem comes 
with relativity; it is not how much, or an appreciation of a certain figure, . 
but when you see your mate with three trucks and you've only got one, you say 
"Why him?" It was wrong, I knew it was wrong, and the company knew it was 
wrong. 30 
31 And we aggressively tried to address that with a distinct lack of 
satisfaction because nobody could ever digest that as it had been inherited 
from the initial mining legislation which was antiquated and based on 
Australian law. 32 ++ Text 
units 38-38: 
In the 1980s, we managed to bring in another factor, 
for the people who were actually affected as against 
who could get on with their normal lifestyle. 
and that was compensation 
compensation for people 
38 ++ Text units 114-114: 
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The National Government commissioned international advisers on the tax issue, 
and they were tarred with the one brush that said multinational miners are 
liars and cheats. But that aint so. The Government was being advised about the 
1974 Agreement by academics out of Sussex, and academics have a pretty 
blinkered view. So do missionaries. These two are about the worst enemies of 
any good progressive mining operation. 114 ++ Text units 148-150: 
I tried very hard to balance that, but it was difficult because if you just 
revalue it, the next fellow is there and thE;! relativity remains fairly 
constant. 148 
149 We were slowly working on changing the relativity; it was a slow process 
and it wasn't able to move fast enough to meet the aspirations of the people. 
150 ++ Text units 164-164: 
Bearing in mind that the price was all over. the place, so what 
anyhow? This is another problem. As long as the company stayed 
quartile of world mining costs, it could come out in front. 
164 ++ Text units 222-222: 
is economic 
within the lower 
The administration was trying to help the whole country with the proceeds of 
the mine, but the Bougainvilleans could not get away from the fact that they 
were being neglected and PNG was being developed with their money. The company 
tried to point out to the national govenunent that these issues needed to be 
addressed. 222 ++ Text units 255-255: 
In the past, companies have opened mines by making stupid promises and walk out 
when it fails; this upsets everybody. We did not do this - we were honest and 
told them we did not really know what the mine would be like. But then people 
said •if you don't know, who the hell does know•. Our only reply could be •we 
don't know what's there yet•. Therefore you have the landowners whose back yard 
was going to be dug up and a company who did not know how much it needed to 
dig. 255 ++ Text units 295-295: 
There were peaks of discontent and nobody addressed that problem. Continually, 
management would ask the goverrunent • ... why don't you stop the flow of all 
these unemployables across the sea because they are disrupting everybody. They 
are making the communities unhappy. They are not getting jobs, so they are 
unhappy as well". But the government in its wisdom said it could not limit the 
movement of its citizens. 295 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ Total number of text units retrieved = 54 
+++ R~trievals in 3 out of 4 documents, = 75%. 
+++ The documents with retrievals have a total of 719 text units, so text 
units retrieved in these documents = 7.5%. 
+++ All documents have a total of 741 text units, 
so text units found in these documents = 7.3%. 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
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APPENDIX G 
Example of Stage Two Coding 
of Interview Data 
Report of subsequent data searches. 
Generated by QSR NUD*IST software. 
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Q.S.R. NUD*IST Power version, revision 4.0. 
Licensee: School of Commerce &Law. 
PROJECT: PhD, User Graeme, 2:28 pm, Feb 2, 1999. 
******************************************************************************** 
(I 54) //Index Searches/Index Search3022 
*** Definition: 
Search for (INTERSECT (2 3) (4 2 1)). No restriction 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Interview-Respondent Number 1 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 192, = 0.52% 
++ Text units 112-112: 
And the mine had no choice but to rely on the government in these ma.tters; it 
was bound by the rules and regulations of PNG. 112 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Interview-Respondent Number 2 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 4 units out of 220, = 1.8% 
++ Text units 50-50: 
The biggest error we made was to think that we, as a company, were there for 
t'he benefit of all Papua New Guinea. For instance, people in Australia can 
understand that the benefits of operations in Australia should be shared 
equally between all Australians, and this is done through the distribution of 
wealth by the central government. 50 ++Text units 52-52: 
Our agreement was with the PNG government,. and we saw Port Moresby as our chief 
area of control and they were the people who made the laws for the country. Arid 
so whatever we did, we had to do with their approval. If we had their approval, 
then it was legaily acceptable and correct and we were able to do it. 
52 ++ Text units 62-62: 
Our negotiations were with the central government, which was right and 
62 ++ Text units 214-214: 
The PNG government made no environmental demands on the company at all. 
such initiatives were taken by the company. 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Interview-Respondent Number 3 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 2 units out of 307, = 0.65% 
++Text units 32-32: 
proper. 
All 
214 
And we aggressively tried to address that with a distinct lack of satisfaction 
because nobody could ever digest that as it had been inherited from the initial 
mining legislation which was antiquated and based on Australian law. 
32 ++ Text units 295-295: 
There were peaks of discontent and nobody addressed that problem. Continually, 
management would ask the government • ... why don't you stop the flow of all 
these unemployables across the sea because they are disrupting everybody. They 
are making the communities unhappy. They are not get·ting jobs, so they are 
unhappy as well". But the government in its wisdom said it could not limit the 
movement of its citizens. 295 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ Total number of text units retrieved = 7 
+++ Retrievals in 3 out of 4 documents, = 75%. 
+++ The documents with retrievals have a total of 719 text units, 
units retrieved in these documents = 0.97%. 
+++ All documents have a total of 741 text units, 
so text units found in these documents = 0.94%. 
so text 
377 
APPENDIX H 
Biographical notes: 
Papua New Guineans who feature in 
the events recorded in this thesis. 
378 
Sir Julius Chan, an integral member of PNG's parliament following 
independence, was the country's inaugural Finance Minister. In 1980 he 
defeated Somare in a no confidence vote and became Prime Minister in a five 
party coalition. His government was torn by in-fighting between the various 
parties, and he stepped down from office following the 1982 elections to be 
replaced by Somare. He served again as Finance and Planning Minister in the 
Wingti government, and was returned as Prime Minister in 1994. 
A member of the first intake of UPNG in 1966, Rabbie Namaliu graduated in 
history and English after which he secured a Masters degree in Canada. 
Originally returning to UPNG as a lecturer, Chief Minister Somare recruited 
him as a private secretary in 1973. Following independence, Namaliu became 
Provincial Commissioner for East New Britain, then chainnan of the PNG 
Public Services Commission. Winning the seat of Kokopo in 1982, Somare 
appointed him Minister of Foreign Affairs. Defeating Wingti in July 1988, he 
became Prime Minister. 
Sir Michael Somare was born in 1936 in Rabaul and studied to be a teacher 
before taking up a career in radio broadcasting. A founder of the Pangu Pati, 
Somare was elected member for East Sepik in the National Parliament in 1968. 
He became Parliamentary Leader of that party in the same year at the first 
session of the House of Assembly. In April 1972 Somare formed the first 
Coalition Government between the Pangu Pati, the People's Progress Party, 
and the National Party and became the first Chief Minister. After PNG attained 
self government in 1973, Somare lobbied vigorously for a rapid transition to 
full independence. When this was achieved in 1975, he became the country's 
first Prime Minister. On 11 March 1980, Somare's coalition collapsed due to 
irreconcilable differences between the party leaders, and Chan became Prime 
Minister. Chan's leadership lasted barely two years, and Somare was returned 
to office once again. After three motions of no confidence during 1985, Somare 
fell to Wingti in November that year. He has remained in parliament since that 
time, and in 1999 held the office of Foreign Minister and Minister for 
Bougainville Affairs under PM Mekere Morauta. 
Born near Mt Hagan, Paias Wingti entered UPNG in 1974 to study 
economics. Elected to the Mt Hagan open seat in 1977 on the Pangu Pati ticket, 
he served as Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation until the fall of the 
Somare Government in 1980. The strong support for the Pangu Pati in the 
1982 general elections resulted in his elevation to leader of the party's 
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Highlands block and Deputy Prime Minister. The 1985 split in the Pangu Pati 
saw 15 party members move to the Opposition, with Wingti as leader. That 
year, defeating Somare in a no confidence vote, he became Prime Minister at 
age 34. His second term as Prime Minister followed the 1987 election, but he 
was replaced by Namaliu in July 1988. Wingti served again as Prime Minister 
from 1992 to 1994. 
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of Papua New Guinea 
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Region 
Papua 
Highlands 
Momase 
Islands 
Province 
Western (Fly) 
Gulf 
Central 
National Capital District 
Milne Bay 
Northern (Oro) 
Southern Highlands 
Enga 
Western Highlands 
Chimbu (Simbu) 
Eastern Highlands 
Mo robe 
Madang 
East Sepik 
West Sepik (Sandaun) 
Manus 
New Ireland 
East New Britain 
West New Britain 
North Solomons 
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Raymond W. Ballmer was General Manager, then Managing Director of BCL 
during the Bougainville mine's construction and early production phases (1969 
to 1975). A United States citizen with extensive experience in large open-pit 
mines, he was chosen as on-site head of the new project because no Australians 
with comparable credentials were available. With the operation well established 
in 1975, he resigned from BCL and returned to the U.S.A. 
Joining CRA in 1955, Donald S. Carruthers became General Manager for the 
group's exploration in 1969, and assumed management of the CRA's coal 
interests in 1975. As BCL's Chairman from 1986, Carruthers, like Cornelius, 
was caught in the events which would eventually result in the closure of the 
mine. 
Having spent many years in other CRA operations, Robert J. Cornelius 
joined BCL in 1982 as General Manager of concentrator operations before 
becoming Managing Director in 1987. The adverse external forces which began 
brewing during Quodling's tenure increased and erupted in Cornelius' 
administration. 
Sir Frank F. Espie, O.B.E. was a key figure of the establishment of BCL. 
When the project moved into the evaluation phase in 1965, control passed from 
King to Espie who was to guide the operation for the next fifteen years. 
Commencing work in 1947 for a firm which was to become a member of the 
CRA group, Espie became Managing Director, then Chairman of BCL and was 
appointed Deputy Chairman of CRA in 1974. Retiring from executive duties in 
1979, he remained a director of BCL and CRA until 1985. 
Haddon King, a geologist, was responsible for CRA's search for copper 
throughout the south-west Pacific area in the 1960s. As Director of Exploration, 
he managed the exploration project which led to the identification of Panguna's 
vast mineral deposits. 
Kenneth M. Phillips was CRA Exploration's senior geologist who, under 
King's direction, led the 1964 prospecting team on Bougainville. According to 
Oliver (1991:155) "it was Phillips' imagination and general exploratory flair 
which recognised, and realised, the [area's] possibilities". As the group's 
leader, it was Phillips who negotiated equitable terms of access with the local 
villagers. 
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When Vernon returned to Melbourne he was succeeded by Paul W. Quodling, 
O.B.E., who served as General Manager from 1977, then Managing Director 
from 1982 until his retirement in 1987. Commencing with Rio Tinto Mining 
Company of Australia Pty Limited in 1956, Quodling joined CRA's exploration 
team on Bougainville in 1966. He became Assistant General Manager for 
Administration, and then Assistant General Manager for Personnel and 
Community Relations prior to his appointment as General Manager. 
Donald C. Vernon joined the CRA group in 1953 and assumed management of 
the Bougainville venture in 1966. Based in Melbourne, he was Espie's principal 
aide. Moving to Bougainville in 1970, he became Managing Director when 
Ballmer withdrew in 1975. In 1977 he returned to Melbourne to take a wider 
role in CRA, including chairmanship of BCL upon Espie's retirement from that 
position. 
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in the events recorded in this thesis. 
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Max Denehy was the Assistant District Commissioner for the Kieta Sub-
District at the time mineral exploration commenced on Bougainville. As liaison 
officer between the administration and the local population, Denehy was 
responsible for advising the Bougainvilleans of the imminent arrival of CRA as 
well as assisting the investigation party in matters such as access and 
interpretation. 
Emeritus Professor James Griffin was formerly Professor of History at the 
University of Papua New Guinea, and is a Senior Research Fellow, Pacific 
History, Australian National University. 
Gabriel Lafitte is the author of various commentaries on Bougainville. In a 
footnote to Logic is a White Man's Trick: The Bougainville Rebellion, Griffin 
(1990b:80) reports: 
The "Bougainville Initiative" was actually written by a certain Gabriel Lafitte, Fr 
Momis' press officer for a few months before the 1987 elections. He had no prior 
experience of Papua New Guinea. In February 1990 he was a convenor of a protest 
meeting [in] Melbourne, billed as "Bougainville - Our New Vietnam" ... Lafitte 
describes himself as "a prominent Buddhist". He is currently manning a Melbourne-
based Bougainville Information Service sponsored by Community Aid Abroad. The 
BIS is to become eventually part of a Melanesian Information Service whose task 
will be "to call for Australians to re-think their relationship with Melanesian 
nationalism." He thinks Bougainville people are "fairly unsophisticated," Times of 
PNG, 17 and 24 May 1990. Students of exhibitionism will note the extraneous 
purposes to which another people's tragedy can be put. It is interesting to compare 
Lafitte's view of the nobility of the BRA rebellion with his fonner employer's 
view. Fr Momis, minister for Provincial Affairs, describes the BRA as "a minority 
isolated armed gang controlling Bougainville only through the 'power of the gun 
and bullying intimidation." The Australian, 28 May 1990. 
Given Lafitte's criticism of BCL and its activities, the researcher asked a former 
executive whether he (Lafitte) had contacted the company to determine their 
perspective on the situation on Bougainville. To the best of the executive's 
knowledge, Lafitte had never sought BCL's views or opinions. 
Emeritus Professor Douglas Oliver has devoted his life to the study of the 
peoples of the Pacific. In 1950 he became professor of Anthropology at 
Harvard University, following which he held the Chair of Pacific Islands 
Anthropology at the University of Hawaii. His association with Bougainville, 
which commenced in 1938, is acknowledged by his widely cited works on the 
history and people of the islands and his consultancy to BCL during the early 
years of the Panguna mine. 
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Graduated from UPNG in 1971, Leo Bannett was a chainnan of the BSPC, 
District Planner for the Provincial Government, a founder of the BDC, and 
Premier of NSP from 1980 to 1984. More recently, he has acted as adviser to 
the PNG Prime Minister on the North Solomons. Hannett was born on Nissan 
in 1941, and studied at Holy Spirit Seminary in Madang with Momis and Sarei. 
When Alexis Sarei resigned as Premier of-the NSP Government in 1987 he was 
succeeded by Joseph Kabui, the Melanesian Alliance Party endorsed member. 
Being from a relocated village near the mine tailings dump, a member of the 
Panguna Landowners' Association, and previously serving as an industrial 
officer with the BMWU, Kabui was largely responsible for distancing the 
provincial government from BCL and its activities. He continued as Premier 
until being suspended by Acting PNG Prime Minister Diro in April 1990. 
Appointed Justice Minister in the Bougainville interim government following 
the declaration of independence, he was a key figure in the subsequent 
negotiations with the PNG government. 
An early supporter of the Panguna landowners, Sir Paul Lapun was born 
1923 in Buin, and trained for the priesthood before becoming a teacher in the 
mission schools. He won the Bougainville seat in the 1964 House of Assembly 
elections, and was returned in 1968 and 1972. A member of the Pangu Pati, he 
served as Under-Secretary for Forests and Minister for Mines and Energy. 
Despite strong opposition, Lapun successfully moved a Bill through parliament 
which, in 1966, gave Bougainvillean landowners 5 per cent of BCL's royalty 
payments. 
Born at Buin in 1942, Father John Momis attended high school in Queensland 
and was ordained a Roman Catholic priest in 1970. Opposed to the presence of 
the Panguna mine from its inception, he has been a central figure in PNG 
politics since 1972 when he became MHR for Bougainville. He was deputy 
chairman of the Constitutional Planning Committee, has served as a 
Government Minister under Somare, Chan and Namaliu and has been both 
Deputy Prime Minister and Opposition Leader. Originally a member. of the 
Pangu Pati, he co-founded the Melanesian Alliance Party in 1982. As Minister 
for Provincial Affairs during the Bougainville crisis, Fr Momis' loyalties were 
divided between national unity and Bougainvillean autonomy. 
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Born in 1936 at Kieta, Henry Moses is led a landowner in one of the Panguna 
mining leases. Starting work as a teacher, he joined BCL as an industrial 
relations officer and subsequently became president of the BMWU. Politically 
active, Moses was a councillor with the Kieta Local Government, a founding 
member (and later chairman of the Development Planning section) of the 
BSPC, and NSP member for Panguna. 
Francis Ona was born in 1953 in Guava and attended Marist mission schools 
on Bougainville. In 1976 BCL employed him as a mine-pit surveyor, a position 
he held for ten years before being transferred to pit operations as a haul-truck 
operator. In August 1987 he was elected General Secretary of the 'new' 
Panguna Landowners' Association. Ona terminated his work with BCL in 
November 1988 when he disappeared into the bush. A leader in the fight for 
independence, he became Interim President of the Republic of Bougainville in 
May 1990. 
Alexis Sarei, born on Buka in 1934, holds a PhD in Canon Law from the 
Vatican, and was ordained a priest in 1966. He left the clergy to become 
personal secretary and adviser to Chief Minister Somare, and was appointed 
District Commissioner of Bougainville District in 1973. Feeling his loyalties lay 
more with fellow islanders than with PNG, Sarei supported secession and was 
declared interim president of the Bougainville Republic at the 1975 
independence ceremony. He was elected NSP premier in 1976, but was 
replaced by Hannett in the 1980 elections. In 1984, he regained the premiership 
only to lose it again in 1987. 
Inaugural president of the 'new' Panguna Landowners' Association, Pepetua 
Serero was a native of Guava who had worked for the Administration radio 
station on Bougainville. Like Ona, her first cousin, she was deeply suspicious 
of whites and vehemently opposed to the mine. Serero died of pneumonia in 
1989 at the age of 36. 
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Source: 
APPENDIX M 
Procedures for claiming damages under 
the Mining Ordinance 1927-66 
Bedford, R. D. & Mamak, A. F. 1977. Compensating for 
Development: The Bougainvillean Case. Christchurch: Bougainville 
Special Publications, page 31. 
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The villager (or village) concerned raised the issue with one of the District 
Administration's officers who, after checking the claim, would file a complaint 
in the Mining Warden's Court. This officer would represent the plaintiff at the 
hearing. 
A claim typical of many lodged during the period of road construction in the 
Pinei valley in the late 1960s is noted below. 
Okiong-Amentat of Korpei village who had gardens on the land known as 
'Damara (no. 2)' owned by Simon Porake sued the Company for the following 
damages: Destruction of 20 small pitpit clumps, 6 mature banana clumps, 100 
roots of tapioca, 1 kaukau (sweet potato) plot 63 feet [19.2 metres] by 140 feet 
[42.7 metres]. Amentat had no other gardens at the time and sought assistance 
in the preparation of a new garden as well as cash compensation for the 
destruction of his crops. The judgement handed down at the Mihing Warden's 
Court on 9 October 1969 was: 
Compensation for destruction of crops 
Cash payment in lieu of rations for 22 
months while a new garden was established 
Total cash settlement 
[A] $86140 
[Al $84141 
[A]$170142 
In addition the Company was to prepare a garden site covering an area of one-
fifth of an acre within three months of the court hearing. 
140 US$120 
141 US$118 
142 US$238 
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Source: 
APPENDIX N 
Schedule of Compensation Rates 
for Subsistence Crops, Animals, 
and Trees in 1970. 
Bedford, R. D. & Mamak, A. F. 1977. Compensating for 
Development: The Bougainville Case. Christchurch: Bougainville 
Special Publications, page 32 
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ITEM A$ ITEM A$ 
Foods (per plant) Tauna (Vegetable) 2.00 
Banana plant 2.00 Tomato 0.50 
Breadfruit tree 5.00 Water cress (sq.yd.) 0.50 
Betelnut tree 3.00 Yam vine 0.40-0.80 
Bean vine 0.20 
Cucumber vine 0.20 Garden allgwance (per acre) 
Chinese cabbage 0.05 Clear and replant 200.00 
Corn cob 0.02 Replant only 30.00 
Choko vine 0.10 Fencing (per chain) 2.00 
Daka (pepper) 2.00 
Ginger 0.20 Animals (each) 
lpika (leaves) 0.50 Dog l.00-20.00 
Korokorung (curry) 0.20 Pig 10.00-80.00 
Mango tree 5.00 
Mumu (leaves) 0.10 Building materials 
Muli (citrus) 1.50 Bamboo (!Oft, thin) 0.01 
Pawpaw plant 1.00 Bamboo (!Oft, thick) 0.10 
Pineapple (each) 0.20 Galip tree 3.00 
Pineapple (sq. yd.) 0.60 laru tree 2.00 
Pau (nut) 2.00 Kanda vine 1.00 
Pumpkin vine 0.40 Limbom tree 1.00 
Passionfruit vine 1.00 Laulau tree 2.00-5.00 
Sago palm (coastal) 5.00 Other saplings 0.20 
Sago palm (inland) 1.50 Others (8-10 in. diam) 0.60 
Sugar cane (clump) 0.90 Others (large) 1.50 
Sugar cane (6ft stick) 0.10 Pandanus tree 2.00 
Sweet potato (per sq. yd) 0.05 Pitpit (clump) 0.20 
Sweet potato (per sq. yd) 0.05 Sapwood tree 5.00 
Taro (kongkong) 0.40 Ropebark tree 0.30 
Taro (normal) 0.08 
Tapioca 0.20 
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APPENDIX 0 
Examples of successful 'nuisance' compensation 
claims made by resettled people during 
the establishment period of the Panguna mine. 
Source: 
Bedford, R. D. & Mamak, A. F. 1977. Compensating for 
Development: The Bougainvillean Case. Christchurch: Bougainville 
Special Publications, page 44. 
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1. In 1969 the Pakia villagers received [A]$17 [US$24] per head on the 
basis of the following claims: flooding of the tributaries of the Pinei river 
as a result of earthworks; school children endangered by heavy 
construction machinery on the only access route to their school; the road 
rendered virtually impassable by mud and dust; a general loss of 
aesthetic appeal in the village neighbourhood as a result of construction 
activities. 
2. In 1971 the Moroni villagers received [A]$1,460 [US$1,898] for the 
following damages: disturbance to sleep due to continuous 'round the 
clock' working of bulldozers; disturbance, annoyance and inconvenience 
from blasting; annoyance and general unpleasantness in the village 
caused by rotting vegetation and dieseline; destruction and loss of water 
supply and sources of firewood; and disturbance of burial grounds. 
3. In 1972 villagers at Iuna, who experienced a landslide due to movement 
of heavy traffic on the western access road, were granted [A]$25 
[US$35-50] to [A]$50 [US$71] per head for hardship caused by the 
landslide, [A]$500 [US$710] to the village for a singsing (traditional 
feast) to celebrate their survival, and [A]$450 [US$639] for damage to 
other property. 
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APPENDIX P 
Correspondence between Father John 
Momis (on behalf of the Melanesian Alliance 
Party) and Mr Paul Quodling (Managing 
Director, Bougainville Copper Limited) 
Reproduced from: 
Quodling, P. 1991. Bougainville. The Mine and The People. St 
Leonards: The Centre for Independent Studies Ltd., pages 90-95 
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p ·~: f:.·: J :-.~ (_! 
'. ;:::_i 
-----------·--- --· ...... . 
Paul Quodling, 
Managing Director, 
Bougainville Copper Limited, 
Panguna, 
North Solomons Province, 
Papua New Guinea. 
Dear Paul, 
'"'I •• ~ •• 
. . .• .... ~~ 
Phcn::-: 'J-; -~ ., _,,· : 
.... 
BOUGAINVILLE INITIATIVE FUND 
4 May I987 
I come to you, having been a leader of this nation for over I5 years, to of£e~ 
you a gift on the eve of your retirement. You have lived among us for many 
years. Perhaps the mine you created will not long outlast your, retirement. 
The gift I offer you is on behalf of the Melanesian people, and particularly 
on behalf of the people of Bougainville. You will come to see t~t what I am 
proposing is indeed in the hearts of all the people of Bougainville. 
What I offer you is the gift of understanding, of knowing in your heart the 
people of this island. I offer you the opportunity to crown your long career 
with the achievement of gaining the friendship of the people, who currently 
regard BCL with great resentment. I off.er you an initiative which will break 
the deadlock which has long frustrated us all, a ~ay out of the staleme.~e which 
leaves us feeling exploited, and leaves you frustrated at being denied permissmon 
to explore, fearful lest our resentment again boila over, as it has in past 
;rears. 
What I propose in fact oifers a win for everyone, and loss for no-one. 
Consider the problems inherent in the present situc.tion. Some of what I say, you 
may not want to hear. Yet in yourheart, you know it is true. To reject the pain-
ful truth is a mistake. The fundamental truth is that BCL has colonized our peo~le, 
it has taken their land, it has reduced them to passive dependence. Our people 
-who to you are just Bougainvill eans,. or even more anonymously 'nationals 1 -
are now servants in a land where once they were masters. They keenly feel it, 
and deeply resent it. In your heart you know this to be true, even it it is 
your compant's policy to keep a low profile, to keep such distance from the 
people that no-one says it to your face. So few of your staff are nationals, 
except for the unskilled and semi skilled who do the dirty shiftwork, breathing 
the dust you make when you make a hole out of a mountain. After fifteen years 
of mining,. only a handful of nationals have a rank higher than foremen, and that 
number is not growing but shrinking. 
I do not come to you to cause you pein. As you will see, I have come to offer 
a fresh initiative, based deeply in our Melanesian culture, \·rhich can do much 
to resolve the impasse which frustrates us all. Yet the ~tarting point must 
be an honest acknowledgement of the truth, even if it is painful •. 
No solution can undo what has been done. Some things are irrevocable. The l3CL 
mine has !brever changed the perceptions, the hopes and fears of the people 
ot Bougainville. You are invaders. You have invaded the soil and the places 
o~ our ancestors, but above all, your mine has invaded our minds. It is like 
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those great alien spaceships, the flying saucers, which so hawit the !'earfu]. 
imagination of Western movie audiences. The spaceship, with its. unknown and vastly-
powerful technologies, lands in the village, terrifying local people who cannot 
be sure if the aliens wish them ill or good. The people of .Bougai.nville speak 
ot· BCL as a monster, and you know it. In recent months our theatre troupes 
have presnted just this view, to you in your own mining company town. 
You say you are good corporate citizens. You pay taxes to the national govern-
ment, you pay wages, you p;;y royalties, you trumpet your public relations 
stunts such as the Bougainville Copper Foundation, which doles out small sums 
to local sports clubs and the like. You build infrcstructure, you compensate 
landowners. Yet those very monies are also very much the problem. 
You have been so determined~~e our earth and send it to Europe and Japan as 
quickly as possible, that you have created an operation on a scale which makes 
it overwhelming. Because of that massive scale you ?Our fifty million tons of 
our- earth into the Jaba River every year. Bec:;.use of that massive scale, yo.u 
have made such massive profits that our economy has been reduced to colonial 
dependence. 
You are not ruthless e:rploi ters. You are the modern faceless corporation which 
takes care to observe local laws, and incorporates local people, locking them 
into minority shareholdings in trading operations you so generously call a foun-
dation. The vast sums of money you make by selling our gold, silver and copper 
has created amounts of cash undreamt of before. And that cash has tr2.gically 
seduced some of the best leaders of our people. It has robbed us of sorne o:r 
our finest men, who have ceased serving their peo le, and instead line their 
own pockets with the money of BCL. You may not be legally responsible for the 
Bougainville Development Corporation scandal, but morally it is your shame as 
much as ours. 
So many of your executives inhabit a fantasy world. They suppose they can 
merely maintain correct, formal relations with the deomocr:;.tica~l:r ''lected 
government which represents the peo~le of this province, and there will be no 
problem. There is a problem. It is all the worse because it has remained unspok en 
for· so long. The problem is that your way and our Melanesian way are different. 
Our people want to improve their lives, to improve their skills and abilities. 
They want to learn skills appropriate to village development. Not only does 
BCL have almost nothing to offer th~t is relevant to assisting the sel:!-reliana? 
and dignity of our people, it actually saps the confidence, reducing our people 
to dependent wage slaves, cogs in a wheel. You have parked your bulldozers 
in our living rooms, yet you pretend that you can simply go about your business, 
and we go about ours, and never the twain meet •. I tell you this is not so. 
The time has come for such delusions to·meet the test of reality. Our culture 
has an ancient entrepreneurial tradition, which~ if nurtured, could restore 
t1ie lost dignity and self-reliance which has descended on us in the lifetime 
of'. this gigantic mine. Our Melanesian entrepreneurial tradition differs marke~ 
from yours. Material wealth was not an end in itself, but a means to gain renown, 
the esteem of one's people. Thus accumulated wealth was regularly distributed 
back to the people who helped create it. By contrast, you are the head of a 
corporation, a body which lives and breathes even when you have reti~ed to your 
f~ in ·.._ Australia. T:Q.~ corporation is an entity which uses the energies 
or men, uut has its own life. 
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The modern corp0ration does not obey the natural rise and fall-of life and 
death, as does our Melanesian tradition, which distributes a leader's wealth 
when he dies. The modern corporation obeys the ideology of the cancer cell, to 
ever grow and grow, without ceasing. 
I want you to understand our Melanesian way. I offer you the gift of understanding 
our culture, because such understanding is the key to transforming BCL's relations 
with the many peoples of Bougainville. If you appreciate the true nature of 
·Melanesian culture, then you can leave as our fri~nd, knowing we have made a 
start to building the bridges we must build between your way and ours. 
The Melanesian way is energetically struggling to adapt to the invasion. which 
BCL has brought. In every village, people now have fresh expectations. They 
want vocational training, to build timber houses tdth long lasting roofs. 
Tlrey want training in self-reliant cash crop growing. They uant better roads, 
and transport, and access to markets. They want trading companies to market 
their produce, companies which do not grow uncontrollable, but which follow 
Melanesian tradition, which return profits to the people whose energies create 
wealth. 
While the Melanesian way is struggling with the cash society you have brought, 
BCL has shown so little understanding or appreciation of the Melanesian 
culture. So many of your em9loyees a.re racist, openly contemptu:Jus of us, 
just as the kiaps were. You have lived alongside us, but not among us. Consider 
the example of an earlier invasion, that of the Church. It was initially 
alien, but it brought the good·news of compassion, love, justice and humility 
to the hearts of our people. It is now a national church, evOlving a Melc..nesian 
theology. Your company shows no such sensitivity. BCL eats, roots and leaves. 
Tar employees insult our national dignity, renaming our nation as Papua Yugimm6. 
BCL workers are told only to keep a low ~rofile. They are given no training 
whatever in our way of seeing. And you know tl:J.a.t our women can be procured 
for K5 at the Panguna mine. 
Thus I come to my specific 9roposal. This proposal achieves several aims. It 
meets the needl> of our people. It restores our dignity, confidence and sel~­
reliance. It gives us the resources to tackle the law and order problem at its 
roots. It sets an example to the nation of the dignified way equals meet to 
resolve their differences. It gives you the friendship of a people who 
for long liave deeply resented you. Once you have won their genuine friends lip, 
it may be possible to begin negotiations over the moratorium which prevents 
exploration of the rich copper neighbouring the existing mine. 
What I propose is not just my idea. You will come to see, in this current naticn al 
election campaign, and through the North Solomons Provincial Government electiO'l 
campaign which starts as soon as the national election is past, that this proposal 
has the active support of the people of North Solomons. The will of the people 
will. prevail. If you do not iaunediately appreciate the wisdom of our proposal, 
I say to you now that you will, once you can clearly see the dignity and 
determination of the 9eo,1e. 
This proposal represents a fresh start. It puts behind us the shameful hijack 
of Bougainville Develo9~ent Corporation by selfish interests, end it puts 
aside BCL' s PO\·:er of 9atronage through your Bougainville Copper Foundation. 
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BOUGAINVILLE INITIATIVE FUND 
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The proposal is thiss that BCL set aside each year three percent of its groes 
income from selling our minerals, to be given directly to the North Solomons 
Provincial Government. This is untied aid, without strings. It is up to the 
government of the province to assert its dignity, capability and competence, 
to determine how that money may best be spent so as to foster the application 
of' the Melanesian entrepreneurial tradition to creating small scale ventures 
which meet the neeO:s of the people, and which return their benefits to the 
village people. As a matt er of national dignity, it will be for the government 
to apply such funds. If we are to recover our confidence in ourselves, this 
is essential. 
There can be no question of BCL's ability to pay. Three per cent of gross sal~ 
is, on 1986 figures, KI2.6 million, a modest figure which will greatly assist 
the government which has most directly borne the brunt of BCL's presence. 
BCL staff have told us that you could aasily save enough for such an annual 
payment, simply by utilizing more efficiently the machinery and manpower you 
have. Gross sales are an appropriate base line, as we do not accept your 
practice of salting away K60 million a year which you return. to the smelters 
who b~ our copper, for the privilege of having them accept your concentrates.. 
We are well aware of transfer pricing and of the existing cartel~. If you find 
three per cent of gross $ilea unacceptable, our alternative is four per cent of 
the net sales revenue you declare in your annual report. 
The agreement between the national government and BCL is outside the scope 
of this agreement. This is an agreement to assist the people who most immediately 
must acC"Omodate your massive operation. We place on notice the urgent necessiv 
of renegotiating the national agreement, given the likelihood that supercondudtor 
technology will slash world copper demand, quite possibly as soon as five yeam 
from now; and because the mine, when it is closed, will leave us an enduring 
legacy of pollution, and metal concentrations in our fish for thousands o~ 
years to come. By any standard your mining benches are incredibly steep <lll.d 
dangerous. Landslides will be the legacy. The government, national and provin~ia1, 
will inherit from you not only a giant hole where once there was a mountain, but 
also the long term expense of cleaning up, and this has not even been discusse:li 
with you. 
We have another reason for this BOUGAINVILLE INITIJ..TIVE. We are concerned not 
only for the people of Bougainville. The nation of Papua New Guinea is at 
a crossroad. One road leads to the r~petition, all over the nation, of the 
tragedy of Bougainville. We have had the Bougainville Development Corporation 
ripoff', we have had the Placer Pacific ripoff·. We can tell the nation right nOi 
the names of the next such tragedies. The names are Ok Tedi, Lihir, Misima, 
Porgera. Each time a few of our leaders surrender to the politics of greed, 
the nation as a whole moves closer to the rule of money, of a rich few 
holding onto power, backed by an army which protects them from the wrath of 
the dispossessed. So many countries have degenerated into corruption and 
dictatorship. PNC is a vital democracy, and can be saved such a fate, if the 
people can see how to live with such massive gold mines in a way which asser-ts 
the dignified right of sovereign people to ensure that benefit is distributed 
to all. 
The alternative road facing the nation is to make good use of our deepseated 
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into enhancing that collective strength. Nurturing such enterprise will talce 
time~ But there are examples of such enterprises, even if we have now created 
an elite of rich men who attach themselves to foreign businesses, to whom 
the Melanesian entrepreneurial tradition is no longer visible. 
As the EOUGAINVILLE INITIATIVE takes shape, you willf~Me from the North 
Solomons Provincial Government. 
One further issue needs to be clearly stated. Because the essence of the Initiative 
is to encourage local enterprise, we cannot permit BCL to swamp local enterpri.se 
by establishing giant supermarkets, at places such as Buin, or Buka, to compet8 
on unfair terms. No local trader can possibly compete with the freight rates 
you get, through the availability on the ship used to bring in mine supplies 
of space for imported foods. The National Investment Development Authori~y 
cannot permit such e:.cpansion of BCL's activities. Be content with mining, 
and feeding your expatriates on expensive imported food. Do not hide behind 
your public relations Foundation, and pretend that such supermarkets are 
a charity. We are asking that you encourage initiative, not stifle it. 
The social, economic and environmental impact of fifteen years of mining has 
not been dealt with constructively and openly until now. If it is left much 
longer, BCL will be gone. The people of Bougainville are determined to set 
a positive eXample to the nation. We will set a standard for dealing construct-
ively with giants such as BCL, so that our people can again control their own 
lives. ~e will restore self-reliance, through projects funded b,- seed capital 
from the Bougainville Initia-C.SFund we here propose. Such mone1 can succeed 
if it is spent by provincial and local community governments. They a.re the 
governments closest to the people. Only they can select projects which not 
only meet community needs, but which in turn generate self-sustaining 
financial independence !or community development. We are resolutely opposed 
to handouts and the passive dependence they create. What we are after is 
seed capital, to generate communal funds which are self-sustaining, and which 
instil pride in community development. I am sure you will acknowledge that BCL 
has never attempted such intimate understanding of our Melanesian va7 as to be 
capable of identifying such projects and patiently nurturing them. Your e:cplid;it 
BCL policy has always been to restrict your funds for large scale projects. 
Only our own democratically elected representatives can wisely ad.minister 
such a fund. 
I played a major role in the creation of provincial governments, in par1; as 
a constructive response to the acute frustrations felt b: the people o! 
this home province of mine, BOugainville. Having been a national leader 
"tor- so long, it is my belief that we must deal directly with each other, 
as human beings equal in dignity. I do not believe in making splashy press 
releases. Before publicizing this proposal I have come to you, face to face. 
I talk straight and true. What is proposed here must come to pass. It will 
he the public agenda of the coming weeks of election campaigning. But first 
I come to you, to offer· you our friendship, and to wish you a happy.retirement 
to top off a successful career. We invite you to retire in the k:nowle~ that 
you are not only a mine builder but also a community builder. 
May God bless you, 
Fr~-?!ls~ 
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BOUGAINVILLE COPPER 
UMrTI:D 
INCORPORA n:D IN 
PAPUA HEW CUINEA 
llth May, 1987 
Fr. John Momis 
Melanesian Alliance 
PO Box 6516 
BOROKO, N.C.D. 
Papua New Guinea 
Dear Fr. John, 
PAHCUNA. 
BOUCAIHVJLLE. P.H.C. 
CABLES: 
""BOUCOP PANCUNA"" 
In responding to your letter of 4th May, I must first assure you 
that it has long been my objective to see a larger proportion of 
the revenue generated by Bougainville Copper L~ted remain within 
the Province. However, there are certain legal and statutory 
constraints under which I am bound to achninister the financial 
affairs of this Company. These place your 'Bougainville Initiative 
Fund' outside my authority. 
It is µnfortunate that we did not have the opportunity to 
discuss this issue more meaningfully in an environment less 
dominated by pre-election politics. I believe that the 
periodic review of the Bougainville Copper Agreement as 
provided in the legislation under which we operate is a 
suitable venue for the parties to discuss relative Government 
revenues. 
In the light of your stated intention to niake this issue 
'the public agenda of the coming weeks of election campaigning', 
I will no doubt be forced to defend the activities for which I am 
responsible. I am reluctant to be placed in this position and 
will do my best to stick to the facts and maintain political 
neutrality. 
The sensationalism which the press have attributed to the 
issue I see as unfortunate and counter productive to the Company's 
relationships with Government. To me it is a cause of great 
personal grief to have this vote of censure cast on all that I 
have set out to achieve in moulding BCL into a responsible and 
sensitive corporation. Nevertheless, my disillusionment will not 
militate against my continued ef.forts _to assist this Province to 
the best of my ability within the responsibility vested in me. 
You·rs sincerely, 
~~ 
Managing Director 
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APPENDIX Q 
Arguments for independence, 
as advanced by Bougainvillean separatists. 
8September1968. 
Source: 
Hannett, L. 1975. The Case for Bougainville Secession. 
Meanjin Quarterly, Volume 34, page 290. 
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The Bougainvilleans are a culturally, ethnically, historically and 
geographically distinct group of people from the rest of Papua New 
Guineans. 
i) Culturally, Bougainvilleans feel and accept that they differ essentially 
from PNG cultures on our main types of dances like kuma and panpipe 
or bamboo dances. These are not found anywhere in Papua New 
Guinea. Most important of all, Bougainvilleans firmly believe that we 
have a distinctly marked different cultural and political ethos - on such 
fundamental principles as natural and social justice and respect and 
reverence for life. We believe in fair play at all times and that everyone 
has his or her rights that must be respected at all times. We do not 
believe in mob fighting or in the law of the jungle that might is right, and 
that individuals or groups of individuals can be a law unto themselves ... 
Numerous examples of wanton killing of human. life in Papua New 
Guinea by Papua New Guineans have led many Bougainvilleans to 
doubt whether Papua New Guineans share with us this conviction that 
human life is sacred and must be upheld with utmost reverence. 
ii) Ethnically, Bougainvilleans are obviously different from Papuans and 
New Guineans. We are generally jet black people, having common 
ancestry with more people down Western Solomons rather than with any 
groups in Papua New Guinea. Before the white man even set foot on our 
soil, there was a lot of intertrading among various groups of people in 
Bougainville. Nissan Islands to the north of Buka traded pigs with Buka 
people in exchange for clay pots, and clay smoking pipes and ochre 
paints which the Buka Islanders in tum bartered with pots from 
Bougainville mainlanders. Except for Nissan Islanders that got their 
traditional money from Tanga Island in New Island group, the Buka and 
Bougainville people made their own traditional money or traded them 
from the South Solomons. 
iii) We have always had a common history of ourselves as distinct from 
Papua New Guineans. The collective force of common experiences of 
exploitation, pain, suffering, and neglect from the colonial forces, have 
brought out more and more this collective consciousness of ourselves as 
one people defined and confined all the more by our geo-political 
isolation from the rest of Papua New Guinea. 
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APPENDIX R 
Bougainville Special Political Committee 
submission to the 
Constitutional Planning Committee 
Reproduced from: 
Mamak, A. F. & Bedford, R. D. 1974. Bougainvillean Nationalism: 
Aspects of Unity and Discord. Christchurch: Bougainville Special 
Publications, pages 73-79. 
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BSPC SUBMISSION TO TIIE CONSTITUTIONAL PLANNING COtf.!ImE 
Bougainville, 
July 26-28, 197l 
The Chief Minister, 
Papua New Guinea Government, 
Chairman of the Constitutional Planning Committee, 
Mr Michael Somare; 
The Deputy Chairman Constitutional Planning Committee, 
Fr John Homis; 
All Honourable Members of the Constitutional Planning Committee. 
Subject: Report of the Bougainville People in Conjunction with the 
Bougainville Special Political Co111111ittee 
Introduction: 
'11lis report is a result of discussions held between all Bougainville people and 
members of the Bougainville Special Political Committee. 
'11le Bougainville Special Political Committee wa·s formed at the Wakunai Combined 
Cowcil Conference in February this year. It is composed of council 
representatives, members of associations and Members of the House of Assembly. 
The Bougainville Special Political Committee is in fact taking the place of 
Government Liaison Offices in other districts and its task is to find out true 
opinion of the people of Bougainville to present to the Constitutional Planning 
Committee. 
The following is a list of members of the Bougainville Special Political Committee: 
1. S11111Uel Kariup 
2. Hamao Tato 
3. John Teosin 
4. Francis Borepiri 
S. John Rlvleviri 
6. Albert Hannett 
7. Clement Dana 
8. Stl!llson Purupuru 
9. John Kungkam 
10. Simon Putu 
11. Fabian Tonepa 
12. John Dnkeni 
13. Peter Teona 
14. Luke Kankana 
Buka Council 
Buka Council 
Hahalis Welfare Association - Buka 
Kunua Area 
Kereaka Area 
Nissan Island 
Teop-Tinputi Council 
Teop-Tinputi Council 
Wakunai Council 
Wakunai Council 
Eivo Council 
Ueta Council 
Napidakoe Navitu 
Busiba Association 
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15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
Aloysius Noga 
Mathias Wape 
Andrew Komoro 
Tony Anagu 
Thomas Sipana 
Ab~aham Sapuruku 
Paul Kaile 
Rupina Hoi 
Nicholas Pita 
Simon Tania 
Joseph Tatsi 
Raphael Niniku 
Buin Council 
Bui n Council 
Buin Counci i 
Siwai Council 
Siwai Counci 1 
Pikei Christian Customary Association 
Bana Council 
Carterets - Tasman - Mortlocks - Nuguria 
Hungkas Association - Port Moresby Branch 
f.fungkas Association - Lae Branch 
Torokina Area 
Arawa Village Leader 
Members of the Co-ordinating Committee of the Bougainville Special Political 
Committee: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Henry Hoses 
Michael Poowa 
Hoses Havini 
John Dumit 
Peter Sissiou 
Leo Hannett 
Kieta Area and Chairman of Finance Collllllittee 
Buin Area 
Buka Area 
Panguna Mungkas Association 
Panguna Mungkas Association 
Overall Chairman of Bougainville Special 
Political CollVllittee 
Ex-Officio Members of the Bougainville Special Political Co11UUittee: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Fr John Mo111is 
Raphael Bele 
Paul Lapun 
Donatus Mola 
HHA (Member of the House of Assembly) 
-MHA 
MHA 
HHA 
Each member of the Bougainville Special Political Collllllittee has formed Sub-
Committees in his area and these Sub-Committees have fully discussed the issues 
in question. 
To obtain the final results of all discussions, i.e. the thoughts of all the 
Sub-Committees and their opinions, there have been two large meetings called 
Plenary Conferences which are to bring every committee member to a central point. 
for summary discussions. 
The first of these meetings was held at Arawa from May 23 to 25, 1973. 
The second meeting was held at Pakia Village, Kieta Sub-district, and at this 
meeting all reports of all committee members were discussed. 
At this meeting discussions were held between members and the Co-ordinating 
Committee and all grievances, thoughts, opinions, attitudes of the people of 
Bougainvi1le were summarised as follows: 
Listen members of the Constitutional Planning Conunittee to what we have to say in 
this report. 
Hear our cries, hear our shouts,. take notice of our feelitl{Js, take notice of our 
strong thoughts and our thinking. All our opinions and all our thoughts; you must 
listen to them thoroughly and put such thought" and opinions in the netJ 
corn1titution so that this constitution can becor.;r. laiJ; c;.Jn become the basis of 
408 
our country. After U.stening to and considering and etJaluating this report IJe 
have made 1.1e belietJe you can establish a good constitution and a good governnent 
for this country so that it stands up rJith honour and truly represents the 
thoughts and opinions of the people of this country and ~ill also serve and 
strengthen the people of this country. . 
The people who have made this report are firmly convinced that the following 
changes which they have outlined must be put into practice quickly. 
A. DISTRICT GOVERNMENT 
1. We the people of Bougainville strongly want District Government as a first 
step 
The reason we want District Government is made clear in the following motion that 
was _passed at the Plenary Conference of the Bougalnville Special Political 
Co111111ittee at Pakia Village, Kieta Sub-district, where all gathered members of 
the committee unanimou.sly agreed. 
lbtion: The Bougainville Special Political Committee together with all the people 
of Bougainville want District Government on 1 November, 1973. Bougainville wants 
recognitton of its right to determine that, if some time in th~ future it wishes 
to remain within Papua New Guinea or independent, it must have the right to 
decide its own future. 
(Mr Clement Dana, the President of the Teop-Tinput~ Council, moved this motion 
and Mr Hamao Tato, Buka· Council- representative, seconded the motion. Every person 
present agreed with the motion.) 
Reference Resolution 1 - First Plenary Conference: Arawa, Hay 23-25, 1973. 
2. lhe people of Bougainville and the Bougainville Special Political Co111111lttee 
asked the Central Governlllent to give their District Government the 
following powers. 
(The following motion was moved by Anthony Anagu, Vice-President of the Slwai 
Council, and seconded by Samuel Kariup, President of the Buka Council; all agreed 
with the motion.) 
3. lhe following is a list of powers that the District Government requires: 
(a) Legislative Powers: the power to make laws. 
1. The District Government must have the right to 111ake some laws; these 
laws should cater for specific problems associated with individual 
districts. An example of this would be a law relating to unemployment 
and vagrancy. · 
2. Some laws should also try to alleviate specific district problems such 
as Standard·6 leavers or children who are retrenched from school at 
an early age. Also some schools should be established to cater for 
the traditional aspects of individual districts. Culture and tradition 
should fona an intricate part of education and law. 
3. 'lllere are also certain matters relating to individual districts that 
are taking up too much of the time of the Central Government. Such 
problems should be catered for at the district level. 
(b) Policy and Decision Making Powers: 'lllese laws will apply to detenainlng 
priorities of the district, and the right to carry .out these priorities. 
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1. The District Government must have the power to make laws pertaining 
to individual requirements within the district, e.g. where a new High 
School must be established, where hospitals IDUSt be built, the work 
of agriculturalists, surveyors, road-makers, rural industries, tourist 
industries; specific district problems are businesses, education, 
culture and tradition, and the economy. 
(c) Executive Powers: laws to carry out the administration of the district. 
1. The District Government ~ust have the power to control the public 
servants and also those public servants working with the Public 
Service must be responsible to it. 
2. The District Government must control each individual department within 
the district and each department snust be responsible to the District 
Government leader. 
l. The District Government must have the responsibility to allocate work 
and to correct or change work within their district so that maximum 
efficiency is obtained wi.thin the district. 
(d) Judicial Powers: courts. 
There must be within the District Government the right to hold District Courts who 
have the power to adjudicate matters pertaining to individual districts. 
1. · Ownership of land must be settled within the district. (Land titles) 
2. The District Government must be able to settle disputes on land. 
l. Village elders should be able to settle land problelllS, but in the event 
of such elders being unable to settle such disputes; people have the 
right to appeal for District COurt. 
4. Village Courts should be established in each district. Now in such 
cases JDatters should be settled a~cording to custom by the elders. In 
each instance the custom should be recorded and laid down as law within 
the district. Visitors to the distri~t must abide by the laws of 
custom and it is up to them to learn such laws. 
(e) Financial Powers: the power to raise taxes, customs, etc. This right 
must belong to the District Government. 
The Bougainville people consider the right to raise taxes, customs, within the 
district an important one. 
1. The District Government of Bougainville must have full power to control 
the land belonging to them and control over the exploitation of their 
natural resources. 
2. -With regard to non-renewable resources, such as copper, iron, gold, 
the District Government must establish a law along the following lines: 
If a company exploits the natural resources of a district, 
such as copper, iron, gold, or any other precious metal 
which cannot be replaced, a law must be established so that 
whatever company exploits such business resources must 
place in trust 111<>ney to compensat~ for the time when these 
natural resources are finished. 
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3. llte Bougainville District Government lllUSt have the power to raise 
taxes from such companies as Bougainville Copper or any other big 
companies which establish themselves in Bougainville. 
4. Royalties received from any ~ining ventures such as BCP must be paid 
to the District Government. · 
S. lhe Bougainville District GoverJ1.111cnt must have the power to collect 
licence taxes, storekeepers' fees liquor licencing fees, motor car 
drivers' licence fees, or any oth~r type of registration taxes. 
6. All Court fines must be paid into the District Government. 
1 • AU income taxes and excise or custom taxes wst be collected by the 
District Government. It ls better if the District Government allocates 
a proportion of collected taxes to the Central Government and not vice 
versa because in the past the Central Government has exploited the 
district and only allocated a sinall amount of what it has collected. 
4. District Government and the types of government within it. 
(a) Village Government: 
1. llte people of Bougainville in association with the Bougainville Special 
Political Committee realise that District Government will only be as 
-~trong as long as the people themselves at village level have some 
representation. 
2. We believe that District Government wst recognise that traditional 
leaders 111USt have the major say in the government at viiiaie level. 
3. Each individual area must find out for itself how traditional leaders 
or elders can make their own village areas good places to live in, and 
eliminate some of the troubles which we are having with the present system. 
•4. i h Leadership within each individual area must be established n t e sianner 
it was done traditionally. 
S. It will be i111portant for the traditional leaders to work closely with 
young educated people in village areas. 
6. It ls hoped that by incorporating traditional leaders in Village 
Government positions, such leaders will be recognised as before in 
helping to establish a sound country. 
7. At Village Government level it ls hoped that such traditional leaders will 
be able to settle traditional snatters such as landownership, marriages, 
and minor troubles in the vii lage areas. It will be important to 
incorporate these traditional aspects which have a chance of survival 
in the modern situation. 
8. There should be two ways in which traditional leaders may r1t into the 
Village Government level. 'I'hey can either be appointed as per . 
traditional methods or elected as per lllOdern method, according to the 
choice of the people. 
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(lo) Ward ColllJUittees: 
It will be important to have a Ward Committee to co-ordinate the activities of 
the tradltlonal leaders. These Ward Committees will act as a type of senate and 
will meet on WJ.tters which will affect more than one leader's area. 
(c) Council Government: 
The next level of government will be a trpe of Council Government arid this 
Government will be responsible directly to the District Government. 
1. >lost of the people of Bougainville recognise that the Local Government 
CoWlcils of today have no powers and have not got the right to establish 
strong laws. 
2. The Local Government Councils of today are weak and have not got the 
right or power to collect taxes to any great extent. 
3. Local Government Councils existing today also do not recognise the 
position of traditional leaders. 
4. Local Government Councils of today do not recognise traditional laws. 
It is important that the type of Local Government Council which exists 
today changes to suit the people. 
S. The first important change lllUSt be that traditional leaders must be 
accepted in the cotmcil"system. 
6. It may be that traditional leaders have to be accepted without the 
normal western type election. although it will be important to have 
younger people elected in the modern manner. 
7. It will be important for representatives of the Council Government to work 
in close association with the District Government so that there is a 
co-ordination of development occurring in individual council areas. 
This type of Council it is hoped will encourage proper development to 
suit the needs of the people. 
8. Representatives of the Council Governments. say one or two from each 
CoWlcil, will be appointed to form the District ~overnment. 
(d) District Govel"Jlment and District Assembly: 
A strong opinion of the Bougainville people and the Bougainville Special Political 
Committee is that the District Government must have all the powers that we have 
stated, which in effect are: 
A. There must be strong laws pertaining to the political, social and 
economic developm~nt of the district. 
8. The political head of the district must have strong powers. 
c. This political head must be elected by all the people of the district. 
D. The right to gove~ the district must belong to the President, or 
whatever name is decided upon, but only in association with his Cabinet. 
E. The Cabinet of the President which adr.:inisters the District must come 
from those elected to the District Government. 
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i=. The members of the District Assembly are elec_ted by e:ich Council 
Government as in (c) 8. 
G. The District Assembly must sit with the President of the District 
Government and must have the power to make laws or to ratify the 
administration of the district and must also be in a position to al locate 
funds to each Council area. Within each district there must be a Chief 
Secretary or position similar to this. 
H. The role of the Chief Secretary will be to administer the laws made by 
the District Government and the District Assembly. The Chief Secretary 
will be in effect the-senior public servant and, as such, will work in 
association with each administrative department and the public s~rvan~s 
working for those departments. 
Final Sununary 
Members of the Constitutional Planning Co111111ittee: 
We have discussed in this report at great length the type of District Government 
we· want and how it will be composed. Why we are worried is that we do not consider 
that we are prepared to go ahead with the rest of Papua New Guinea in obtaining 
Self-Government and Independence. We want you to hear our plea and give us 
District Government so that we can incorporate some of the changes we feel 
necessary before we go ahead. If the Central Government cannot give us District 
Government by I November, 1973, we have moved the following 1110tion to speed up 
changes on BougainviUe. The motion is as follows: 
"While waiting for the House of Assembly to ratify submissions of the 
Constitutional Planning Co~ittee and make them law, we the people of 
Bougainvllle ask the Central Government to give us a special purpose 
authority so that we can assume the responsibility ~n Bougainville 
for the requests we have made in this submission." 
(Motion moved by L. ll~nnett and seconded by Raphael Niniku representing his people: 
the JDOtion was passed \Dlanimously.) 
We want to repeat the motion that we have passed which is: "The Bougainville Special 
Political Committee together with all the people of Bougainville want District 
Government on 1 November, 1973. Bougainville wants recognition of its right to 
determine that, if some time in the future it wishes to remain within Papua New 
Guiriea or independent, it must have the right to decide its own future." We 
repeat once more that Bougainville wants the Central Government to give it District 
Government on 1 Novemoer, 1973. 
We thank you for hearing this submission. 
Henry Moses 
Hichae 1 Poowa 
Moses Havini 
John Dumit 
Pete·r Sissiou 
Leo Hannett 
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE BOUGAINVILLF. PEOPLE 
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Source: 
APPENDIX S 
Declaration of Independence 
of the 
Republic of Bougainville 
Oliver, D. L. 1991. Black Islanders: A Personal Perspective of 
Bougainville 1937-1991. Melbourne: Hyland House, pages 242-243. 
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Declaration of Independence - Republic of Bougainville. In the name of God 
the merciful Father, ruler of nations and Lord of the Universe, 
WHEREAS Bougainville Island was politically separated from the Solomon 
Group of Islands and seeded [sic] to the German colony of New Guinea by an 
agreement made in 1886 between England and Germany, and was subsequently 
included in the Australian Trust Territory of Papua and New Guinea in 1918 
and WHEREAS Bougainville was then included in the Independent State of 
Papua New Guinea despite the objections of the people of Bougainville, on the 
16th September 1975. 
AND WHEREAS Bougainville is geographically apart and its people culturally 
distinct from Papua New Guinea. 
AND WHEREAS it has been a long standing wish and aspiration of the people 
of Bougainville to become a separate independent nation. 
AND WHEREAS in 1989 Papua New Guinea declared and fought a war 
against the people of Bougainville the result of which has been the withdrawal 
of all police, army, navy and judicial functions from Bougainville. 
AND WHEREAS Papua New Guinea still declares that it has jurisdiction and 
authority over Bougainville and has begun imposing an economic embargo 
against Bougainville. 
AND WHEREAS the Bougainville Revolutionary Army has since been in total 
control of Bougainville on behalf of its people. 
AND WHEREAS Papua New Guinea has again declared its intention to invade 
Bougainville and subjugate its people. 
AND WHEREAS Papua New Guinea has refused to recognize the democratic . 
rights of the people of Bougainville. 
AND WHEREAS it is the inalienable right of a people to be free and 
independent. 
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Now therefore, I Francis Ona, Interim President of the Republic of 
Bougainville, DO HEREBY PROCLAIM AND DECLARE on behalf of the 
people and the government of the Republic of Bougainville that as from today 
the seventeenth day of May in the year one thousand nine hundred and ninety 
Bougainville shall be forever a sovereign democratic and independent nation; 
founded upon the principals [sic] of liberty and justice and eve seeking the 
welfare and happiness of he people in a more just and equal society. 
Francis Ona 
President 
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Source: 
APPENDIX T 
Text of the 'Endeavour Accords' 
between representatives of the 
PNG Government and Bougainville 
Bougainville: A Pacific Solution; 1994. Report of the Visit of the 
Australian Parliamentary Delegation to Bougainville, 18-22 April, 
1994. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, pages 75-
76. 
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A delegation of the National Government, led by the Right Honourable Sir 
Michael Somare, GCMG, MP, held broad-ranging talks with a delegation of 
Bougainville, led by Mr Joseph Kabui, from the 29th July to the Sth August 
1990 outside Kieta Harbour, abroad [sic] Her Majesty's New Zealand ship, 
Endeavour. 
International observers from Canada, Vanuatu and New Zealand were present 
at the talks. 
The two delegations welcomed the opportunity for face-to-face dialogue, and 
agreed that this process should continue. 
They agreed that the long term political status of Bougainville is to be 
addressed as part of the continuing dialogue. 
Meanwhile all .political declarations with respect to that future status are 
deferred. 
The National Government delegation confirmed that at the earliest opportunity 
it would take all practical steps consistent with the Constitution of Papua New 
Guinea to bring about the return of services to Bougainville. 
Such restoration of services would be done without force. But should 
personnel responsible for restoring services be interfered with, the 
Government of Papua New Guinea reserves the right to withdraw services 
where such interference occurs. 
The return of services, particularly health, education and communications are 
accepted as a matter of urgent priority. 
The two delegations agreed that in order for services to be restored on 
Bougainville, the security of personnel must be fully safeguarded. 
The Government of Papua New Guinea will consult regularly with the 
present Bougainville delegation on the restoration of services. 
The two delegations agreed on the desirability of the full participation of 
Bougainvilleans in future security arrangements on Bougainville. 
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The two delegations thanked the Government of New Zealand and the Royal 
New Zealand Navy for their generous assistance in making a venue and 
support facilities available for the talks. 
The two delegations also thanked the observers for their cooperation. 
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Source: 
APPENDIX U 
Extracts from the 'Honiara Declaration' 
between representatives of the 
PNG Government and Bougainville 
PNG Times, 24 January, 1991. Reproduced in Bougainville: A Pacific 
Solution (1994). Report of the Visit of the Australian Parliamentary 
Delegation to Bougainville, 18-22 April, 1994. Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, pages 77-80. 
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Principles. 
6. We desire peace and reconciliation with each other and with our 
Heavenly father. 
We take joint responsibility to restrain from the use of weapons and anns 
to create an environment of peace and harmony as well as a precondition 
to justice and peace. 
We agree to defer discussions on the future political status of 
Bougainville and have further agreed to embark upon a joint programme 
of Peace, Reconciliation, and Rehabilitation, within the current 
constitutional framework of the Nation of Papua New Guinea. 
We reject violence and seek meaningful consultation as a means of 
solving the crisis, and deeply mourn the loss of lives and destruction of 
properties, and trust in the common fatherhood of God and resolve to 
find lasting justice, peace and security on the Island of Bougainville. 
We recognise the importance of establishing legal and representative 
authority in Bougainville to assist in returning the island to normalcy. 
We recognise the constitutional role of the PNG Defence force. 
We agree to accept external assistance including a multinational 
supervisory team (MST) to contribute to the implementation of this 
programme under the framework determined in this Declaration. 
We commit ourselves to the welfare and security of all individuals and 
organisations who participate in this Programme. 
We endorse maximum Bougainvillean involvement in the implementation 
of this Programme. 
Definition of 'Programme'. 
7. The 'programme' in this Declaration means the Package of phased 
arrangements for the restoration of services on Bougainville including:-
Phase I 
(i) Peace and Restoration. 
(ii) Lifting of the Blockade. 
(iii) Establishment of a Task Force. 
(iv) Establishment of Interim Legal Authority. 
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Phase II 
(i) Restoration of Services. 
(ii) Rehabilitation Programme including maintenance and reconstruct-
ion; and other associfited activities determined by the legal 
authority in Bougainville in accordance with this Declaration. 
(iii) Future negotiations. 
Task Force Membership. 
8. In order to facilitate the execution of this Programme, we agree to hereby 
establish a Task Force which shall consist of representatives appointed 
by the National Minister for Provincial Affairs, in consultation with an 
Interim Legal Authority. 
Terms of Reference. 
9. We agree that the terms of reference for the Task Force shall include: 
(i) Planning, co-ordination and implementation of this Programme; 
(ii) Monitoring and supervision of this Programme; 
(iii) Investigate and determine the scope and components of the 
projects under this Programme; 
(iv) Investigate, mobilise and secure all financial avenues at its 
disposal to finance this Programme; 
(v) Develop a detailed timetable to implement this Programme which 
must be submitted to the Minister for Provincial Affairs for Final 
approval as soon as practicable following their appointments; 
(vi) The Task Force shall report to the Legal Authority in Bougainville; 
(vii) Furnish monthly reports or otherwise as directed by the Legal 
Authority in Bougainville; and 
(viii) Undertake other responsibilities as directed by the Legal Authority 
in Bougainville to implement this Programme. 
Obligations and Responsibilities. 
10. Parties agreed to take the following actions:-
National Government 
(i) (blank). 
(ii) Grant amnesty and immunity from prosecutions to the members 
of BRA, and BLF in accordance with legal and constitutional 
requirements of Papua New Guinea. 
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(iii) Organise a multinational supervisory team to participate in this 
Programme. 
(iv) Commit and disburse funds to the Programme under its normal 
budgetary allocations. 
(v) Allow and facilitate non-government agencies, including churches 
and community groups to contribute towards the successful 
implementation of this Programme. 
(vi) Resume all government services including public and statutory 
administration, law and order and justice. 
Bougainvillean Side 
(i) Disarm the BRA, BLF and its associated military activities 
including the surrender and destruction of arms under the 
supervision of the Multinational Supervisory Team. 
(ii) Release all detainees held as a consequence of the conflict. 
(iii) Guarantee the safety and welfare of the members of the 
Multinational Supervisory Team. 
(iv) Assist the Task force and the Legal Authority in Bougainville to 
expand funds towards effective implementation of projects to be 
developed under this Programme. 
(v) Receive and facilitate non-government agencies, including 
churches and community groups to contribute towards the 
successful implementation of this Programme. 
Programme Schedule. 
11. We agree that the following Time Schedule shall be adopted to implement 
this Programme from the signing of this Declaration:-
(i) One (1) week to one (1) month- establishment of the Task Force 
and assembling of the MST. 
(ii) Between one (1) month to six (6) months - project identification 
and resource mobilisation. 
(iii) Eighteen (18) to thirty-six (36) months - completion of the 
Programme, abolition of the Task Force, return to normalcy. 
Reviews and Consultations. 
12. We agree that this Declaration shall be reviewed at least on a six (6) 
monthly interval until the conclusion of the Programme in accordance 
with the Programme schedule. 
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13. Notwithstanding the foregoing paragraph, the National minister for 
Provincial Affairs may request a review either independently or on advice 
of the Legal Authority or the Task Force. 
14. The Programme under the Declaration does not for the time being include 
the programme of restoration of services undertaken by the National 
Government on Buka and adjacent islands. 
15. The National Minister for Provincial Affairs shall determine and reconcile 
the relationships between these two programmes on advice from the 
Legal Authority in Bougainville. 
Dispute Settlement. 
16. We agree to resolve any dispute including conflict or misunderstanding 
arising from the Programme under this Declaration through consultation 
and dialogue. 
17. Where resolution of disputes cannot be reached, each party may 
recommend arbitrators for approval by the other. When appointed, the 
arbitrators shall work towards resolving any such conflict and 
misunderstandings. 
18. This Declaration shall be terminated upon completion of this Programme 
or by one Party when acts of sabotage or similar action inconsistent with 
the spirit or letter of the Declaration taken by the other. 
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APPENDIX V 
Transcripts of 
respondent interviews 
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RESPONDENT INTERVIEWS 
Appendix V contains transcripts of the interviews conducted with three past 
executives of the Panguna mine, as well as an Australian who grew up on 
Bougainville. A small number of passages have been excised from the original 
conversations so as to shield the identity of the informants, however none of 
these omissions impact on the factual, interpretive or contextual material of the 
interviews. 
INTERVIEW ONE 
Location: Adelaide, Australia. 
Duration: 2.5 hours. 
This respondent was a key executive in the establishment of the Panguna mine. 
He was involved in the preliminary negotiations with the Australian and PNG 
authorities, and was intimately involved with the Bougainvillean people during 
the mine' s formative years. 
Interview Transcript 
The Bougainville people came from the South Solomons and populated the 
islands on the way up and they really did not have any cohesive way of living. 
The people who know most of what they do are probably the Catholic 
missionaries who have been there for a long time. When the trouble started, the 
missionaries sat on their hands because they wanted to be in control of the 
people. A lot of the mine employees were educated by the Church and [Father] 
Morn.is was one of them; he was probably on a short list of people who could 
have been Bishop of Bougainville. So most of them had a church background. 
My fears for the peace settlement is that most of the people come from little 
blotches of people all over Bougainville who have a different cultural 
background. The basic problem is the Bougainvilleans' lack of seeing 
themselves as a united people. When I started working with the idea of the 
mine, the division amongst the Bougainvilleans was apparent, but not openly 
so. I was in charge right from the start, so people may blame me for anything 
that went wrong, but they may also give me some credit for all the things that 
went right. I was very well aware of the strength of the Church and I spent a lot 
of time talking to the local missionaries and I learned a lot from them. 
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Generally, the missionaries gave me good advice. But I think that is where the 
problem may lie; too many groups of people who are not very broad in their 
outlook. 
My father was a mining engineer and he worked in Burma; I was born in 
Burma. My father and mother both came from Adelaide and I went to school in 
Adelaide. But I was quite a bit influenced by what happened in Burma, so I 
applied some of that knowledge to Bougainville and did my best to check on 
what happened in other parts of the world where mining companies tended to 
operate. Very wrongly in the eyes of some people, I persuaded somebody I had 
a lot of respect for to do a tour of Africa and come back and tell me what we 
ought to be doing. My board told me I was crazy, but I took no notice. This 
man told me that the people of West Africa who were from a British background 
did not have much time for the locals, and advised me not to take too much 
notice of the Australians in Papua New Guinea because they were part of the 
Australian government and they took too much notice of the Department 
administering the Territory under the trustee arrangement. There were not many 
parallels between the Bougainvillean situation and that in Africa. 
I was an unusual [person] in that having spent my early days in Burma, I had 
very strong views on what we should be doing in the interests of the local 
people. I could see the problems in Burma of the Englishmen who came out and 
looked down on the Burmese. They sent some Burmese to England for training, 
but did not give them any opportunities to get promoted, and the same sort of 
thing was happening in PNG with other English and Australian owned 
ventures. I wanted the Bougainvillean people involved from the beginning, so I 
spent a lot of time getting to know them. It must be remembered that it was their 
country. 
The missionaries did not treat the Bougainvilleans particularly well. They 
weren't anything in the [church] hierarchy; in the mission complex, the locals 
-lived the native quarters and very few of them lived with the expatriate clergy. 
The expatriate missionaries were a mixture of Dutch, American and Australian, 
but not too many Bougainvilleans. A few of the brighter Bougainvilleans went 
to secondary school and then went to tertiary institutions scattered around the 
planet. Some, like Momis, became priests. 
Many of the problems in the establishment period related to working out who 
owned the land where the mine would be situated. In time we got that fairly well 
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settled. I was responsible for the policies of employing mainly Bougain-
villeans, and the [indigenous] people were happy with that at the time. But 
· looking back on it, perhaps the percentage of local employees was not enough. 
The influx of PNG workers caused some problems because most of the ones 
that we had were tribally different to the Bougainvilleans and were better 
educated. Being better educated, they rose through the ranks of the company 
faster than the locals and this caused friction with some Bougainvilleans. 
We had three different styles of accommodation. We had the fellow straight out 
of the jungle in the basic rooms; we had a number of people at apprenticeship 
level who lived in different accommodation, and we had some in more Westem-
style lodgings. We brought them into the bottom accommodation; some 
graduated up and some did not - this was at their option. 
The question as to what [management] should have done differently is not 
simple. As you talk to [the other past executives], you will get three different 
answers. I tended to listen carefully to what the Church had to say. [One 
executive] was more the type who did not worry about what the Church 
thought; he did what he thought. I think [the other executive] was probably 
more inclined to listen to the government. 
The Church suggested that we were too generous in our compensation. They 
might have seen that compensation would cause a wealth gap between 
Bougainvilleans, but I suspect that while the Church wanted us to help the local 
people, it was worried that we might push the clergy aside. I think that the 
Church might have unconsciously felt threatened by the mine's influence on the 
people. 
Looking back on it, I think we should have been more forceful in bringing the 
local people together. By the local people, I mean Bougainvilleans from many 
villages and others from around PNG. We employed as many secondary 
educated Bougainvilleans as we could get hold of, but there was not enough of 
them. For apprentices, we had to go outside Bougainville to recruit. We were 
recruiting fellows from Rabaul, Lae and Port Moresby. We were taking the 
cream off the top of PNG students and workers, and this would have rankled 
the Bougainvilleans. Just how we might have brought these many people 
together, I'm not sure, but it might have been easier if we had started in the 
early days. 
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When it was decided to go ahead with the mine, there was no significant 
expressed resistance from the Bougainvillean people that I knew of. The 
government adopted the attitude that "we'll fix all that". Port Moresby, I 
believe, overestimated its own ability to evaluate and manage the whole 
situation. And the mine had no choice but to rely on the government in these 
matters; it was bound by the rules and regulations of PNG. To some degree, 
PNG now has to fix the problem it created. 
When the mine started, we did not know the extent of the environmental 
damage. We knew there would be an impact on the land, but there was no way 
of knowing just how big it might be. Compared to other mines, Bougainville 
was a Very high tonnage operation and so a large amount of material went down 
the river system. This would be a problem, but in the 60s, we did not see it that 
way. We expected most of it flow out to sea, and it did, but a lot remained in the 
river itself. We did our best to minimise the damage by using only one river 
system, and the material that was deposited in the river was in an uninhabited 
area so it did not affect the local people very much. I really don't think that the 
environmental question was the root cause of the Bougainvilleans' grievances. 
It was an issue, but not the main one. In the beginning, the people could not 
picture what the long term effect was going to be. When they saw the 
accumulation of the tailings, it concerned some of them, but people like Ona had 
to have something to complain about, and the river was a good target. But I 
think most of the native population were pretty happy; they were well looked 
after, they were well paid, they had good accommodation .,. by their standards. 
It seems to me that the revolution was the result of a discontented minority 
rather than the way most people thought. The mining lease was fairly close to 
the village where Ona lived, and that stirred the pot a bit. 
I don't think the PNG government was very interested in the Bougainvilleans. 
They might have had some concerns about the natives' grievances, but not to a 
very large measure; they were more concerned by the revenue. 
The company saw it as its duty to look after the Bougainvilleans as best it could, 
despite the Church's urgings not to be too generous. And in those days, this 
was a very advanced approach. We were providing good accommodation for 
Australian staff and we were careful to make sure that the accommodation for 
indigenous people was not inferior. We tried very hard to maintain an ·equitable 
situation. Our policies towards the Bougainvilleans gradually evolved; we were 
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not able to set them up from the beginning because we were not always sure 
what would be appropriate. But we were generally satisfied with them, and I 
believe the Bougainvilleans were also satisfied on the whole. Although the 
management styles of the executives differed, I believe we all had a common 
concern for the welfare of the locals. We may have put different emphasis on 
different points, but it is fair to say that throughout the years of the mine' s 
operation we were always sensitive to the people whose land we were using. 
I think the reasons things went so wrong was that we were not able to foresee 
the forces that were building up. There was no indication from the local people 
of the feelings that were going on under the surface that I knew of. Remember I 
was not there at the time, but it seems that the seriousness of the situation was 
not really evident until the power pylons were blown up. The PNG government 
did not have much to offer as a solution to the mine's troubles at that time; 
reliance on the rule of law was inadequate I think. Of course at that time in a 
developing country like PNG, most of the senior people had been out in the 
bush most of their li.ves. They had not had much broad experience in a lot of 
areas, so when the trouble started, they were left wanting. Also, there were very 
few people in Port Moresby or Canberra who had any understanding of what 
was going on. 
Because most of the discontent was underground, it is very hard to say what the 
company could have done to avoid the closure. Maybe it could have foreseen 
the problems or maybe there was something which it could have done, but I 
don't know what. 
The government is probably hopeful that the mine will be rehabilitated, but I 
don't know how it is going to because there is a lot of money involved and 
nobody is being very bright about where it is coming from. The equipment has 
sustained considerable damage. We have not been able to get people in there to 
check up on the situation. No mining company would be very interested at this 
point I should think. 
When the Bougainville Crisis erupted, many people blamed the mine. But I 
think the mine was a catalyst for the trouble, not the cause. If the mine had not 
been there, it may not have happened or it may have happened at a future time. 
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INTERVIEW TWO 
Location: Adelaide, Australia. 
Duration: 2 hours. 
This man managed the Panguna mine during the early period of its operation, 
and remained closely involved with the venture for many years through various 
executive roles in the parent company. 
Interview Transcript 
We had an ideal operation which ran very satisfactorily for the best part of 18 
years, and when you take into account the political situation before we started, 
the fact that [PNG] got to independence in 1975 and that we went so well for 14 
years after independence was because of good management practices. And I 
should say that all the credit for the success of Bougainville should go to Frank 
Espie. He was the king of Bougainville; the person with the ideas - a man who 
was ahead of his time in terms of trying to find out the way to do things in a 
foreign and undeveloped society. He is a very modest individual and he 
probably [would not] confess to the credit he is due. It was because of Frank's 
thoroughness in the way he went into the background of Bougainville that 
things went so well for so long. I feel very sorry for Frank that the whole thing 
blew up. 
Compared to the Australian and PNG governments, the company went to no 
end of trouble to recruit international experts in all areas in order to get the best 
advice possible as to how to go about creating an operation of this magnitude in 
such a region with a minimum impact on the local people; and wherever 
possible, with benefit to the local people. But, it is impossible to develop 
anything of this size in a place like Bougainville without it having some negative 
impact on the community. The governments did very little in the development of 
Bougainville. They relied only on their internal people to look into various 
aspects, but none of them went to any great deal of trouble - if any at all - to go 
outside their own public service in order to get answers to some of the 
problems. Bearing in mind that Australia did not have a lot of experience in this 
area, and PNG had less. 
Frank Espie travelled the world in great detail and spent a lot of time talking to 
people who were involved in mining operations in Africa in particular to find 
out from them what had gone wrong in the past and what they would do 
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differently if starting up from scratch again. It was only very shortly before 
Bougainville's commencement that Zambia had nationalised their copper mines. 
Prior to that the mines had been run by two major companies, but in the mid 60s 
Zambia wanted more money and decided the way to get more money was to 
acquire bigger interest in the mines. And so, with the agreement of the 
companies, they acquired 51 % but the companies still ran the mines. The 
Zambian government did not have any money, so it paid for their share of 
equity with the dividends they received in the future. The upshot being, all the 
money they were being paid in dividends they were paying back to the 
companies, so they were getting even less money than they were before. 
Eventually, the government thought the only way to do better was to acquire 
even more equity and they nationalised the mine and kicked the companies out. 
Instead of things improving, having disposed of the expatriate management, 
things went from bad to worse. On top of that, the agriculture which was run by 
white Rhodesians was taken over and run by locals, and farm produce dropped 
dramatically. Agriculture turned from being an export to an import. Then the 
mine had to support the starving people by buying food. By the 70s, the mine 
was shut and the copper remained in the ground. There were plenty of other 
similar stories from Africa. This is the sort of thing that Frank Espie tried to 
learn from to make sure it did not happen in Bougainville. Frank recruited a 
couple anthropologists - one from Fiji and one from Harvard - and they were 
very helpful in advising us on how to go about developing the area with 
minimum impact on the local people. 
Frank Espie was advised to recruit training experts to train the local people 
because it was pointed out that if we waited on the local education system we 
would wait forever to get people who were sufficiently skilled to run the mine. 
Frank believed it was essential to have as high a proportion of Papua New 
Guineans working in the mine as was possible. The government did not 
stipulate the expatriate-national ratio; Frank did it voluntarily because he 
maintained he was not interested in having an agreement which was satisfactory 
to the Australian government. He wanted an agreement which would be 
satisfactory to the first independent PNG government. And I think he 
succeeded; it was a fair and reasonable agreement. 
The unfortunate part about the procedures of starting up was that in the period 
between the agreement and the start up which was 4 years, was that the price of 
copper went through the roof. And so the first full year of operation showed an 
enormous profit - a greater figure than anyone ever imagined. This upset the 
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Papua New Guineans who maintained that we kne\N that this was going to 
happen, and we had taken them for a ride. So they immediately started re-
negotiating the agreement, and hence the less favourable 1974 agreement. These 
talks started in 1972 and in order to prepare for a re-negotiation, myself and 
another executive were sent to Africa to visit a number of government 
operations in order seek advice as to what we should do about the PNG 
government's demands. That way we could stand on our dignity and say this is 
an agreement which was approved by government and if you don't like it, it 
could go to an international court of law for arbitration. We visited Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Ghana; in every case they said we had no alternative 
but to agree to a new agreement because internationally it would look bad if we 
did not. 
There is no question that the preliminary work that was put into anthropological 
research and training was first class. The workforce at Panguna was very good. 
Technically, the operation with the high local labour content of about 80% was 
as good as I've seen anywhere in the world. The Papua New Guineans and 
Bougainvilleans made excellent operators and excellent tradesmen. In every 
way, costwise, safetywise and in every way, our operation was better than any 
of the other CRA operations in Australia. This was mainly due to the efforts that 
went into training. In fact, it was so successful that CRA introduced the same 
training procedure into its Australian operations. One of the penalties of the 
shutdown on Bougainville is that there is no longer any organised training or 
apprentice training in PNG because other companies who are there have not 
done anything about training. So you can see that training was another area in 
which Bougainville Copper was a leader. 
We made some mistakes. The biggest error we made \Vas to think that we, as a 
company, were there for the benefit of all Papua Ne 'W Guinea. For instance, 
people in Australia can understand that the benefits of operations in Australia 
should be shared equally between all Australians, and this is done through the 
distribution of wealth by the central government. Our agreement was with the 
PNG government, and we saw Port Moresby as our chief area of control and 
they were the people who made the laws for the coun t:ry. And so whatever we 
did, we had to do it with their approval. If we had their approval, then it was 
legally acceptable and correct and we were able to do it. This was a mistake 
because nobody in PNG considers themselves as a Papua New Guinean. The 
country's biggest problem is its fragmentation. It has over 700 different 
languages (not dialects), and each language group Ii ves independently. Each 
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group 1s only concerned in its own interests and region. There 1s little 
communication between groups. 
This fragmentation causes obvious problems for those who are elected to 
government. They are elected solely to look after their own particular language 
group and because there are 100 members of parliament and 700 different 
languages, each member is representing on average 7 nations almost. Of those 7 
nations which they represent, they are only interested in one, and that is their 
own language group. So their group gets priority and the other 6 get ignored. 
Thus at every election, there is almost 100% turnover of politicians because 6 
out of 7 constituents are opposed to him. Knowing that he will only be there for 
5 years, each member tries to fill his pockets as high as he can and do as much 
as he can for his language group. He has no interest in doing anything for his 
electorate or in doing anything for the country as a whole. You can see that the 
nation has tremendous problems, and they are getting worse every year. Now 
we were not aware of this when we went to PNG. We wanted to be a model 
citizen and we made sure that what we did was to the benefit of the country as a 
whole. And so everything that we did was with that in mind. 
Our negotiations were with the central government, which was right and proper. 
But at the negotiating table, not one Bougainvillean was present and as a result, 
the Bougainvilleans had no say in either the original agreement of 1967 or the 
renegotiated agreement in 1974. Now having said that, the company h.ad a 
Bougainvillean on our side of the table representing the company; he was one of 
our directors. But the government had nobody there representing the Provincial 
Government, and had there been anybody there for the Provincial Government 
it probably would have been the District Commissioner - and he was an 
Australian anyhow. So that would not have benefited the situation at all. So 
there was nobody there representing the Bougainvillean issues, and then when 
we drew up our program of the workforce, our objective was to recruit the best 
people we could from the whole of the country. We saw that because we were 
located on Bougainville, there should be a higher proportion of Bougainvilleans 
than anyone else and as a result of that we had about 40% Bougainvilleans. 
But the result of having 40% Bougainvilleans meant that there was 60% non-
Bougainvilleans. Although we thought that was a fair distribution across the 
country, the Bougainvilleans wanted 100% Bougainvilleans - no Papua New 
Guineans. We at no stage considered that because it was not possible to find the 
standard of people necessary if we confined recruitment to Bougainville. There 
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is a copper mine on Misima Island which started after we did. They agreed that 
they would recruit only local people and if they weren't available from Misima, 
they would recruit people from overseas. This was acceptable to the people of 
Misima because, like Bougainvilleans, they would rather have foreigners than 
other PNG races. So it is not only Bougainvilleans who have this problem. I'm 
sure that if the mine ever started up again, it would be on the basis that the only 
nationals there would be Bougainvilleans. These were our fundamental 
mistakes: we did not insist on Bougainvilleans participating in the negotiations 
and we tried to help the employment situation in the entire country. The same 
mistake was made in relation to the [Bougainville Copper] Foundation. We set 
up the Foundation as our donation arm of the company, and the objective was 
that we provided donations to the country as a whole. This was not acceptable 
to the Bougainvilleans. 
The government's motivation in excluding the Bougainvilleans [from the 1967 
and 1974 negotiations], I believe, was that they wanted to maintain control over 
who got what out of the agreement. I'm sure that the PNG government were not 
prepared to give the Bougainvilleans more than they already had. If you look at 
it from the point of view of the central government, they maintained that the 
standard of living on Bougainville was already higher than anywhere else in the 
country. They had a better hospital, better schools, better roads, better 
everything than the rest of the country - particularly the highlands. They had 
enough problems in the highlands, and they maintained that they could not 
afford to give any more money to Bougainville because they needed every dollar 
they could get out of the company to go to the highlands. So they refused to 
give the Bougainvilleans any more. I'm sure the government did not appreciate 
the depth of feeling among the Bougainvilleans about this stance. 
The 1974 Agreement was not, in retrospect, all that unreasonable from both 
sides although we thought it was pretty rough at the time. The terms were fairly 
similar to other like projects around the world. But it was only reasonable if 
both sides performed what they were supposed to perform, and this is where 
the government fell down. The government was supposed to provide very good 
facilities on Bougainville (education, health, law and order, etc), but they did 
not do it. And in each case, because these things were vital to the future of the 
company's operation, the company was forced to spend the money necessary to 
assist in providing those facilities. So we had to_ hire our own security group to 
assist the police, we had to build our own hospital, we had to supplement the 
education budget so the government could afford to pay the teachers, and so 
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forth. This was unsatisfactory, and I'm sure the government felt that if the 
Bougainvilleans needed things badly enough, the company would make sure 
they got it. But the company really could not afford to be spending any more 
money than it already was on the local people; it was unreasonable to expect the 
company and its shareholders to foot the bill for everything the people wanted 
when it was the government's job. There had to be a limit. We bent things as far 
as we could to help the locals but if we had have realised things were going to 
blow up the way they did, we would have pressured the government more. So I 
guess you could say one of the other things we did wrong is that we did not 
thump the table hard enough in terms of insisting that the government provide 
the Bougainvilleans with a bigger slice of the action, or that they sit down with 
the Bougainvilleans and renegotiate the agreement between themselves so they 
satisfied the Bougainvilleans on what should happen. 
When we arrived in 1964, the Bougainvilleans thought they were very isolated 
and rejected by Port Moresby. They never saw anyone from Port Moresby and 
were left very much to their own devices. They were a forgotten island. And 
even in those days, the population was sufficiently small to be able to provide 
enough food for themselves and they had a good climate. I guess the 
government felt that they did not need any more than they were already getting. 
But they had aspirations about wanting a lot more and, of course, with the 
advent of radio and communication, the Bougainvilleans got some idea of what 
was going on in the outside world and I suppose they reckoned they needed 
more than they had. This was not unreasonable. 
Concerning compensation to the landowners, there was a regular renegotiation 
of the terms on a regular basis, and the chairman of that negotiating team was 
one of the members of the Provincial Government, Mel Togolo; he was also a 
director of the company. He had been negotiating with the people of the area in 
1986, and they agreed with the terms and conditions of our operations. Another 
thing that needs to be recognised is that the people who created all the trouble 
and started the rebellion were not the people who were representing the villagers 
and who had been negotiating with us. We were negotiating with the men who 
were considered. the heads of the villages - the relationship between them and 
the company was good, and we had reached agreement on compensation and 
the like. But the people who created all the trouble were the next generation, and 
they were not a recognised group; they had not been elected to any position and 
they were being ignored by their elders and the company. The company felt that 
the people that they should be dealing with were the elders who represented the 
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community. In fact, Ona had two problems; one was that he was a second 
generation, and the other was that he was married to a non-Bougainvillean. 
Being a matrilineal society, land ownership is passed down through the women, 
so compensation was paid to the women or their descendants. As Ona was 
married to a non-Bougainvillean, he was not getting any compensation because 
his wife did not own any land. So this was a cause of discontent as far as he 
was concerned. 
I guess there was one other mistake the company made, and that was that in our 
efforts to localise employment to the highest level possible, we appointed Papua 
New Guineans to senior positions whenever we could. The most senior PNG 
person in BCL was a Bougainvillean who was in charge of Human Resources. 
That covered both employment issues and community [relations], and was 
regarded as a very important area of responsibility. In fact, it was stipulated in 
the early days by Frank Espie that if anybody was to get to the top of BCL, they 
had to have had experience in the HR/community relations area. When the 
organisation was first established, we had a General Manager and three assistant 
GMs reporting to him: production, finance & administration, and 
employment/community relations. Paul Quodling was responsible for finance 
and administration. When the first GM went back to America, I was made GM 
and Quodling took over employment and community relations because it was 
the most important position in the company. When I left, Paul became GM. I 
mention this to emphasise the importance we placed on this position. The 
person who took over from Paul Quodling in charge of employment/community 
relations was a senior technical person who did an excellent job, but he was 
retiring and we were looking for a replacement for him and we thought who 
better than this Bougainvillean. This man was very capable and highly regarded 
and had a very good working relationship with all our senior people. 
In retrospect, that was a big mistake and it was made out of ignorance because 
we figured a Bougainvillean would be the correct person to have there. What we 
did not realise was that this man came from the Siwai in the south of the island 
and not from the Nasioi area where the mine is, and consequently any 
complaints that came to him through the Nasioi group he ignored because he 
had no feeling for them and hated them. Now I have no proof of this, but 
evidence would seem to strongly indicate it. I did not recognise this until after 
the whole thing blew up; I was always aware of the tension between the 
language groups on Bougainville, but I was not aware of the depth of their ill-
feeling. We always thought that the Bougainvilleans were fairly homogeneous 
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in their outlook on life. But it is now obvious that the only thing they agree on is 
the fact that they hate non-Bougainvilleans. But if you isolate the non-
Bougainvilleans, they hate each other almost as much. This is the same across 
the whole island. In fact on one of my later trips there I visited a Roman 
Catholic priest who was living in the Panguna area, and he told me that this 
Bougainvillean executive was not telling management the truth about what was 
going on. He was telling us only what he thought we wanted to hear. 
We all had a good relationship with Father Mornis, especially Paul Quodling. 
But unfortunately, when the crunch came, I think that Father Momis was in a 
position to be able to do more to control the situation than he did. I'm sure [if he 
realised] how bad things would get; I don't think for a minute that he would 
have instigated the trouble that occurred deliberately. But I think that when 
things were getting nasty, if he had appeared on the ground and had a meeting 
to say we need to stop this; let's sit down and talk about this, let's agree that the 
mine should stay closed until we have got everybody on side, that would have 
saved the day. But when it blew up, the Church did nothing. The Bishop did 
nothing, Momis did nothing - and the Church had more influence over the 
Bougainvilleans than anybody else. 
Another mistake we made was not taking the letter [i.e. 'The Bougainville 
Initiative'] more seriously. That should have rung all sorts of alarm bells and 
should have forced us to sit down with Father Momis to.get to the bottom of the 
problem. One of the things I have learned about people in general and Papua 
New Guineans in particular, is that you cannot talk too much or listen too much. 
You need to talk and talk and talk and listen to what is really worrying them. We 
were more content to keep the operation running at maximum output rather than 
worrying about the feelings behind this letter. In retrospect, keeping the mine 
running meant absolutely nothing; if we had shut the operation down the day we 
got the letter and left it shut for 6 months while we talked and did nothing else, 
it would have been a hell of a lot better than what has happened over the past 10 
years. So instead of writing this one page reply which said this is not possible 
(thus taking a Western-style approach), we should have gone to every length to 
get to the bottom of it. I must emphasise that our response was agreed to by 
everybody - it was not a Paul Quodling only response. 
That situation was even more so when the letter arrived from Pepetua [Serero] 
asking for 10 billion dollars in compensation. We have since been told that on 
Bougainville, when the men are involved we need to worry, but if the women 
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are involved you have a major problem. The fact that a woman wrote the letter is 
something that we should have reacted to immediately - although she had no 
authority, she was a senior woman in the Guava village. The sum was so huge 
that we thought it was a bit of a joke. In fact, after Pepetua's letter, Joseph 
Kabui [Premier of the Province] spoke to Don Carruthers [BCL chairman] and 
said "I hear you knocked back that request for 10 billion". Don said "Yes, we 
did. It was outrageous" And Joseph said "Well, there must be some figure that 
the company would consider for compensation. How about 5 million?" Now 
the difference between 10 billion and 5 million is like chalk and cheese. Don 
told Kabui that it was ridiculous to be talking of such figures. Even then, if we 
had got everybody together to try to get the bottom of it all, it might have 
helped. It may not have, but it might have. 
This is the problem we had. Everybody who made demands on us - Momis, 
Kabui, Serero and a couple of others - they weren't the recognised body 
representing the landowners. They were some offshoot. And we were advised 
by even Kabui at that stage that they were not the main players and we should 
ignore them. So we did, but this was the wrong thing to do. When it reached 
the stage of blasting the first power pylon, we flew from Melbourne to hold a 
meeting with the [PNG] Prime Minister because we thought it was so serious. 
We needed to express our concern and to insist that a delegation from the 
Parliament goes to Bougainville and talks to them. We told Namaliu that this 
was serious and we've got to get dialogue going; he agreed this was a good 
idea. But it was just before Christmas, and he obviously thought it was not a 
good idea to hurry into action before Christmas, so he did nothing. A month 
later things got infinitely worse. 
So I think every time something happened, we should have sat down and 
talked. Even up to the time they stole the explosives and blew down the power 
pole and burnt the director's cottage, I don't think the situation was beyond 
recovery. I think all the rebels were doing at that stage was demonstrating their 
frustration and saying "Listen to us". But what the company did and the 
government did was to take a Western attitude that these people were breaking 
the law and they have to be taken in hand. When the first pylon was exploded, 
the company should have shut down and started talks. We did not do that. What 
we did was to show them how good we were from an engineering .point of view 
by getting the pole up again and power on in about 16 hours. Then they blew 
the next one down. Looking back, that was a ridiculous thing to do. And we 
were all guilty of this; not just one executive. We were mainly interested in 
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keeping things going and normal. It was as though there were two parts of the 
company; one responsible for keeping operations going, and one responsible 
for communicating with the community and the government. 
The central government was hopeless throughout the whole affair. They did 
virtually nothing. Of course, when the whole thing blew up, they had to find a 
scapegoat and who better to blame than the company? The whole country ended 
up blaming Bougainville Copper for the situation, even the other mining 
operations - Porgira, Ok Tedi, you name it. The government was happy to say 
that the Bougainville Crisis was all our fault. Somare, and Chan, with whom 
we had had very good relationships over the years, blamed us almost entirely 
for the trouble. They refused to accept any of the responsibility for themselves. 
Namaliu was PM when the mine closed, he was kicked out and Wingti came in 
and he achieved nothing and then Chan came in. Chan's opening remarks to the 
parliament were that he was going to fix the Bougainville situation during his 
term. He attempted to do this, but became frustrated by the difficulties he struck 
trying to get the [Bougainvillean] people to agree to anything. So he escalated 
the armed conflict, and reintroduced sanctions on imports. He also organised 
the 'Sandline' mercenaries to clean up the situation and this was a disaster. 
Somare did try to help, even though he was no longer the PM. He flew into the 
rebel held area at a time when the rebels had captured some army personnel in 
retaliation for army killings and the Bougainvilleans were pretty upset about it. 
His aim was to get them to agree to terms for releasing the army people; he came 
away empty handed. 
Lafitte was Father Mom.is' speech writer. He wrote the 'Bougainville Initiative' 
for Momis and that started the whole mess. He would not have been interested 
in talking to you Graeme, because he would not be interested in getting to the 
truth in relation to Bougainville. I think it is interesting that he did not return 
your calls. He's bad news; I don't know what his agenda is and why he is so 
biased143 • 
There were two areas of environmental damage, which everybody would have 
preferred not to have happened. The construction of the road on the east coast, 
143 This remark was in response to a question from the interviewer concerning the 
activities of Gabriel Lafitte. Over the years, Lafitte had written several scathing 
attacks on the mine and its management, and was involved in the Bougainville 
rebellion through his association with Fr. Momis. The researcher was anxious to 
interview Lafitte in order to obtain an alternative perspective, but all attempts of 
contact were ignored. Refer to Chapter 8 and Appendix K. 
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which was a massive undertaking and a great engineering triumph, required the 
sidecasting of huge tonnages of material which inevitably found its way into the 
Pinei River which ran to the coast. That was unavoidable, and it was 
unfortunate because a lot of p~ople relied on the fish in that river. We paid them 
compensation, but money does not really compensate for those things. Of 
course, after the sidecasting was complete and the road was working, the 
vegetation took over and the river returned to normal; so it only lasted a few 
years. But it was a real eyesore to start with. 
The real damage was the disposal of tailings into Empress Augusta Bay on the 
other side of the Crown Prince Range. Again, this was an eyesore, and it led us 
to build the pipeline. That was being done when the rebellion started. Again in 
retrospect, we should have started the pipeline earlier. Bougainville is very steep 
on the east coast, and on the west coast it flattens out from the range over 30 or 
40 kilometres. Because it is so flat, it is very swampy and thus uninhabitable. 
When we took out the mining lease we had an area which was maybe 200-300 
metres wide and it was our objective to keep the tailings within that area. But 
that meant that there was quite a build up of material because of the gradual fall 
and so the river moved out over a large area. The solids then killed any 
vegetation that was there. This was not a problem because there were no 
gardens there because of the swamps, but a factor we did not know at the 
beginning was it prevented communication between the two sides of the river. 
People used to walk across the river in the course of their activities which was 
difficult enough when it was just a river, but once it became a swamp full of 
dirty mud it was impassable. This was an unforeseen difficulty. 
It is hard to say if we could have handled [the disposal of tailings] differently. 
The reason the government agreed to us putting the material in the river to take it 
out to sea was that conventional tailings dams could not be built. There were no 
natural structures there to support a dam because it was so flat and swampy. It 
could have been done by building up walls around an area and filling it; that is 
satisfactory because the water can used again by pumping it back to the 
concentrator. But because of the tonnage we were treating, we would have had 
to either build that over an extremely large area (kilometres in distance), or build 
it up very high. The large area option would have damaged a huge amount of 
land. If we had a small area high wall dam, because of the high rainfall it would 
never have dried out properly and because of the frequent earth tremors, the 
whole thing may have collapsed. If that happened, there would be this 
enormous tonnage of material spreading uncontrolled over a vast area probably 
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killing people. It was too dangerous to have dams. We took advice that 80% of 
the tailings would flow to the sea, but that did not happen; hence the very large 
build up and the advent of the pipeline. It was certainly an unsightly mess, there 
is no question of that. In terms of the area affected compared with the island, it 
was very small. The PNG government made no environmental demands on the 
company at all. All such initiatives were taken by the company. Port Moresby 
did not care what happened to the island so long as the government got the 
money. 
INTERVIEW THREE 
Location: Brisbane, Australia. 
Duration: Various sessions over a 2 day period. 
This respondent was a senior manager for CRA/BCL on Bougainville for most 
of the mine's life. Due to the extended period of his tenure, he was an integral 
figure in virtually every phase of the Panguna operation. His long involvement 
with, and affection for, the Bougainvillean people provides an intimate 
understanding of their customs, and empathy with their perspectives of the mine 
and its impact on their lives. 
Interview Transcript 
I think it is appropriate to recognise that the human relations aspect of the 
Bougainville operation was by far the most significant single side of 
management responsibilities, because of its social limitations and because it was 
an offshore operation. By human relations, I don't mean just the workforce, I 
mean the entire population of the island. It was always a very significant part of 
the management goal. 
The digging of the dirt and the shovelling of concentrate was fairly simple. You 
can go and hire many characters and good engineers who are good at that sort of 
thing. And they are essential. You can leave them alone to do their job. But 
from a management point of view, you must concentrate on the community, the 
political, the workforce and those types of aspects. I would never try to tell 
anybody how to drive a ... haul truck; but I could find someone who did know. 
You, as a researcher, are really doing a human relations or human resources 
study in taking on the management of an operation such as Bougainville. 
The environmental impact was not all that bad. Visually, it could be construed 
as being bad because there was a lot of [material] poured down into that swamp 
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area. You can't grind thousands of tons of dirt a day without leaving a bit of 
rubble, but there was no toxic environmental involvement as you do have in 
other operations such as cyanide in gold processing and that sort of thing. You 
could say it was good, clean dirt. But it was dirt, and it was ugly and it was 
different, and it did impact on some Bougainvilleans. 
I always thought that the problem that we were unable to address satisfactorily 
was the fact that of all the money we were paying out in compensation, the poor 
[people] that were really hurt did not get the lion's share of it. And that was a 
factor of where the mine was, how the operation needed to be set up, the 
population structure, and so forth. It's no good blaming anybody because that's 
the way it was. But, if you look at the people who were getting their back yard 
dug up, particularly the Guava people, to them we were putting [an extremely] 
big hole in their land; they were obviously a bit put out about that. We were 
paying compensation to all these people down the river who were living in the 
swampy areas because we were filling in the swamps with the tailings. And if 
you look at the areas, the problem had always been that compensation for use of 
land was calculated on area and it never took recognition of the fact that the 
areas had different productivity and that different productivity related to different 
populations. Therefore we were taking the Panguna area (the Special Mining 
Lease) and were dividing it amongst thousands of people. We were taking a 
much bigger area for tailings and multiplying it by the same factor per hectare 
and dividing it by a tenth of the population because that area would not support 
a subsistence economy, because it was a swamp. Therefore, you have 
immediately created an inequity and the real problem comes with relativity; it is 
not how much, or an appreciation of a certain figure, but when you see your 
mate with three trucks and you've only got one, you say "Why him?" 
[This approach to compensation] was wrong, I knew it was wrong, and the 
company.knew it was wrong. And we aggressively tried to address that with a 
distinct lack of satisfaction because nobody could ever digest that as it had been 
inherited from the initial mining legislation which was antiquated and based on 
Australian law. The government could never recognise that in a subsistence 
economy, area and population was a factor that used a different divisor. So we 
did try to address that in the renegotiations. In the 1980s, we managed to bring 
in another factor, and that was compensation for the people who were actually 
affected - as against compensation for people who could get on with their 
normal lifestyle. The government refused to recognise this problem, and we 
were never able to get them to address it. 
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When the agreement was revised in 1974, it was written in that the agreement 
would be renegotiated - or looked at - every seven years. In 1981, we told the 
government very loud and clear that [the compensation issue] is a problem 
which we believe is not being recognised. You ask yourself "What was the 
[PNG] government?" The government was a few politicians who are not there 
long enough to understand the issues and a bunch of 'wet behind the ears' 
advisers who hold senior positions in a developing country. There was no 
consistency. We did not have the long-term public servant that we have in 
Australia where you can talk to, say, the Department of Mines and talk to some 
rational being and expect to be talking to the same person in 12 months time. 
There were some quite rational beings there and we had good relationships with 
them but, in broad terms, it was impossible to get those sorts of issues thought 
about and addressed because they were too hard. From the National Govern-
ment's point of view, Bougainville was their big 'milch cow' and they did not 
want to 'rock the boat'. I think the National Government failed to appreciate that 
the Bougainvilleans were getting [agitated] and the Bougainvilleans seem to get 
[agitated] in a cycle. That came up in the 1960s and the 1970s; it appears to 
come and go. 
It is not hard to understand why the Bougainvilleans got agitated; until the mine 
started, they were treated like people from the boondocks. They were virtually 
ignored, and then the 'big men' from Port Moresby began to arrive, and they 
never liked Port Moresby. The Bougainvilleans would gladly cut each others' 
throats based on language differences, but the only thing that combines the 
Bougainvilleans is their hatred of the 'redskins'. To see the 'redskins' getting 
most of the money generated by the mine really gave them a reason for hate. But 
there was nothing they could do about it; they could not attack them because of 
the ocean between them. But here is the operation which is supplying the 
'redskins' with money and creating that injustice, therefore, if we attack that, 
we are doing our best to rectify that injustice. That was the fundamental behind 
a lot of Bougainvillean thinking. 
Reports that the Bougainvilleans' motivation for destroying the operation was 
not the mine, the company, or the management, rather they were trying to harm 
the government and the mine was a tangible target is only half right. It is easy to 
step into the trap of lumping together the Bougainvilleans; they are very 
individualistic people. There was not one single motivating force - there were 
many undercurrents. It depends on your perspective. If you were a Guava 
villager standing up on a hill looking at somebody digging a [huge] hole in your 
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land and the fellow on the next hill is getting more compensation than you per 
capita, that is an inequity. If you were living on the outskirts of the mining area, 
and you are not participating in any compensation, you look at the man over the 
back fence and say "He's getting compensation, what about me?" If you are the 
Provincial Government, you say "We're the local government, so why is Port 
Moresby getting all this money and we are getting this measly bit of flow on". 
The attack on the mine, in my mind, was not a completely anti-company 
exercise. It partly sprang from the festering, the 'Bougainville Initiative', and 
Father Momis convincing the people that they were going to be in for the big 
bonanza. Momis then went back to Port Moresby and did nothing. 
Father Momis did not even answer [our] letter when [we] said "... let's do 
something about this problem" [Quodling's letter in response to the 
Bougainville Initiative]. I said to Momis "Let's get the [problem] fixed. We 
know that there are problems and I'm quite happy to address them. But I'm not 
going to address them by tying some impractical solution that is not going to be 
approved by the government or the company". 
Then you've got other people there who are looking around and they are 
frustrated for some reason. They see all the tailings in the river and someone has 
got cancer and they ask "What's causing it?". The answer is ''That bloody mine, 
she did not have cancer last year". It got to the point where anything that 
changed was blamed on the mine. 
Look, overall, the people were upset with the National Government rather than 
the mine specifically. The mine was really seen as a benefactor, but not by all. 
Gone were the days when everyone clapped with glee because the mine was 
there, but most people valued its input to the island. In fairness however, you 
have to look at it from the National Government's perspective. Here is one of 
the provinces that is relatively rich because the mine is paying fees, royalties, 
and so on. 
The costs and taxes imposed by Port Moresby were hefty, but broadly in line 
with imposts paid by most mines around the world. I think it is fair to say that 
the commissions which were negotiated in 1967 by the Australian Adrriin-
istration were done in good faith as they saw it at the time because they were 
looking towards a later PNG independence date and getting the mine in 
operation by giving CRA incentives to commit. It was not really clear as to 
whether Panguna was a viable operation a that stage. As it turned out, it was a 
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very profitable operation for the first couple of years. But it is unfair to say that 
the mine took advantage of a naive, pre-independence administration or to say 
that a pre-independence administration gave too much away. In the context of 
how it was seen at the time, the agreement was realistic from all viewpoints. 
One of the problems was the way the agreement worked out with that tax 
holiday - we came in on the first couple years of self-government with a huge 
income and no tax liability. Now in hindsight, that was unfortunate timing 
because the copper price went through the roof. If the copper price had stayed at 
around what was used in the feasibility study, we would have had a nice, steady 
income, a few tax free years, [could have] paid back the loans, start paying tax 
and everyone is happy. But in fact the mine started, and the newly self-
governing country was inundated by people saying the tax holiday was unfair. 
And, it can be seen that it was unfair given the unforeseen circumstances. But 
those who accused the mine of deliberate rake-offs were not right. 
The National Government commissioned international advisers on the tax issue, 
and they were tarred with the one brush that said multinational miners are liars 
and cheats. But that is not so. The Government was being advised about the 
1974 Agreement by academics out of Sussex, and academics have a pretty 
blinkered view. So do missionaries. These two are about the worst enemies of 
any good progressive mining operation. In that, I believe there was an element 
of over-correction in the 1974 agreement and the resource tax was a bit too 
high. But of course, the National Government kept the lion's share of this 
impost. 
I keep [claiming] that there was no single issue in the mine's closure. One of the 
other problems was that there was a strong Catholic community. The father-
hood was largely coming out of the U.S., and one particular priest was very 
anti-mining. He was brought up in the coal mining areas of Pennsylvania and he 
had a chip on his shoulder like a log. He preached to the people that what was in 
the land belongs to the people. Against that, the government was based on 
Australian principles that what's on the land belongs to the people and what's in 
the land belongs to the government. So the Bougainvilleans got a contradiction 
of advice - you've got Jesus on one side telling the poor [people] that it's their 
copper and someone is [stealing] it, and the government on the other side saying 
the copper is ours. I must point out that the clergy were terribly influential on 
Bougainville and the Church was never happy about the mine. We tried hard 
with the Church, we really did. It was difficult. The Church was entitled to give 
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the people the benefits of their view, and most of the priests believed they were 
doing their best for their flock. 
But you look at these poor [Bougainvilleans] and what they've been through. 
They've had Japanese invasion, they've had Australian administration, they've 
been up and down for 100 years. These people are smart and they refused to 
accept all the people coming and going and pushing and shoving, and then they 
got hit with the mine as well. The mine just added to the confusion. Look, the 
Bougainvilleans grievances were genuine, but they had too many people telling 
them different things. 
You have got to understand also the value of land to these people. Their whole 
culture hinges around their land. We can go down the street and buy land; it is 
not so on Bougainville. Nobody has the right to give land away. That's another 
factor which came into the equation. The Bougainvillean priorities and thought 
processes were directed by what they saw as being a great injustice and a 
change of lifestyle. So, even if the hole in their backyard was not as big as it 
was, and if the river was not polluted, trouble was always a possibility. 
There was no doubt of speculation in my mind that relativity of benefit was 
insufficient for those particular people who had their land disturbed. I tried very 
hard to balance that, but it was difficult because if you just revalue it, the next 
fellow is there and the relativity remains fairly constant. We were slowly 
working on changing the relativity; it was a slow process and it wasn't able to 
move fast enough to meet the aspirations of the people. And I doubt if the 
compensation would have ever met those aspirations because it is difficult in 
any society if you've got 100 and they want 200 (whether it's cabbages or gold 
coins). The answer did not lie in absolute amounts, but in relativities. 
As our ability to mine lower grade ore economically increased, the size of the 
ore body increased automatically. [As a result], we built a sorting plant, we 
commissioned an in-pit conveyor system, and we increased the capacity of 
some trucks. The disposal pipeline was started also because that was becoming 
a chafing factor in that while the river was carrying the tailings away, the silt 
was expanding further out and building up. The river did not carry as much 
tailings out to sea as was initially proposed. We were also looking at using the 
tailings outflow for hydro power. All these improvements allowed us to make 
the original pit bigger. Not by large dimensions in diameter, but because of the 
nature of the animal a fairly small change in the diameter means a large volume 
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of material. So we could mine economically those grades of material that had 
previously been classified as waste. So the 900 million tons original estimate 
was extended. Bearing in mind that the price was all over the place, so what is 
economic anyhow? This is another problem. As long as the company stayed 
within the lower quartile of world mining costs, it could come out in front. 
Now, the decision to expand the pit resulted in an increased level of activity 
which was apparent to the people looking at the mine. This led to a further 
impression that [the company] was are not going to pack up and [leave] like it 
said it would, it was digging more holes in our land. And they were absolutely 
correct. I have no idea how much that was an influence in their discontent, but I 
believe it was definitely a contributing factor. So the new technology, the 
pipeline and the growing pit were seen as a conscious decision to go on rather 
than to pack up. I'm not saying that people thought we were going to pack up; 
I'm not saying that anyone sat down and said 900 million tons was the estimate 
and they've got 850 million so they are off next week; I don't think that ever 
happened. But in the eyes of some, and only some, it was getting bigger. 
Here's these [foreigners] we have been putting up with for 20 years and now 
they are making the mine bigger; they are going to swallow us up. This increase 
in the complex commenced about 1986-87. 
The ecological concerns are difficult to judge. There was no scientific basis for 
many of the claims about dying bats or deteriorating medical conditions of the 
locals, but these issues were real and the mine was there. We were dealing with 
people where there is a cross-section, particularly with the influence of the cargo 
cult, who survive on rumour, gossip and innuendo, and these things tended to 
get out of hand. The issues would not stand up to analysis, but they were a 
substantial force to try and deal with. 
So, we had the expansion going on in 1986-87, there was an election coming 
up in 1987, and Lafitte was stirring the pot with Father Momis. [Momis] was 
standing for government and the Bougainville issue was a real vote winner. No 
doubt about it. At the same time, the leadership, or the 'big-man' philosophy in 
the villages was changing. The young [men] were challenging the older ones, 
particularly their previous decisions about the mine. One aspect is that there is 
no structural long-term leadership, the other problem was that there was a social 
change that was breaking down the traditional leadership of the society. Further, 
the cash economy was growing, there were differing ideas about land usage, 
and there was an explosion in mobility (once if you wanted to go to the coast, 
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you walked; now you hop into your brand new Nissan and you're there in half 
an hour). Education was improving but there were not enough facilities for 
people to move up into senior education, so there was a partially educated, 
younger generation who questioned traditional values. They had a totally 
different perspective on life, but the elders were still administering the 'cookie-
jar' and they resented this. It was rumoured that some of the elders were 
murdered when they resisted take-overs by the young. 
There was a rapidly increasing population because health care stopped nature 
killing them off and people kept migrating from mainland PNG. So you had this 
increasing number of young mobile people in a society that had a limit on the 
amount it could sustain with an essentially subsistence economy. 
All these things led to the unrest. You cannot say that the mine was not 
responsible for the whole catastrophe on Bougainville because if there was no 
mine, there would have been no argument about who got what. Before the mine 
people were happy as they were because they did not know any different. The 
mine is undoubtedly the cause, but there.was nothing that could have been done 
a lot differently other than not open the mine. Once the decision was made to 
start the mine, the die was cast. But it could have been a lot better if PNG had 
done more for the Bougainvillean people. 
Another point is, it may have been better if the company could have taken a 
bigger role in looking after the Bougainville people. But the government did not 
want a little elite. They did not want the situation which happened in Zambia 
where a mine set up and looked after the locals but everybody outside the lease 
got few benefits at all. So the company was under great pressure not to increase 
the standard of our housing or facilities. Maybe in hindsight we should have 
said to the government "bugger you, we are going to look after these people 
anyhow". It was not a cost factor. The administration was trying to help the 
whole country with the proceeds of the mine, but the Bougainvilleans could not 
get away from the fact that they were being neglected and PNG was being 
developed with their money. 
The company tried to point out to the national govemmerit that these issues 
needed to be addressed. I have to rely on my memory here, as most of the 
documents were lost during the evacuation. Twice we went to the government. 
The first time (about 1981) we spoke of the problems which the locals perceived 
- among them was definitely the relativities issue. More meetings in 1988 
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showed some promise. I drafted a letter to the national government stating the 
issues we wanted to address; principal among them was the aspirations of the 
Bougainvilleans. I devised an action plan for greater local benefits, but it fell on 
deaf ears because when Father Mom.is got back into parliament did not appear to 
be interested in his electorate. But I cannot say that he neglected the people; I 
think he was sincere in his aim to help all PNG. 
Regardless of the outcomes of the present peace talks, Bougainville will remain 
separate from PNG and divided within itself. For thousands of years, they have 
been a separate and distinct race. On Bougainville before the mine, people who 
lived in one place did not know the people who lived in the next place. 20 
kilometres away, the people have completely different languages, processes for 
life, and cultures. It is only in the last 50 years that they have been welded to 
this massive nation called PNG. To force Bougainvillians to become married to 
PNG [would eventually cause] animosity. Sooner or later the Bougainvilleans 
were going to tell PNG that they did not want to be part of that country. I 
believe the mine sped that process up. Before the mine, PNG was 'out of site 
and out of mind', but they got a bit of money from the PNG government. 
It is hard to say exactly how the mine accelerated the separatist move, but 
perhaps it gave them concrete issues to want to be separate. They saw issues 
like the land being changed, money flowing to the national government with 
only a small return to the island, and the changing of their culture. The cultural 
changes were broad; they saw people going off to work in the mine, and they 
saw people earning massive incomes compared to previous village life. 
Originally, they did not need an income. 
I was mentioning earlier the inevitability of the revolt. Colin Filer argued in one 
paper that deals made with one generation of landowners would be repudiated 
by the next generation regardless of the nature of the deal that is originally 
negotiated. Furthermore, the authority of the leaders in these communities may 
very well be undermined by the very fact that they were party to some previous 
agreement. This is only his opinion, but I think his opinion is relevant. What he 
wrote is not a great discovery; no matter what the culture, the new generation 
wants to change things established by the old generation. 
One thing I would like to add is that the Bougainvilleans were not part of the 
initial decision to open that mine. They were represented insofar as they had a 
member in the national government in Paul Lapun, but the landowner _himself 
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was not there in the traditional Melanesian way of sitting there chewing the Betel 
nut and talking it over for 25 days plus until finally consensus came out. 
Someone else - outside their society - said "you people can come into 
Bougainville and dig up the land". 
Ken Phillips, the original geologist, was ahead of his time. He was more than a 
chipper of rocks; he was a very good social thinker and he made the point at the 
time that some Bougainvilleans were happy about the prospect of the mine and 
some were not. He saw the problem that the decision to mine was not being 
made in the Melanesian way of 'yes we all agree that this is a great thing'. And 
it could not be that way because we did not know what the mine was going to 
be; this is one of the great difficulties in exploration. In the past, companies 
have opened mines by making stupid promises and walk out when it fails; this 
upsets everybody. We did not do this - we were honest and told them we did 
not really know what the mine would be like. But then people said "if you don't 
know, who the hell does know". Our only reply could be "we don't know 
what's there yet". Therefore you have the landowners whose [land] was going 
to be dug up and a company who did not know how much it needed to dig. 
The hospital when we went there had a dirt floor. It was a shed. The surgeon 
operated on a wooden bench. There was a bowl of body parts (spleens, I think) 
sitting in the theatre. Bougainville was not at the top of the list in the 
Administration. In fairness, you have to ask yourself whether the Australian 
Administration did a good job. I personally think that, under the circumstances 
with which they were presented, some of those early Australians did a 
marvellous job in developing a very mixed and divided society. Most of them 
were good men who had the interests of the Bougainvilleans (and PNG as a 
whole) at heart. The people on the ground had difficulties being heard in 
Canberra, however. The Australian government was remote from the realities of 
what was happening. You certainly cannot blame the Australian administration 
directly for the problems. The mining legislation was antiquated but they had to 
live with it; they tried to have it changed because they saw problems in 
transporting it as it was and that a different approach was needed in PNG. But 
you are looking at a very few number of people with a big range of 
responsibilities and a very small budget trying to be heard in Canberra. 
The best summary of the Bougainvillean outlook was given me by a local. He 
said "I've figured out you Westerners. You are born, you have a couple of 
years and go off to school for 15 years, then you go into the workforce all your 
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life, then you spend the last years of your life sitting under a tree doing nothing. 
Yet, we are born and all our life we sit under a tree and do nothing, and you 
have the bloody hide to call yourselves civilised". 
What did the company not do right? Probably the biggest issue was a failure to 
recognise the inevitability of what happened. Had we have seen this, we might 
have done things a bit better. We had 20 years of reasonable stability, and did 
not see the importance of the few people that occasionally threw stones at us. 
We missed the fact that the younger people would not accept what the older 
generation had agreed to. There is probably a timing factor as well. There was a 
change in the management. I had been there right through, and a few other [long 
serving managers] were being repatriated. There was no longer someone who 
they could talk to, who they knew. This is not a criticism of those who followed 
me. Maybe we should have prepared the locals more for these company 
changes. 
The inevitability of the revolt was not seen, but what we would have done had 
we have recognised it, I'm not too sure. There was an undercurrent of new 
generation upsurge. It was seen by some that the mine was expanding rather 
than contracting. The animosity between the provincial and the national 
government was escalating rather than diminishing. With all these factors 
running around, those who wanted change saw this as an opportunity to get in 
there and make their presence felt. 
I think you need to question the Bougainvillean need for development. They 
were poor by our standards, but they were not deprived. The mine brought 
them benefits which a lot of them enjoyed, but they really did not need them. 
PNG wanted a commercial economy inore than these islanders. Their lives had 
gone on a long time without materialism; perhaps they were better off without it. 
They were not living in poverty like many places in Africa where mines were 
developed. They were not poor. Their health, food and lifestyle was OK before 
the mine. The friction between the tribes was there, but seldom manifested itself 
because they did not have the facility or mobility to wage war on each other or 
anybody else. The infrastructure changed this; they could get to one another 
more easily and fighting became more prevalent. This was not a big problem 
though, because their sense of being Bougainvillean was increasing. They were 
developing a common identity amongst themselves. Many Buins for example, 
continued to dislike the Bukas, Guavans etc., and vice versa, but they are all 
united in a greater dislike for the 'redskins'. Their new mobility gave them 
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exposure to other tribes and they did not like each other, but they also gained 
exposure to outsiders and they liked them less. 
The mine attracted to Bougainvillea large number of 'redskins', a lot of whom 
were not employable. A man would come from the PNG highlands, get a job at 
the mine and send his money home. Then 20 more would arrive in search of 
money, or simply a radio and a wristwatch. These characters settled in satellite 
communities and the Bougainvilleans did not like them. The Bougainvilleans are 
generally placid, but when they are stirred up they are pretty fierce, and they 
would attack these Niuginians; the highlanders were scared of them. There were 
peaks of discontent and nobody addressed that problem. Continually, 
management would ask the government" ... why don't you stop the flow of all 
these unemployables across the sea because they are disrupting everybody. 
They are making the communities unhappy. They are not getting jobs, so they 
are unhappy as well". But the government in its wisdom said it could not limit 
the movement of its citizens. Again, the mine was responsible. If there was no 
mine, these [people] would not have been coming to Bougainville. 
Now, it is OK to say that each Bougainvillean group did not like each other, but 
remember that the PNG tribes who came to the island also hated each other. 
This added another dimension. 
As soon as the Bougainvillean Initiative letter came out, it generated a problem. 
It generated in the minds of the people aspirations of all these goodies coming to 
them. I recognised that there had to be a venue to get this opened up, and the 
venue was the seven year review in 1988. I was not directly involved in the 
management by then, but I did some work on the side and I wrote a paper for 
Bob Cornelius recommending the way I thought BCL should be handling the 
discussions. These recommendations hinged around having greater involvement 
of the local people and greater benefits for them from the mine's presence. Now 
that never really got off the ground. Whether we could have got that going, I 
could not comment. I am pretty clear as to what we should have done, however. 
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INTERVIEW FOUR 
Location: Brisbane, Australia. 
Duration: Comments offered during the course of interview three. 
This brief contribution was made by an Australian who was raised on 
Bougainville. Her Bougainvillean husband held a senior position in the Panguna 
mine. Due to her immersion in the Bougainvillean culture, her participation in 
this research was arranged voluntarily by one of the above respondents, as he 
believed she could bring a non-management perspective to the study. 
Interview Transcript 
It seems to me the key thing is that the mine may have been able to do things 
differently but what happened would have happened sooner or later. It may 
have happened sooner if the mine had not been so well managed, it may have 
happened later if they had done an even better job. Ultimately, the mine's 
closure was inevitable. Having grown up on Bougainville, I could see that the 
people wanted a change. The mine did not help; it was something else to 
aggravate the situation. They had this mine and all the money was going over to 
the PNG government and they were not getting much back. 
Other issues were seen as the changes to the land. There were people whose 
soul was tied to the land and then all of a sudden there was another generation 
who does not have any tie to the land because there is no land to be tied to - that 
completely changed the culture. In all these issues the mine contributed to parts 
of them, but what they did to ease the pain was to attack the mine. Eventually, 
the situation would have blown up anyway. It may have taken another 150 
·years, or 50 years, but sooner or later, I believe that the Bougainvilleans want to 
be a separate group of people. They do not see themselves a Papua New 
Guineans, they consider themselves more Solomon Islanders. 
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